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Abstract 
In general, cut elimination holds for arithmetical systems with the w -rule, but not 
for systems with ordinary induction. Hence in the latter, there is the problem 
of generalisation, since arbitrary formulae can be cut in. This makes automatic 
theorem -proving very difficult. An important technique for investigating deriv- 
ability in formal systems of arithmetic has been to embed such systems into semi- 
formal systems with the w -rule. This thesis describes the implementation of such 
a system. Moreover, an important application is presented in the form of a new 
method of generalisation by means of "guiding proofs" in the stronger system, 
which sometimes succeeds in producing proofs in the original system when other 
methods fail. 
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"Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore, there is no idea, or con- 
ception of any thing we call infinite. No man can have in his mind 
an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infi- 
nite time, infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is 
infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and 
bounds of the thing named; having no conception of the thing, but of 
our own inability." 
Thomas Hobbes 
Normally, proofs considered in theorem -proving are finite; however, there is a 
reasonable notion of infinite proof involving the w -rule, which infers the universal 
application of a proposition from an infinite number of individual cases of that 
proposition. It is the aim of this thesis to exploit this notion within the domain 
of automated theorem -proving. Necessarily, implementational problems as to the 
representation of such an infinite process on a computer must be overcome. 
Recursively defined structures are used both in mathematics and computing, and 
proofs involving such structures show a certain regularity. This regularity enables 
proof by induction: that is a method of proving a proposition P(n), containing an 
arbitrary positive integer n, by showing first that the proposition is true for n = 1 
(or 0) and secondly that for any value n = k, P(k) implies P(k + 1). 
If induction is used, generalisation is often needed also. Generalisation puts a 
proposition into a more general form, of which the original becomes a particular 
case. However, generalisation is a major theorem -proving problem which has not 
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yet been satisfactorily solved because there are no obvious heuristics which work 
in all cases. One possible solution to this problem is to use a stronger inference 
rule in place of induction. If the w -rule is used, the problems associated with 
generalisation may be avoided. However, the w -rule involves the use of infinite 
proofs, and therefore poses a problem as far as implementation is concerned. 
With the goal of automatic derivation of proofs within some formalisation of arith- 
metic in mind, an (implementable) representation for an arithmetical system in- 
cluding the w -rule is proposed and the benefits of such a theorem -proving system 
investigated. In addition, a new method of generalisation by means of "guiding 
proofs" in this system is proposed, which may succeed in producing proofs in 
Peano Arithmetic when other methods fail (in particular, by providing a suitable 
generalisation) . 
This chapter briefly discusses motivation and goals for the thesis and presents a 
short historical introduction to automated theorem proving, followed by discussion 
of the importance of automated theorem proving and generalisation. Finally, an 
outline of the structure of the thesis is provided. 
1.1 Aims 
The w -rule allows inference of VxP(x) from the infinite sequence of propositions 
P(0), P(s(0)), P(s(s(0))), etc. The goals of the thesis are to implement the w -rule 
and demonstrate the practical use in a theorem -proving context of the resulting 
system. This involves the presentation of an implementable version of the w- 
rule, together with a formal description and investigation of properties of the 
corresponding arithmetical system. The implementational system will be seen to 
be useful both as a proof environment and as a guide to generalisation in the more 
usual formalisation of arithmetic. 
2 
1.2 Automated Theorem -Proving 
This section provides a brief historical introduction to and discusses the impor- 
tance of automated theorem proving. 
Logic lies at the heart of artificial intelligence, since it is central to reasoning, and 
consists of much that is algorithmic in nature. As is revealed from the discussion 
in Section 2.1, whatever philosophical standpoint is taken, formal mathematical 
proofs still operate in terms of their own symbols, and so form an especially suitable 
domain for computation. As a result, theorem -proving has been a successful sub- 
ject of early artificial intelligence research and implementation. Once computers 
became available, initial inefficient symbol- crunching approaches were improved by 
normalisation procedures (Gilmore, 1970), and by further refinement of standard 
procedures in the form of resolution (Robinson, 1965). In addition to the develop- 
ment of such uniform procedures, systems like PRESS (Bundy & Welham, 1981) 
and the Boyer -Moore theorem -prover NQTHM (Boyer & Moore, 1988) were devel- 
oped with the aim of guiding proofs using various heuristics. Further developments 
in automated theorem proving, including advances in such high -level tactical rea- 
soning (for example by HOL (Gordon. 1988), LCF (Gordon et al, 1979) and CLAM 
(Bundy et al, 1990)) are considered in Section 3.2. 
Since actual human reasoning may be rather naïve, the view has been put forward, 
for example by Marvin Minsky and Roger Schank, that artificial intelligence should 
not be concerned with logic, and that automatic theorem -provers are not intelligent 
(Minsky, 1963). However, this is a matter of opinion: Hayes counteracts that logic 
is "the most successful precise language ever developed to express human thought 
and inference" (Hayes, 1977). 
In any case, there is strong evidence for the usefulness of automated theorem - 
proving, for it is extremely important both from a practical and a theoretical 
point of view. On the practical side, both program synthesis and program verifi- 
cation (Constable et al, 1985), and hardware synthesis and hardware verification 
(Gordon, 1988; Basin, 1991) have arisen. In addition, theorem -provers provide 
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tools for mathematicians (and scientists generally), both as automatic theorem 
provers or proof environments. One application of the latter is for tutoring sys- 
tems, which help students learn various aspects of mathematics.' 
Theorem -proving has applications in problem solving, generally; many types of 
problem may be encoded by mathematics - for example, the STRIPS system 
reasons about change by theorem -proving methods (Pikes et al, 1971). The meth- 
ods used are not necessarily those used by humans: there is a distinction between 
so- called weak artificial intelligence, which tries to simulate intelligent behaviour, 
without insisting that the process is analogous to an actual psychological process 
of some existent being, as opposed to strong artificial intelligence. The work in 
this thesis falls between the two camps: in particular, the (computable) method 
for calculating generalisations suggested in Chapter 8 would not be one normally 
used by a human; but on the other hand it exploits general patterns in the high - 
level structure of the proof in a manner which may be explained in terms of human 
reasoning (as opposed to some specialised technical process occurring deep within 
the code) . 
On the theoretical side, automatic theorem -provers may simulate mathematicians. 
There are various alternative approaches within mathematical theorem -proving, 
one of which is to create an `artificial mathematician', in other words to recreate 
either the process or just the end result of actually doing mathematics. This in- 
volves detection of general patterns of proof, and provision of maximum possible 
automation of proofs. However, many implementations have chosen a less ambi- 
tious aim of producing an interactive system in order to suggest ideas to the user, 
to allow description and manipulation of proofs and also to automate trivial steps 
which would be tedious to do by hand. As mentioned above, other systems are 
designed with the tutoring of logic in mind; these may analyse mistakes, suggest 
analogies and help the user to learn various methods of proof. My work falls into 
the first category; the goal is to enable automation of proofs, rather than the pro- 
'For example, (Twidale, 1989). A review of various tutoring systems is described in 
(Goldson et al, 1992). 
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vision of a proof environment or a tutoring system. A selection of related systems 
will be considered in Section 3.2. 
Moreover, there are other benefits which are obtained from attempts at theorem - 
proving in the form of new programming languages such as Prolog (and indeed the 
whole field of logic programming; see for example (Hogger, 1984)). The advantages 
of having a formal basis for program development, compared with the approach of 
testing programs (which cannot be relied upon to establish either the correctness 
of a correct program or the incorrectness of an incorrect program) is summed up 
in a quotation attributed to Edsger Dijkstra (Buxton & Randell, 1969): 
"Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never 
to show their absence." 
The acceptance of this argument entails that it is necessary to address the prob- 
lems of actually carrying out formal reasoning and thus the need for automated 
reasoning systems. 
Next, an important (and problematic) notion within theorem -proving, which is 
central to the issues described in this thesis, is introduced, namely that of gener- 
alisation. 
1.3 Generalisation 
Generalisation may be defined as a proof step which allows the postulation of a new 
theorem as a substitute for the current goal, from which the latter follows easily. 
It is important that the original should follow fairly directly, in order to ensure 
that the generalisation would be closely related to the original expression rather 
than just being a random lemma. As shall be further discussed in Section 2.7, 
generalisation is a powerful tool with a variety of rôles. These include defining 
new concepts by extension or the recombination of existing ones (which has a 
parallel with abstraction); turning proofs for a specific example into ones valid for 
a number of examples; allowing proofs (for in some systems, namely for which cut 
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elimination does not hold, certain theorems are only provable using generalisation); 
and producing clearer proofs (by the use of lemmata). 
From an abstract point of view, there seem to be only a few ways of generalisation. 
One obvious method is the generalisation of a formula by replacing a constant with 
a variable. In addition, predicates and classes tend to come in families with mem- 
bers which may be more or less general (eg. feline and carnivore have a relationship 
from the more specific to the more general). This is known as ISA- hierarchy gen- 
eralisation (see for example (Fahlman, 1979)).2 Furthermore, there is numerical 
generalisation, such as from x = 3 to x E [2, 5] . Other forms of generalisation 
include the addition of disjuncts to a condition, and universalisation, which is the 
process of converting lists of specific formulae to quantified combinations: for ex- 
ample, one might wish to generalise P(xi), Q(xi), P(x2), Q(x2), ..., P(x,,), Q(x,i) 
etc. to Vx P(x) AQ(x). An alternative approach is of considering generalisation as 
the inversion of sound inference rules; this will be discussed further in Section 3.1. 
Van der Waerden's account of how the proof of Baudet's conjecture was found 
(der Waerden, 1971) illustrates how generalisation lies at the heart of mathemat- 
ical discovery, and how, surprisingly, generalised theorems may be easier to prove 
than the original goal. This is because the induction hypothesis is also made 
stronger when the goal is strengthened by generalisation. Generalisation may en- 
able the completion of the proof, but one of the inherent dangers is that a method 
to construct generalised conjectures may suggest non -theorems. 
Although generalisation is an important problem in theorem -proving, it has by 
no means been solved. It is important and still being investigated for reasons 
which have to do with cut elimination and the lack of heuristics for providing cut 
formulae respectively, for in sequent calculus the generalisation step is achieved 
by use of the cut rule. A cut elimination theorem for a system states that every 
proof in that system may be replaced by one which does not involve use of the cut 
2Note that generalisation may take place from individuals to classes of which they 
are members, or alternatively from subclasses to classes. 
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rule3. Uniform proof search methods can be used for logical systems, in sequent 
calculus form, where the cut rule is not used. In general, cut elimination holds for 
arithmetical systems with the w -rule, but not for systems with ordinary induction. 
Hence in the latter, there is the problem of generalisation, since arbitrary formulae 
can be cut in. This makes automatic theorem -proving very difficult, especially as 
there is no easy or fail -safe method of generating the required cut formula. An 
important technique for investigating derivability in formal systems of arithmetic 
has been to embed such systems into semi -formal systems with the w -rule. This 
thesis presents a new approach to the problems of generalisation by means of 
"guiding proofs" in the stronger system, which sometimes succeeds in producing 
proofs in the original system when other methods fail. This method has been 
partially automated and results in the suggestion of an appropriate cut formula. 
Further discussion of generalisation is given in Section 3.1 (when various different 
types of generalisation are illustrated by means of examples) and Section 11.3 (in 
which there is a comparison of various generalisation methods). 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. 
Chapter 2 raises issues related to the notion of infinite proofs and provides 
motivation for the work in the thesis. After examination of the philosophical 
idea of infinite proofs in Section 2.1, in the context of discussing possible 
constructive restrictions on the w -rule, a historical introduction to the w -rule 
is given and the importance of cut elimination is highlighted. In Section 2.4 
Gödel encoding is mentioned as a prelude to discussion in Chapter 4. Next, 
in Section 2.5 various w -rules are introduced and compared, followed by a 
brief discussion of another method of providing infinite proofs, namely by 
3See Section 2.3. 
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infinitary logics. Finally, in Section 2.7 various motivations for consideration 
of arithmetical systems with the w -rule are given. 
Chapter 3 first discusses an analogous method of generalisation for natural 
deduction systems and classifies various different types of generalisation, and 
then describes inductive theorem proving systems and presents the notions of 
inductive learning, explanation -based generalisation and primitive recursion 
over abstract datatypes, all of which are related to and provide background 
information for the work described in later chapters. 
Chapter 4 presents a description of first order arithmetic with the w -rule 
by extending a given system of Peano Arithmetic and discusses both the 
need for and possible methods of restricting such a rule. In addition, the 
chosen approach for restriction of the w -rule is detailed. In order to carry 
out this approach without using encoding, a new notion of effectiveness must 
be defined. 
Chapter 5 defines such a notion over arbitrary datatypes, and shows that 
it is the effective prooftrees of a described arithmetical representation using 
the w -rule which provide the required restriction. 
Chapter 6 presents an implemented version of such a system, which involves 
the application of rewrite rules, and relates this to the theoretical system 
described. 
Chapter 7 discusses the claim that various propositions not provable in the 
system of Peano Arithmetic without the cut rule are provable using the 
restricted w -rule, and discusses the strength of the extended system. 
The next two chapters deal with an application of this work in the field of 
generalisation. Chapter 8 presents a new method of generalisation by means 
of which proofs in the extended system may automatically guide proofs in 
Peano Arithmetic. The amenability of extension of this method to other 
domains is shown in Section 8.2. The methods of using explanation -based 
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generalisation and linearisation on the individual subproofs of the w -rule, 
such that a cut formula is suggested upon which induction may be per- 
formed, are expounded in Sections 8.1.4 and 8.4. Chapter 9 extends this 
generalisation method to other examples which are less clear, in a more 
speculative manner. 
Chapter 10 describes the implementation of my system (including genera- 
tion of individual proofs, forming general proofs, showing correctness of the 
general proof, and the application of rewrite rules), a system in which the 
general proofs may be displayed and investigated, and also the implementa- 
tion of the generalisation method (namely the provision of a cut formula via 
explanation -based generalisation methods) for arithmetic. 
Chapter 11 presents related work such as reflection, proof transformation and 
other generalisation approaches, and then moves on to give a comparison of 
the generalisation method suggested with these other approaches. 
Finally, in Chapter 12, suggestions for further work are provided and an 
assessment of the contributions of the thesis is made. 
The appendices relate to: a description of sequent calculus (Appendix A); 
the provision of useful commands in the Seldon system (Appendix B); a 
summary of various relevant proofs with respect to three of the main list 
generalisation examples (Appendix C); a transcript of the system NQTHM, 
which relates to an example considered in Subsection 11.4.1 (Appendix D); 
details of the implemented system (Appendix E), including transcripts illus- 
trating the automatic generation of proofs and provision (including checking 
for correctness) of the general proof (Appendix E.4) plus the automatic pro- 
vision of cut formulae via the explanation -based generalisation method for 




"This infinite is potential, never actual: the number of parts that can 
be taken always surpasses any assigned number. But this number is 
not separable from the process of bisection, and its infinity is not a 
permanent actuality but consists in a process of coming to be, like time 
and the number of time." 
Aristotle 
This chapter provides the context and motivation for the topics which shall be 
raised in further chapters. In Section 2.1 the nature of mathematical reasoning 
is examined in order to clarify the notion of what is meant by an infinite proof. 
In so doing the nature of the w -rule is clarified, since it generates infinite proof 
obligations. Section 2.2 presents a description of the historical development of 
the w -rule. In Section 2.3 background issues, which involve the importance of the 
cut rule within automated deduction, are presented, in order to facilitate compre- 
hension of later chapters and highlight the importance of cut elimination. The 
cut -elimination theorem is an important proof -theoretic result, which is especially 
suitable for automation. Such an implementation has been carried out for the 
case of predicate calculus, and is discussed in Subsection 2.3.5. Gödel encoding is 
discussed in Section 2.4 as a prelude to discussion in Chapter 4 of the usual ap- 
proach to placing restrictions on the w -rule. Section 2.5 introduces and compares 
a variety of w- rules, and in particular the constructive w -rule, and assesses the rôle 
of these rules within deduction. Another method of provision of infinite proofs, 
namely infinitary logic, is considered in Section 2.6. Motivation for the work in 
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the thesis is given in Section 2.7, and in particular Subsection 2.7.1 outlines the 
use of the constructive w -rule within automated reasoning, as an introduction to 
further details provided in the following chapters. Finally, conclusions are given. 
2.1 Notions of Infinite Proof 
Since the w -rule has infinitely many hypotheses, the nature of the resulting (in- 
finite) proof should be considered. In Chapters 4 and 5 the extension of the 
arithmetical systems HA or PA (presented in Section 4.1) with a restricted form 
of the w -rule will be considered as a suitable system for implementation. In this 
section, in order to determine how this may be a valid extension, the nature of 
canonical proofs within these systems will be explored. Moreover, various notions 
of proof and of infinite structures, and hence of infinite proofs, are discussed with 
reference to alternative viewpoints within the foundations of mathematics. 
2.1.1 Foundational Theories Regarding Proofs 
After a brief exposition of the nature of logic and a short historical introduction, 
various foundational views regarding proofs will be presented as a prelude to the 
discussion of infinite proofs, and those involving the w -rule in particular, in the 
next subsection. 
Nature of Logic 
Logic may be traced back to Aristotle, who systematised immediate inference and 
syllogisms, and remained a primary reference for the subject until the last century. 
Since then, there have been major developments in a variety of fields including 
the development of the predicate calculus (of which syllogisms form a minor part), 
modal logics, logics of relations, deontic logics, and the formalisation of many other 
systems. Logic is concerned both with the definition of systems and the study of 
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ideas related to valid reasoning, which gives rise to the subfields of formal and 
philosophical logic respectively. 
Formal logic is primarily concerned with axiomatisation of systems. An axiom 
system is a system in which certain expressions are derived in accordance with a 
given set of inference rules from an initial set of expressions called axioms, which 
are taken as given. It is necessary to specify which symbols may be used within the 
system and what combinations of these are to count as expressions which either 
may be axioms, or derived from axioms. These expressions are called formulae, 
and those which may be derived from the axioms are called theorems. The for- 
mation rules are analogous to grammatical rules, and the formulae to meaningful 
sentences. The inference rules define which formulae may be derived from others, 
and so determine what the theorems of the system will be, with relation to the 
axioms. There may be an infinite number of axioms. Important (and desirable) 
properties of such a system include consistency, soundness and completeness.' Sys- 
tems complex enough to axiomatise mathematics turn out to have these properties 
only to a limited extent. Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems state 
that any consistent formal system adequate to axiomatise arithmetic contains at 
least one logical formula which is neither provable nor refutable in the system, 
even though we may be able to see that it is true, and secondly that a system's 
consistency cannot be proved within the system itself (Gödel, 1931). In addition, 
the logical paradoxes discussed in the following section indicate difficulties in the 
construction of systems representing arithmetic. Interest has therefore been shown 
in the consideration of various systems, each with different properties. 
Moreover, since the application of inference rules is (normally) computable, logic 
has provided a suitable domain for the use of computers; other motivations for the 
automation of logic have been discussed in Section 1.2. 
'See Section 2.3 for further details. 
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The Paradoxes 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, both the theory of real numbers (de- 
fined by Dedekind as a cut of the set of rational numbers) and the theory of 
rational numbers and natural numbers were based on set theory, which had been 
introduced some half -century earlier. The axiomatisation of logic, as described in 
the above subsection, led to axiomatic approaches by Frege and Peano to show 
that arithmetic is part of logic and to formalise arithmetic respectively. But at 
the beginning of this century it was noted that some of the most useful notions 
used in set theory give rise to paradoxes. The most famous of these was Rus- 
sell's paradox2; others include the Burali -Forti paradox in the theory of transfinite 
ordinals, and the Richard paradox dealing with the notion of finite definability 
(Kleene, 1962, P35 -39). These paradoxes of set theory are analogous in form to 
the ancient (semantic) "liar" paradox (one formulation of which is "this statement 
is false" ). The paradoxes showed that the concept of class or set as it was then 
being used had not been sufficiently clarified, since it is not possible to suppose in 
the face of them that a class does correspond to any statable condition on classes 
which may be given. Thus Frege was led to remark that the whole foundation 
of mathematics had been undermined. Much of the foundational research of the 
early twentieth -century was directed at problems posed (or thought to be posed) 
by the paradoxes, and three new general viewpoints were seen to emerge: Hilbert's 
approach, intuitionism and logicism. These foundational approaches will be dis- 
cussed, but first platonism and formalism, the existing schools of thought which 
fell under criticism, will be considered. 
Platonism 
Various philosophical stances can be distinguished with regard to the nature of 
mathematics. Platonism is the dominant attitude in the practice of modern math- 
ematics; there is a direct connection between platonism and the law of excluded 
2 "Is the set of all sets that are not members of themselves a member of itself ?" 
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middle3, and the classical version of arithmetic is an example of a system which 
includes this law. Platonists (such as Gödel) believe that numbers, sets, etc. are 
abstract entities, that mathematical objects have an external existence indepen- 
dent of our thought and that the facts concerning them do not depend in any way 
on the possibilities of verification. 
Formalism 
Formalists (as do intuitionists) deny the Platonic view of independent existence 
of mathematical truth. One result of the axiomatisation of a theory, as described 
earlier in this subsection, is that the meaning of the primitive terms become ir- 
relevant to its deductions. Formalists, such as Bourbaki and Curry, carried this 
abstraction from meaning to its limit, and held that mathematics consists of for- 
mal systems whose elements are meaningless symbols, to be operated on by fixed 
rules. Much of the language is replaced by an artificial syntax, and what remains 
is a specification of certain strings of symbols as "axioms" and certain rules, each 
of which allows the inference of a new string from certain previous ones. The 
strings which can be obtained from axioms by successive application of the rules 
are called theorems. 
Logicism 
The logicist approach, carrying on the tradition of Dedekind, Frege and Peano 
and of which Russell was one of the most famous exponents, held that mathe- 
matics should be reduced to logic and that the well -known paradoxes arise due to 
disregarding the types of concepts. Accepting this program involved taking some 
platonist assumptions as intuitively evident. In seeking to reduce arithmetic to 
logic, in part the logicists wanted to show that no appeal to sensible intuition was 
necessary in arithmetic, as had been claimed by John Stuart Mill and Kant. In 
3F- Av -A. 
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order to try to reduce number theory to logic, the notion of a cardinal number was 
defined as the number of some class. Together with Poincaré, Russell thought that 
the cause of the paradoxes lay in the use of impredicative definitions4. Russell's 
solution to the paradox he invented was to use a hierarchy of types; similarly, a 
hierarchy of orders was used to avoid the semantic paradoxes (eg. the liar para- 
dox and Weyl's paradox5) by excluding impredicative definitions. The resulting 
ramified theory of types necessitates postulation of the (contentious) axiom of 
reducibility, which states that any higher -order property or proposition could be 
replaced by some first -order one. Moreover, many terms have different senses for 
each type or order. Although logicists claim to reduce mathematics entirely to 
logic so that mathematical objects can be defined in logical terms via classes, and 
mathematical proofs can be reduced to logical proofs, the approach is generally 
deemed to have failed because, even if part of the essence of mathematics is not to 
do with intuitive understanding, set theory is arguably not part of logic: classes 
are not necessarily logical objects and Russell had to introduce new axioms (of 
infinity and reducibility) which are not part of logic. Even Russell was not entirely 
happy with the introduction of these, saying of the axiom of reducibility in the 
introduction to (Whitehead & Russell, 1925): 
"This axiom has a purely pragmatic justification: it leads to the 
desired results, and to no others (so far as is known). But clearly it is 
not the sort of axiom with which we can rest content." 
Since these introduced axioms are not essential to reasoning, a reduction of arith- 
metic to set theory does little to increase the clarity of the foundations of arith- 
metic. 
4An impredicative definition of an object is one which depends upon a set of which 
the object is a member. 




A further foundational position is represented by intuitionism. The belief that 
mathematics is invented has given rise to a controversial theory known as con- 
structive mathematics, which is motivated by the belief that claims about the 
existence of mathematical objects and the truth of mathematical propositions 
should be judged according to the possibilities of construction of these objects 
and propositions. By "possibilities of construction" is meant "idealised possibil- 
ity of construction", in order to take account of the limitations of human beings' 
abilities, and to cope with the problem of assertions about the infinite. 
The intuitionists, led by L.E.J. Brouwer and Arend Heyting, developed a con- 
structive system of logic which formed a coherent whole, differed from classical 
mathematics, and moreover thought of the mathematician, Brouwer's "creative 
subject ", as being an integral part of the mathematical process. They believed 
that the subject- matter of mathematics is confined to what can be constructed by 
the mind. The name "intuitionism" is due to Brouwer's acceptance of Kant's claim 
that our concept of natural numbers is due to an a priori intuition of temporal 
succession (Bernays, 1983, P264): 
"What Brouwer appeals to is evidence. He claims that the basic 
ideas of intuitionism are given to us in an evident manner by pure 
intuition. In relying on this, he reveals his partial agreement with 
Kant. But whereas for Kant there exists a pure intuition with respect 
to space and time, Brouwer acknowledges only the intuition of time, 
from which, like Kant, he derives the intuition of number" 
Thus, the intuitionists' use of intuition is in the sense derived from Kant, roughly 
meaning perception, and is (Heyting, 1934): 
"nothing other than the faculty of considering separately particular 
concepts and inferences which occur regularly in ordinary thinking." 
According to Heyting, there is for mathematics (Heyting, 1934): 
"no other source than an intuition, which places its concepts and in- 
ferences before our eyes as immediately clear." 
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The philosophical ideas on which intuitionism is based go back at least to Aristo- 
tle's analysis of the notion of infinity as "the open possibility of more" which can 
therefore never be actualised, and his rejection of Plato's views about the absolute 
existence of mathematical entities and the "Complete and the Whole" notion of 
infinity (raetov nalSAou) (Wickstead & Comford, 1929, P206): 
"The infinite turns out to be the contrary of what it is said to be. 
It is not what has nothing outside it that is infinite, but what always 
has something outside it." 
By the nineteenth century constructivist ideas were being clearly expounded by 
Leopold Kronecker, amongst others. However, intuitionism itself is generally ac- 
knowledged to have been founded by the Dutch mathematician Brouwer, who set 
out his ideas in several publications from 1907 onwards (Brouwer, 1964). This is 
in the main because he was the first person to assert a conclusion from which other 
influential contemporary writers with similar ideas, such as Poincaré, shrank: that 
constructivism should require a substantial modification of classical logic and anal- 
ysis. Brouwer went beyond Kronecker's methods by the systematic application of 
forms of abstract reasoning and succeeded in establishing a general intuitionistic 
logic, which has been systematised by Heyting. Although mathematical intuition- 
ism is associated especially with L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Heyting, there are other 
mathematicians with a similar viewpoint: for example, Borel and Lebesgue who 
are known as semi -intuitionists (or the French empiricists), and the constructivist 
Bishop (Bishop, 1967). 
Brouwer's point of view leads immediately to a criticism of the laws of excluded 
middle and of negation. If we assert " -'A ", we are claiming that there is a proof 
of -A (or, as Brouwer says, a construction exists which obtains an absurdity from 
the supposition of a proof of A), which is quite another matter from not having a 
proof of A. As illustrated by Fermat's Last Theorems (or indeed any other as yet 
unsolved problem of mathematics), there does exist an A such that we are not in 
6For all integers n > 2, and all positive integers x, y, z : xn + y"` zn. 
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a position to assert A or -,A, although either may ultimately be assertible. Hence, 
in this rather weak sense the law of excluded middle does not hold. The proof - 
theoretic result is that intuitionist logic accepts part of classical predicate logic 
(in fact it rejects the law of excluded middle, or, equivalently, the law of double 
negation7). In addition, and for the same reasons, the procedure of reductio ad 
absurdum is rejected. So, the intuitionist point of view leads to a distinctive logic 
and also to a distinctive theory of the foundations of analysis. 
Hilbert's Programme 
Another approach to the foundations of mathematics was taken by David Hilbert; 
his programme in the 1920s to prove that any problem that could be given a 
mathematically precise statement could be solved using logic was at the time 
widely viewed as the contemporary challenge facing mathematics. This viewpoint 
is sometimes referred to as formalism, although the designation is misleading, since 
Hilbert never said that platonist mathematics could be simply defined as a "mean- 
ingless" formal system. Hilbert thought that the logical paradoxes showed that 
non -finitary mathematics needed justifying, and the objective of his programme 
was to secure the foundations of Platonist mathematics by a finitary8 analysis of 
classical formal systems. His method was to axiomatise classical mathematics and 
prove the consistency of the resulting formalism by finitary means within meta - 
mathematics (also called proof theory), which is a metatheory in which properties 
of the formal mathematical system are described and studied. He hoped to for- 
malise all of mathematics (or at least, analysis) into a single system, and that the 
consistency of this system could be proved by methods so elementary that no -one 
could question them. 
71- -,A -4 A. 
8Finitism is a method rather than a theory, and is a form of constructivism which 
insists that operations must be done in a finite number of steps with a finite number 
of elements. Strict finitism is an extreme form which insists that constructions must be 
carried out in practice. 
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However, Gödel's incompleteness theorem (Gödel, 1931)9, plus Skolem's theorem 
that it is not possible to characterise the system of natural numbers by a countable 
system of axioms stated in the predicate logic of the first order (Skolem, 1934), 
show that there is a certain limit to the effectiveness of Hilbert's method, and that 
formal logical methods do not allow all arithmetical questions to be answered. 
Indeed, it is not certain that strong enough constructive methods can be found 
even to prove the consistency of classical analysis: in 1963 Kreisel showed that 
intuitionist analysis, with the bar theorem and a strong schema of "generalised 
inductive definitions" included, does not suffice to prove the consistency of classical 
analysis (Kreisel, 1965). 
Work on Hilbert's programme has nonetheless continued, with contributions by 
Ackermann, von Neumann, Skolem, Herbrand, Gödel and Gentzen. However, it 
was necessary to work with formalisms that embody only part of mathematics, 
and proofs which rely on more abstract notions - but nevertheless valuable re- 
sults were achieved. For example, Gödel and Gentzen proved independently (and 
finitistically) that if intuitionistic first -order arithmetic is consistent, then so is 
classical first -order arithmetic. The proofs were based on a method of translating 
classical theories into intuitionist theories cf. (Baker, 1989). Nonetheless, these 
investigations have remained within a relatively restricted domain, and have not 
even enabled a proof of the consistency of the axiomatic theory of integers. 
Further Viewpoints, and the Formalisability of Arithmetic 
Contrasting notions of the nature of arithmetic have already been presented. In 
addition, there has been more modern interest and discussion about its nature, 
such as Penrose's argument that our insight into arithmetic is non -algorithmic 
in nature (Penrose, 1989), or Lakatos' notion of the evolution of mathematics 
9See earlier discussion in this section. Gödel's theorem (incorporating strengthenings 
due to Rosser and Tarski, Motowski and Robinson) shows that, in any consistent ax- 
iomatisable extension of certain finitely axiomatisable subtheories of Peano arithmetic, 
there are propositions of number theory that can neither be proved nor disproved. 
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(Lakatos, 1976). Penrose, amongst others, has argued that it is mathematical 
insight which allows us to see the truth of true but unprovable statements, and 
hence that this notion of mathematical insight cannot be completely captured by 
any algorithm. He writes (Penrose, 1989, P141): 
"When we convince ourselves of the validity of Gödel's theorem we 
not only `see' it, but by so doing we reveal the very non -algorithmic 
nature of the `seeing' process itself . .. Real mathematical truth goes 
beyond mere man -made constructions." 
On the other hand, Dummett holds that provability is not a stable property and 
that indeed mathematics is a subject whose results are liable to revision, since 
individual sentences have meaning (Dummett, 1977, P403):1° 
"The meanings of our mathematical statements are always, to some 
degree, subject to fluctuation." 
It is not appropriate to explore these viewpoints in depth at this stage, but merely 
to note that influential developments of the foundational positions given previously 
have been put forward; Penrose's viewpoint in particular shall be discussed further 
in Section 2.7. 
In this subsection the foundational approaches of logicism, intuitionism and Hilbert's 
approach, together with formalism and platonism have been characterised. Of 
these positions, only intuitionism, the classical (in the sense of platonic) approach 
and the finitary approach are serious contenders as relevant methods to be used for 
clarification of the nature of the w -rule. In the following subsections the notion of 
canonical proofs is discussed, and also various notions of proof, infinite structure 
and infinite proof which have been proposed are presented, in order to gain some 
philosophical insight into the nature of the w -rule. 
2.1.2 Distinctions Relating to the Idea of a Proof 
In this subsection various notions of proof will be considered. 
'0For further details of this discussion, see (Prawitz, 1977). 
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Intuitive Proofs Versus Formal Proofs 
Contrasting with the formalist viewpoint of proofs as uninterpreted linguistic 
structures (ie. unjustified symbols), according to Hilbert's approach it is the case 
that discussion about such a formal system (which takes place within some metathe- 
ory and may indeed itself be considered part of mathematics) must of course be 
meaningful. The platonic view of proofs as interpreted linguistic structures, and 
as meaningful symbols which are an operation serving to test or check the correct- 
ness of an arithmetical calculation, accords with the logicist view that mathematics 
deals with structures in a formal manner, independently of their meanings. These 
viewpoints have in mind the idea of formal proofs, which are proofs in a formal 
system (Kleene, 1962, P83): 
"A (formal) proof is a finite sequence of one or more (occurrences 
of) formulas such that each formula of the sequence is either an axiom 
or an immediate consequence of preceding formulas of the sequence." 
In this sense, the proof of Vx x -4 x will be some derivation in a system, such as: 
axiom 
r F r 
-* -r 
I-r-4r V 
IHdxx -4 x 
On the other hand, the intuitionist position is that proofs are mental: Brouwer 
insisted that proofs are (possibly infinite) mental constructions (Heijenoort, 1967, 
P64): 
"These mental mathematical proofs that in general contain in- 
finitely many terms must not be confused with their linguistic accom- 
paniments, which are finite and necessarily inadequate, hence do not 
belong to mathematics." 
and (Dalen, 1981, P4): 
"... intuitionistic mathematics is an essentially languageless activity 
of the mind". 
Dummett writes (Dummett, 1977) : 
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"Mathematical objects, unlike concrete ones, can be apprehended 
only in thought; hence if they are not regarded as themselves the prod- 
ucts of thought, that can be only because they are viewed as the per- 
manent possibilities of certain mental operations." 
Intuitionism insists that in mathematics we should assert a mathematical state- 
ment only if we either know it by immediate intuition or know how to prove or 
disprove it, using steps known by intuition. A proof known by intuition is just 
one which is evident to the mathematician and an acceptable proof of something's 
existence involves constructing it. Intuitionists do not believe, as formalists do, 
that mathematics is to be found in formal systems, but on the other hand they 
do recognise formalisation as an important tool for mathematical investigation. 
The mental constructions exist in the mind of an idealised mathematician. The 
language of mathematics is an (inadequate) attempt to describe these mental con- 
structions. 
Brouwer's position is that no mathematical proposition is true unless we can in 
some nonmiraculous way know it to be true. True to this notion, any mathematical 
object will exist only if it can be constructed. Hence, whenever a constructive 
proof mentions the existence of an object, it must provide a method of "finding" 
that object. So, proving 2xF(x) means showing how to construct an x such that 
F(x), and proving by3xF(x, y) must involve giving a general method for finding 
x on the basis of y. The logical connectives are interpreted in such a way that a 
disjunction A or B constitutes for the intuitionist an incomplete communication 
of a statement which either says that A holds, or that B holds, or else gives a 
method by which one may choose from A or B one which holds. 
Thus, an intuitive proof is a mental construction giving a justification: it makes 
something evident. This encapsulates a Wittgensteinean approach of "we recognise 
a proof when we see one" (Sundholm, 1983a, P156). It is a primitive notion which 
may be used in giving more complex justifications (for example that the proof of 
A A B is comprised of the pair of the proof of A and the proof of B). Heyting's 
"Interpretation of the Signs" (Heyting, 1956, P96 -7) is such a process, when he 
defines the semantics of the intuitionistic connectives: "p A q can be asserted if 
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and only if both of p and q be asserted" etc., for which a summary may be given 
(Kreisel, 1962b, P201- 202):11 
"As Heyting indicated, one then obtains proof conditions for A ... 
In particular, if A is B o C, where o denotes a logical connective and 
rB and rC determine the sense of B and C, then we obtain rA from rB 
and rC." 
In the above explanations the meaning of a proposition is given by its `proof 
condition' and (as Kreisel stressed in (Kreisel, 1962b)) in some sense proofs are 
evident in that they are recognisable as such. Heyting thought that a mathematical 
proposition is proved by carrying out a certain construction (which must satisfy 
certain properties such as giving a mathematical object). The proof objects are 
in the sense of his definition of proof of p * q in the "Interpretation of the Signs" 
that (Heyting, 1956, P97): 
"The implication p - q can be asserted, if and only if we possess 
a construction r, which, joined to any construction proving p (suppos- 
ing the latter be effected), would automatically effect a construction 
proving q." 
Such functions are proof objects: Heyting considered that there were two primi- 
tives for meaning of the basic logical notions, namely judgement or proof (espe- 
cially of identities), and functions. Pairs of proofs p and functions II of the form 
(p, II) would be defined in the sense that '(po, Ho) establishes A -* B' means that 
po is a proof of12 
[(p, II) establishes A] [Ho(p, H) establishes B] Vp, H 
A possibility introduced later by Curry and Howard is that proofs as mental con- 
structs can be approximated by A -terms whose execution corresponds to some 
11This relates to the field of "compositional semantics" - see for example 
(Gaifman & Shapiro, 1988). 
12However, any such list of formal laws leaves some room for different interpretations 
(Kreisel, 1971, P143). 
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such construction (Howard, 1980). This resulting proof object can be thought of 
as a constructive witness term. Thus, if what might constitute a proof in type 
theory of, say, Vx : U x -+ x (where x : U means that the object x is of type U) 
is considered, for this approach aa.Ab . b will be a proof. Similarly, Kreisel used 
A)' for the relation "construction c proves proposition A" (Sundholm, 1983a, 
P154). Note how Heyting's position (that a mathematical proof is of the form of 
a process of construction carried out to produce a mathematical object, thereby 
proving a proposition) relates to the idea of a proof presented in terms of a function 
generating a well -founded and correct tree of sequents (cf. Chapter 5). 
Sundholm differentiates between a construction as a process of construction (ie. 
making a proof evident), the object obtained as the result of a process of construc- 
tion or the construction -process as an object (Sundholm, 1983a, P164). Brouwer's 
notion of construction is quite different from Heyting's, for Brouwer believed 
that within mathematical activity (processes of) constructions are carried out, 
but when reflection on these happens, the processes may be treated as objects 
(Sundholm, 1983a). 
There is also the notion of proof as the completion of a task to be considered, 
for Heyting considered that mathematical proof is the fulfillment of the intention 
expressed by a mathematical statement. Sundholm shows that this is essentially 
the same as what is known as the Kolmogorov explanation, which states that a 
mathematical statement is to be viewed as the expression of a problem, and so 
the intention expressed by the statement is fulfilled if and only if the problem is 
solved (Sundholm, 1983a). So, with reference to the w -rule: `If every number n has 
the property A(n), then VxA(x) holds', the intuitionist interpretation would be 
that if it is proved that every number n possesses the property A(n), then VxA(x) 
holds, whereas the sense of Kolmogrov's interpretation of intuitionism would be 
the claim that there exists a proof (which would be effectively given) of VxA(x) 
from the given hypothesis. The former is the approach taken with regard to the 
implementation (cf. Chapter 4) and the `general proofs' of Chapter 6 provide the 
justification that every number n has the property A(n). 
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In conclusion, the distinction between formal and intuitive proofs corresponds to 
the differing views of proof given by formalists and intuitionists, both of which 
may be useful. 
Canonical Proofs Versus Demonstrations 
Within the intuitionist position, there is a further differentiation between canon- 
ical as compared with non -canonical proofs. Dummett highlights the distinction 
between constructions which are supposed to constitute proofs of mathematical 
statements (in the sense in which `proof' is used in the intuitive explanations of 
the logical constants mentioned above, which are mental constructions) as opposed 
to so- called `demonstrations' (Dummett, 1977). The primary notion is that of a 
proof in the strict sense, which Dummett calls a canonical proof; the notion of 
demonstration is secondary, and definable in terms of this. A demonstration is 
considered to supply (at least in principle) an effective method of constructing an 
actual proof. The type of explanations provided in textbooks are demonstrations 
rather than canonical proofs. So a demonstration (or non -canonical proof) may 
be thought of in terms of being an indication of how to construct a rigorous (ie. 
canonical) proof - the latter is not actually being carried out, but it would be 
possible to do so. The notion of non -canonical proof may also correspond to the 
metatheory: a metamathematical proof is an intuitive demonstration of the truth 
of a meaningful statement about the formal objects of a theory (Kleene, 1962, 
P85). 
There are several reasons for the canonical versus non -canonical proof distinction. 
First, it avoids circularity in explaining the logical constants; this is necessary in 
defining what counts as a canonical proof of A -+ B, say, where proofs already 
involving modus ponens should be disallowed (at least for those containing A -3 
B as a premise). Arguments involving modus ponens may be valid, but would 
be demonstrations rather than canonical proofs. The same applies for universal 
quantification with regard to universal instantiation, and negation with regard to 
ex falso quodlibet (Dummett, 1975). Heyting wrote about this notion of circularity 
(Heyting, 1934): 
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"It would be circular to apply any philosophical or logical prin- 
ciples as means of proof, since mathematical conceptions are already 
presupposed in the formulation of such principles." 
In the sense that is given to `proof' in the explanations of the logical constants 
given by Heyting's "Interpretation of the Signs" , the informal proof (which might 
contain the line A V B because there is an effective method of obtaining such a 
proof for example) does not actually provide a proof of the disjunctive statement 
- it provides only a method, effective in principle, for finding such a proof. When 
we have to decide whether to accept a given construction as a proof, say of a 
conditional statement A 3 B, we need to judge whether, when applied to an 
arbitrary proof of A, it will yield a proof of B. In so doing, we should consider 
only those possible proofs of A that have a complexity below a certain bound 
determined by the complexity of A, and hence of lower complexity than is required 
for a proof of A -+ B itself. This argument applies to the other logical constants 
in a similar manner. 
Secondly, an important result concerning pure logic obtained in finitist metamath- 
ematics is provided by theorems such as Herbrand's theorem (1931) and Gentzen's 
theorem (1934), to the effect that the proof of a formula of first -order logic can 
be put into a normal form. In such a normal form proof the logical complexity 
of the formulae occurring in the proof is in certain ways limited in relation to the 
complexity of the conclusion; for instance, no formula can contain more nested 
quantifiers than the conclusion, and the cut rule is eliminated (cf. Section 2.3). 
As a consequence, a quantifier -free formula deduced from quantifier -free axioms 
can be proved by propositional logic and substitution. Normalised natural deduc- 
tion proofs provide an exact analogy for what is required of canonical proofs if the 
intuitionistic explanations of the logical constants are to form a system free of con- 
ceptual circularity. It does not follow that this holds for any formalised first -order 
theory - the comparison between canonical proofs and normalised proofs only 
holds in a natural deduction system. Thus, the conversion to canonical proofs 
may be regarded as a verification procedure. More specifically, the deletion of 
elimination rules from a canonical proof suggests a comparison with the notion 
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of a normalised deduction, for normalisability implies that for each logical con- 
stant, the full language is a conservative extension of that obtained by omitting 
the constant from its vocabulary (Dummett, 1975). 
Thirdly, the distinction between a canonical and a non -canonical proof provides 
a constraint on a logic. For example, if elimination rules and introduction rules 
are laid down, one might wish to establish some sense in which the latter preserve 
"soundness". Note that a non -canonical proof does not fix meaning, whereas a 
canonical one does: so, "there exists a canonical proof" may be taken to be the 
intuitionistic analogue of "true ". Dummett writes (Dummett, 1975, P15): 
"We must, therefore, replace the notion of truth, as the central 
notion of the theory of meaning for mathematical statements, by the 
notion of proof: a grasp of the meaning of a statement consists in a 
capacity to recognise a proof of it when one is presented to us, and a 
grasp of the meaning of any expression smaller than a sentence must 
consist in a knowledge of the way in which its presence in a sentence 
contributes to determining what is to count as a proof of that sentence." 
From the intuitionistic viewpoint, arithmetical statements are understood in terms 
of their assertibility, rather than their truth. Does such assertibility relate to the 
existence of a canonical proof or of a demonstration? Dummett claims that a 
statement is assertible provided that we are in fact in possession of (an effective) 
means of obtaining a canonical proof of it, whether or not we are aware of the 
fact (for example, we may not be aware of the fact in the cases of disjunctive 
or existential statements) (Dummett, 1975). So an (indirect) proof of a sentence 
would be a method for obtaining a direct (or canonical) proof, and the meaning 
of the sentence is given by this canonical proof. In other words, the claim is that 
the point of reasoning is to establish something indirectly which in some sense 
could have been established directly. Constraints are needed for how the proof - 
conditions of Heyting's constructive proof -tables (ie. the "Interpretation of the 
Signs ") are to be understood: Heyting's explanation of logical constants roughly 
corresponds to taking the introduction rules as fixing the meaning of the logical 
constants (Heyting, 1956). So, the introduction rules for a constant represent the 
direct or canonical means of establishing the truth of a sentence with the constant 
as principal operator; they are synthesising rules, explaining how a proof of A o B 
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can be formed in terms of the (given) proofs of A and of B. Then, the elimination 
rules are justified by reference to the introduction rules (Dummett, 1991, P252). 
In fact, the idea is to have either the introduction or the elimination rules serving 
as the direct, meaning -giving way of learning the truth, with the other providing 
the indirect means. 
Fourthly, demonstrations are a useful distinction because sometimes one might 
want to regard something as demonstrated due to the existence of an effective 
method for constructing a proof (for example that some huge number either is or 
is not prime) - that is to say that it is possible in some sense to give a proof. 
Finally, this distinction between canonical and non -canonical proofs is intuitively 
plausible. Sundholm considers the statement "I have 7 coins in my pocket"; this 
may be verified by counting or calculating, and is not likely to be verified in a 
wholly formal manner (Sundholm, 1986, P487): 
"In most cases the use of valid inference has very little to do with 
how one would normally set about to verify the truth of something. 
For instance, the claim that I have seven coins in my pocket is best 
established by means of counting them. It would be possible, however, 
to deduce this fact from a number of diverse premises and some axioms 
of arithmetic. ... This would be a hightly indirect way in comparison 
with the straightforward counting process. The utility of logical rea- 
soning lies in that it provides indirect means of learning the truth of 
statements. Thus in order to account for this usefulness it seems that 
there must be a gap between the most direct ways of learning the truth 
and the indirect ways provided by logic. If we now explain meaning 
in terms of proof, it seems that we close this gap. The direct means, 
given directly by the meaning, would coincide, so to speak, with the 
indirect means of reasoning. ... one must not make the identification 
between proof and meaning so tight that logic becomes useless." 
In this subsection a useful distinction between canonical and non -canonical proofs 
has been given, together with motivations for so doing. Canonical proofs are 
rigorous proofs which constitute the meaning of a proof. 
In the case of the w -rule, the w- proofs are the canonical proofs of universally 
quantified statements over the natural numbers, to the effect that, given a natural 
number, a proof is returned of that instance. 
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2.1.3 Notions of Infinite Structure 
This subsection is concerned with investigating the widely differing views held 
about the nature of infinite structures, with a view to next considering infinite 
proofs. 
The classical viewpoint (encompassing Dedekind and Cantor) is of a platonic math- 
ematical structure. Cantor's theory has been called a theory of the actual infinite 
since he is said to have thought of infinite classes as actual or completed. The 
infinite is actual or completed, in the sense that an infinite set is regarded as ex- 
isting as a completed totality, prior to or independently of any human process of 
generation or construction, as though it might be seen in its entirety. So, classi- 
cal mathematics views an infinite process rather as if it were a particularly long 
finite one. Universal propositions are said to have definite truth -values. Clas- 
sical analysis also accepts the totality of subsets of the natural numbers, which 
allows deduction of theorems such as that any real number is either equal to 0 or 
not. Bernays argues that we can regard the totality of sets of natural numbers 
as analogous to the totality of subsets of a finite set. An "arbitrary" subset of 
the natural numbers is fixed by an infinity of independent determinations fixing 
for each natural number whether it belongs to the subset or not (Bernays, 1983, 
P260): 
"In the same way, one views a set of integers as the result of in- 
finitely many independent acts deciding for each number whether it 
should be included or excluded. We add to this the idea of the totality 
of these sets." 
This assumption of the totality of arbitrary subsets of the natural numbers justifies 
impredicative definitions. Weyl proposed to construct analysis on the basis of 
platonism merely with respect to the natural numbers, and managed to reconstruct 
a large part of analysis without using impredicative definitions. 
In a related way, the logicists' postulation of the "axiom of infinity" implies infinite 
totalities, and the existence of the natural number series as a hypothesis about 
the actual world. 
29 
The formalist view of infinite structures is that they cannot exist (within a formal 
theory), in the sense that the objects of interest are finite linguistic structures. 
Hilbert, with his metamathematics, thought that no infinite class may be regarded 
as a completed whole, and that proofs of existence should give at least implicitly 
a method for constructing the object which is being proved to exist. 
The intuitionists' view is that nothing more can be known about infinite structures 
than may be derived from their generating rules. Intuitionists refuse to assume 
that infinite sets exist, although allowing rules which generate ever larger finite 
sets. The infinite is potential or becoming or constructive, rather than actual. The 
natural numbers are regarded as mental constructions, generated in a way which 
may be determined by repeated application of the successor function to O. 
An early challenge to the classicists' view along these lines was by Gauss, 1831 
(Kleene, 1962, P48): 
"I protest ... against the use of an infinite magnitude as something 
completed, which is never permissible in mathematics." 
Principles valid in thinking about finite sets do not necessarily carry over to infinite 
sets (for example that the set of natural numbers contains a greatest member). 
Note also that Brouwer did not accept the law of excluded middle for infinite sets, 
but only for finite ones (see (Kleene, 1962, P47)). 
So, for the intuitionists, an infinite structure should be thought of as something 
which is always in the process of being constructed. In the case of the w -rule, a 
proof of VxA(x) will be a process which is seen to result in a proof of A(n) for 
any number n which is generated (cf. Subsection 2.1.2). To conceive of an infinite 
structure is to understand the (non- terminating) process which generates it. As 
Dummett says (Dummett, 1977, Chapter 3), 
"... all that we can, at any given time, know of the output of 
the process of generation is some finite initial segment of the structure 
being generated. There is no sense in which we can have any conception 
of this structure as a whole save by knowing the process of generation." 
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In other words, each individual member of an infinite sequence may be constructed, 
but there is no construction which contains within itself the whole infinite se- 
quence. 
2.1.4 Views of Infinite Proofs 
I shall now consider the approach of various factions regarding infinite proofs, and 
hence the use of w- rules. In particular, the question of whether infinite proofs are 
mathematical objects in the same sense as finite proofs is considered. 
The formalist view is that proofs about infinite structures may be provided via 
axiomatisation, for the formalisation of an axiomatic system can give rise to an 
infinite system - for example, if all instances of a schema are taken as axioms. 
There must however be a mechanical procedure for deciding whether a given for- 
mula is an axiom and whether a given inference of a formula from finitely many 
premises is correct according to the rules of inference. 
Zermelo, although not an intuitionist, agrees with the intuitionist position that we 
try to understand infinite proofs by approximation via iterations of basic steps, 
rather than as a whole (Zermelo, 1932, P85): 
"The true subject- matter of mathematics is not, as many believe, 
`configurations of symbols', but ideal abstract relations between the 
elements of a conceptually established infinite manifold, and our sys- 
tems of signs are thereby only auxiliary devices, always incomplete 
and changing from case to case, in our attempts to achieve step -wise 
mastery of the infinite, which we cannot immediately and intuitively 
`survey' and `comprehend'." 
The intuitionistic view is that infinite proofs are seen in terms of generating princi- 
ples. For Brouwer's notion of a proof of the w -rule, the appearance of a universally 
quantified statement in a proof (VxA(x)) will just signify our recognition that a 
certain operation when applied to any element of the domain will yield a proof of 
the corresponding instance, that is A(k) in the natural number domain. In the 
fully analysed proof the universal quantification line is essentially left out, and left 
implicit. Dummett writes (Dummett, 1975): 
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and 
"a proof of a universally quantified statement will be an operation 
which, applied to each natural number, will yield a proof of the corre- 
sponding instance; and if this operation is carried out for each natural 
number, we shall have proofs of denumerably many statements. The 
conception of the mental construction which is the fully analysed proof 
as being an infinite structure must, of course, be interpreted in the light 
of the intuitionistic view that all infinity is potential infinity: the men- 
tal construction consists of a grasp of general principles according to 
which any finite segment of the proof could be explicitly constructed. 
... Indeed, it might reasonably be said that the standard intuitionistic 
meanings of the universal and conditional quantifiers involve that a 
proof is such a potentially infinite structure." 
"A proof containing inferences with infinitely many premises ap- 
pears non -constructive only because we try to imagine ourselves as 
completing the infinite process of proving each of the premises individ- 
ually, and then drawing the conclusion, and this, of course, makes no 
constructive sense. But, on the intuitionistic understanding of infinity, 
the only way in which we can draw an inference from infinitely many 
premises is by recognizing that each of these premises can be proved; 
and that, in turn, can be accomplished only by recognizing, of some 
general procedure, that it will yield a proof of each of the premises. 
Thus the only way of understanding the idea of an inference from 
denumerably many premises A(0), A(1) ... which is consistent with a 
constructivist outlook proves to coincide exactly with the intuitionis- 
tic interpretation of an inference from VnA(n). An intuitionistic proof 
involving inferences from universally quantified statements really is, 
therefore, what Brouwer maintains, a representation of a more fully 
analyzed proof containing inferences from infinitely many premises." 
Therefore, an w -rule proof is a canonical proof of an arithmetical universal state- 
ment. Note how the general procedure mentioned above corresponds to the gen- 
erating function gen -p f (which generates individual proofs) given in Chapter 6. 
So, a proof containing inference rules which have infinitely many premises, such 
as the w -rule, cannot be a written proof, but could be a mental construction, or 
from the classical approach, a platonic structure. The proof must however be well - 
founded (so if represented in tree form, every branch must be finite). However, it 
is not necessary that every proposition occurring in the proof should depend on 
only finitely many premises. Indeed, this is the form of the representation of the 
system incorporating the constructive w -rule presented in Chapter 4. Dummett 
32 
summarises the intuitionists' view of infinite proofs as follows (Dummett, 1977, 
P95 -6): 
"At first sight, this appeal to the conception of an infinite, though 
well- founded, proof is contrary to the constructivist spirit. However, 
we must interpret it in accordance with the general intuitionistic doc- 
trine about the nature of infinity: an infinite structure can never be 
regarded as completed; rather, to grasp an infinite structure is to grasp 
a principle whereby any finite segment of it, however large, can be ex- 
plicitly constructed. Looked at in this light, it can hardly be denied 
that an intuitionistic proof supplies a principle for the explicit con- 
struction of any finite segment of its fully analysed version, so long as 
it is understood that the direction of analysis, and thus of construction, 
runs counter to the direction of inference." 
The formal theory of the w- derivations given in Chapters 4 and 5 provides an 
attempt to describe infinite mental structures, generated in a primitive recursive 
way, and analysed as well- founded trees with basic axioms at the leaves. 
2.1.5 Conclusions Regarding Foundational Positions 
For even non -advocates, intuitionism provides a new way of looking at mathemat- 
ics and logic, and a productive challenge to the old order. Moreover, its ideas 
have ramifications for many -valued truth systems, and hence in such diverse fields 
as the philosophy of possible worlds and electronics. Yet classical logic remains 
a useful, well -developed model, in many cases less cumbersome than intuitionist 
logic, and so has not been replaced. From a purely practical point of view, there 
is a place for both systems, each more suitable for certain contexts and having dif- 
fering benefits and disadvantages. By its nature, intuitionist logic produces useful 
algorithms, while classical logic is able to "prove" more sequents and gives more 
concise proofs - complexity of proofs is weighed against the provision of a ready 
algorithm. The most interesting aspects of the intuitionistic approach regarding 
proofs from my point of view are that they should be constructive, and also be 
convincing (in the sense of being correct). The intuitionistic attitude towards 
relevance of intuition in the mathematical process has no practical consequences 
here. 
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In conclusion, the implementation of the constructive w -rule described in Chap- 
ter 4 embodies an intuitionistic approach to the representation of an infinite proof 
system. The classical alternative (the full w -rule) is not suitable for implementa- 
tion. Classical mathematics would not object to the use of a constructive w -rule, 
for some people who object to intuitionism are quite happy with the classical 
restriction to recursive functions. Although the classical viewpoint is not as re- 
stricted as the intuitionistic one, the constructive restriction on infinite proofs does 
make sense. 
So, my position regarding infinite proofs shall be the intuitionistic one in so far 
as I regard the generating process as sufficient to characterise them. This ties in 
well when one attempts to represent such proofs in a finite way, as is necessary 
for the implementation of a system involving infinitary rules such as the w -rule. 
Primitive recursive well- founded trees shall be presented with respect to a gener- 
ating function, namely f, defined in Section 5.3. Note the correspondence between 
the notion of intuitive proofs (as constructions giving objects) and the idea of a 
proof presented in terms of a function generating a well- founded and correct tree 
of sequents, together with the relation between formal proofs and the description 
of the semi -formal system PACW'3 given in Chapter 5. 
In addition, I shall conclude that canonical proofs within PAa provide a notion 
of soundness for this system, in the sense described above. A canonical proof of 
a statement S within the system PA, will be provided by a well- founded and 
correct higher order primitive recursive tree with S as the sequent at its topnode, 
as shall be defined in Chapter 5. As mentioned in the previous subsection, the 
w -rule proof is equivalent to a canonical proof of, and thus provides a meaning for, 
Vn E nat ß(n).14 The implementational representation of general proofs (using 
13PACu, is a representation of arithmetic with a primitive recursively restricted w -rule 
in place of the rule of induction; see Section 4.3 for further details. 
14Note also that the numerals in the hypotheses of the rule are themselves canonical 
representations (of numbers). 
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rewrite rules) is a matter of convenience and clarification, and corresponds to 
`demonstrations'. 
As a side issue, there is a difference of opinion about the shape of constructions 
which prove a universal sentence VxA(x), which is analogous to the preference 
for reflection systems (see Section 11.1) versus w- rules. Kreisel and Troelstra 
advocate that it should be pairs of the form (e, f), where f (n) is a proof of A(n), 
and e proves that f has this property. On the other hand, Dummett, Prawitz and 
Martin -Löf believe that the function f alone is enough (Sundholm, 1978). In my 
representation, I have taken the latter view, and have not included a proof of the 
fact that the function generates a prooftree with A(n) as root. 
2.2 Historical Development of the Omega Rule 
Tarski and Hilbert seem to have both formulated early versions of the w -rule 
independently. Apparently, the earliest proposal of an w -rule was by Tarski 
(Tarski, 1936, P279, note 2), who claimed that he introduced the rule in an "un- 
published talk" to the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society at 
Warsaw in 1927, although the first publication in which this was mentioned is 
(Tarski, 1933) . He calls the rule by the name of "the rule of infinite induction" , 
but it is in fact what we now call the w -rule. However, Hilbert is often credited with 
introducing the rule, which he named "transfinite induction" . In particular, lines 
13 -18 on P491 of (Hilbert, 1930) read as follows: "If it has been demonstrated that 
the formula A(z) is true for every given numeral, then the formula VxA(x) may be 
used as an axiom." The rule was then formulated again (as the rule DC2: VxA(x) 
is a consequence of the collection of formulae A(k)) in (Carnap, 1934, Section 14), 
which led to the w -rule being referred to as "Carnap's rule" in (Rosser, 1937), 
although this naming has not been followed. It seems likely that Carnap did 
formulate the rule independently from both Hilbert and Tarski (Isaacson, 1992, 
P12 -14). Sundholm (Sundholm, 1978, P3) considers Hilbert's rule to be merely a 
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version of the rule of uniform reflection15, with `.`demonstrated" to be interpreted 
in terms of provability, whereas it could instead be regarded as a constructive 
version of the w -rule. In any case, the uniform reflection principle is a sort of 
formalised w -rule, a name under which it was in fact known for some time, such 
as by Kreisel (Kreisel, 1962a) and Feferman (Feferman, 1960). The first pub- 
lished discussion of the formalised w -rule was in (Rosser, 1937, PP134 -5), where 
Kleene is credited with the idea. Turing's work on ordinal logics (Turing, 1939) 
is also highly relevant, and was developed by Feferman to form his work on pro- 
gressions based on reflection principles (Feferman, 1962). Apparently, the name 
"omega- rule" did not occur until about 30 years after the rule was first formulated 
(Sundholm, 1978, P3), with (Grzegorczyk et al, 1958) being the first authors to 
actually use the name "rule -w" . The closely related methods for dealing with 
incomplete systems, namely adding reflection principles or adding restricted w- 
rules,1ó essentially led to the same result: that every true arithmetical sentence 
is provable. Emerging from these various rules, as shall be seen in the following 
sections, one of the most promising options as regards implementation is the con- 
structive w -rule. Informally, this may be described as the following: "If each P(n) 
can be proved in a uniform way (from parameter n), then conclude VnP(n)." 
2.3 The Importance of Cut Elimination 
The cut elimination theorem is an important proof -theoretic result, which may be 
automated. It states that if a sequent F I- A is provable in classical or intuitionistic 
calculus respectively, then one can find a cut -free proof of F I- A in classical or 
intuitionistic calculus respectively. (That is to say that a proof for the same 
sequent may be found, in which the `cut' rule of inference is never used.) The 
15See Section 11.1 
16See Sections 11.1 and 2.5 respectively. 
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following sections provide first theoretical background and then discussion about 
cut elimination within theorem proving, which provides a motivation for my work. 
2.3.1 The Cut Rule 
The cut rule is a very significant rule in the sequent calculus presentation, because 
it is the only way of inserting formulae into the proof which are not subformulael7 
of the current sequent. Several cut rules exist18; probably the most widely used is 
the classical cut rule: 
rHA,. Alf, A1- II 
(2.1) 
r,Wl - A,II 
where r, H, A and [ are arbitrary lists of formulae, and A is an arbitrary formula. 
The left -hand premise is of the generalisation, and the right -hand premise is a 
justification that it is indeed a generalisation, ie. that its addition to the hypotheses 
results in a proof of the original sequent. A is referred to as the cut formula, since 
it is a formula which is "cut in"; it is new in terms of top -down proof search. The 
intuitionistic cut rule which is normally used is: 
rHA A,A1 -C 
r, 0 1- C (2.2) 
The cut rule is important in systems where cut is not a basic rule, such as natural 
deduction systems (for further details see Subsection 3.1.1). In this case it would 
be written as: 
r 
2.3.2 Proof -Theoretic Rôle of Cut Elimination 
Cut elimination theorems are widely regarded by logicians as being extremely im- 
portant. In a general sense, they may be regarded in a way as tests of consistency, 
17Subformulae are defined in a recursive manner, as according to Table 2 -1. 




0 atomic 0 
-1 {sub(0)} u {- } 
0 =one; 
0- b V 9; {sub(0)1U {sub(e)} U {0} 
0 - Vx 0(x) 
0 - 3x Cx) 
{0} U {sub( *(t))} 
for t any term free for x in '0 
Table 2 -1: Subformulae 
for if a cut elimination theorem can be proved for some formalised theory of arith- 
metic, then that theory is consistent.19 Another point which should be mentioned 
is that the cut elimination theorem of a particular system would enable the proof 
of the subformula property, which states that in any proof in that system of the 
sequent F I- A, every formula which occurs in any sequent in the proof must be a 
subformula either of A or of one of the formulae in F.20 The subformula property 
enables a much firmer idea of the nature of the proof of a sequent in that system, 
since we are guaranteed that it is not the type of system where a formula may 
completely disappear from subsequent sequents (using a top -down approach, and 
analogously for bottom -up). 
One particular relevance of the cut elimination theorem for predicate calculus is 
that information may be extracted from proofs. For example, there is the so- called 
existence property, the intuitionistic case of which states that if 
I- 3x1i ... , xnP(x1, ... , xn,), with P quantifier -free, then the normal form of the 
proof yields terms t1, ... , ta such that there is a proof of the statement P(t1, ... , ta). 
This constructive version of Herbrand's Theorem is derived from the Cut Elimi- 
19 " if a cut elimination theorem can be proved for some formalised theory of 
arithmetic, it will follow that only numerical equations can occur in a proof of a numerical 
equation, and hence that there can be no proof of 0 =1; and from this the consistency of 
the theory follows." (Dummett, 1977, P45) 
20Subformulae are defined recursively, as shown in Table 2 -1. 
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nation Theorem. It gives the (perhaps surprising) result that, upon the assertion 
(ie. proof, in intuitionistic terms) of the existence of something with a certain 
property, some object possessing that property will be specified. For classical 
logic, Herbrand's Theorem demonstrates that the provability of a quantifier -free 
formula of predicate calculus is consequent only on the language of the formula. 
In addition, the cut elimination theorem is involved in the proofs of other impor- 
tant theorems, such as Beth's Theorem. This states that if a relation is implicitly 
definable (ie. in terms of itself) then it must also be explicitly definable (ie. only 
with regard to some external parameter). So, for example, in Peano arithmetic, 
< may be defined (implicitly) via the axioms: 
Vxi(x < 0) 
Vxdy(x<Syt+x<y or x =y) 
An explicit definition of < would be, for example, 
x<y 3z(z00Ay =x +z). 
This example is to illustrate the nature of implicit and explicit definitions - in 
fact, cut elimination is not true for arithmetic, hence Beth's Theorem does not 
hold for this system, and so those arithmetic relations definable by implicit and 
explicit means would not necessarily coincide. 
2.3.3 Justification for Use of the Cut Rule 
Why, then, do we have the cut rule? Well, as already mentioned, cut elimination 
does not hold for many systems, such as the usual axiomatisation of arithmetic. 
And although cut elimination is desirable for theorem -proving reasons (as dis- 
cussed in the following subsection), in many cases use of the cut rule may lessen 
the length and obscurity of a proof, thereby making it easier to follow due to more 
"natural" proof steps. Moreover, the rule justifies the use of lemmata. There is 
some discrepancy as to whether a lemma is supposed not to be proved at the stage 
of introduction, as according to the definition given by Proclus (commentary on 
Euclid) that they are useful assumptions which need justification: 
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"When, in either construction or demonstration, we assume any- 
thing which has not been proved but which requires argument, then 
we regard what has been assumed as doubtful in itself and worthy of 
investigation, and call it a lemma" 
or whether lemmata enable repeated use of pre -proved information. Either type 
may be useful: the former for enabling proofs, and the latter for condensing proofs, 
for example. In general, lemmata can clarify and structure proofs, and indeed 
determine the whole shape of a proof, particularly in existence proofs. They are 
particularly useful when proving large theorems, as the same material does not 
have to be proved many times in the same proof, and it is easier to keep track of 
the different levels of proof of the theorem. 
Within proof theory, a lemma is a theorem introduced into a proof by use of the 
cut rule. So, many types of generalisation can be viewed as the use of unproved 
lemmata. As discussed above, lemmata (and hence the cut rule) may be used 
both for reasons of construction (to help search for a proof) and presentation (to 
produce clearer and more efficient proofs). They also allow, via the cut rule, the 
introduction of new terms and definitions, so that the proof is no longer normal. 
This is termed a `proper' use of lemmata, where the non -normal search space will 
extend all of the normal search space and hence will be larger. However, not all 
applications of the cut rule introduce new terms: an `improper' use is when two 
parts of a normal proof are joined, and in this case the proof will not be more 
efficient (apart from the possibility of using the lemma as a shorthand in several 
places), although it might be clearer or more structured. 
Various techniques have been proposed to introduce lemmata into theorem -proving: 
"gazing ", used to introduce explicit definitions by abstracting the search space 
(Plummer & Bundy, 1984); Plaisted's work on abstraction mappings (Plaisted, 1980); 
and Walsh's work on the implementation of abstraction - see for example 
(Giunchiglia & Walsh, 1989). 
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2.3.4 Cut Elimination and Theorem Proving 
Cut elimination theorems are important in theorem proving because they enable 
a restriction of the search space involved when building up a proof. If the cut rule 
were allowed to be used in the proof, random formulae could be cut in, making 
automation of the search for a proof practically impossible. On the other hand, if 
cut elimination were to hold, one would need only consider normal (ie. cut- free)21 
proofs when doing theorem -proving. 
This, together with the factors mentioned in Subsection 2.3.2, explains why cut 
elimination might be desirable. Hence it is unfortunate that when predicate cal- 
culus is extended to give a formalisation of arithmetic by the addition of Peano's 
axioms22 including induction, cuts may no longer be eliminated in all cases. One 
such exception is illustrated by the example below - it is not possible to prove 
s = t I- t = s without using cut (although equality could be formulated so that 
cuts were not needed - in this case by including s = t I- t = s as an axiom): 
s=s axiom 
lthin 
basic sequent, type 3 
s= t,s= s,s= sl-t =s 
contr 
s=t s=s s=t,s=s t=s 
cut 
s= tI- t =s 
Since this is the case, automatic search for a proof might have to involve use of the 
cut rule, and the cut formula would have to be provided by some sort of heuristic, 
since there would be no logical rule which would give it. Unfortunately, there is 
no easy or fail -safe method of generating the required cut formula. 
2.3.5 Cut Elimination: Implementation and Results 
As mentioned above, cut elimination holds for predicate calculus. An implemen- 
tation of this process (for simple cases) was carried out within the implemen- 
21A normal proof is one in which every formula is a subformula of the hypotheses or 
the conclusion. 
22See Subsection 4.1.1. 
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tational system Seldon described in Chapter 1023. In order to implement the 
cut elimination theorem, various theoretical considerations had to be made in 
view of the slightly unusual logical rules (notably "cut ") used by the theorem 
prover selected. Much of the theory given in texts such as (Dummett, 1977) or 
(J. -Y. Girard & Taylor, 1989) had to be re- worked in order to be implemented. 
Seldon itself was extended in order to make it more suitable as an implemen- 
tational system for the proposed research (for example, the logical rule was 
added to the system, and a set -theoretic approach was taken in preference to using 
exchange and contraction rules). The detail is not relevant here24, but it might be 
worth mentioning the general algorithm used, which is analogous to those given 
in order to prove cut elimination in many other systems. 
In order to understand the algorithm for cut elimination, there are two main 
measures of complexity of proofs to be considered: the rank of a cut is the sum 
of the maximum lengths of the left -hand and right -hand paths in the prooftree 
following application of a cut rule in which the cut formula still remains unaltered 
(that is, for which the succedent or antecedent, as appropriate, of each sequent 
associated with a node on that path contains the cut formula). The degree of a 
cut is the number of logical constants in the cut formula. The basic idea of the 
algorithm is, given a proof of a sequent with cuts, to obtain a proof of the same 
sequent with cuts of lower complexity, and then repeat to get a cut -free proof. 
More specifically, a cut with no cuts above it in the tree is selected (where the 
original sequent is counted as being at the `bottom' of the tree), and its rank 
is measured. If the rank is positive, a rank -reduction step is carried out. This 
involves the replacement of one subtree by another with the same premises and 
conclusion, but with the difference that any cuts in the second subtree will always 
be of lower rank than the first. The various cases may be worked out theoretically. 
The procedure is then repeated. When the rank is zero, the degree of the cut is 
23Further details are given in (Baker, 1990). 
24The final result is that, upon input of a proof in Seldon, by typing the predicate 
eliminate_cut, a cut -free proof of the same sequent will be returned (Baker, 1990). 
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measured. If this is zero, the cut may be directly eliminated, otherwise the cut 
must be replaced by one(s) of lower degree. Unfortunately, this may increase the 
rank. The procedure is then repeated until all cuts are eliminated: note that since 
the rank may always be strictly reduced without change of degree, while the degree 
may always be strictly reduced, and cuts of rank and degree zero may always be 
eliminated, then it follows that the process will terminate, and that all cuts may 
be eliminated. 
Although cut elimination does not hold for Peano Arithmetic, there are other 
systems for which it does: for example, there is cut elimination for primitive 
recursive arithmetic (Kreisel, 1965, P161). The latter is quantifier -free arithmetic 
encompassing propositional calculus, primitive recursive functions and induction; 
for further details see (Takeuti, 1987, P84). In addition, Schütte proved that all 
but the most trivial applications of the cut rule (for which the cut formula is of 
the form s = t) can be eliminated for the system encompassing Peano Arithmetic 
together with the w -rule, PAW (see Chapter 5) (Schütte, 1960)25, and this was 
followed by consideration of other systems for which cut elimination also holds, 
such as Peano Arithmetic with a recursively restricted w -rule (Shoenfield, 1959).26 
For further details of cut elimination in the system LWIW (cf. Section 2.6), see 
(Girard, 1987, P393 -4). 
In order to carry out cut elimination in PAW, an assignment of ordinals is provided 
which not only measures the "lengths" of proofs but also gives direct estimates 
of number -theoretic bounds for existential theorems. The basic idea underlying 
cut elimination is analogous to that for predicate calculus given above, and the 
essential idea is as follows: consider a proof in PAW of F of the following form, 
where the cut -formula A is either VxB(x) or Bo A B1: 
I'f- BZalli 
I'HA 
dw or n r 
F C 
I', Bn, F- C some n 
b'l or A l 
I',AI-C 
cut(A) 
25See the Appendix of (Mendelson, 1964) for Schütte's consistency proof. 
26See also (Girard, 1987, P393 -4). 
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This proof may be replaced by: 
r F- Bn r, Bn f- C 
r c 
where the cut -formula B, is a subformula of the original cut -formula A. Repetition 
of this idea yields a proof of r in which all the cut -formulae are prime.27 For a 
formal treatment, see (Schwichtenberg, 1977). 
2.3.6 Conclusions Regarding Cut Elimination 
This section has provided essential background for the overall concern of the thesis 
with the automatic derivation of proofs within some formalisation of arithmetic. 
The importance of cut elimination has been discussed, by means of justification 
of the consideration in Chapter 4 of a formalisation of arithmetic for which cut 
elimination is valid. Moreover, cut elimination will prove to be highly relevant 
during the discussions about generalisation which follow in later chapters. 
The next sections consider aspects of infinitary proof including Gödel encoding, 
various w- rules, infinitary logics and, lastly, motivation for consideration of systems 
of arithmetic with w- rules. 
2.4 Gödel Encoding 
The w -rule is not suitable for implementation, as it has an infinite number of 
premises, but various restricted forms might be suitable. This section briefly dis- 
cusses Gödel numbering, which provides the usual approach to placing restrictions 
on the w -rule and describing systems with an infinitary rule. 
One of the essential ideas, that of coding numbers, which Gödel used in his proof 
of the incompleteness theorem has become a standard procedure in logic. Infor- 
mation may be presented in many different symbolic languages, but it is often 
27A formula is prime if it is of the form 1 or ,ß(t1, ... , tn), where ß is a decidable 
predicate and the ti are terms. 
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convenient to put this into numerical form in order to discuss and manipulate 
this information. For example, information processed by machines is often first 
converted to a numerical form (although it is also possible to deal directly with 
objects such as formulae in most modern programming languages). Gödel gave a 
construction for an arbitrary first order language G such that each symbol, term, 
formula and sequence of formulae of G is assigned a code number in such a way that 
there is an effective means of going from formal objects to their Gödel numbers, 
and vice versa. There are different ways of doing this, but the general procedure 
is to use the expression as a product of powers of primes. 
Gödel numbering is a one -to -one map from the formal expressions of the language 
to the natural numbers. The corresponding number, called the Gödel number, 
of an expression S is denoted by r51. An operation or relation defined on a 
class of formal objects is said to be arithmetised if it is thought of in terms of 
a corresponding arithmetical operation on the Gödel numbers of these objects. 
The operations of substitution and the generation of the nth numeral may be 
arithmetised in this way. A proof or deduction will be a finite sequence of strings 
of symbols, and so will also have a Gödel number. 
Gödel's purpose in devising this coding system was to transform assertions about 
a formal system (such as PA) into assertions about numbers, and then to express 
these assertions within the formal system. The assertions which can be made 
about a formal system concern formulae, theorems and proofs. There is a primitive 
recursive relation PK (m, n) which holds if and only if m is the Gödel number of a 
sequence of formulae which constitutes a proof in K of the formula whose Gödel 
number is n. 3x PK(x, rA,) is often abbreviated to Pr fK(rA') (or HK rAi). Other 
properties of the system give rise to new relations in a similar way. Now the 
expression of P in PA provides a formula which would decide within the system 
itself the meta -level question of whether any sequence of formulae constitutes a 
proof in PA. This provides an attempt to use PA as a metasystem for itself. 
However, a contradiction is avoided since this attempt can only be partial because 
not all relations (over N) are expressible in PA. 
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Further discussion of restrictions on the w -rule using an encoding approach is given 
in Subsection 4.3.2. 
2.5 Various Omega Rules 
A standard form of the w -rule is: 
A(0), A(1) . . . A(n) . . . 
VxA(x) 
where n is a formal numeral, which for natural number n consists in the n -fold 
iteration of the successor function applied to zero, and A is formulated within 
the language of arithmetic. Löpez- Escobar has claimed that the w -rule is more 
basic than induction (Löpez- Escobar, 1976). This rule is not derivable in Peano 
Arithmetic (PÁ)28, since for example, for the Gödel formula G(x), for each natural 
number n, PA H G(n) but it is not true that PA H VxG(x). As mentioned above, 
cut elimination may be carried out on the resulting system, which makes it easier 
to prove consistency. 
However, this is not a good candidate for implementation since there are an infinite 
number of premises. It would be desirable to restrict the w -rule so that the infinite 
proofs considered possess some important properties of finite proofs. There are 
many such restrictions, which shall be considered below. One suitable option 
which has already been mentioned is the constructive w -rule. The w -rule is said 
to be constructive if there is a recursive function f such that for every n, f (n) is a 
Gödel number of P (n), where P (n) is defined for every natural number n and is a 
proof of A(n) (Takeuti, 1987). This is equivalent to the requirement that there is 
a uniform, computable procedure describing P(n), or alternatively that the proofs 
are recursive (in the sense that both the prooftree and the function describing the 
28A formalisation is given in Section 4.1. 
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use of the different rules must be recursive) (Yoccoz, 1989a), which is the basis 
taken for implementation (as opposed to the Gödel numbering approach).29 
The sequent calculus enriched with the constructive w -rule in place of the rule of in- 
duction (let us call it PArw30) has cut elimination, and is complete (Shoenfield, 1959). 
Moreover, PA, + I ND is a conservative extension of PA,.31 The principle of in- 
duction is a consequence of the w -rule (see Section 7.2). However, the compactness 
theorem fails, as does the second -order interpolation theorem. 
Shoenfield has shown that `PA + w -rule' (PA(1)32 is a conservative extension of 
`PA + recursively restricted w -rule' (Shoenfield, 1959) and this result has been ex- 
tended to weak second order arithmetic by Takahashi (Takahashi, 1970). However, 
this does not apply to all theories, and notably not to some cut -free systems, nor 
to HA, intuitionistic number theory (Löpez- Escobar, 1977). The usual formalisa- 
tions of intuitionistic arithmetic produce a stronger theory with the unrestricted 
w -rule than with the recursively restricted w -rule; there is a similar result for 
some cut -free systems, and analogously for the recursively versus primitive recur- 
sively restricted w -rule. So, intuitionistic primitive recursive trees are not enough 
to represent HA, (and therefore not enough to enable completeness of HArw) 
However, if HA* is defined as HA together with the transfinite induction schema 
over all well- founded33 primitive recursive (binary) relations on natural numbers, 
then HA* is complete for H2 sentences. Furthermore, in any metatheory extend- 
ing second order arithmetic, this theory is equivalent to HA with the full w -rule 
(Friedman & Scedrov, 1985). To show this, recursive well -founded prooftrees are 
29lndeed, the introduction of infinitary rules in most proof systems in computer science 
can be restricted to a recursive one (Yoccoz, 1989b). 
30For a more formal description see Chapter 5. 
31A is a conservative extension of B if, for each closed formula F of the language of 
the theories, B I- F Al- F. 
32See Section 4.2 for description. 
33A binary relation R on a set S is said to be well- founded if 
b'X (Va ES (VbES(bRa _*bEX)- 4aEX) -4 daESaEX). 
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considered and coding is used: for the infinitary rules one requires a recursive se- 
quence of Gödel numbers of trees that end with the premises; see Subsection 4.3.2 
for further details of such a method. 
Given the system of intuitionistic arithmetic HA defined by Kleene (Kleene, 1962), 
a proof that HAG, (the system HA with the w -rule replacing the rule of induction) 
is stronger than HArG, (the analogous system with a recursive restriction on the 
w- rule), runs as follows. Assuming the model M =< w, +, ., /, f >, it is provable 
by induction that for all sentences A of HA, if A is true in M, then HAG, I- A. 
In addition, if HArw h. A, then A is realisable.34 However, Vx(3yT(x, x, y) V 
Vy-i (T (x, x, y))) is true but not realisable (Löpez- Escobar, 1977, P92) . Hence, 
HAG, cannot be a conservative extension of HArw 
Another rule which has been proposed is the finitely -applied w -rule: 
Vx3yPpA(y, subst(rA(z)1, x)) 
F- VxA(x) 
where subst(rA7, n) is the Gödel number of the sentence obtained by substituting 
n, the numeral representing the number n, for x in A(x). This w -rule is a finite 
formulation of the w -rule by means of arithmetisation of syntax, and is hence in- 
tended to replace the latter. There is a strong correspondence between this rule 
and the uniform reflection principle (given in Section 11.1). Note that in partic- 
ular the previous rules considered differ from this syntactically finite form of the 
w -rule which was considered by Rosser (Rosser, 1937) and subsequently Feferman, 
for which completeness results rely upon the particular path taken which indexes 
iteration through the constructive ordinals. More specifically, Rosser showed that 
Gödel's incompleteness theorem applies for the resulting system of arithmetic with 
this form of the w -rule, Z', and also obtained incompleteness for arbitrary finite 
iterations of the rule; (Feferman, 1962) and (Feferman & Spector, 1962) give com- 
pleteness and incompleteness results respectively, depending on the path taken for 
the iteration into the recursive transfinite of the procedure by which the system 
Z' can be obtained from Z, the analogous system without this rule. Feferman has 
34For a discussion of realisability, see (Dummett, 1977, P318). 
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also shown the equivalence of extending PA by the finitely applied w -rule with 
extending PA by uniform reflection35 (Feferman, 1962); it is also equivalent to an 
extension by 60- transfinite induction, as mentioned in Section 11.1. Restriction 
of this rule to primitive recursive formulae is weaker than the ordinary w -rule 
restricted to primitive recursive formulae, but still strong enough to generate a 
proper extension to PA, since for example the Gödel sentence may be derived.36 
Another form of the rule, the finitely applied co-rule as an extension of primitive 
recursive arithmetic37, considered for example by Ignjatovic (Ignjatovic, 1988), 
extends primitive recursive arithmetic, but fails to extend PA. 
Hence, there are many versions of a restricted w -rule. The recursively restricted 
one is considered in particular because the resulting system is complete and it is 
suitable for automation. There is a primitive recursive counterpart38 which would 
also be suitable, for which the resulting system was shown to be complete by Nelson 
(Nelson, 1971). This is in fact the w -rule chosen for the basis of implementation; 
see Subsection 4.3.1 regarding the decision to use the primitive recursive rather 
than the recursively restricted w -rule. Since the primitive recursive version (cf. 
Chapter 5) is also a constructive w -rule, to avoid confusion I shall refer to the 
"recursively restricted w- rule" and the "primitive recursively restricted w- rule ", 
whenever differentiation is applicable. 
Next I consider briefly another way in which infinite proofs may be represented. 
35See Section 11.1. 
36Any sentence A such that A - I- A is provable in a system S is called a Gödel 
sentence for S (Takeuti, 1987, P79). 
37See (Girard, 1987, P67). 
381n other words, such that there is a primitive recursive function f for which, for 
every n, f (n) is a Gödel number of the proof of A(n), the nth numerator of the w -rule. 
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2.6 Infinitary Logics 
Infinitary logic absorbs the notion of infinity into its syntax by allowing infinite 
disjunctions and conjunctions. If a and ß are two infinite cardinals, then the in- 
finitary logic Lo is first order logic, but allowing the conjunction and disjunction 
of a set of fewer than a formulae and universal and existential quantification over 
a set of fewer than ß variables, such that there are a individual variables. Hence, 
Lli,,, is classical first order logic. The next weakest case is the language LWW which 
allows countable conjunctions and disjunctions but only finite strings of quanti- 
fiers. That is to say that given a first order language L with countably many 
relation, function, and constant symbols, and w1 variables, the language LWIW has 
the same symbols as L, but in addition the conjunction symbol and disjunction 
symbol may be applied to countable or finite sets of formulae as well as to pairs 
of formulae. From around 1962, the model theory of LWIW has been investigated; 
the Lowenheim -Skolem Theorem holds for LWIW but not the compactness theorem, 
and neither can the concept of a well- ordering be expressed. Well- behaved sublan- 
guages are often considered instead, since otherwise there are uncountably many 
formulae. LW1W1 is a much more powerful logic than LWW; see (Keisler, 1971) or 
(Takeuti, 1987, P188 -284) for further details of infinitary logics. Even the sim- 
plest infinitary logic, LWIW, is not suitable for implementation because it would not 
be possible to represent infinite conjunctions of arbitrary formulae in a finite way 
(although of course there is the possibility of allowing just effectively presented 




The w -rule, and also its constructive counterparts, are of interest for several rea- 
sons. First, they may be seen as an attempt to overcome the limitations of reason- 
ing using a formal system that follow from Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Gödel showed that there are statements in 
the formal language of natural number arithmetic that are logical consequences 
of the usual axioms of arithmetic but cannot be proved in the first -order theory, 
unless that theory is inconsistent (Gödel, 1931). His procedure was to construct 
in a formal system of simple type theory with the natural numbers as ground 
type, P, a formula A which states that there is no natural number x which is the 
Gödel number of a proof in P of the formula B, with B set to be A itself. In 
other words, A may be defined as - x(IIx proves A), where En is the proof (with 
Gödel number n) of some theorem in P. A is essentially stating "I am unprov- 
able (in P)" (which is analogous to the liar paradox, with "unprovable" instead 
of "false ") . Now, if P has the feature that only true formulae are provable (which 
is desirable!), then with strong similarity to both the liar paradox and Russell's 
paradox, if the Gödel formula A were provable (in P), it must be false, and hence 
unprovable (giving a contradiction). Similarly, -,A is also unprovable. Therefore, 
A is formally undecidable in P. Note that a first order theory is complete if and 
only if for each closed formula of the language of the theory either A or -'A is 
provable, and consistent if and only if at most one of A and -'A is provable. In- 
formally, a complete theory is one strong enough to allow proof of any statement 
that it would be desirable to prove, and a consistent theory is one free of formal 
contradiction, so the incompleteness theorem says that for any formal theory of 
arithmetic there will always be true statements that are not theorems of this the- 
ory, and hence we can never completely formalise arithmetic.39 As discussed in 
'However, according to D. Isaacson, it is possible to define a concept of arithmetical 
truth with respect to which PA is complete, as in (Isaacson, 1987). 
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Subsection 2.1.1, Penrose argues that arithmetic is non -algorithmic in nature, and 
that mathematical insight allows us to see the truth of true but unprovable state- 
ments, and J.R. Lucas similarly uses Gödel's proof to draw a distinction between 
men and machines (Lucas, 1970). 
In particular, Penrose says that the w -rule is non -algorithmic, in the sense of being 
computationally infeasible because it requires the proof of an infinite number of 
hypotheses, and Gödel's theorem shows that the usual computable approxima- 
tion to the w -rule, namely induction (or even a finite collection of new induction 
rules), is an inadequate substitute for the w -rule. From an analysis of Gödel's 
incompleteness theorem it can be seen that the problem lies in the formalisation 
of mathematical induction, but on the other hand Gödel's theorem does not apply 
if the w -rule is used since this is not a formal system in the required sense: it 
is rather a semi -formal system because the proofs are infinite. Therefore, use of 
the complete formalisation of arithmetic constructed from the Peano axioms and 
the constructive w -rule would provide an objection to this argument of Penrose's, 
since a complete formalisation of arithmetic can be constructed from the Peano 
axioms and the constructive w -rule (Shoenfield, 1959) and since this system may 
be implemented (and is therefore algorithmic in nature) . 
From an implementational point of view, and quite apart from these consider- 
ations, completeness is desirable because it would be highly undesirable that a 
formula of the system should be seen by elementary computation to be false and 
yet be provable. Although resource limitations, such as time, may not allow the full 
exploitation of completeness, at least by having a complete system the situation 
where simple or interesting deductions are just not possible is avoided. 
A related reason for investigating use of the w -rule in theorem -proving is that it is 
possible to prove more expressions in a system including it, for "PA + constructive 
w- rule" is a stronger system than PA. I shall be especially concerned in Section 7.1 
with certain expressions which can be proved in a system with the constructive 
w -rule but which may not be provable in Peano Arithmetic without cut. 
Secondly, the w -rule allows us to do away with the cut rule. Many meta -theorems 
follow from the cut elimination theorem in both first and higher -order proof the- 
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ory. However, as discussed in Section 2.3, it is impossible to eliminate all cuts in 
extensions of arithmetic because the formal proofs contain applications of mathe- 
matical induction. Yet, by means of introducing the w -rule, Schütte eliminated all 
applications of induction and all non -trivial applications of the cut rule in first or- 
der arithmetic (Schütte, 1960).40 Hence, an important technique for investigating 
derivability in formal systems of arithmetic has been to embed such systems into 
semi -formal systems with the w -rule (although there have been other motivations 
for this, such as searching for consistency results).41 
In addition, some proofs may be generated more easily in the system with the 
w -rule, and there is scope for a new approach to the problems of generalisation, 
as shown in Chapter 8. 
The following subsection presents further motivation for consideration of the w -rule 
in terms of its practical use in automated -theorem proving. 
2.7.1 Use of the Constructive Omega Rule 
One use of the constructive w -rule is to enable automated proof of formulae, such 
as Vx (x +x) +x = x +(x +x), which cannot be proved in the normal axiomatisation 
of arithmetic without recourse to the cut rule (notably, induction does not carry 
through). As mentioned above, in these cases the correct proof could be extremely 
difficult to find automatically. However, it is possible to prove this equation using 
the w -rule by generating proofs of (0 +0) +0 = 0 +(0 +0), (1 +1) +1 = 1 +(1 +1), ... 
and working out the general pattern of these proofs. In Chapter 7 another reason 
why it might be advantageous to carry out theorem -proving in the system PA,, 
40Parsons went on to prove that every proof with finite order (in the sense of having a 
uniform bound on the number of constructional inferences in each branch) in Schütte's 
system S of number theory with the w -rule, can be effectively transformed into a proof 
from certain free variable axioms in Schütte's quantification theory Kl (Parsons, 1958). 
41Many results relevant to the understanding of nonconstructive mathematics from a 
constructivist point of view can be obtained from consistency proofs; for example, in 
1956 Beth proved classically the completeness of intuitionist quantification theory. 
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is presented, namely that induction may carry through when it does not in the 
system PA. Next, a preview of the general implementational approach which will 
be taken will be given. 
For the implementation it is necessary to provide (for the nth case) a description 
for the general proof in a constructive way (in this case a recursive way), which 
captures the notion that each P(n) is being proved in a uniform way (from pa- 
rameter n). This is done by manipulating A(n), where VxA(x) is the sequent 
to be proved, and using recursively defined function definitions of PA as rewrite 
rules, with the aim of reducing both sides of the equation to the same formula. 
The recursive function sought is described by the sequence of rule applications, 
parametrised over n. In practice, the first few proofs will be special cases, and it 
is rather the correspondence between the proofs of P(99), say, and P(100), which 
should be captured. The processes of generation of a (recursive) general proof 
from individual proof instances, and the (metalevel) checking that this is indeed 
the correct proof have been automated (see Chapter 10). Further details of the 
algorithms and representations used will be given in Chapter 10, together with 
in Chapter 6 the correspondence between the adopted implementational approach 
and the formal theory of the system described in Subsection 4.3.2. 
2.7.2 Conclusions Regarding Motivation 
In this section interest in w -rules within automated deduction has been justified, 
and a suitable rule for my purposes chosen, namely a constructive version of the 
w -rule, which shall henceforth be used as the basis for implementation. Also, an 
indication of how the w -rule may be used in practice has been given. 
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2.8 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter various w -rules have been introduced, and a coherent view of infi- 
nite proofs has been presented, with reference to differing viewpoints within the 
foundations of mathematics, in order to assess the nature of the various types of 
w -rules and to provide a notion of soundness for the system PAS,,, which shall 
be considered in Chapter 5. The w -rule was seen to provide a canonical proof, 
and hence a meaning, for universally quantified statements, and implementation 
of such an infinitary rule may be carried out in a constructive manner. 
In Section 2.3 cut elimination was defined and discussed. The cut elimination 
theorem for predicate calculus states that every proof may be replaced by one 
which does not involve use of the cut rule. This theorem no longer holds when 
the system is extended with Peano's axioms to give a formalisation for arithmetic. 
The problem of generalisation results, since arbitrary formulae can be cut in. This 
makes theorem -proving very difficult - one solution is to embed arithmetic in a 
stronger system, where cut elimination holds. In particular, this is the case given 
the addition of the constructive w -rule. In this new system, automated proof of 
any arithmetic sequent could be attempted, without hindrance from the problems 
of generalisation. 
In Section 2.7 various motivations for consideration of the system of arithmetic 
with a primitive recursively restricted w -rule in place of induction (PAS,,) were 
presented. Some advantages of the approach are 
the completeness of the resulting system; by this means it is possible to 
overcome limitations of reasoning using a formal system that follow from 
Gödel's first incompleteness theorem (namely that there are true statements 
that are not theorems of the formal system). Hence, more expressions are 
provable in PA,,, than PA (and especially than PA \ cut). 
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 no generalisation is needed in this system since cut elimination for PA,.,, 
holds. Hence desirable properties such as the subformula property may be 
derived. 
some proofs are generated more easily in PAS,, than PA. 
as shown in Chapters 8 and 9, there is a method by which proofs in PAS,,, 
may guide proofs in PA. 
However, the explicit manipulation of proofs necessitated by use of the w -rule has 




"But how can finite grasp infinity ?" 
John Dryden 
This chapter presents related work which will be built upon in later chapters. In 
Section 3.1, an overview of generalisation is given: an analogy of generalisation for 
natural deduction systems is given in Subsection 3.1.1, followed by classification of 
different types of generalisation. In Section 3.2, an overview of inductive theorem 
proving techniques during the last few decades is given, since the implementation 
presented in this thesis is closely related to this area of research. Section 3.3 deals 
with inductive inference, which is a notion encompassing some of the algorithms 
used in further chapters. Since the technique of explanation -based generalisation 
is used later in this thesis (in particular Subsection 8.1.4 relates to its application 
to a new domain), it is described in Section 3.4. In addition, in Section 3.5 a 
description is given of primitive recursion over abstract datatypes. 
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3.1 Generalisation 
A general overview of generalisation within automated deduction has already been 
provided in Section 1.3. In this section an overview of generalisation as a process of 
enabling proof of statements by induction will be given, together with an analogy 
for natural deduction and the presentation of various categories of generalisation 
methods. 
If induction is blocked for an expression', generalisation may be used as a step 
to convert this expression into a new, more general, expression which may be 
proved by induction. A generalisation of a statement I. is a statement such 
that = (W - 1.). Therefore, if verification of 1 is the goal, it is sound to prove 
W instead of 13.. Indeed, it might actually be necessary to adopt this approach in 
cases where 1. is a theorem of a system S but it is not the case that may be 
proved by induction within S (although W may be found such that W is provable 
by induction within S, and such that W is a generalisation of (1.). 
Heuristics are needed for the suggestion of W since there is no appropriate algo- 
rithm for finding suitable generalisations.' A suitable suggested generalisation will 
be constrained by being just general enough to provide a proof by induction whilst 
avoiding overgeneralisation, for not only may generalisations W be computed such 
that it is not the case that W is provable by induction, but overgeneralisations may 
also be computed (that is to say where W is not a theorem of S). 
'Induction is said to blocked if, after all available symbolic evaluation has been carried 
out, the induction conclusion is still not an instance of the induction hypothesis, and 
hence remains unprovable. 
20f course, an algorithm could be used which tried every possible option, but the 
search required might be infeasibly large, plus there would be the drawback of not 
allowing the conclusion that there was no adequate generalisation. In short, this trivial 
approach is not what is required. 
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3.1.1 Analogy of Generalisation in Natural Deduction 
Systems 
In sequent calculus, generalisation is provided by the cut rule. This has an analogy 
in the formalisation of other systems. In particular, normalisation for natural 
deduction systems corresponds to cut elimination in sequent calculus.3 Hence, 
doing a cut corresponds to having a non -normal proof. A normal deduction proof 
will have a particular form, for each branch in the deduction may be divided in 
the following way: there will be a formula A such that all formulae above A are 
premises of applications of elimination rules and all formulae below A (with the 
exception of the last) are premises of applications of introduction rules. 
Normalisation may always be achieved in classical and intuitionistic logic (cor- 
responding to the property of cut elimination in predicate calculus). Arithmetic 
can be represented in natural deduction by allowing the axioms of arithmetic to 
appear as the leaves of the proof (ie. the hypotheses), and not worrying if they do 
not get discharged; such a formulation is given in (Troelestra, 1982, P19 -21), in 
which the induction rule is naturally a rule of inference rather than an axiom. 
Generalisation does not occur in the usual natural deduction system, but on the 
other hand one may achieve this effect. It is possible to look upon a proof in a 
calculus of sequents as an instruction on how to construct a corresponding natural 
deduction (see (Prawitz, 1965, P91)). In general, the rules on the succedents cor- 
respond to the introduction rules whereas the rules on the antecedents correspond 
to the elimination rules. For example: 
In particular, 
rl-A Fi-B A B&1 
111-AAB A&B 
ct), r H 0 `dxAdE 
dx(1,(x),r{-0 At 
3See (Prawitz, 1965), and the discussion in Subsection 2.1.1. 
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These steps achieve the same as a generalisation step, and furthermore they form 
a non -normal proof fragment (and necessarily so in order to perform this trans- 
formation). There will always be a proof fragment of this form when making such 
a `generalisation step', and it will vary only according to the number of variables 
involved. 
The overall conclusion to be made is that the same search problem occurs in 
natural deduction systems as in other formulations, such as the sequent calculus 
used for implementation. 
3.1.2 Different Types of Generalisation 
In this subsection terminology related to different kinds of generalisation shall be 
presented, including the broad approach of considering generalisation in terms of 
inversion of sound inference rules. A well -known alternative method of classifi- 
cation of some of the main types of generalisation used in theorem -proving will 
also be given: Boyer and Moore are normally associated with generalising terms to 
variables, and Aubin with extending their work to allow generalisation of variables 
apart and generalisation of terms with a constant in an accumulator position; for 
further details of such methods, plus further developments for example by Hesketh, 
see Section 11.3. 
Generalisations may be obtained by backwards application of sound (derived) first - 
order inference rules. Examples of such rules are given in Table 3 -1. The substitu- 
tion rule computes a generalisation of W by replacing one or several occurrences of 
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a term in ' by a universally quantified variable. An example of its use for general- 
isation is that the rule of substitution applied backwards to Vx f ac(x).0 = 0 would 
yield a formula by y.0 = 0. The inversion of the weakening rule is mainly applied 
to evaluated step formulae for elimination of induction hypotheses, and inverted re- 
placement corresponds to Aubin's notion of indirect generalisation4 (Aubin, 1976). 
Inverted modus ponens is used to obtain simpler verification problems and to avoid 
overgeneralisations computed by inverted substitution, and is used by Boyer and 
Moore (via labelling of some lemmata as generalisation lemmata by the user, in 
order for their system NQTHM to consider just those lemmata when computing 
generalisations) (Boyer & Moore, 1979). With each rule some heuristic must be 
provided which tries to decrease the risk of an overgeneralisation by stipulating 







Table 3 -1: Useful Inference Rules for Computing Generalisations 
However, it might be more practical to consider the following four categories, 
rather than the classification given in Table 3 -1. 
Terms to Variables 
A generalisation heuristic which works in many cases is to examine any common 
term structure, and generalise common subexpressions to a new variable (cf. sub- 
'See Subsection 11.3.2. 
5See (Walther, 1992) for further details. 
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stitution backwards). For example (where <> denotes `append'), naïve induction 
fails for VxVyVz(rev(x) <> (y <> z) = (rev(x) <> y) <> z), but this may be 
generalised to VvVyVz v <> (y <> z) = (v <> y) <> z, for which induction 
works (see Subsection 8.2.2 for further details). 
Variables Apart 
If generalisation of terms to variables fails, or is not appropriate, other methods of 
generalisation may be tried. The idea of generalisation of variables apart is, given 
some theorem with the same variable occurring many times, to find a generalisation 
by careful differentiation between the variables. For example, one may generalise 
Vx (x +x) +x = x +(x +x) (which may not be proved by induction) to VxVyVz (x+ 
y) + z = x + (y + z), which may be proved by induction on x (see Section 8.1). 
Terms with a Constant in an Accumulator Position 
Within the recursive definition of a function, an accumulator is an argument used 
to accumulate the value of the function, such as the second argument in the defi- 
nition of rev2, where: 
rev2(nil, l) = l; 
rev2(h :: t, l) = rev2(t, h :: l). 
A new type of generalisation is needed in these cases. As an example, rev2(x, nil) = 
rev(x) may be generalised to rev2(x, a) = rev(x) <> a. See Appendix C.3 for 
further details of this example. 
Addition of Accumulators 
Appendix C also considers examples for which the introduction of an accumulator 
is needed for generalisation, but not necessarily in order to generalise a constant: 
for example, dl rotate(len(l), l) = I may be generalised to Via rotate(len(l), l <> 
a) =a< >l. 
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A brief introduction to generalisation has been given in this section, in preparation 
for further discussion of this topic and the presentation of a new generalisation 
method in Chapter 8. 
3.2 Inductive Theorem Proving 
The application area of this thesis lies within the field of inductive theorem proving, 
and as such, is a development of some of this work. This section will present a 
brief overview of the various systems developed within this domain; these are 
especially of interest because all of these systems are faced with the problems of 
generalisation, since inductive proof is being carried out. Hence, the generalisation 
technique presented in Chapter 8 could be implemented as a useful addition to 
any of these systems. 
Much work has been carried out in the area of inductive theorem proving over 
the last few decades. There have been many different approaches, which have 
involved a varying amount of automation. I shall consider only the major inductive 
theorem provers, rather than proof environments such as HOL (Gordon, 1988) and 
Isabelle (Paulson, 1986) (higher order systems in which a variety of object -level 
logics may be used); the generic environment ICLE (Dawson, 1992) or the Logical 
Frameworks project. The latter is designed to support proof development in a 
variety of logics, with main implementation LEGO, which is an interactive proof 
development system in a natural deduction style, allowing proof development in 
the logic of calculus of constructions (Luo & Pollack, 1992). The main concern of 
these proof environments is to enable the user to carry out proofs, rather than to 
provide methods of automation. 
3.2.1 The Boyer -Moore Theorem Prover 
Of the inductive theorem provers, perhaps the most famous is that developed 
since 1972 by Boyer and Moore at Austin, called NQTHM (Boyer & Moore, 1988). 
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This is able to prove an extensive range of theorems requiring induction in such 
domains as number theory and LISP. NQTHM is designed to be used mainly with 
the fixed set of axioms provided, plus a number of definitions given by the user. 
The Boyer -Moore system incorporates powerful techniques including induction, 
linear resolution and generalisation. The induction heuristic is closely tied to the 
principle of recursive definition, and it filters out inductions which are not likely to 
work and merges competing alternatives. It is semi -automated, in the sense that 
a user may interact by providing lemmata which might guide the basic prover, 
support successful statement generalisation, or give hints to recognise termination 
of an algorithm. It operates on a first order logical system of recursive functions 
over finitely generated objects, and can express basic datatypes of LISP (in other 
words, numbers, lists etc.), plus definitions, and recognises well- founded induction 
schemes. 
Theorems which have been proved are added to the rewrite rule block, and la- 
belled according to their specific category. "Methods" (ie. tactics) are tried on the 
current proof goal sequentially. When one succeeds, the process is repeated on the 
resulting This list of methods will try first symbolic evaluation and various 
simplifications (such as rewriting, linear and binary resolution and subsumption), 
and only finally techniques which will complicate the proof (and therefore must 
be used according to stringent conditions), such as induction and generalisation. 
It is a heuristic theorem -prover, and so it is possible that no proof may be found, 
or that it may go down blind alleys. Indeed, the lack of explicit strategy makes 
it difficult to detect if the proof is in a loop, or if there is generalisation to a 
non -theorem, and so on. 
The prover does much tedious work filling in minor details, but needs the user to 
input the main steps to the proof for any theorem of interest. 
"Although NQTHM is quite capable of finding proofs for some sim- 
ple theorems with which even graduate students may struggle, we think 
of NQTHM as more of a proof checker than as a theorem -prover" 
(Boyer & Moore, 1990). 
Perhaps it is fairer to conclude that it is a very powerful theorem -prover, which is 
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capable of proving large numbers of theorems automatically, whilst also having an 
interactive mode. It is able to automatically prove some complicated verification 
theorems, but the axioms and proofs are implicitly universally quantified: no 
synthesis proofs are possible as there is no mechanism for existential quantification. 
However, by using recursive functions, Boyer and Moore are able to express many 
things usually expressed with quantifiers when dealing with "finite" objects such 
as trees of integers. Aubin developed his work in inductive theorem proving at 
Edinburgh (Aubin, 1975); he considered the computation of induction axioms and 
proposed several techniques for statement generalisation (see Subsection 11.3.2). 
3.2.2 OYSTER -CLAM 
The OYSTER -CLAM system developed by Bundy and colleagues at Edinburgh 
(Bundy et al, 1990) provides a degree of automation of proofs. The OYSTER 
system is an interactive proof editor which is the reimplementation in Prolog 
of the NuPRL program development systems by Christian Horn, a visitor to the 
Mathematical Reasoning Group in Edinburgh (Horn & Smaill, 1990). Many de- 
tails about the system are already present in NuPRL: the object level -logic is a 
higher -order constructive logic including induction, in a sequent -calculus forma- 
tion. Since the object -level logic is constructive, extract terms may be obtained 
from proofs, and then executed by application to an input. A theorem may be 
regarded as a specification which is realised by its extract term, and so the system 
allows program synthesis (see Subsection 10.2.1 for further details about extract 
6NuPRL is a proof development environment (which builds upon LCF) developed by 
Constable (Constable et al, 1986) for a version of Intuitionistic Type Theory based on 
that developed by Per Martin -Löf, (Martin -Lof, 1970). (LCF is a proof assistant which 
stands for `Logic for Computable Functions', and is an interactive system based on clas- 
sical logic, in which tactics may be used, in some cases to handle subgoals automatically 
(Gordon et al, 1979).) NuPRL uses constructive logic and embodies a "propositions as 
types" and "proofs as programs" approach. Like NQTHM, this is more an interactive 
system for proof development than an automatic theorem -prover. There is a tactic lan- 
guage, but there is no meta -level planning or exploration of the prooftree; nodes of a 
prooftree are operated upon sequentially and all arguments to inference rules must be 
instantiated. 
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terms.) Both definitions and libraries of theorems may be used. Proofs are con- 
structed in a top -down way via application of rules of inference, guided either by 
a user or by a proof tactic. The latter is a Prolog program which incorporates 
commands of the theorem proving system (in themselves Prolog predicates). The 
tactic may, for example, recognise if the sequent to be operated upon corresponds 
to a certain pattern, and in this case perform certain rules of inference upon it. 
CLAM is a meta -level system built on top of OYSTER to turn the latter into an auto- 
matic theorem proving system, and support the use of proof plans 
(van Harmelen, 1989). For each tactic written in the OYSTER system, CLAM con- 
tains a specification of the tactic, called a method, which consists of an input 
formula, preconditions, output formulae and postconditions. Thus CLAM is able to 
predict if a particular tactic will be applicable in OYSTER without actually running 
the tactic. A proof plan is obtained via CLAM by finding an applicable method, 
calculating the output formulae and postconditions, and repeating the process un- 
til no further unproved formulae remain. Since, for a given sequent, more than one 
method may be available, backtracking may be necessary. The whole meta -level 
process is called proof planning. The proof plan, or record of methods, can then 
be executed at the object -level by using the corresponding OYSTER tactics. The 
methods, tactics and heuristics of CLAM are modelled on the Boyer -Moore theorem 
prover. 
3.2.3 INKA 
The INKA system (Biundo et al, 1986) developed in Karlsruhe and then at Darm- 
stadt and Saarbrücken by Walther and co- workers also has a high degree of au- 
tomation. It is able to automatically guide symbolic evaluation and lemma recog- 
nition when proving the induction step (Rutter, 1990). Hutter compares the in- 
duction hypothesis and conclusion to obtain a syntactical pattern which must 
hold for each intermediate stage of the deduction. INKA also automates termi- 
nation proofs for recursively defined algorithms (Walther, 1988). Many induction 
lemmata used by Boyer and Moore may be completed by the system without user 
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guidance, and statements containing existential quantifiers may also be dealt with. 
In addition, several generalisation techniques have been implemented within the 
system: Hummel has described and analysed various generalisation heuristics for 
recursive functions, some of which she then implemented within the INKA system 
(Hummel, 1987) . 
3.2.4 Inductionless Induction 
Another, alternative approach to automated induction is that of inductionless in- 
duction (so- called because an induction proof is not explicitly constructed), also 
known as proof by consistency, and inductive completion. These techniques have 
been developed over the last decade, for example by Huet and Hullot 
(Huet & Hullot, 1982). Given the set of all statements T provable from the 
database of a theorem -prover, the type of approach taken is that if T is complete, 
then verifying the consistency of 'T U {1'} for some statement is equivalent to 
showing that E T, in other words that is provable in the system. More specif- 
ically, if the input language is restricted to universal quantification, the Knuth - 
Bendix procedure can be used to verify consistency. This procedure is to generate 
a canonical rewrite system corresponding to T U {(I)} that is consistent precisely 
when is an inductive consequence of T, and inconsistent when it is not. So, if the 
process of generating a complete system terminates and a contradiction results, it 
is concluded that I. cannot be proved; otherwise E T is proved. The properties 
of T and the proof procedure used determine the particular test for consistency. 
The major calculation is of superpositions of terms, which yield critical pairs; 
the generation of these pairs corresponds to induction schemas, their simplifica- 
tion corresponds to post- induction proof, and generalised statements and lemmata 
may also be computed from them (see (Thomas & Watson, 1991), and the follow- 
ing section). Although there is no explicit induction used, Reddy has shown that 
many inductive completion axioms can be viewed in terms of performing induction 
over a Noetherian ordering (see Subsection 4.1.2) given by T, in the sense of being 
a uniformly terminating term -rewriting system where no term can be infinitely 
rewritten (Reddy, 1990). Reddy used a method called term -rewriting induction to 
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prove properties of term -rewriting systems, and Knuth -Bendix completion -based 
inductive proof procedures to construct term -rewriting induction proofs. Goguen 
has shown the correctness of algebraic methods for deciding the equivalence of ex- 
pressions by applying rewrite rules, and proving equational inductive hypotheses 
without using induction (Goguen, 1980). See (Barnett et al, 1992) for a compari- 
son of inductive completion with recursion analysis and the rippling technique of 
CLAM (although this deals with non -definitional lemmata, and not generalisation). 
3.2.5 The Chosen Approach 
I have not used an inductive completion -type approach, but have preferred the 
Boyer- Moore -type approach, primarily because the input language is not restricted 
to universal quantification, and although the system PA, with the w -rule in place of 
induction (see Chapters 4 and 5), does happen to be complete, greater flexibility 
in the general approach would be desirable. Note that in practice anyway it 
is not claimed that the implementational system used is complete (Chapter 6). 
The systems which have most influenced my work are those of Boyer and Moore, 
Aubin and OYSTER -CLAM. The implementation is actually written as an extension 
of OYSTER (although a different logic is used). 
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3.3 Inductive Learning 
This section refers to related work in the field of inductive inference (in other words, 
presenting algorithms to obtain a general pattern from individual instances), for 
part of the work encompassed by this thesis is to implement use of the constructive 
w -rule. This implementation may involve the automatic generation of general 
proofs from individual cases, which corresponds to the extraction of a pattern from 
a sequence of proofs. This is not a new problem: the first results on automated 
induction first began to emerge in the mid -sixties and seventies.? 
Inductive (or experimental) learning seeks by examining examples and non -examples 
of a concept to determine by syntactic means alone which features in the examples 
led them to be classified in this way; thus inductive generalisation may be thought 
of as the process of hypothesising a general rule from examples. Explanation -based 
(also called analytic) learning also takes into account the process which caused this 
classification. Analytic techniques permit learning from a single example, whereas 
inductive learning usually requires many examples to learn a concept. My work 
has parallels with the work done by Mitchell, and also Shavlik, in the field of (an- 
alytic) learning by experimentation (Mitchell et al, 1981; Shavlik & Jong, 1989). 
Shavlik and De Jong have developed a model (namely Physics 101) for applying 
explanation -based learning to mathematically -based domains. The solution to a 
specific problem is generalised into a form that can later be used to solve con- 
ceptually similar problems. It differs from other explanation -based approaches to 
learning in mathematical domains, for example by O'Rorke (O'Rorke, 1987), in 
that it tackles the generalisation of number. However, a greater parallel is that 
with work in the field of inductive generalisation, rather than such analytic gener- 
alisation. Inductive inference, or generalisation, encompasses for instance the early 
7For example, Winston's concept- formation program (Winston, 1975) and Mitchell's 
developments of this (Mitchell, 1978), plus Michalski's work on the INDUCE systems 
(Michalski, 1983), where the inductive inference method involved generalising variables 
and dropping conditions. 
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LEX system (Mitchell et al, 1983), plus work done by G. Plotkin, M. Thomas and 
others, as discussed below. Since 1980, Mitchell, Utgoff, Nudel and Banerji have 
developed a system called LEX which acquires heuristics in order to solve sym- 
bolic integration problems. It does this by the procedure of generating a practice 
problem, using available heuristics to solve this problem, and then analysing the 
search steps used to obtain the solution. New (domain- specific) heuristics are pro- 
posed to improve the performance on subsequent problems, and are tested out on 
suitable generated examples. 
More specifically, LEX starts off knowing a set of operators to try, and when they 
may be applied, with the goal of deriving heuristics about when application of the 
operators is appropriate. LEX uses the idea of version spaces by keeping track of 
all possible versions of a heuristic from the most specific to the most general; these 
versions are related by ISA- hierarchy generalisation. As new problems are tried, 
and more positive and negative instances of rule application are encountered, the 
gap narrows between the most general and most specific versions permitted by 
those instances; in fact it is sufficient to keep track only of these boundaries (ie. 
the most specific and the most general versions that have not been ruled out). In 
addition, LEX can propose problems that will help to narrow the version space, 
by providing crucial experiments that distinguish between more general and more 
specific cases. See (Boswell, 1987) for an assessment of the later development of 
the system, LEX2. 
Further references for inductive generalisation include Mitchell's article "General- 
ization as Search" , which compares existing programs that generalise from exam- 
ples, with respect to the standpoint of the title (Mitchell, 1982a) and Plotkin's 
paper "A Note on Inductive Generalization" (Plotkin, 1969). Other relevant 
work in this field includes that by Kinber and Brazma to formalise the process 
of generalisation (Kinber & Brazma, 1990), Muggleton's work on logic programs 
(Muggleton, 1988) and Thomas and Jantke's generalisation of rewrite rules during 
the course of inductive completion (Thomas & Jantke, 1989). Kinber and Brazma 
formalise the process of generalisation of sample computations explaining the be- 
haviour of a program, in order to synthesise such a program: detection of fragments 
70 
of arithmetical progressions may be made via a system of inductive inference rules 
(Kinber & Brazma, 1990). Muggleton has incorporated the production of the least 
general generalisation of given predicates ( "predicate invention ") into the Induc- 
tive Logic Programming tool Golem (Muggleton, 1988). For example, this allows 
the construction of father -or- father -in -law from examples of grandfather and back- 
ground about mother. Although others (eg. Banerji) have described mechanisms 
for predicate invention, Muggleton's research is the first to provide a theoretical 
framework for predicate invention; this is carried out within the lattice of entail- 
ment relative to interpretation rewrites. However, the implementation cannot yet 
deal with inventing a partition for the "quick- sort" algorithm. 
Muffy Thomas has tackled methods of generalising infinite sets. The Knuth - 
Bendix procedure (see Subsection 3.2.4) generates a decision procedure for equal- 
ity, but may diverge and generate an infinite set. Her approach is based on finding 
exact generalisation of the varying parts of the infinite sequence of rules, so that 
the infinite sequence of rules may be replaced by an equivalent finite sequence. 
Sometimes the solution is to introduce new subtypes, and deduce a new (enriched) 
order -sorted signature. All the terms of the introduced sort are those over which 
generalisation should be made; the addition of the corresponding rule results in 
a confluent and terminating system (Thomas & Watson, 1991). This gives an ef- 
fective procedure for generalisation, which sometimes works, but is restricted to a 
regular tree language. 
Relevant work in the field of inductive learning has been discussed. However, all 
of these approaches are limited, and there is little work being carried out which is 
analogous to the process described in this thesis of one logical system guiding the 
construction of a proof in another. 
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3.4 Explanation -Based Generalisation 
This section gives a brief description of explanation -based generalisation, since the 
notion is used elsewhere in this thesis. In particular, it is involved in the method 
proposed for generalisation of proofs in Chapter 8. Explanation -based generalisa- 
tion is a technique for formulating general concepts on the basis of specific training 
examples, first described in (Mitchell et al, 1986). For example, a particular so- 
lution may be generalised to obtain a specification of the most general problem 
which it solves. Typically, such methods require one algorithm to perform a gener- 
alisation from an old domain, another to determine the applicability or otherwise 
of the generalisation to a new domain, and yet another to actually apply the gen- 
eralisation in the new domain. In fact, unification alone may be used for the initial 
stage of constructing a generalised solution. The information about unification is 
fed through various stages of the construction using back propagation, in a manner 
described for example in (Boswell, 1987, P77) (with reference to LEX2). The con- 
struction of patterns for problem -solving within LEX2 is illustrated in Figure 3 -1, 
in which constraint back -propagation is used to enable explanation -based general- 
isation. With reference to this figure, the most general form of the expression for 
which the rules would be applicable may be calculated as follows: 
The form of an expression to which Rulel is applicable must be f S.G(x)dx, 
and afterwards S. f G(x)dx, for any rational number S and first -order func- 
tion G. 
For Rules to be applicable, G(x) must be xK # -1, for any rational number 
K. 
Any such information derived will then be filtered back to the original ex- 
pression, to give a most general generalisation (using the rules used on the 




5. f x2dx 
3 5.3 
Rule Used 
Rulel : f R.F(x)dx R. f F(x)dx 
Rule2 : f xR#-ldx Rfl 
Generalisation 
f S.x"-ldx 
S. f x"-ldx 
S. f G(x)dx 
Figure 3 -1: An Example of Explanation -Based Generalisation in LEX2 
Kedar -Cabelli and McCarty have developed a Prolog meta -interpreter called 
PROLOG -EBG which constructs generalisations from training examples 
(Kedar -Cabelli & McCarty, 1987). Donat and Wallen have developed this work 
within Isabelle to provide a generalisation method based on higher order unifica- 
tion and resolution (Donat & Wallen, 1988). In addition, it has been argued that 
explanation -based generalisation is equivalent to the technique of partial evalua- 
tion, used in functional and logic programming as a program optimisation method 
(van Harmelen & Bundy, 1987) . 
See Subsection 8.1.4 for specific discussion of explanation -based generalisation 
methods with regard to the new domain of general proofs described in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Primitive Recursion 
This section discusses the possibility of an extension of the notion of primitive 
recursion which will be further considered in Chapter 5. 
The class of primitive recursive functions is the smallest class (of functions 110 -} 
IN) containing the basic functions of zero, successor and projection, and closed 
under the basic operations given below (where d is a constant and h is some prim- 
itive recursive function: 
Recursion: (with optional arguments x) for g, h already defined as primitive re- 
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cursive, then so is f where: 
f(0,x ") =g(x); f(n +1,x) = h(f(n,x),n,x) 
Composition: If g : IN3 IN and hi : lNk IN (1 < i < j) are primitive recursive, 
then by composition so is f : INk ---> IN defined by 
f(n1, ... , nk) = g(hl(nl, .. , nk), ... , hj(nl, ... , nk)) 
The recursive functions are those obtained from these functions and rules, plus 
those obtained by use of the least number operator (f (x) - the least number 
n E IN such that the primitive recursive function g(x, n) is 0). Some functions, 
such as Ackermann's function, are computable (and hence recursive by Church's 
thesis), but not primitive recursive. 
Tucker, Zucker and Wainer have generalised the notion of primitive recursiveness 
to that of "CR- computability" (and also the notion of recursive enumerability8 to 
"semicomputability ") (Tucker et al, 1990, P10).9 They define, for each A E K, 
where K is a class which is closed under isomorphism (also called an abstract data 
type), and A is a E- structure, and various other restrictions, functions fi of type 
-I 
(IN, k; li) such that for i = 1, ... , m, 
fi(O,x) = gi(x) 
and for z > 0, 
fi (z, x) = hi(z, f1(Sl (z, x), x), . . . , fm,((Si (z, x), x), .. 
, fl (Sd(z, x), x), . . . , fm(Sd(z, x), x)) 
where for i = 1, ... , m, gi and hi are CR- computable (of suitable type), and for 
i = 1, ... , d, Si is defined by 
8i(z, x) = min(Si(z, x), z - 1), 
8A set is recursively enumerable if and only if there exists some primitive recursive 
function W such that A = {yI3xW (x) = y }. 
9Note also the use of starred sorts (as given in (Tucker et al, 1990, P5)) to combat 
the lack of effective coding of finite sequences within abstract structures in general. 
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for some CR Si of type (IN, k; IN), so that for z > 0, SZ(z, x ") < z. Over 1N, all these 
schemes are equivalent to simple primitive recursion, as with the cases which I 
shall consider in Chapter 5. Note the type of fZ: this definition is not suitable for 
the basic types which I wish to consider which are strings, labelled trees, lists and 
(Cartesian) products of these types, and for which the recursion is over a different 
data structure than the natural numbers. Hence I shall define in Section 5.1 an 
analogous notion of primitive recursive form for datatypes other than the natural 
numbers, and call this "effectiveness" .10 
3.6 Summary 
The chapter is devoted to the provision of background and relevant definitions for 
notions which shall be referred to in later chapters. Much interest and contempo- 
rary work is being carried out in the fields discussed in this chapter, and one may 
conclude that there is plenty of scope for exploiting their relationships and using 
some as a means for effecting advances in others. 
10This should not be confused with the related well -known notion of effective com- 
putability (see (Boolos & Jeffrey, 1980)). 
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Chapter 4 





kEK...lEk ..xEN.xE% :Ds x+1 Ek::D.NDk. 
Giuseppe Peano 
This chapter presents a formal description of a representation of first order Peano 
Arithmetic in Section 4.1, which is reliant upon the description of sequent calculus 
given in Appendix A, followed by a description of the semi -formal system of first 
order arithmetic with the w -rule. It proceeds to discuss first the need and then 
the possible methods of restriction of such a rule. In Subsection 4.3.3 the chosen 
approach for restriction of the w -rule is detailed. 
4.1 PA: First Order Peano Arithmetic 
At the head of the chapter Peano's five postulates were given, where D denotes 
implication. These postulates are a set of axioms for the natural numbers which 
were made explicit before formal systems for the latter were studied, and are still 
central to the modern formulation of arithmetic: classical arithmetic is taken to 
be the theory of the natural numbers built up from Peano's axioms, classical pred- 
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icate logic and the use of primitive recursive definitions. As discussed in Subsec- 
tion 2.1.1, intuitionist arithmetic differs from classical arithmetic in its underlying 
philosophy: in particular, statements are understood in terms of their assertabil- 
ity, rather than their truth. The axioms of Peano Arithmetic are expressed in a 
first -order language of arithmetic, and may directly be seen to be true from our 
grasp of the fundamental nature and structure of the natural numbers. The latter 
is expressed in our understanding of the natural numbers as the smallest structure 
closed under a one -one mapping and containing an element which does not lie in 
the range of that mapping. 
Syntactical details about the formal system PA follow.' A formal system is com- 
prised of a language, axioms and rules of inference. The language normally consists 
of infinite but denumerably many symbols, finite sequences of which form expres- 
sions. Certain expressions (namely the meaningful ones) are designated as the 
formulae of the language. The formulae of PA (and also PAW) are those of formal 
number theory.' The latter will be briefly outlined at this stage to determine the 
conventions to be used. The symbols of the language will be variables, n -ary func- 
tion symbols (a 0 -ary function symbol is a constant) and n -ary predicate symbols 
for each n (the binary predicate symbols including equality), plus the logical sym- 
bols V, A, , V and 3. (In fact, one only needs to have m V and 3, and could 
define the other logical symbols in terms of these). Parentheses and commas in- 
dicate grouping. Terms are formed from 0 and number variables by means of the 
successor function s, +, . and functions. Atomic formulae are of the form x = y, 
where x and y are terms. Formulae are built up from terms in the normal way, 
using quantification on number variables only, to give a first order theory. So, 
formulae are constructed by a generalised inductive definition such that 
1. an atomic formula is a formula; 
2. if u is a formula then is a formula; 
'See for example (Buchholz & Wainer, 1987) for an alternative formulation. 
2As given in for example (Schwichtenberg, 1977). 
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3. if u, y are formulae, then u V V, u A y and u -* y are formulae; 
4. if u is a formula and x is a variable then ]x u and Vx u are formulae. 
The axiomatisation of both systems PA and PAS,, will be given in terms of 
sequents,3 that is expressions of the form r f- 0, where r and 0 are finite (pos- 
sibly empty) lists of formulae. In fact, I shall use a representation where there is 
just a single conclusion in the sequent (that is, 0 must be a formula). Defining 
PA in terms of such intuitionistic variants enables the definition of HA, the intu- 
itionistic counterpart of PA, merely by removing the law of excluded middle. The 
derivations in PA may be regarded as being in tree form, with a given analysis 
as in Appendix A, and the proofs as being derivations with axioms at the leaves. 
The rules of inference for PA are the standard rules for the logical connectives' 
and equality, the axioms are the schema r F- A, where A E r, plus the axioms of 
arithmetic, and also there is the rule of induction. For reference, Peano's axioms 
and the chosen form of the rule of induction under consideration (for there are 
many forms) are stated below. 
4.1.1 Peano's Axioms 
F- Vx Vy s(x) = s(y) -+ x = y; 1 -1 property of successor function 
Vx -i(s(x) = 0); 0 is not the successor of anything 
F- Vx x + 0 = x; addition is primitive 
F- VxVyx +s(y) = s(x y); 
F- Vx x.0 = 0; multiplication is primitive 
F- Vx Vy x.s(y) = (x.y) + x. 
These axioms include a convenient representation of addition and multiplication 
(although these functions can be defined in terms of the successor function using 
3See (Prawitz, 1971, P262 -266) for a natural deduction -style formulation of first - 
order Peano arithmetic, and see Appendix A for a description of sequent calculus. 
4See Table A -1. 
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primitive recursion) . In a similar way, defining equations for each elementary 
function may be given. Induction, substitution, the concept of the natural numbers 
as being generated from an initial member via the sucessor function, together with 
the first two axioms given above correspond to Peano's five Postulates given at 
the start of this chapter. 
Note that a free variable formulation of these rules is used in Seldon5. Regarding 
the question as to whether the axioms of PA should be formulated in a quantifier - 
free form, rather than as above: if a free variable formulation had been given, 
instantiation would be a derived rule, but this would involve use of the substitution 
rule (see Subsection 4.1.5), which requires cut if it is not to be taken as a basic 
rule. However, the use of quantification theory in proofs of quantifier free formulae 
can be eliminated (Kreisel, 1965, P161). 
4.1.2 Induction Rule 
This is the version used in the implementation: 
r I- A(0) F I- Vy(A(y) --> A(s(y))) 
r h dxA(x) 
An alternative representation often used which may be derived from this is: 
r IH A(0) F, A(r) I- A(s(r)) 
F I- A(y) 
Peano's induction rule is obtained as an instance of the generalised (Noetherian) 
induction rule: 
`dmEM(bkEMk <Mm - (k)) - Cm) 
VmEM(1.(m) 
where <M is a well -founded order of the set M. 
4.1.3 Basic Sequents Involving Identity 
1. I- s = s for all terms s. 
5The implementational system - see Chapter 10. 
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2. Si = t1, ... , sn = t, F- f n(s1, . . . , sn) = f n(t1, , tn,) for f any function 
letter, si, ti any terms. 
Hence t1 = t2 I- s(t1) = s(t2). 
3. s1 = t1i ... , sr, = tn, Rn(s1, ... , sn) I- Rn(t1, ... , tn) for every predicate con- 
stant, including ` ='. 
Hence s= t,s= rf -t =r. 
4. s =tFt =s for alltermssandt. 
5. s = t, t = r f- s = r for all terms s, r and t. 
1. -3. are the equality rules normally used (for example see (Takeuti, 1987, P69)), 
but as Gallier has shown, these only allow elimination of "essential" (ie. non- 
atomic) cuts ( Gallier, 1986); 4. and 5. are needed to allow the elimination of 
atomic cuts (cf. natural deduction representation given in (Kaye, 1991, P117)). 
Thus, so long as the equality sequents above are taken as axiomatic, it is the 
presence of the induction rule (for which cut reduction only carries through as far 
as E1- formulae), rather than equality statements, which prevents cut elimination 
holding for PA. 
4.1.4 The Cut Rule 
Subsection 2.3.1 has already introduced various forms of the cut rule. In Seldon6 
the cut rule is given in a form appropriate for backward reasoning as: 
FHA r,Al-C 
rHc (4.1) 
The repercussions of this modification will be discussed at a later stage in Chap- 
ter 10. If the rule of repetition is used in order to allow repeated formulae, rule 4.1 
6The system used for implementation: see Section 10.2. 
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may be derived using 2.2: 
Alternatively, 
r,F-A r,Al -C 
2.2 
r,rF-C 
rep repeated (for all formulae of r) 
rF -c 
rF -A D,AF -C 
rthin rthin 
r,OF- A r,O,AF-C 
4.1 
r,A C 
This shows that, in a system which includes the rules of repetition and thinning, 
rules 2.2 and 4.1 are equivalent. 
4.1.5 The Rule of Substitution 
Note that the rule of substitution? 
rF- A=B AF-REA] 
subst r, 0 F- R [B] 
is a derived rule of inference, using axiom 3. from Subsection 4.1.3, and the cut 
rule (twice), as shown below: 
0 F. R [A] 
axiom 
rI- A=B A=B,RCA] F-R[B] 
cut(A = B) 
r, R [A] I- R[B] 
cut(R [A] ) 
r, A f- RIB] 
However, as mentioned above, using substitution as a derived rule would mean 
that the cut rule is needed for very many proofs. Taking substitution as a basic 
rule, as in the implementation, avoids this problem. 
?Note the conventional use of R [A] to signify that A has been substituted for some 
occurrence of x in R(x). 
81 
4.2 PAW: First Order Arithmetic with Infinite 
Induction 
In this section a system of arithmetic with the w -rule shall be described, with 
a view to implementation. This will have infinite proofs and therefore not be 
a formal system in the usual sense. As discussed in Chapter 2, such a system 
may have various desirable properties such as cut elimination; see (Prawitz, 1971, 
P266 -267) for a natural deduction representation, for which (analogously) full 
normalisation may be carried out.8 
The system PA, is essentially PA enriched with the w -rule in place of the rule 
of induction.9 The derivations are then infinite trees of formulae; a formula is 
demonstrated in PA, by "exhibiting" a prooftree labelled at the root with the 
given formula. I shall consider later how the prooftrees for the system PAcG, 
might be described, but first syntactical details about this system PA, will be 
given (cf. (Löpez- Escobar, 1976, P162)). The formulae of PA, are those of formal 
number theory, with the restriction that the sequents of PAG, consist exclusively 
of sentences (that is, closed formulae).10 The logical rules of inference for the 
8Cut-free derivations in the sequent calculus correspond to normal derivations in 
natural deduction systems. If the natural deduction derivation of a sequent is normal, 
one can find directly a cut -free proof of the corresponding sequent (Prawitz, 1965, P88- 
93). See also the discussion in Subsection 3.1.1. 
9See Subsection 4.1.2. 
19Attention may be restricted to closed formulae only (ie. ones without any free vari- 
ables), since the free variable x in the premise of the Vr -rule is now replaced by infinitely 
many premises r I- A(n) in the w -rule. The restriction will ensure that every free term 
is numerical; moreover, the axioms and basic inferences will be restricted to formulae in 
which no free number variables occur. 
A problem arises due to the fact that there are free variables in the implementational 
system, and free variables in PA, but no free variables in PAS,,, as it is presented in 
this chapter. The implementation approach is to retain the dl -rule, and add the w- 
rule (although it could be stipulated that the Vr- and 3l -rules should not be used). 
The theoretical results state that PA,,, or PANG, are complete for sentences, and make 
use of the fact that the w -rule only applies to sentences (cf. Section 2.5). The closed 
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propositional calculus are the same for PAW as for PA, as are the structural rules 
of inference. The rules of inference for the quantifiers differ: bl and 3r are the 
same, but the following replace Vr and 2l: 
I'HA(0) I'HA(1) ... I'-A(k) 
brW 
I' H bxA(x) 
A(0), I' I- 0 A(1), r f- 0 ... A(k), rI- 0...3lW 
3xA(x), I' H 0 
There is no logical axiom schema, but there is an arithmetical axiom schemata: 
For closed terms t1, t2, 
If t1 = t2 under canonical interpretation, I- t1 = t2 is an axiom of PAW. 
If t1 t2 under canonical interpretation, t1 = t2 I- is an axiom of PAW. 
In certain formulations t = u, A(t) H A(u) would be added to the axioms for 
equality, but this is already covered by the representation of PA given in Section 4.1 
(Girard, 1987, P349). 
PAW has been described by Schütte as a semi -formal system to stress the differ- 
ence between this and usual formal systems which use finitary rules, for PAW has 
basic inferences with infinitely many premises (namely the w -rule) (Schütte, 1977, 
P174). 
formula restriction is basically made to avoid problems arising when there is nesting 
of free variables; thus, a restriction to the examples considered in Chapter 8 such that 
free variables are not used in these examples should avoid any problems due to the fact 
that free variables may be carried across in the implementation. The consequences of 
possibilities of use of free variables in the implementation have not been checked, but 
presumably so long as this restriction is carried out, there should not be a problem. 
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4.3 PA: First Order Arithmetic with the Con- 
structive Omega Rule 
4.3.1 The Use of a "Constructive" Rule 
As discussed in Section 2.1, for implementational purposes infinite proofs must be 
thought of in the constructive sense of being generated, rather than absolute. So, 
having described infinite prooftrees in the metatheory given above, I would like to 
restrict attention to the constructive prooftrees. In Chapter 5 a characterisation of 
effective infinite proofs is given, to allow presentation of the system PA enriched 
with a constructively restricted w -rule in place of the rule of induction. In order to 
do this, the question of whether the `recursive' or rather the `primitive recursive' 
w -rule should be used is now considered (in the sense of appropriate restrictions 
on the w -rule which are to be specified). 
It is important to consider whether it would be preferable to generate the deriva- 
tions by means of a recursive, or else a primitive recursive, function, and hence 
whether this corresponds to PArc, or the analogous system PAS,, (PA+ primi- 
tive recursive restricted w -rule \ induction). This will depend upon whether it 
is the recursive w -rule or its primitive recursive counterpart which will provide 
the basis for implementation, which will be decided by whether the general proof 
representation (in terms of rewrite rules) is recursive or primitive recursive. 
However, if one has the rule of repetition rhó in PAW, any recursive derivation 
can be "stretched out" to a primitive recursive derivation using the same rules of 
inference, plus this rule. Indeed, the cut elimination theorem does not hold for 
PA,,, if this rule is omitted (Löpez- Escobar, 1976, P169). Since if the derivation 
II is recursive, and the rule of repetition is allowed, then there is a primitive recur- 
sive derivation II' not equal to H such that H and H' prove the same formula, one 
might as well allow the rule of repetition, and just concern oneself with primitive 
recursive definitions. Although the rule of repetition may be used if necessary, its 
use will not normally be a useful option under a goal- directed discipline such as 
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the implemented system, and it must be used at most a finite number of times 
in any branch, in order to prevent looping. In the next chapter I shall show that 
the general proof notation in terms of application of rewrite rules may be repre- 
sented effectively (where effectiveness will be presented as an analogous concept 
to primitive recursion). 
What are the properties of the resulting system? As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
Nelson has shown completeness for PA with the primitive recursive w -rule in place 
of induction (Nelson, 1971). PA is no stronger than PA, (see Chapter 4), since 
it has the same syntax. 
However, intuitionistic arithmetic is a stronger theory with the recursively re- 
stricted w -rule than with the primitive recursively restricted w -rule (but it is 
also a stronger theory with the w -rule than the recursively restricted w -rule) 
(Löpez- Escobar, 1977, P77). As mentioned above, this is not so if the law of ex- 
cluded middle is added, thus giving a classical system; see Section 2.5 for further 
details. 
Note that there is also an analogy to be drawn between my implementational 
approach and finitism. Formal systems of recursive number theory, in which gen- 
erality is expressed by free variables and existence by the actual presentation of 
an instance or (if the object depends on parameters) a function, may be said to 
be finitary if the functions admitted are sufficiently elementary - for example, 
primitive recursive functions. In such formalisms any formula will express a gen- 
eral statement, each instance of which can be checked by computation. For this 
reason classical logic can be used. Hence there is an analogy with finitist methods 
regarding my use of the co-rule, and also this justifies use of the (classical) system 
PAW, which has been generated in a constructive manner. 
In conclusion, I shall choose the (classical) system PA with a primitive recursive 
restriction on the prooftrees. This is because my approach is not that of using 
reflective methods, and moreover because there is cut elimination in this system, 
it is suitable for implementation and also PA with the unrestricted w -rule forms 
a conservative extension of this system. 
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4.3.2 Methods of Restriction 
This subsection presents the usual approach to making the w -rule effective. The 
normal approach when dealing with a system with infinitary proofs such as PAS, 
is to work with codes for the derivations' rather than using the derivations them- 
selves, where the codes are natural numbers, and are defined inductively, corre- 
sponding to the inductive build up of such derivations.12 The inductive definition 
carries through easily for the finite rules, but for the w -rule there is a problem as 
in general there are infinitely many premises. The solution normally adopted is to 
assume that the codes for the premises can be enumerated by a primitive recursive 
function, and to use a code (or primitive recursive index) of such an enumeration 
function to construct a code of the whole derivation (see for example (Girard, 1987, 
P390)). The code of a derivation should contain sufficient information about the 
derivation, such as allowing the primitive recursive inference of the name of the 
conclusion of the last inference of the derivation, a bound for the length of the 
derivation, a bound for the cut -rank, etc. See (Schwichtenberg, 1977, P886) for 
further details, including the case of the w -rule. All such derivations obtained by 
embedding arithmetic into this infinite system can be coded. So, as discussed in 
Section 2.5, the restriction on the primitive recursive w -rule is that there is a prim- 
itive recursive f for which, for every n, f (n) is the Gödel number of the proof of 
A(n), the nth numerator of the w -rule (and analogously for the recursive w- rule). 
If infinite PAL,- derivations are considered as well- founded trees in this manner, 
then any code u of a PAW- derivation d can be thought of as being obtained in 
an inductive manner by a code of the corresponding subderivation being attached 
to each node of the tree corresponding to d. Hence the property of u being a 
code for a PAW- derivation (cf. definition given in (Schwichtenberg, 1977, P886)) is 
"Note that, if numeric encoding is used, statements like '-dx x = = 1377890425 
are provable, whereas such expressions will not be present in the system which I utilise. 
12See Section 2.4. 
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equivalent to u being associated with such a well -founded tree. This notion may 
be generalised (Schwichtenberg, 1977, P894): 
"One has to express that at any node (= sequence number) n 
the tree is locally correct, ie. that the code u,,, affixed there (un can 
be easily defined by induction on n) and all its predecessors un *(Z), 
i = 0, 1, 2, ... fulfil a relation as given in the definition of codes for 
(PA-derivations). The well -foundedness is then obtained automat- 
ically, since in particular l un ,0 
1 
< u is required and < is a well - 
ordering." 
I shall not use this approach to making the w -rule effective, but shall instead adopt 
a different method, which is described in the following subsection. 
4.3.3 The Chosen Approach 
In this subsection further discussion is provided about placing a restriction on the 
prooftrees of PA,, such that only those which have been constructively generated 
are allowed, in order to capture the notion of infinite labelled trees in a finite way. 
The chosen approach is that constructive proofs to which attention is restricted 
shall be characterised directly. The meaning of the restriction that the numerators 
of the w -rule may be effectively generated will be discussed in this subsection. In 
Chapter 5 I shall present a representation of in terms of effectively -given 
w- prooftrees, which may not be defined until the notion of primitive recursion 
over datatypes other than the natural numbers has been expressed in Section 5.1. 
Before this, the nature of restrictions on the w -rule which render it suitable for 
implementation must be considered. 
Kreisel discusses the question of appropriate restriction of the proofs of PAW as 
follows (Kreisel, 1965, P163): 
"What restrictions should be put on the proof figures ...? First, 
the obvious way of ensuring inclusion of the new system in the old is 
that one should be able to "talk" about the new system in the old. Pre- 
cisely, each proof figure is a partial ordering of formulae with premises 
preceding conclusions: it should be definable in the old system, and 
it should be provable that (the formula at) any node is related to its 
immediate predecessors according to the rules." 
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Thus, by adding the provability relation and numeric encoding, a reflection sys- 
tem which necessarily extends the original one may be formed (see Chapter 2 
for a comparison between reflective systems and semi -formal systems with the 
w- rule). However, the necessity of using this Gödel numbering approach may be 
avoided by following Tucker in defining primitive recursion over various data -types 
(Tucker et al, 1990), and also Feferman (Feferman, 1989). This is the approach 
that I shall take. 
If an arithmetical encoding method were to be used, the primitive recursive con- 
straint could be attached directly to the w -rule. Recall that the coding restriction 
would be that there is a (primitive) recursive function f such that for each natural 
number n, f(n) is the code of a (possibly infinite) derivation of P(n). However, 
without using such an approach it is not possible to place the restriction on when 
the rule is applied, and instead it must be placed on the shape of the proof in 
which the w -rule appears. So in my case, the primitive recursive restriction on the 
w -rule is that what is restricted is the shape of the trees: only derivations which 
are "effective" will be accepted, a notion which must be defined. 
In the previous subsection a notion of PA,, was given, but there remained the 
question of giving some restriction on the proofs involving the w -rule. I now define 
HPAc4, c iff 3f. f is an `effective' prooftree of PA with as initial sequent 
This is a definition of PA, but it does not define PAS,, as a (semi)- formal system 
in the sense that it does not say what the axioms and rules of inference are. This 
definition replaces the usual approach of using numeric encoding (using notation 
-1) to consider some statement used to strengthen PA of the form: 
I-PA (2H (prooftree(II) A conc(II) = rl'i)) 4) 
In conclusion, it is possible to place restrictions on the admissible prooftrees with- 
out using Gödel encoding, but this necessitates the clarification of what it is to 
place restrictions on the subproofs themselves. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
The chosen approach for restriction of the w -rule such that it may be implemented 
has been presented. In order to carry out this approach without using numeric 
encoding, a new notion of effectiveness must be defined. This will form the subject 
of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Effective Prooftrees for PAcw 
"When one's proofs are aptly chosen, four are as valid as four dozen." 
Matthew Prior 
In this chapter a characterisation of PAcW, which is a representation of arithmetic 
with the w -rule restricted in the way described in the previous chapter, is presented 
in terms of "effective" prooftrees. In order to do this, the notion of effectiveness 
(using primitive recursive definitions in theories other than the natural numbers) 
is defined. 
5.1 Effectiveness over Various Datatypes 
In this section I shall consider the question, and give appropriate definitions, of 
what it is to be a primitive recursive function for a function which does not nec- 
essarily have domain ITV. The analogous property shall be denoted "effectiveness" , 
and bears a strong relation to structural recursion in versions of constructive type 
theory and functional programming languages. This section closely follows Tucker 
et al., whose work on this topic is discussed in Section 3.5. The type of fZ given 
in Tucker's definition means that this definition is not suitable for the basic types 
which I wish to consider, which are strings, labelled trees, lists and (Cartesian) 
products of these types, and for which the recursion is over a different data struc- 
ture than the natural numbers. Hence I shall define an alternative generalisation 
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of primitive recursion for datatypes other than the natural numbers, and call this 
"effectiveness". 
In order to define effectiveness for a particular datatype, it is necessary to define 
the basic functions, composition and recursion, and then state that the effective 
functions over that datatype is the smallest set closed with regard to these oper- 
ations. Certain patterns will be general, and will be considered before the more 
specific cases. 
I shall define what it is to be effective for functions f : S1 x S2 ... x Sk -* Sk +1, 
where Si (for 1 < i < k + 1) is one of the following sorts: string (representing 
sequents) or nat; or else formed using type constructors: Si list (representing lists 
of arbitrary sort; in particular, nat list represents tree -positions). In the next 
section I shall consider representation of trees labelled with objects of type Si. 
This is with the ultimate goal of considering in a further section whether or not 
the pro oftrees for PAW are effective. 
In the following sections, the notation will be employed that type (or typei for 
i E 11V) may range over sorts. 
General 
Projection functions: gk(A1, ... , Ak) = Ai qk : type' x ... x typek -+ typei 
Composition: If g : type' x ... x typed -> type, hi : types, x ... x typesk -* 
typei,1 < i < j are effective, then f : types, x ... x typesk -+ type is primitive 
recursive, where for Stri E types: 
f (Strl, . . . , Strk) =s 9(hl(Str', . . . , Strk), . . . , h; (Strl, . . . Strk)) 
Specific 
In all of the following cases, the effective functions are the basic functions and 
projection functions, together with all those which may be generated from effec- 
tive functions by a finite number of applications of the rules of composition and 
recursion. The definition of datatypes shall be given in terms of constants and 
constructor functions. 
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5.1.1 Natural Numbers: f : nat -* type 
If type is nat, this is just primitive recursion. 
Datatype: nat = {0} U {s(n) In E nat} 
1. the constant is 0 
2. the constructor function is the successor function s : IN -* IN such that 
s(x) = x +1 Vx E IN, as with primitive recursion. 
Recursion: 
If g : type' x ... x typek -+ type and h : type' x ... x typek x nat x type -4 type 
are effective, then so is f : type' x ... x typek x nat -3 type, where: 
f(n1,...,nk,0) = g(n1,...,nk) 
f(n1,...,nk,S(x)) = h(n',...,nk,x,f(nl,...,nk,x)) 
(the ni E typei may be omitted). 
5.1.2 Lists: f : t list -+ type 
Note that the elements of the list may be of any type, and not just nat. 
Datatype: t list = { [ ] } U {cons(x, y) lx E t,y E t list} 
1. the constant is [ ] (- nil) 
2. constructor function is "cons" 
cons : type x type list -4 type list, written ::. 
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Recursion: 
If g : type' x ... x typek -3 typem and h : type' x ... x typek x typen x typenlist x 
typen,, -+ typem are effective, then so is f : type' x ... x typek x typen list -4 typem, 
defined by 
f(n1, ...,nk, C7) =g(n',...,nk) 
.f(n1,...,nk,H :: T) = h(nl,>nk)H,T,f(n',...,nk,T)) 
(where the ni E typei). 
(Note that functions such as head : type list -÷ type and tail : type list -4 type list 
are definable using recursion.) 
5.1.3 Strings: f : string -+ type 
In this subsection a definition of effectiveness for strings is given, where strings are 
taken to be binary trees with characters at the nodes, used to represent the syntax 
of formulae, etc. This representation allows a concatenated expression to be split 
uniquely into two parts, which is necessary when making the recursive definition 
below. Suppose that a finite set of characters (C) is given. 
Datatype: string = C U {st *stIst E string} 
1. constant strings are taken to be the initial characterisation of characters. 
2. the constructor function is )x. ay. x *y (syntactical juxtaposition or concate- 
nation - see for example (Kleene, 1962, P71)), where * : string x string -* 
string and `A' *`B' =s `AB'. 
Recursion: 
Given gchar : type' x ... x typek -+ string, h : type' x ... x typek x string x string x 
type -4 type which are effective, then f : type' x ... x typek x string -4 type 
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is primitive recursive, as defined below, where S 1 , .. , Sk (Si E typei) may be 
omitted: 
f (S1, ... , Sk, `char') =s gchar(S1, . . . , Sk) 
f(Si,...,8k,A *B) =s h( 51,..., Sk, A, B ,f(Si,..., Sk, A),f(Si,..., Sk, B)) 
(The characters are a finite, enumerated set, so definition by cases is effective.) 
5.2 Labelled Trees 
In the previous section I have defined what it is for f : t1 x ... x t , -* t,,,, to 
be effective, where ti = string or nat or type list. To define labelled trees, one 
may just consider t : nat list -4 label_type: it is not necessary to define an 
extra datatype tree. The intention in this section is to represent w- prooftrees as 
f : nat list -4 string *string from positions to formulae. For positions outside 
the tree, the range of f is defined to be É, where É is shorthand for some dummy 
expression of the form string *string. To this end, formal definitions must be 
presented: f shall be defined to be a well -founded tree; the rule used at each node 
in the tree prescribes well -formedness; strings shall represent the formula and rule 
at each node (for formulae correspond to strings); plus the definition of f as a 
prooftree shall be given. The ultimate goal is to use the notion of effectiveness in 
order to place a restriction on the w -rule without the use of numeric encoding. In 
the following chapter I shall also show what trees my implementational approach 
selects, and how their correctness may be checked. 
5.2.1 Syntax 
Next some examples of the sorts of syntax which is involved are presented, and it 
is shown how this fits into the general framework. 
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Recall that the syntax used for labelling the tree is composed of variables, con- 
stants, terms, formulae and sequents.1 Terms are the objects of the language, 
which are generated from constants and variables via functions, and including the 
former. Formulae are assertions about terms having certain properties, and are 
generated via predicates and the logical operators. Sequents are composed of a 
finite (but possibly empty) set of formulae, followed by a turnstile (I-), followed 
by at most one formula. Although it may be considered a simplification just to 
use strings rather than abstract syntax, it is sufficient for the current purposes. 
Note that the characters allowable within symbols are a, ... , z, A, ... Z, 0, 1, ... 9. 
Brackets `(' and `)' are used for clarification of grouping. Other symbols involved 
in forming terms, formulae and sequents are ` + ', `.', `, ', ` I- ' and the logical con- 
nectives. A string is a sequence of these symbols enclosed by ". Only some of these 
strings will be meaningful, namely those corresponding to the terms or formulae 
of the language PA,,,. 
The aim is to show that the functions used to label trees with syntax are effective. 
In fact, recursion over strings is not needed in order to define the string operations 
below, since these may be built using concatenation (î), composition and projec- 
tion plus recursion over lists and numerals. Basic syntax will carry over from PA, 
such as: 
plus(X, Y) =s (X*` +') *Y; 
times(X, Y) =s 
equals2(X, Y) =s (X*` = 
Given the definitions of effectiveness over strings (and hence the syntax) given in 
Subsection 5.1.3, it may be shown that the basic operations corresponding to the 
formation of terms in the language, and then the formation of formulae, are also 
primitive recursive. 
plus: string x string string is effective, where 
1See Section 4.1 and also (Kleene, 1962, P70 -80) for syntactic details. 
2Note that this is the object -level equality. 
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plus(Strl, Str2) =s (Str1` +') *Str2.3 
Similarly, the other term -constructing operations are effective, ie. times: string x 
string -4 string where times(Strl, Str2) =s (Str1 *`.') Str2 (via proof by re- 
cursion). The operation corresponding to the formation of atomic formulae ie. 
equals(X,Y) =s (X*` =')Y is also shown to be effective in an analogous manner 
to plus. 
Formulae are formed by composition, and by use of logical symbols. So, if X 
and Y are strings, one may define and: string x string -+ string such that 
and (X, Y) =s .X."` A 'W. The definition is given generally, but only used on 
formulae. Similarly for or and implies: these are all shown to be effective by 
recursion. not: string -+ string defined by not(X) =s *X, also has a recursive 
definition. In the case of the quantifiers forall /exists: string x string -* string, 
forall(X, Y) =s `d' *X *` :: ' *Y4 is effective (and similarly for exists). 
Sequents 
In order to form sequents, one requires the function turnstile: string list x string -* 
string, and the new symbols "H" and "," , such that: 
turnstile( [ ] , Y) =s ` I- ' *Y; 
turnstile( [X] , Y) =s 
turnstile( [H :: T] , Y) =s H*`,' turnstile(T, Y). 
The notion of parametrised syntax strings is also needed. For example, nthsuc 
allows the expression of sn (Y), ie. `. . . s(Y), and is defined by nthsuc: nat x 
n times 
string -4 string, which is effective by the definition: 
nthsuc(0, Y) =s Y; 
nthsuc (s(X),Y) =s `s('* nthsuc(X,Y) i')'. 
This is closely related to numeralstring: nat -± string, which generates strings of 
natural numbers `0', `s(0)', `s(s(0))', etc. and which may be defined by 
numeralstring(n) = nthsuc(n, `0'). 
3This applies to more than terms - for example, plus(`0', `s( +') = `0 + s( +'. 
4According to the Seldon formulation of forall: see Subsection 10.2. 
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Next the definition of what it is to have a parametrised equation is considered; 
this is needed to describe the nth iteration of some rewrite rule. For the particular 
equation s'' (X) + Y = sn (X + Y), eq: nat string may be defined by: 
eq(n) =s equals(plus(nthsuc(n, `X'), `Y'), nthsuc(n, plus('X', `Y'))). 
This is an example of the sort of expression found in the lines of the general 
proof (for they are parametrised - if a particular number is substituted for n, the 
result will evaluate to the syntax of formulae within sequents associated with 
individual nodes in the recursive prooftree). Other examples of parametrised 
syntax are g(n) =s gae' plus(0,Z) ( =s nth_suc(n, plus(0,Z))) and h(n) =s 
plus(` s ... s(0) ', Z) ( =s plus (nth_suc(n, 0) , Z)). The approach extends to all of 
the syntax of PAW as defined in Section 4.1. Note that, for the general proof, 
which shall be defined in Chapter 6, it is necessary to show in addition that both 
the application of rewrite rules is effective, and that the extension of the syntax 
used within the general proof is effective (see Section 6.3). 
5.2.2 Comparison with Effectiveness of nth Subtree of 
Prooftrees 
The effectiveness of syntactical functions f : nat -> string such that f : n 
`41 (n)' is primitive recursive for some formula 4)(n) compares with the effectiveness 
of functions f : nat list -4 string defining proofs. For it is necessary to express 
the notion of an nth subtree, sn(Term), in terms of n within the representation of 
PA,,,,,, in order to consider the kth subtree (ie. P(k), where A(k) is the (k + 1)st 
hypothesis of the constructive w -rule ) Hence, there is a correspondence 
between certain syntactical expressions, such as numeralstring (with domain nat 
and range string) and prooftrees. However, as seen in the previous subsection, 
most of the other syntax is not parametrised in this way. 
Now it is possible to tackle expression of the `primitive recursive' restriction on 
the w -rule, in terms of the effectiveness of its subproofs. 
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5.3 Effective Prooftrees for PAS,,, 
In the previous section the notion of what it is for a tree to be effective has been 
defined. It is now possible to move on to provide a definition of prooftrees for 
PA, part of which is to show that these are effective. 
5.3.1 General Approach 
Firstly the notion of prooftrees shall be defined. This representation is analogous to 
giving the semantics of PA,,,, for the well- founded trees are mathematical objects 
which are the focus of discussion. The semantics of PAW would define what it 
means to say that a statement X is provable in PAW, which in this case would be 
if there is an effective prooftree which ends up proving X. In Subsection 2.1.2, it 
was postulated that the meaning of a proof might be represented by a canonical 
proof; hence the canonical effective prooftrees would provide a semantics for PAW 
(cf. Subsection 5.3.3). 
I have defined a tree as primitive recursive if there is an effective function which 
describes it,5 and I have considered the question of what it is for f to be an 
effective function f : nat list -+ seq * rule in Section 5.2. Note that in general, 
the aim is to constructively define infinite trees; in particular, I am going to define 
5This leads us to consider what the criteria for equality might be. Will two w- 
derivations be the same if the functions which define them are the same, as Sundholm 
(Sundholm, 1978, P89) suggests? It might be said that it is rather the end result that 
matters, and the fact that the derivations were generated, and not the similarity of the 
functions which generated them. As Kreisel writes (Kreisel, 1971, P127): 
"in connection with the topic of criteria for the identity of proofs, it is 
perhaps worth mentioning that we can easily introduce some equivalence 
relation between derivations even if we consider only extensional equality 
(between terms)." 
However, the algorithm does matter, as is shown by the existence of input -output func- 
tions (eg. Goodstein's function) which are computable by a primitive recursive function, 
but for which the algorithm may not be represented in a primitive recursive manner, and 
the similarity of generating functions must form the criteria for the identity of proofs. 
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a function which determines what is at any individual node in the tree. It is 
possible to have trees with a non -recursive shape; I wish to exclude such trees 
from being prooftrees. The prooftrees shall be given by an effective description, 
and will be labelled with formulae, using effective syntax, and must be correct and 
well- founded. This makes use of constructive ideas regarding infinite proofs (see 
Section 2.1). 
A derivation in PAS,, consists of a tree at whose nodes are assigned sequents and 
rules. An "analysis" of a derivation (here without rules) consists in assigning to 
each node n of the tree one of the expressions Vr, Vi, ... , Vr, 31 axiom in such a 
way that if Vr, ... , axiom respectively is assigned to the node n, then the sequents 
directly below the node n have been obtained from the sequent at the node n by 
the rule Vr, ... , axiom respectively (in the case of axiom it is understood that the 
sequent at n is a lowermost sequent and an arithmetical axiom). 
So, the general idea is that infinite PAS,,, derivations may be considered as well - 
founded trees generated by an effective function from tree positions (finite lists 
of natural numbers) to the sequent and rule associated with each node, where at 
each node there is either no branching at all (ie. it is a bottommost node) and an 
instance of the rule axiom is affixed, or there is 1 -fold branching (corresponding to 
the rules Al, Vr, -3 r, 3r, etc.) or a 2 -fold branching (corresponding to the rules 
Ar, vi, -+ 1, cut, etc.) or an w -fold branching (corresponding to the rules Vr,, and 
2L). In fact, there will be infinite branching at each node and the nodes which 
are not needed will be marked with a dummy symbol É. These derivations will be 
effective trees labelled with formulae (ie. each node is labelled with the appropriate 
sequent to be proved at that stage) and the rule used, which are checked for correct 
inference. 
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5.3.2 Definition of Effective Prooftrees for PAS,,, 
These notions are now formalised: 
Definition 5.1 (Effective prooftree for PAcw) f is an effective prooftree for 
PAc,,,, if and only if f is an effective function f : nat list -+ seq * rule such that f 
is well - founded and correct. 
Definition 5.2 (Well- founded tree) f is well- founded if it does not have an 
infinitely deep branch. 
The fact that only finite lists of natural numbers are allowed as positions is built 
into the definition of nat list - what is important here is that every branch 
terminates. This is encapsulated in 1. below.6 
Definition 5.3 (Correct tree) f is correct if at any point in the tree, the rela- 
tionship between each node and its subnodes will be determined by the rule applied. 
This notion is captured in 6. below. The correctness of prooftrees is further dis- 
cussed in Section 5.4. 
I define f: Position of Node 1-4 (Sequent at Node, Rule used at Node), where the 
range specifies labels, or symbols, in the tree associated with each node, and the 
position is represented by lists of natural numbers. I will define an ordering on 
trees in terms of this position representation (where the positions are represented 
by lists of natural numbers): 
Definition 5.4 (Order in tree) Define the relation < on nat list x nat list by: 
Posl < Pos2 <-4 31 Pos2 = Posl <> 1, 1 E nat list 
6So in the representation below, each branch must at some stage have axiom or 
incomplete (see 3. below) associated with a node on that branch (this will actually be 
the bottommost node, due to the definitions of construction of the tree). The notion 
of `É' formulae is retained for empty nodes. See for example (Girard, 1987, P294), for 
further details of well- founded trees. 
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This defines < as a partial ordering, which will enable the description of the trees 
as well- founded with regard to this ordering. These definitions hold for the tree 
being developed top -down. If a node has position [P1, . . . , Pk] , its subnodes will 
have positions [P1, ... , Pk, 0] , [P1, ... , Pk, 17, etc. The representation would be 
analogous if the tree were developed bottom -up, as in the representation given by 
(Löpez- Escobar, 1976). 
Definition 5.5 (Empty node) É, the empty label, is shorthand for (dummy seq, 
dummy rule), and indicates that there is nothing at a particular node. 
Hence, f : nat list -* seq * rule describes a derivation in PAS,, for the sequent 
where 1. is the sequent at the top of the tree (viz. at the node [ ]) if: 
1. {p : nat listl f (p) É} is a well -founded tree according to <. 
2. If f (p) É, then q2 (f (p)) is a sentence associated with the node p (namely 
the sequent to be proved) , and 4(f (p)) is the name of a rule of PAS,, used 
to produce its immediate successors, where q is a projection function such 
that q2 (A, B) = A and q2 (A, B) = B. 
3. If p is a bottommost node in the tree, ie. f (q) = É for all q such that p < q, 
and f (p) É, then either q2 (f (p)) is an axiom of PAS,, and q2 (f (p)) is 
axiom, or else f (p) is set to incomplete to indicate that the tree is incomplete. 
4. If Pos <> [K] (K E IN) is not a bottommost node, then q2 (f (Pos <> 
[K])) is the Kth subgoal of q2 (f (Pos <> [K])) applied to 6(f (Pos)) . 
Definition 5.6 (Incomplete tree) The derivation is incomplete if not all the 
leaves are closed ie. if incomplete is associated with any node in the tree. 
Definition 5.7 (Prooftree) The derivation will be a prooftree if it is a complete 
derivation, in other words if all its leaves are axioms (and the others marked as 
dummy nodes, if appropriate, since there is infinite branching at each node). 
Definition 5.8 (Subgoals) The subgoals of p may be defined as subgoals(p) = 
{gá(f(p <> [n])) In E IIV,f(p <> [n]) É}. 
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Consequences of this Definition 
Properties of the tree will be: 
1. Defining br(Rule), where Rule is a rule of PA, as the number of subgoals 
of Rule (ie. br(bru,) =w, br(-+ r) =1, br(-* l) =2, etc.), if L 0 w, where 
br(g2 (f (Pos))) = L, L E IN, then f (Pos <> CM]) = É VM > L, M E IN.7 
Since br(axiom) = 0, if p < q and p 0 q for some position representation 
p,q, where p is a bottommost node in the tree, then f (q) = É. 
2. If f (Pos <> CI] ) = É, then f (Pos <> [J]) = É b'J > I E I1V. 
As mentioned above, Löpez- Escobar (and hence Sundholm (Sundholm, 1978)) de- 
velop the tree from the axioms towards the sequent to be proved. Infinitely deep 
branches are prevented, although there may be infinitely many top nodes. The 
process may be thought of as a reductive process, as opposed to one of generation. 
The procedure described above is analogous to this approach, but, in particular, 
4., the section which checks that the formula labelling at the nodes corresponds 
to the proof rules applied, would be replaced by: 
4.* If Pos is not a top -node, then the sequents above Pos (ie. Pos <> [K] (where 
the positioning is defined the other way up) where K E I1V, ie. {q2 (f (Pos <> 
[K] )) : f (Pos <> [K]) 0 É }) act as premises for an instance of the rule 
q2 (f (Pos)) , which yields q2 (f (Pos)) as conclusion. 
In this case the rule associated with a node is that used to infer the sentence as- 
sociated with the node from its immediate predecessors, which may be considered 
preferable from a theoretical point of view. However, the approach described in 
this section is more suitable for automation, as it generates the subgoals of the 
w -rule, rather than having to check their presence. 
7 >_, since the natural numbers, and the subnodes, are taken to start at O. 
102 
5.3.3 Uniform Search 
There is a useful discussion to be had concerning uniform search within the 
prooftrees. If the object is to carry out uniform search, or the ability to generate all 
possible proofs is considered desirable, it is necessary to input information about 
which rules to use in a particular proof. If not, a canonical tree could just be 
generated (for example, by the standard decomposition method (Takeuti, 1987, 
P44 -7)). The way of forming a canonical tree is to operate on the major con- 
nective, with some uniform method of decision about the order of choosing the 
formulae, and any new terms or variables to be used. Infinitary branching of the 
tree results if the major connective is a universal quantifier on the right of the 
sequent, or an existential on the left. Such a process may be constrained to satisfy 
the conditions given in the previous subsection, and thus will describe a method of 
provision of an effective prooftree corresponding to the proof of a given sequent in 
PAS,, (although of course other (non- canonical) prooftrees which also correspond 
to the proof of such a sequent in PAS,, are possible). Hence, for each sequent S 
a possibly infinite tree is defined, from which either a (cut -free) proof of S may 
be obtained, or an interpretation not satisfying S. Such a canonical prooftree will 
provide a meaning for the original sequent to be proved: see Subsection 2.1.2 for 
a general discussion of canonical proofs. 
How is it possible to check which prooftrees are well- founded (cf. Definition 5.2), 
in case the non -canonical prooftrees are also of interest? Although the well - 
foundedness check is not computable8, it might be possible to compute all possible 
rules which are applicable at a particular node. There are only a finite number 
of rules which may be applied at each node (in fact, k + 1, where the sequent 
is {A1, ... , Ak} I- C, since a logical rule may be applied only on the major con- 
nective of each formula) , although of course there are also thinning and various 
8The Halting problem reduces to the well- founded tree problem (but not vice versa). 
The former is unsolvable in the sense that it is not possible to provide an algorithm in 
terms of n to tell in advance whether a computation will terminate upon input n - see 
for example (Boolos & Jeffrey, 1980, P28). 
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other structural rules, plus the possibility of selecting from an infinite but denu- 
merable number of terms when using the quantificational logical rules (and so in 
this sense there would be an infinite number of possible rules). However, it would 
be possible to automate search for a proof by constructing some sort of universal 
search method which would calculate a suitable rule to be applied to seq, develop 
the tree, and then backtrack to the latest failure point in a backwards, depth -first 
manner. If only one proof were required, the standard decomposition method 
mentioned above could be used; otherwise, many proofs of a particular sequent 
might be found using such a uniform search procedure. 
This discussion relates to the question of whether the prooftree -generating function 
should be of the form f : nat list -+ seq, or f : nat list -+ seq * rule. `rule' 
is an enumerated type (although the quantification rules take parameters, thus 
producing an infinite number of possibilities), and represents each rule used at a 
tree position (in the form of a list of natural numbers) to derive the corresponding 
subgoals. This can be inputted via some external source, or else calculated from the 
form of the sequent, as suggested above. Note that in Löpez -Escobar's analogous 
representation, the rule is part of the analysis, and not of the tree, although 
Sundholm uses seq *rule (Sundholm, 1978, P13). So long as it is possible to show 
that rule application is an effective operation, either option is possible within the 
framework given above. 
In conclusion, I shall retain the labelling notation of seq *rule, since both a sequent 
and a rule are associated with the node. The rule may be used in order to establish 
correctness. 
5.3.4 Summary 
In this section a characterisation of primitive recursive prooftrees has been given. 
In the next chapter another description of w- prooftrees is given, closer to practical 
interests. I have described infinite prooftrees in some metatheory in a finite way, 
and restricted attention to constructive ones. Effectiveness has been defined over 
various datatypes, and the constructive trees to be considered are the effective 
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trees. The next section considers how it would be possible to prove that these 
trees are correct. 
5.4 Correctness of Well - Founded Trees 
There are two main notions of correctness of well- founded trees, namely `local' 
correctness, which checks that an appropriate rule is applied at each node of the 
tree, and `global' correctness, which is concerned with whether the tree is well - 
founded. Such a distinction is highlighted by Kreisel (Kreisel, 1971, P128): 
"In the case of, possibly, infinite derivations there is the addi- 
tional step of verifying that each (infinite) proof figure involved is well - 
founded. More explicitly, we give a description of a sequence of proof 
figures ... What has to be established is first that the figure described 
is locally correct, that is the formula at a node N of a proof figure is 
built up according to the rules from the formulae at the immediate 
successor of N; second in the infinite case, that the whole figure is 
well- founded;" 
Given a tree in the form of f : nat list -+ string, how is it possible to check that 
this is a locally and globally correct tree? In the previous sections well- founded 
prooftrees have been discussed, and hence global correctness, but the question of 
local correctness of prooftrees was not properly considered. To check for local 
correctness, meta -induction is used over the prooftrees. In order to define this, 
induction principles over trees, lists, strings, etc. are used. There is a natural way 
of defining induction corresponding to effectiveness (using the base case, construc- 
tors, etc.) In general, for the datatypes nat, type list and string given above, the 
induction rule for each type is of the form: 
A(b) A(f) A(c(r)) 
Vx E type A(x) 
where b is the base case of the datatype type, and c(r) is the constructor of type 
applied to r (arbitrary arguments of type). 
The base cases and constructors for the various types under consideration are 
given in the previous sections. So, for example, induction over lists will take the 
105 
form: 
A([ ]) A(t) = A(h :: t) 
bl E type list A(l) 
for arbitrary t E type list and h E type. 
To show local correctness of the prooftrees, the corresponding meta -induction (for 
nat list) is used for the tree -defining function f : nat list -* string * string. Thus: 
f (EJ) f (Pos) f (Pos <> [k]) 
dx f(x) 
where Pos, x E nat list and k E nat. That is to say that given an initial sequent 
(and initial rule used), plus a way of obtaining from a sequent at some position the 
sequent at a node directly below that position, then the sequent at each node of the 
tree is defined. This process of obtaining sequents at subnodes, given a sequent at 
a node, is carried out by applying the rule associated with the node to the sequent 
at the node, and is described above. The result is uniquely determined, given a 
rule and sequent, and hence the prooftrees are locally correct. (This formulation of 
induction for prooftrees corresponds to meta -induction in PA,,,,,, which is discussed 
in Subsection 7.2.2, for which a well- founded tree will be shown to be correct by 
proving that the sequent at Pos <> [k] may be reduced in a uniform manner to 
the sequent at Pos.) Note that the induction over the partial ordering < of the 
tree representation is usually given as transfinite induction, which is allowable if 
numeric encoding is used at each node (Kreisel, 1965, P163). 
At this stage it could be objected that there might be circularity, for although 
the w -rule is used instead of induction, meta -induction is being introduced here, 
which might result in there being no advance. This question will be addressed in 
Subsection 8.6.2, in which it shall be shown that the generalisation problem does 
not in practice occur in the theory of trees, and so that there is a gain after all. 
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5.5 Overall Conclusions 
In this chapter a characterisation of PAS,, has been presented. I have chosen 
to use the primitive recursive w -rule, rather than its recursive counterpart. When 
reasoning about the enlarged system, the objects of interest are recursive (possibly 
infinite) prooftrees (in the sense of Löpez- Escobar (Löpez- Escobar, 1976)), labelled 
with formulae (namely, the sequents to be proved at each point) and rules. The 
notion of effectiveness of a tree, which corresponds to primitive recursion, has been 
defined. A (proof) tree must be well- founded, in the sense that it does not have 
an infinitely deep branch. The rules that relate the formulae between node and 
subnode are the standard rules for the logical connectives, the extra w -rule with 
subgoals (1.(0), 1,(1), ..., and substitution. A formula in PA is demonstrated in 
the extended theory by exhibiting a prooftree labelled at the root with the given 
formula. In the next chapter I shall show how the implementation relates to the 




In this chapter the relationship between PAS, and the implementational version 
of such a system is considered. More specifically, the following are examined: 
presentation of the general proof representation (involving the application of 
rewrite rules); 
approach; 
consideration of the relationship between the general proof representation 
and PAS,,; 
correctness of the general proof representation; 
discussion of conditional rewrite rules and branching general proofs. 
6.1 General Proof Representation 
The general proof representation used in the implementation for representing and 
manipulating proofs shall be presented. In the following sections the relationship 
between this representation and the system PAS,,, shall be detailed, and then 
various properties of the general proof representation investigated. 
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6.1.1 What is a General Proof? 
As discussed in Chapter 4, one way in which the constructive w -rule may be put 
into effect is to require that there is an enumeration of the derivations which prove 
the premises - for example one could code proofs by numbers, by means of a 
primitive recursive function which generates them, as described in Section 2.4. 
But I have not used such a traditional representation; it was sufficient for my 
purposes to provide (for the nth case) a description for the general proof in a 
constructive way. 
The general proof representation represents P(n), the proof of the nth numerator 
of the constructive w -rule, in terms of rewrite rules applied a function of n or a 
constant number of times to formulae (dependent upon the parameter n). There 
are two types of representation of the general proof which will be considered: an 
implementational representation and the representation in terms of trees described 
in Chapter 5, which are closely related. It is necessary to provide (for the nth case) 
a description for the general proof in a constructive way (in this case a recursive 
way), which captures the notion that each P(n) is being proved in a uniform way 
(from parameter n). The method of obtaining a general proof of a statement A(r) 
is to take the nth case A(n), and apply the rewrite rules indicated in the hope of 
reaching truth or equality. For example, let us consider Vx (x +x) +x = x +(x +x). 
Let us presume that, within the particular formalisation of arithmetic chosen, one 
is given the axioms of addition of Figure 6 -1. The general proof, P(n), will take 
the form given in Figure 6 -1 (although it may be represented in a variety of ways). 
By sn (0) is meant the numeral n, ie. the term formed by applying the successor 
function n times to O. The next stages use the axioms as rewrite rules from left to 
right, and substitution in the general proof, under the appropriate instantiation of 
variables, with the aim of reducing both sides of the equation to the same formula. 
The general proof represents, and highlights, blocks of rewrite rules which are 
being applied. Meta -induction may be used (on the first argument) to prove the 
more general rewrite rules from one block to the next: for example, 
Vn sn(x) + y = sn(x + y) 
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Axioms 
0+y = y (6.1) 
s(x) + y = s(x + y) (6.2) 
Proof 
n = sn(0) 
USE 6.2 n TIMES ON RIGHT 
USE 6.2 n TIMES ON LEFT 
USE 6.1 TWICE 
USE 6.2 n TIMES ON LEFT 
(n +n) +n 
(Sn (0) + Sn (0)) + Sn(0) 
(Sn (0) + Sn (0)) + Sn (0) 
Sn (0 + Sn 0)) + Sn (0) = 
sn (Sn (0)) + Sn (0) 
Sn (0) +sn(0)) 
=n+(n+n) 
= sn(0) +(sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= Sn(0 + (sn(0) + sn(0))) 
sn(0 + (sn(0) 
¡+ 
sn(0))) 
= sn(sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= sn(sn(0) + sn(0)) 
A B C D 
EQUALITY 
Figure 6 -1: A General Proof of Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) 
corresponds to n applications of axiom 6.2 above. 
Proof 
Base: n = 1 s(x) + y = s(x + y) - 6.2. 
Step: If sr (x) + y = Sr (x + y), then sr +1(x) + y = sr +l (x + y). 
sr+l(x) + = s.sr(x) + y 
= s(sr(x) + y) by 6.2 
= s.sr(x + y) by hyp 
= sr+l(x + y) 
This type of meta -induction used to justify the correctness of the general proofs 
shall be further considered in Subsection 6.4.1. 
The recursive function which is sought is described by the sequence of rule appli- 
cations, parametrised over n. The general proof is given in terms of n, each rule 
R being applied fR(n) times, for some fR. In practice, the first few proofs will 
be special cases, and it is rather the correspondence between the proofs of P(99), 
say, and P(100), which is to be captured. The question of whether the goal is just 
being transferred to the meta -level in the general proof, where pre- defined rules 
are used to obtain equality, thus obtaining a form of circularity, is addressed in 
Subsection 8.6.2. 
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6.1.2 Implementational Approach 
The above discussion results in the consideration of how the general proofs might 
be represented from an implementational point of view. For an application of the 
w -rule, a description of the nth subproof is required, uniformly with respect to the 
parameter n. An example representation, in the linear case, for the general proof 
for P(n) is: 
gen([R1(Posl, f l'(n)), R2(Pos2, f 2'(n)), ...] ). 
where the representation for each individual proof for P(J) would be of the form: 
proof (J, [Rulel j(PoslJ, T1 j), Rule2 j(Posli, T2 j), ...] ) 
This is a predicate, its first argument being the natural number J, and the other 
argument being an ordered list of predicates such that RuleKK is the Kth rule to be 
applied in the proof, and is applied TKJ times, with PosKj specifying the position 
at which it is applied. Note that one may have RuleAj = RuleBJ. For further 
details see Section 10.3. Note that in general a more complicated representation 
is needed (see Section 6.6), since it is necessary to know exactly where to apply 
the rules in the proof, particularly if branching occurs, and perhaps the best way 
of pinpointing this information is to use a tree representation. 
An analogous representation in terms of prooftrees may be used. A recursive 
function gen_p f : proof x IN -3 proof is defined which, when given a number and 
a (proof)tree, returns the prooftree below some node in the tree whose position is a 
function of that number. So if the co-rule is used initially (at node [ ] ), the n +ith 
subtree of the tree may be selected by using gen_p f (Tree, n), which will be the 
prooftree with top node [n] (for 0 < n E w). This enables the construction of the 
generalised proof, in the sense that it will represent the mechanism of obtaining the 
proofs P(0), P(1), P(2) ... generated by the constructive w -rule. It can be seen 
that this is closely related to the function which generates recursive prooftrees 
given in the previous chapter. 
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6.2 Relationship Between General Proof Rep- 
resentation and PA,, 
In this section the relationship between the representation of proofs given in Chap- 
ter 5 and those given in Section 6.1 above is defined. 
6.2.1 The Derived Rule Z 
In the representation of PA,, a derived form of primitive recursive function - 
defining equations as inference rules is required to allow rewriting of formulae 
(which takes place in general proof examples, and hence an analogy is needed). 
These are of the type I below - it is just convenient to define these as single steps, 
as shorthand in order to avoid going through all the equivalent tedious steps of 
PA. 
Axiom: VxVy s(x) + y = s(x + y) 
Example General Proof: s(o) +o =s(o)Z s(o +o) =s(o) 
In general: 
I' `dxyR(x, y) = S(x, y) 0 H T(R(p, g))Z 
I', 0 I- T(S(p, q)) 
I is a derived rule of PA, as it is equivalent to the following: 
axiom 
R(p, g) = S(p, g) R(p, g) = S(p, g) 
VI( x2) 
dxy R(x, y) = S(x, y) H R(p, q) = S(p, q) I' I- </xy R(x, y) = S(x, y) 
cut 
I' R(p, q) = S(p, q) 0 I- T(R(p, q)) 
I', 0 F T(S(p, q)) 
subst 
One may deduce a more general rule T, in a similar manner, where I' is the 
following: 
r h V R(x) = S(x) A H T (R(p1)1, 
F, A I- T(S(p)) 
where if the arity of x is k, then p = {pi, ... pk} for terms pi (1 < i < k) in the 
language of PA,. 
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The derived rule Z above corresponds to "apply R. once ", where R. is the rewrite 
rule R(x, y) S(x, y). "Apply 7Z a constant number of times, k" just repeats Z 
k times. Z corresponds to the basic formulation of PAS,,, so if the given proce- 
dure about tree construction from rules is followed, a recursive prooftree will be 
obtained. Note that in the tree there is infinite branching, so dummy subtrees will 
have to be inserted if necessary. 
In the general proof, one starts with something to be proved, and ends with 
equality, corresponding to an axiom. In practice, only rewrite rules are usually 
used, but it is possible to use logical rules which might cause the general proof to 
split. However, such case splits of conditionals do not pose any problem, because 
they correspond exactly to the logical rules of PAS,. 
Note that if such derived rules were to be used in the prooftree representation, the 
whole equivalent subtree should be substituted instead, since the new node position 
otherwise would not be a direct subnode (in terms of its position representation) 
of the original node at which such a rule was applied. 
6.2.2 The Derived Rule J 
The other case to consider is when a rewrite rule of the form "apply 7Z some 
function of n times" is applied in the general proof. This corresponds to the 
(derived) rule J below, which may be proven in PAS,,, with the use of induction. 
r dxdyR(x, y) = S(x, y) 0 I- T (Rfl"> (p, q)) 
r, 0 F- T (Sf (n) (p, q) ) 
where S (n) (p, q) is the result of applying the rule R. f (n) times to Rf (n) (p, q) 
(assuming that such a rule application may be carried out). One such example is 
that considered in Subsection 6.1.1, in which sn(x) + y sn(x + y) corresponds 
to n applications of the rewrite rule s(x) + y s(x + y). It is also possible to 
derive a more general version J', which is analogous to T. 
113 
The proof in PAW of J is as follows: 
ax 
R(Rr (p, q)) = S(Rr (p, q)) F R(Rr (p, q) = S(Rr (P, q)) 
VI 
r I- VxyR(x, y) = S(x, y) F R(Rr (P, 4)) = S(Rr (P, 4)) 
cut ax 
r F R(Rr (P, 4)) = S(Rr (P, 4)) T(S(Rr (P, 4))) F T (S(Rr (P, 4))) 
F T(S(Rr(P,9))) -f T(S(Rr(P,4))) 
T(Rr(P,4)) -> T (Sr (P,4)) F T(Rs(r)(P,4)) -3 T(S3(r)(P,4)) * 
r 1- T(Rn (P, 4)) T(Sn (P, 9)) 
0 F T(Rn (P, 9)) r, T(Rn (P, 9)) F T (Sn (P, 9)) 
r, F T(Sn(P, 4)) 
At * there is the prooftree: 
ax 






R(p, q) = S(P, 9) F R(p, q) = S(P, q) 
ax VI 
r F Vxy R(x,y) = S(x,y) Vxy R(x,y) = S(x,y) F R(P,4) = S(P,4) 
r F R(p, q) = S(p, q) 
r F T(R(p, q)) -> T(S(P,4)) 
cut 
cut 
The justification for use of induction in the proof is that induction is a derived 
rule in PAW (see Chapter 7). At this stage the question might be raised that 
this all seems rather circular, for although the w -rule is being considered instead 
of induction, induction in PAW is being used, which might leave us no better off. 
This question will be discussed in Subsection 8.6.2. 
A summary of the above consideration of the relationship of the general proof 
representation with PAW is that the proof of A(n) in the w -rule A(o)'."A()..* is tlxA(æ) 
represented in the general proof using notation which is not that of PAW, but 
which is more suitable for implementation. However, the notation (represented by 
derived rules I and J), may be converted to that of PAW, as may be seen by the 
fact that the rules I and J correspond to proofs in PA,. 
So, the general proof can be accounted for in terms of PAW. 
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2 
6.3 Proving Properties: Syntax of General Proof 
Representation 
Description of syntax shall be used to indicate the system in which correctness 
of the general proof system is proved (that is, showing that anything provable 
in the general proof representation will be provable in the recursive prooftree 
representation, ie. PACE,). In doing so, use is made of inductive principles over the 
syntax. 
Syntax parametrised by n has already been shown to be `effective' in Subsec- 
tion 5.2.1. In this section I wish to give a primitive recursive description of the 
operations on the syntax in the general proof representation, which will involve 
giving a primitive recursive description of what it is to apply a rewrite rule a func- 
tion of n times, or a constant number of times. So the aim is to define, primitive 
recursively, the following (cf. apply on page 118): 
rewrite (1,Stringl,String2)if... 
rewrite (s (X) , String1, String2) if .. . 
Vn rewrite (n,g(n) ,h(n)) if ... 
where g, h: nat -+ string, as defined above. 
I define first of all a basic function with strings and instantiation. Suppose the 
appropriate rewrite rule is R : Rl R2. 
rewrite (1 , R, E1 , E2) if (getsule(R,R1,R2) andmatch(E1,R1,Z) and match(E2 , R2 , Z) ). 
rewrite (s (X) ,R,E1,E2) if (rewrite (1,R,E1,E3) and rewrite(X,R,E3,E2)). 
where match(String, Formula, Vars) matches String (rewritten as a formula) 
with Formula, with unification variables Vars, and get rule(R, Rl, R2) returns 
the appropriate left and right sides (Rl and R2 respectively) of the rewrite rule R. 
Note the connection between the first procedure (of a single application of R) and 
the use of the derived rule I, which is defined in Subsection 6.2.1: the latter rule 
would essentially carry out this stage. Now I have to justify using a rewrite rule 
n times (which is done to give the general proof). The justification will involve 
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induction over the syntax. The induction rule is of the form: 
I- g(0) h(0) g(r) h(r) I- g(s(r)) h(s(r)) 
ind 
I- Vn g(n) -+ h(n) 
One could prove * by rewriting g(s(r)) to j(g(r)) and h(s(r)) to j(g(r)). 
Another, more formal, approach is to define: rewrite(n, g(n), h(n)) =s eq(n), where 
eq(n) is as given above on page 97, and is essentially equals(g(n), h(n)). Then the 
idea is to show that Vn. eq(n) is a theorem of PA,,,,. Note that for each inference 
rule in the object logic, there is a rule (corresponding to substitution), 
I- theorem (equals(A,B)) -* theorem((A)) -* theoremR(B)), 
where cI3. is any formula in which A may appear. 
There is also, to exclude X being `)', 
I- term(X) -* theorem(equal(X, X)). 
I will work through an example to illustrate the procedure. By induction: 
Base case : I- `s(X) + Y = s(X +Y)' - axiom. 
Step case : suppose I- `sn (X) + Y = sn (X + Y)'. 
To show : I- `ss(n) (X) + Y = ss(n) (X + Y)'. 
ie. H theorem (equals(plus(nthsuc(s(n), `X'), `Y'),nthsuc(s(n), 
ie. H theorem(equals(plus(`s(' * nthsuc(n, `X') * 
Now the induction hypothesis should be used. So: 
H theorem (equals(plus(nthsuc(s(n), `X'), `Y'), `s(' * nthsuc(n, plus(`X', `Y') * 
(subgoal) I- theorem (equals(plus(nthsuc(s(n), `X'), `Y'), `s(' *plus(nthsuc(n, `X'), `Y') * 
`)')) 
This proves that, for all n, H s(X) +Y = sn (X +Y) is a theorem, and hence that 
the rewrite rule from sn (X) + Y to sn (X + Y) is justified, assuming the rewrite 
rule s(P) + Q = s(P + Q) at the object level (the former is just this rule applied 
n times). 
In conclusion, I have shown which operations I consider to be primitive recursive 
on the syntax of the general proof representation, and these include the operations 
of the application of rewrite rules. 
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6.4 Correctness of the General Proof Represen- 
tation 
I shall now check further properties of the general proof representation. In Sec- 
tion 5.4 correctness of well- founded trees was discussed, and a distinction made 
between local and global correctness. In this section I shall demonstrate that 
the implementational approach is globally correct, in the sense that it is sound 
with respect to the presentation of PAS,, given in Chapter 5, and also (in Subsec- 
tion 6.4.1) that it is locally correct, in that the rewrite rule applications specified 
correspond at each node to a general proof representation. 
Soundness entails that only true statements of PAS,, are provable via the general 
proof representation. So for this case it is necessary to show that the resulting 
formulae from the application of rewrite rules correspond to the application of 
proof rules in PAC,,. I shall show that for each general proof construct, there 
is a corresponding primitive recursive prooftree of PAS,,,. In other words, it is 
necessary to show what the effect of the rewrites is, and check that the formula 
labelling at the nodes corresponds to the application of proof rules in PAS,,. So 
it must be shown that "rule applied once /constant / f (n) times" in the general 
proof corresponds to (in the sense of giving) correct subtrees in the prooftree. 
Now, the general proof is only dealing with a branching (w) point, and the subtree 
below that. The general proof corresponds to a subtree of the w -rule. It is merely 
necessary to show that the representation used in the implementation is a derived 
form of the structures given in the previous chapter. The essential task of showing 
that the application of rewrite rules may be represented in PAS,,,, has been carried 
out in Section 6.2 above. 
Hence, global correctness necessitates showing that for each general proof construct 
there is a primitive recursive function which indicates what is at any particular 
node in the tree representation described above. This is possible by inspecting 
the tree diagrams for the derived inference rules I and J above. The primitive 
recursive function would be analogous to the definition of f in the previous chapter. 
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When "apply rule R k times" appears in the general proof, the function would 
generate the tree as previously described, but using the rules from I (repeated 
as appropriate), or J, and generating the rest of each infinite layer as dummy 
variables. Of course, the layer is not literally filled in, as this will be a non - 
terminating process. It is merely necessary to note that, for example, f (Pos <> 
[l]) = É bl E nat list, and that any particular individual position could be 
checked as yielding É. This is enough to give correctness of the tree. A tree with 
infinite branching points may be generated using the constructive w -rule (ie. from 
the general proof). This should be using a depth -first generation, because the tree 
is required to be well- founded; in this way the tree would in essence be completed 
- after a certain point with generating the subgoals of the w -rule, the case for 
the kth subtree could be given if termination was required. 
The function that generates the general proof has properties of f (which is a 
primitive recursive prooftree for PA,,,,). When implementing global correctness of 
the general proof, one is proving properties of functions from natural numbers to 
strings (the application of rewrite rules a function of n times, where the (basic) 
rewrite rule is a function from strings to strings). I will want to prove properties 
of the rewrite -rule application apply : rewrite rule * tree_pos * nat * string -4 
string. (The third argument is the number of times applied, the fourth is the 
initial expression, and the range is the final expression.) So, for example, there is 
apply(rewritel, P, n, ti(n)) = t2(n), where t1, t2 are of the syntactic form described 
in the previous section. Meta -induction is used to justify such statements, where 
the rewrite rule is applied a function of n times, as shown in the following section. 
When the constructive w -rule is used, one would wish to show that, given the 
representation f : n `.(n)' discussed in Subsection 5.2.2, the n in the syntax 
denoted by l.(n) is primitive recursive, in order to show that the primitive recursive 
restriction on the w -rule does indeed apply. Such recursiveness has been shown 
above in Section 6.3. 
The general proof P(k) will represent the kth subtree below use of the w -rule on 
some sequent of the form dxIc.(x). Hence, P : nat list + seq * rule describes a 
subtree. The sequents in the nth subtree (ie. the general proof) are defined by: 
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P(Pos :: n <> l) = Seq * Rule for some l E nat list, where q2(f (Pos)) is the 
constructive w -rule. P is f , the generating function for the whole tree, but is just 
defined over this domain. This defines a primitive recursive P which represents the 
general proof. However, this is not the way that P is defined in the implementation, 
and hence it is necessary to show the correspondence between them. It is necessary 
to show that the notion of a rewrite rule being applied n times is both primitive 
recursive (which must itself be defined over this domain), and sound with respect 
to the theory of PAS,,. For the general proof, one could define the representation 
genpf : rule* subpos * nat * tree_pos *seq -* seq, which is analogous to the function 
apply mentioned above. Primitive recursion is demonstrated by the operations of 
adding a single branch to extend the tree, and induction to prove the nth case, as 
shown in the following subsection. 
In conclusion, in order to convert from general proofs to a recursive prooftree form, 
it is necessary to substitute k for n, where k E IN, to get the kth subtree. Rewrite 
rules should be converted to the appropriate rules of PAW (from the trees given 
in Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 for I and ,7) and applied as appropriate; this also 
covers the case of the application of rules f (n) times. 
6.4.1 Induction over General Proofs 
The correctness of well- founded prooftrees has been discussed above in Section 5.4, 
and global correctness of the general proof representation has been discussed above. 
I now move on to consider local correctness. Corresponding to the general repre- 
sentation there is an effective prooftree; I shall consider how this can be verified 
(ie. shown to be correct at each node). 
Within the general proofs use is made of generalised forms of derived rules of 
inference, representing application of these rewrite rules n times, such as sn(x) + 
y sn(x +y) from s(x) +y = s(x +y). These generalised forms may be proved by 
meta -induction on n, as shown in Subsection 6.1.1 (note that meta -induction over 
prooftrees will be further considered in Subsection 7.2.2). Such meta -induction is 
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carried out in the theory of parametrised syntax considered in the previous section, 
and in Subsection 5.2.1. 
Of relevance also is the discussion given in Subsection 10.3.1, which presents an 
implementational method for checking for correctness of the general proof, in the 
sense that the general proof gives an w- proof' of the statements which it claims to 
be proving (that is, that it is the right answer to the inductive inference problem). 
Thus, the implementational section on correctness given in Subsection 10.3.1 at- 
tempts to prove such generalised statements, ie. to justify such (derived) rewrite 
rules used in the general proof by means of such meta -induction. 
By justifying the general proof, the corresponding effective prooftree is also justi- 
fied. The overall process is that the correctness of each branch is being checked 
at the meta -level: given various initial formulae with a common structure, a 
parametrised representation of these formulae is constructed via inductive infer- 
ence (which corresponds to the initial line in the general proof) and the derived 
(parametrised) rewrite rule is applied to give a new parametrised representation 
(corresponding to the new line of the general proof), from which the new individual 
formulae may be derived. 
In general, there are two sorts of operations to extend the prooftree: applying 
a rewrite rule R at some tree position Pos(n) will give an updated tree with 
a single node added (type 1), and applying a rewrite rule R some function of 
n times at a given position will return a new tree with that number of extra 
nodes (type 2). These may then be tacked together to form the final general 
proof. (Meta)induction may be used to justify type 2 applications. Thus, given 
gen_p f : proof x IN -+ proof , as described on page 111, if one wishes to prove 
Vn (D(genpf (Tree, n)), induction will require proof of 1(gen_pf (Tree, 0)) and, 
given a proof of .1)(genpf(Tree,x)), to show that there is a proof of 
'(gen_p f (Tree, s(x))), where x is any natural number. 
'Note that an w -proof is a proof in PAC,, with initial rule used being the w -rule: 
hence the general proof is a parametrised version of an arbitrary subtree of this proof, 
using certain derived rules. 
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In summary, it is possible to extend the tree by a rule applied a constant number of 
times, which may be calculated straightforwardly via iteration of a single extension, 
or else by a function of a natural number, f(n) say, times, which will be justified 
by induction on n (over the inductive structure), plus quantification over the 
object -level syntax. More specifically, this justification will take the following 
form. Suppose a rewrite rule R is applied n times at position Pos(n), where 
R : R1 R2. Let Kn be defined as the result of applying R n times to K. 
The goal is to prove that Vk ß (R1 ") c (R2" ). The base case of induction is to 
prove ß(R1) ß(R2), which is provable by comparison with rule R. The step 
case assumes that (1)(R1n) (D(R2'1) and wishes to prove Ï(R1n +1) 1.(R2n +1) 
There is: 
t,(R1n +1) = 1.(R1* (R1n)) 
1)(R1 * (R2n)) by hyp 
.1.(R2* (R2n)) by R 
= 1. (R2n +1) 
where A * B means "apply rule A, then apply rule B". So, given Rl, R2 : Seq 
Seq, I define RI.* R2(Seq) - R2(R1(Seq)). 
This process may be justified by the following (condensed) proof of PAS,,,: 




f(Rln) = f(R2n) F f(Rln) = f(R2n) 
ax 
Rl = R2 F Rl = R2 F f(R1 (R1")) = f(R1 * (R1n)) 
f(Rln) = f(R2n) F f(R1 * (R1n)) = f(R1 * (R2n)) 




R1 = R2, f(Rln) = f(R2n) F f(Rln+1) = f(R2n+1) 
ind 
R1 = R2 F f(Rlk) = f(R2k) 
Note that an individual case, namely of proving the new rule do sn (x) +y sn (x+ 
y), has already been considered in Subsection 6.1.1, and that Subsection 6.2.2 has 
justified the application of such rules in the general proof, in terms of being a 
derived rule of PAS,,. Subsection 10.4.1 outlines the implementational algorithm 
used to justify this process. 
In conclusion, the general proof specifies a particular mathematical object, which 
is a primitive recursive function of the type described in Chapter 5, and local 
correctness of the general proof may be demonstrated using meta -induction. 
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6.5 Completeness of General Proof Represen- 
tation 
I now turn to the question of completeness, namely whether the general proof rep- 
resentation is strong enough to represent any (primitive) recursive tree of PAS,,,, 
More specifically, given an arbitrary primitive recursive tree that satisfies the con- 
ditions 1. -4. on page 101 (ie. a prooftree of PAC,,,,), is there always a corresponding 
general proof notation (involving the notion of applying rewrite rules)? Note that 
one may carry out meta -induction over the prooftrees2 (which is used to justify 
the general proof). The original prooftree generated will be of the form (with 
recursion): (a) Seq to Segl (and possibly Seq2) by a rule of PA, plus infinite 
dummy nodes, or (b) Seq to an infinite number of sequents generated by an w- 
rule (dr or ]1,,,). One method of attempting to show completeness would be to 
use meta -induction over prooftrees: first the base case (of a basic prooftree being 
covered by a general proof) would be considered, and then, assuming that a given 
prooftree is covered by the general proof notation, one would try to show that that 
the prooftree extended by the application of a rule at a node is also covered by 
the general proof notation. An extension of type (a) is allowed for in the general 
proof notation for case -splits and branching: the classical form of the rewrite rules 
suggests the appropriate case split on the general proof, so that I- A A B just gives 
A, B in the general proof but f- A V B causes a case split, for example. An exten- 
sion of type (b) corresponds to use of the w -rule at a node in the prooftree. The 
subsequents may be represented by the new general proof line A(n, rn) from the 
previous general proof line VxA(x, rn) (where the former was originally derived 
from Vy ...VxA(x, y)). The new general proof refers to the nth subgoal of the 
prooftree: substituting k for n in A, where 0 < k < w, corresponds to the subn- 
odes generated within the prooftrees. In general, the relationship of the general 
proof representation with that of the effective prooftree representation described 
2See Chapters 5 and 7. 
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in the previous chapter is that the general proof corresponds to a generalisation 
of the nth subtree below use of 3lu, or `drli, in a prooftree derivation. However, this 
argument is neither convincing nor rigorous. 
Indeed, it does seem as though what is allowed in the hypotheses of the w -rule 
by the general proof representation, namely parametrisation over the number of 
applications of a rewrite rule, is not general enough (this ties in with the discus- 
sion in the following section about whether branching rules in the general proof 
are directly analogous to the use of logical rules in an w- proof) . It is the case 
that, as shown for example in Subsection 6.2.2, rewrite rules may be used in a 
substitution into a general predicate (of arbitrary logical complexity), and hence 
the general proof representation (which represents the proof of the nth numerator 
of the constructive w -rule in terms of the application of rewrite rules to formulae) 
does not imply that all proofs considered are of equations. However, the general 
proof representation does limit what happens in an w -rule application to what can 
be achieved by iterated substitution. Hence, it would be better just to concentrate 
on the soundness aspect, since completeness is not actually provable. 
6.6 Branching General Proofs and Conditionals 
In this section the question of branching general proofs is introduced, and it is 
considered whether branching within the general proof is really necessary, and if 
so, how this might be represented. 
6.6.1 Branching Rules 
Branching rules are rules which generate more than one subgoal. They are respon- 
sible for the tree representation of the general proof, rather than just a linear one. 
As far as the development of the general proof goes, it should be the case that the 
user may traverse the tree and extend the general proof at various nodes, or else 
be able to specify a proof using branching rules. In particular, the user should be 
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able to specify whether repeated use of a branching rule would be upon all the 
subnodes, or just a subset of these. Note that if the general proof corresponds to 
a w -proof subtree (as shown above), then there is already in principle subsequent 
branching in the general proof. 
What might be an example of a branching rule? An obvious example is that 
of conjunction, namely when the goal is to prove I- Vx (A(x) A B(x)) by the 
constructive w -rule. This would correspond to the r + lth subnode of the recursive 
prooftree in PA,,, being H A(r) A B(r), upon which the rand rule could be used, 
breaking down the proof into that of H A(r) and I- B(r). Is it always possible to 
apply such a rule before applying the constructive w -rule, that is, before using the 
general proof notation? The answer is that it is not always possible to break down 
the logical quantifiers before using the constructive w -rule, rather than within 
the general proof, for with the case of Vx(B(x) V C(x)), there could be a case 
split in the general proof, with B(r) for some r, and C(r) for others (cf. step 
linearity in Subsection 8.3.2). An example when this happens is in the proof of 
dx(even(x)Vodd(x)) given in example 4. of Subsection 9.1. Note the special status 
of V in the constructive case (cf. A V -,A) (Kreisel, 1965, P166): 
"this wholesale carry over of derived rules from predicate logic is one of 
the special virtues of cut free infinite proofs. An important exception 
is this: if A V B is provable in predicate logic either A or B is provable. 
In arithmetic, only if A and B are closed." 
6.6.2 Conditional Rules 
There is a further question about how conditional rewrite rules may be applied in 
a general proof. Note that it is important not to confuse conditional rewrite rules 
of the form condition -+ rewrite, eg. x 0 -+ p(s(x)) = x *, with rules which just 
alter the syntax of the current general proof goal, eg. true A A = true. The latter 
are proof transformations on the general proof which take the form A AB = A, B, 
AV B A (or B) - these account for the case split, -,-,A A, AV 'A true, 
etc. These rules include the other normalisation analogues and might be used to 
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put the general proof into normal form, as a method of quickly detecting truth or 
falsity, and are proof transformations rather than derived inference rules. 
Given a general proof Q, the new line of the general proof using the conditional rule 
cond x = y will be (- icondAQ) V ( cond AQ[y /x]). In the case of the `conditional' 
example given in Subsection 8.1.5 (namely proof of Vx(x 0 0 -} p(x) + s(s(x))) = 
s(x) +x), when using the rule * given above (ie. 8.12), the new line of the general 
proof would be: sn -1(0) = O A ((sn(0) = O V p(sn(0)) + s ...) V (sn -1(0) 0 O A ...)). 
continues 
Using the V -rule twice, equality would be obtained. Thus, the form of the derived 
rule used when the general proof matches the rewrite part of the conditional rule 
will be:3 
I' I- `dx(cond(x) -3 RM= S(x)) 0 I- T(R(P)) 
I', 0 I- (---icond(f) A T(R05))) V (cond(f) A T(S05))) 
6.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter the relation of the implementational approach to the theoretical 
notions of effective trees given in Chapter 5 has been considered; such trees se- 
lected by the implementation are shown to be correct, according to a given way 
of checking for correctness, which involves using induction over various datatypes. 
To reason about such trees, I work in a theory of trees and of the original syn- 
tax (which may be defined effectively). Defining equations for primitive recursive 
functions are taken as axioms, with a derived form as inference rules to allow 
rewriting of a formula in the obvious way. Furthermore, the system encapsulated 
by the implementation (further described in Chapter 10) has been shown to be 
sound with respect to the system PAa, introduced in the previous chapter, al- 
though completeness has been left as an open question. Finally, casesplits and 
conditionals in the general proof have been shown to correspond to branching in 
the effective tree representation. 
3Note that this would only be an appropriate rule to be used in a classical system, 




"The method of mathematical induction may be thus described. We 
prove that if a theorem is true in one case, whatever that case may be, 
it is true in another case which we may call the next case; we prove by 
trial that the theorem is true in a certain case; hence it is true in the 
next case, and hence in the next to that, and so on; hence it must be 
true in every case after that with which we began." 
Todhunter 
The following sections detail:- 
consideration of certain propositions not provable in PA \ cut; 
clarification of the status of induction as a derived rule within PAS,,; 
the use of meta -induction over proofs; 
an investigation of the relationship between various methods of proof of 
arithmetic propositions. 
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7.1 Propositions Not Provable in PA \ cut 
In this section attention will be drawn to certain propositions that seem not be 
provable in PA \ cut, and a suggested example of this type will be presented. Such 
propositions must undergo generalisation in order for a proof to be provided within 
PA. It will be shown later that for some of these propositions, a proof in PAS,, 
may suggest an appropriate cut formula upon which induction may be performed, 
and hence a proof in PA. 
Ever since Gentzen's Hauptsatz, which proved that the cut rule could be eliminated 
from predicate calculus (Gentzen, 1969), attention has been focussed on whether 
cut elimination holds for other logical systems; some of the results have already 
been discussed in Subsection 2.3.5. It is a known result that cut elimination cannot 
be proved for PA, and that it is the induction rule which poses the problem, 
rather than any other addition used to form this extension of predicate calculus 
(Schwichtenberg, 1977). If one restricts PA to a subsystem in which the induction 
rule is restricted to El- formulae', then cut reduction may be carried out, but only 
down as far as E1- formulae, because then the rule of induction makes the reduction 
process come unstuck at the point: 
r i- A(0) r, A(x) H A(s(x)) 
2nd 
r, A(y) C r I- A(y) 
cut r-c 
There is however a partial cut elimination theorem for PA which is provable by 
adapting the cut -elimination proof for predicate calculus, namely that any provable 
sequent will be provable without free cuts' (Takeuti, 1987, P112). The investiga- 
tion in this section of certain expressions within PA which may need a cut for their 
'A(x) - 3z1i ... , 3znB(x, zl, ... , zn) where B is quantifier -free or, at worst, contains 
only "bounded" universal quantifiers. 
2A cut is free if its cut formula is free; a formula A is free if either it has no ancestor 
which is an induction formula, or it has an induction formula as an ancestor but a logical 
symbol is introduced in an ancestor of A between any such induction formula and A 
itself. 
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proof is consistent with Kreisel's demonstration that there is no primitive recursive 
algorithm for eliminating cuts within PA, so there is no primitive recursive way 
of transforming a proof containing cuts to a cut -free proof. More specifically, cut 
elimination in PA is not possible in the sense that there is no recursively enumer- 
able sequence of derived rules such that: 
(i) it can be proved in arithmetic that the rules satisfy the subformula property, 
and 
(ii) the proof figures are finite, so that induction can be applied. 
The solution as far as cut elimination is concerned is to weaken (ii) by using infi- 
nite proof figures, and use the w -rule, as has been discussed previously. A different 
form of induction may be used (see Section 7.2). As mentioned before, there will 
be cut -elimination in this new system. 
However, considering the system PA \ cut, is it possible to show that certain 
expressions, such as Vx.(x + x) + x = x + (x + x), are not provable within this 
system? One approach is to reduce the problem using the subformula property.3 
The latter states that if r I- A is derivable in predicate calculus, then there is a 
derivation of this sequent which contains only subformulae of F I- A. Hence, if 
r H A does not contain -, or -*, then each formulae in an antecedent of a sequent 
in the derivation is a subformula of a formula in r, and similarly succedent with 
respect to 0 (since each of the rules has the subformula property). This procedure 
will eliminate all the logical connectives, leaving only equations (with the rule of 
induction, plus various axioms) , so long as the original sequent did not involve 
or -*. If there is a cut in the proof, obviously the subformula property no longer 
holds. 
The rules which remain are induction, plus the equality axioms H s = s, A = B H 
s(A) = s(B) and A = B, A = C I- B = C. Substitution may be considered to be 
a derived rule, which requires cut, and so is not allowed, but it is more natural to 
allow it as a basic rule. The use of recursive equations as rewrites must also be 
part of the system (and these rely on substitution), so in order not to be too severe, 
3This has been discussed in Subsection 2.3.2, with reference to Table 2 -1. 
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substitution will be allowed as a basic rule. The proof of Vx (x +x) +x = x +(x +x) 
will be blocked in PA \cut, since after normalisation when all applicable rules have 
been used, the only remaining option is to show analyticity of the sequent, which 
is not possible. (Analytic propositions are those which are equivalent, or definable 
in terms of each other.) The proof can only be of the form: 
(t +t) +t= t +(t +t) 
x (x +x) +x= x +(x +x) r V 
or: 
B 
f s((r + s(r)) + s(r) ) = s(r + s(r + s(r))) 
normalisation 
H (0 -}- 0) + 0 = 0 + (0 + 0) (r + r) -}- r = r + (r + r) H (s(r) + s(r)) -{- s(r) = s(r) + (s(r) + s(r)) 
ind 
bæ(æi-x)-i-x=x+(x-Fx) 
The latter uses rewrite rules s(x) + y s(x + y) and 0 + y y to achieve 
normalisation off-- (r + s(r)) + s(r) = r + s(r + s(r)), which is still not an equality. 
These proofs seem to be blocked, but in fact it is possible to carry out some less 
obvious inductions and substitutions, such as rewrite rules in non -wave directions, 
and so this discussion forms only an indication that such a proposition might 
not be provable in PA \ cut, rather than a concrete proof. However, it might be 
possible to actually obtain a proof for this particular example by means of the 
use of a theorem -prover to perform an exhaustive search to see if the process did 
terminate, for detection of subsumed applications could be used to try to counter 
the fact that the induction rule may be continually applied. 
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7.2 Induction Within PAcw 
In this section the nature of induction within PA,,, will be investigated. In addi- 
tion, meta -induction over proofs will also be considered. It is important within the 
following subsections to retain this distinction between induction as a derived rule 
of inference and the rule of proof which shall be called meta -induction. Section 8.3 
provides further discussion regarding the relationship between induction in PA, 
induction in PAS,,, and general proofs. 
7.2.1 Induction as a Derived Rule 
Induction is a derived rule in the sense that any use of induction can be captured 
by use of the w -rule. The principle of induction is a consequence of the w -rule, 
by the following argument: given I- A(0) and I- Vx (A(x) --} A(s(x))), then by 
n -fold application of V- and -+ - elimination, we may deduce, for each n, a proof 
of I- A(n). Hence, by the w -rule, I- VxA(x). However, this justification makes 
essential use of induction (via the cut -rule) for the step concluding I- A(s(n)) 
from I- A(n) and A(n) I- A(s(n)), which possibly shows that the w -rule is not 
central to our conception of the structure of the natural numbers (Isaacson, 1992, 
P21). For in order to prove each A(k), cut is used to obtain access to Vx(A(x) -4 
A(s(x))) in each branch. See Figure 7 -1 for a graphical representation of this 
argument. Although this is an inessential use of cut in the sense that the proof 
could be formulated differently (ie. without a cut, by the cut elimination theorem), 
this demonstrates that even without the explicit use of induction, the latter is 
being used implicitly because the proof is being specified in a primitive recursive 
way. The transformation of Figure 7 -1 into a proof not involving the cut rule is 
carried out in an analogous manner to the cut elimination proof for PA,, (see 
Subsection 2.3.5); the cases will differ according to the connectives in A, but cut 
elimination may be provided for the part of the proof from A(s(k)) to the open 
leaf A(k); this will prove of relevance when considering linearisation of general 
proofs for the purposes of generalisation in Section 8.3. 
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 l-A(0) .. 
rF-A(0) 
axiom ; similarly 
r, A(s(k)) I- A(s(k)) r A(k) l 
r, A(k) A(s(k)) A(s(k)) 
vi 
F Vx(A(x) -3 A(s(x))) r, Vx(A(x) -+ A(s(x))) I- A(s(k)) 
cut 
r F- A(s(k)) 
r F- `dxA(x) w rule 
Figure 7 -1: Derivation of Induction in PAc,,: Given the w -rule and F I- A(0) 
and H Vx(A(x) -* A(s(x))), it is possible to prove with the use of the cut rule that 
I- dxA(x) 
Note that induction in PA,,, involves the provability of P(n) rather than the 
proof of P(n), that is to say that prov(111i P(0)), prov(112, P(n) -* P(n + 1)) - 
prov(K(111,112), VxP(x)), where K combines the prooftrees Ili and 112 in such 
a manner as may be derived from the associated graphical representation of the 
effective prooftree given in Figure 7 -1 (that is, by instantiating variables in free 
occurrences of 112, and conjoining these prooftrees). The claim is that there is 
some way of filling in the proof from P(n) to P(n + 1) (ie. via K, the combination 
of the individual proofs 111 and 112), and that this is the same in all cases. This 
corresponds to the fact that the proof of F F- A(s(n)) may be reduced to that of 
H A(n). If so, this would result in the overall structure of Figure 7 -1 as being: 
r F- A(0) 
r F- A(0) r F- A(1) 
rF-A(0) rF-A(1) rF-A(2) etc. 
w - rule 
F F- dx A(x) 
Further discussion of the relationship between induction in PA and the `linear' 
form of such a prooftree is given in Section 8.3. 
In conclusion, the rule of induction in PA,li, states that if PAS,,, proves r F- A(0) 
and also proves H Vx(A(x) - A(s(x))), then PAS,, proves r F- VxA(x), which can 





Induction over Proofs 
A(n) A(s(n)) 
Figure 7 -2: Comparison of Standard Induction and Induction over Proofs 
7.2.2 Meta -induction Over Proofs 
This section discusses meta -induction over proofs. Induction over verification 
proofs has already been introduced in Sections 5.4 and 6.4.1. This form of meta - 
induction carries out induction over the natural numbers in the theory of prooftrees 
and syntax which has been described in Chapter 5. Note that this form of induc- 
tion is not the same as the derived rule of induction discussed in the previous 
subsection. Using the Gödel encoding method presented in Subsection 4.3.2 how- 
ever, these inductions merge, in an analogous manner to primitive recursion and 
effectiveness (cf. Chapter 5). Meta -induction within PA,,, is a rule which makes 
an assertion about proofs, and not about sequents. Ordinary induction over the 
natural numbers is of the form (r H A(0) and) r, A(n) f- A(s(n)) for arbitrary 
n E w, justifies r f- ex A(x). In other words, given a hypothesis A(n), the aim 
is to show the conclusion A(s(n)). This rule can be mimicked at the meta -level 
in PAcw. The idea, as shown in Figure 7 -2, is that meta- induction enables proof 
transformations of the form "proof of _4(n) justifies proof of A(s(n))" to result in 
the conclusion that `dxA(x) holds. (The n achieves the status of a meta -variable, in 
this case ranging over numerals, as mentioned earlier.) Hence this induction rule 
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captures the idea that a proof for VxA(x) may be obtained if a proof of A(s(x)) 
is given in terms of extending the proof of A(x). 
The following example illustrates such a case when the proof of A(s(x)) reduces 
to the proof of A(x): 
(s(x) + y) + z 
1- 
s((x + y) + z) 
(x+y)+z 
= s(x) + (y+ z) A(s(x)) 
rules 1, 
= s(x + (y+ z)) 
rules ,, 
= x + (y + z) A(x) 
In actual fact, this idea of extension needs to be revised such that PAS,, proves 
A I- B means that "given a proof of A, one may construct a proof of B" . The 
idea of extension is no longer directly incorporated into the proof, but there are 
cases in which one would wish to construct a proof of B by using the proof of 
A as a guide, rather than by a direct extension of A. (In fact, if the definition 
were not revised in this way, this meta -induction rule would essentially become 
redundant.) Moreover, as shall be shown below, this form of induction may work 
when ordinary induction would require use of the cut rule in the proof in order to 
carry through. 
Meta -induction over proofs is a more powerful form of induction than induction 
in PA, in the sense that there are cases in which induction in PA is blocked (and 
therefore a cut is required), but meta -induction in PA,,,,, works, making use of 
proof structure. Therefore, a cut in PA may be avoided by carrying out meta - 
induction over proofs. Proofs are manipulated and not just the hypothesis, as 
is the case with standard induction. Uniform manipulation is carried out on the 
nth case proof to give the n + lth case proof; also, the structure of the formal 
numerals themselves may be exploited to give a proof. This will be considered in 
more detail in the following subsection. 
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The Use of Meta -induction in PANG, 
When implementing the system PANG one might wish either to generate proofs 
in PANG, (in cases where this is easier than automation in other systems) or to 
use these proofs as a guide to enable proofs in other systems.4 In this subsection, 
a class of proofs for which there is a problem of automatic derivation in PA are 
considered,5 but which may be proved in PAW. Consider the example Vx (x + 
x) + x = x + (x + x), for which a general proof has been provided in Figure 6- 
1. Induction in PA is blocked, because P(s(x)) may not be given in terms of 
P(x), as shown in Section 7.1. However, meta -induction in the system PAW does 
carry through, although induction in PA did not, for the following crucial reason. 
The proof of the successor case is not an extension of the proof of the case of 
its predecessor, as the latter may not be substituted into the former, but instead 
we may use the rules for the latter as a "guide" for the rules of the former. So 
the proof of the successor case is described by a uniform transformation on the 
proof of the previous case, but this transformation is not restricted to extension 
of the previous proof. This extension of the previous proof is the w- analogue of 
induction.6 
To illustrate - we wish to prove: 
c 
(n + n) + n = n + (n + p,yc (s(n) + s(n)) + s(n) = s(n) + (s(rn) + s(n)) 
A 
A may not be substituted directly in a proof of B, because terms like C (essentially 
unaltered by the rules given) must be distinct from the other terms in the formula, 
4See Chapter 8. 
6The problems involved are discussed in Section 7.1. (Notably, a cut elimination 
procedure cannot be defined for PA.) 
6The advantages of this method will be of interest later in the thesis, since manipu- 
lation of general proofs via meta -induction is closely related to the linearisation process 
described in Section 8.3, in which the same rule blocks are repeated to reduce A(s(r)) 
to A(r) in the general proof, down to A(0). As shall be shown, this process justifies 
VxA(x), suggesting that the latter would be a suitable cut formula. 
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in the sense that they must have a distinct variable. This is because one would not 
wish to carry out induction on these "unaltered terms" as one would wish them 
to remain the same. In this case this is not so, and hence standard induction does 
not work. (Note the correspondence between C above and 8 from Section 7.1.) 
However, rules for proving A may be converted to those for proving 13 by the 
"meta- rule" rulei(n) rulei(s(n)). Any uniform manipulation on the nth case 
proof (ie. proof of A), resulting in the n + lth case proof (ie. proof of B) will 
achieve the desired effect. As a result B may be proved without substituting A 
directly.? 
More importantly, one is dealing with formal numerals and not numbers in this 
case, and so the structure of the formal numerals in Z3 may be exploited, to allow 
use of rewrite rules not previously applicable. This consideration also enables the 
proof of the original goal by means of the constructive w -rule. 
In conclusion, in cases of this type, induction at the meta -level may be used when 
induction in PA fails. (For those examples where induction in PA carries through, 
then a reduction of P(s(x)) to P(x) will be possible, and by this same process, 
induction at the meta -level will carry through as well). Thus, the existence of the 
logic PA,, is justified in theorem -proving terms, for by this means a proof may 
be given of those propositions not obviously provable in PA without using the cut 
rule (the latter being considered undesirable as regards the automation of proofs), 
and for which induction is blocked. In Chapter 8 I move on to consider how this 
proof might suggest the form of the proof in PA (using cut). 
7Either the rules, given by the nth case proof, may be applied to the consequent, 
with n + 1 substituted for n, and the whole method checked as outlined above, or 
alternatively, one could start with the axioms and use induction to generate rewrite 
rules of an appropriate form, and then use these rules. For example, given axioms 6.2 
and 6.1, as shown in Subsection 6.1.1 induction may be used on the first argument to 
obtain 
Vnsn(0) +y= sn(0 +y) 
In fact, in this case, this is the only rule which would be generated, by induction on 
x. Induction on y would not generate useful new rules. The rule could be changed to 
apply to the n + lth case proof to Vn sn +1(0) + y = sn +1(0 + y), which is exactly the 
rule which is needed. 
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7.3 Conclusions 
An informal argument has been given that certain propositions not provable in 
PA without the use of the cut rule (even allowing substitution as a basic rule) 
are provable within PAW. In addition, induction as a derived rule and the use of 
meta -induction within PA, have been considered. 
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Chapter 8 
A New Method of Generalisation 
within Automated Deduction 
"Generalisation is the process through which we obtain what are called 
general or universal notions." 
Sir W. Hamilton 
The next two chapters deal with an application of the implementation of PAS,, 
in the field of generalisation, which, as discussed in Chapter 3, is very important 
from a theorem -proving point of view. This chapter presents a new method of 
generalisation by means of which proofs in PA,,, may automatically guide proofs 
in Peano Arithmetic. (The implementation of this algorithm is discussed in Chap- 
ter 10.) The possibility of extending this generalisation method to other domains 
is shown in Section 8.2. The methods of using explanation -based generalisation 
and linearisation on the individual subtrees of the proofs of the w -rule, such that a 
cut formula is suggested upon which induction may be performed, are expounded 
in Sections 8.1.4 and 8.4. Methods of generalisation already proposed by other 
people work on most of the examples presented in this chapter, but there are some 
examples, particularly in the following chapter, for which the proposed generali- 
sation method suggests a generalisation when others do not. 
As discussed in Section 3.1, there are many different types of generalisation, rang- 
ing from the generalisation of the proposition A to A A B and, for the predicate P, 
3x3y P(x, y) to 3x P(x, x), or VxVy P(x, f (y)) to VxVa P(x, a). In this chapter 
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the following generalisation will be concentrated upon: Vx P(x, x) to VxVa P(x, a); 
in the following chapter Vx P(x, c) to VxVa P(x, a) will also be considered. Cur- 
rent methods of generalisation are presented in Section 11.3. My approach will 
not be specific to sequent calculus since, as discussed in Subsection 3.1.1, there 
are analogous problems in other presentations. 
8.1 How Proofs in PAS,,, Suggest Generalisation 
in PA 
8.1.1 General Approach 
There is a class of proofs, including Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x), which appear 
to be provable in PA only using the cut rule but which are provable in PA, (see 
Section 7.1). In this section I consider whether the proof in PAS,,, suggests a proof 
in PA, and so in particular, what the cut formula would be in a proof in Peano 
Arithmetic. That is, for the example mentioned above, I would wish to suggest a 
suitable A which will enable the completion of the proof, such that: 
AI-`dx(x+x)+x=x+(x+x) HACUT `dx (x+x)+x=x+(x+x)* 
Ordinary induction does not work on *; this is discussed in more detail in Sec- 
tion 7.1). That is why it is necessary to use the cut rule. One would wish A 
to be a more general version of *, so that A h * could be proven, but on the 
other hand to be suitable to give an inductive proof, so that I- A could be proven 
by induction. Hence the problem of generalisation would be tackled by using an 
alternative (stronger) representation of arithmetic as a guide. 
A heuristic for generalisation would be to examine what remains unaltered in the 
nth case proof (or "general proof ") and then write out the original formula, but 
with the corresponding term re- named. What is meant by `unaltered' is defined by 
what is unaffected by the rewrite rules. The terms should be renamed because one 
would not wish to carry out induction upon these terms, since the general proof 
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shows that they are not altered within the proof process, unlike an induction 
variable. The heuristic may be regarded as a simplification of the explanation - 
based generalisation method considered in Subsection 8.1.4. This method works 
both for the cases of generalising terms to variables and variables apart, as shown 
in Subsection 8.1.3, but, as shall be shown in Section 8.4, it requires modification 
in the case of the addition of accumulators. 
8.1.2 Strategy for Normalisation 
It is important at this stage to clarify the strategy for generation of a general 
proof, since the rewrite rules applied will affect the generalisation suggested. The 
algorithm used in the implementation for this stage is discussed in Section 10.4. If 
the "unaltered term" heuristic is to be used, it is important not to apply just any 
rewrite rule which is applicable to the general proof, but rather those sufficient to 
reach equality in the general proof. In other words, once equality is reached in the 
general proof, additional rules may still be applied, but by so doing it may be the 
case that a more general proof will not be provable with the same rule set, and 
hence that the explanation -based generalisation method will be too constrained 
to suggest a new initial formula. Hence, for the purposes of generalisation, the 
general proof of interest is the minimal general proof which results in equality (in 
other words, such that redundant rules not needed in order to give equality are 
not included) .1 In practice, all that is required is an equality check on each line 
of the general proof, which terminates further rewriting if it succeeds: this check 
is present in the implementation. The effect of rearrangement of rewrite rules 
within the general proof is considered in Section 8.4: if rearrangement without 
addition of rewrite rules provides a proof of an identical inital sequent, then the 
same generalisation would be suggested - otherwise, this would not necessarily 
be the case. 
1Note the connection between such a restriction of the search space and the way 
in which other generalisation methods choose between possible solutions (such as Jane 
Hesketh's exploration of multiple rewrite rule applications (Hesketh, 1991b)). 
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8.1.3 Examples Illustrating Application of the Suggested 
Heuristic 
A method of generalisation has been proposed. This section investigates how it 
fares in practice. This method covers the cases when generalisation from terms to 
variables and also generalisation of variables apart is normally used; an extension 
of the method to deal with generalisation of constants to variables and introduction 
of accumulators shall be discussed in Section 8.4. 
Generalisation of Variables Apart: Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) 
For the example corresponding to the general proof of Vx (x +x) +x = x +(x +x), 
which is discussed in Subsection 6.1.1 and presented in Figure 6 -1, A, B, C and 
D remain essentially unaltered. As well as this being apparent from the general 
proof, this could be deduced using the axioms and the argument positions of A, 
B, C and D in the formula. These terms must therefore not be involved in an 
induction. So, one might rewrite the variable corresponding to A, 5, C and D as 
y. In this case, this would give 
A- (x+y)+y=x+(y+y). 
A could then be proved by induction on x. Ordinary induction on Vx (x + x) +x = 
x + (x + x) is blocked, and yet induction on the suggested generalisation carries 
through: 
(x + x) + x = x + (x + x) H (s(x) + s(x)) + s(x) = s(x) + (s(x) + s(x)) 
. . . H s((x + s(x)) + s(x)) = s(x + s(x + s(x))) 
blocked 
(x + y) + y = x + (y + y) H (s(x) + y) + y = s(x) + (y + y) 
... H s((x + y) + y) = s(x + (y + y)) 
equality, by weak fertilisation 
Generalisation of Terms to Variables: x + s(x) = s(x) + x 
This is Example 8.3 from Table 8 -1, and is another example of a proposition 
which requires cut in its proof in PA. Let us consider whether the formula is 
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provable in PA,,,; there is a general proof of the nth case, thus allowing proof by 
the constructive w -rule. 




s(sn(0)) + sn(0) 
s(sn(sn(0))) see Note 1 
sn(0) see Note 2 
Note 1: from Axioms 6.2 and 6.1, one may derive sn(0) + z = sn(0 + z) = sn(z) 
(cf. proof in Chapter 6 of sn (x) + y = sn (x + y)) . 
Note 2: it is necessary to know s (sn (X)) = sn (s (X)) , which may be shown by 
cancellation. Note that sr(X) is shorthand for s(X). 
r times 
In order to address the question of how a proof using ordinary induction might 
be suggested, let us consider the generalisation heuristic. This requires careful 
consideration of which terms remain unchanged by the rewrite rules. 
X + s(x) 
Sn (0) + s (Sn (0)) 
A 13 
Sn (0 + s (Sn (0))) 
ri 
sn(s (Sn (0))) ----' r3 
= s(x)+x 
= s(sn(0)) + sn(0) 
C 
¡D = s(Sn(0 + Sn (0))) 
D 
= s(sn (Sn (0))) 
'-' D 
changed changed 
Hence x + s(x) = s(x) + x 
unchanged unchanged 
x -+ sn(0) 
B, D retain position and form 
Ditto 
Equality by cancellation 
The generalisation suggested is therefore x +s(y) = s(x) +y, since it is not desirable 
to do induction on B or D. The generalisation carries through, even though it is 
not one which might obviously spring to mind. This is also the generalisation 
suggested by the (more rigorous) explanation -based generalisation method. This 
cut formula enables a proof by induction in PA, as follows: 
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Subst, y = x 
EQUALITY 
r + s(y) = s(r) + y F r + s(y) = s(r) + y 
r + s(y) = s(r) + y H s(r + s(y)) = s(s(r) + y) 
7r 
6.2 
base case r + s(y) = s(r) + y H s(r) + s(y) = s(s(r)) + y 
iud(x) 
b'xHyx+s(y)=s(x)+yf-... Hdxb'yx+s(y)=s(x)+y 
I Hx x+ s(x) = s(x) + x 
Tr:A=B s(A) = s(B) 
cut 
In conclusion, generalisation of variables apart is carried out by the method sug- 
gested in order to deal with cases in which the generalisation of common subex- 
pressions would be used by some other methods; for instance, for this example, 
many methods would just initially generalise to VxVy x +y = y +x (cf. Chapter 11). 
However, in some cases the effect is the same in the end (cf. Subsection 8.4.4). 
It has been seen that the suggested heuristic works for simple arithmetical ex- 
amples, at least. A cut formula is suggested, but it is not necessarily the most 
general one. Now, the rules used in the general proof are the same for both 
Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) and VxVyVz (x + y) + z = x + (y + z). This is be- 
cause the latter is a generalised form of the former and this fact may be exploited 
when doing such proofs. There exists a more general method which produces the 
most general cut formula obtainable from using the same rules as in the general 
proof. This is explanation -based generalisation (see Sections 3.4 and 8.1.4, and 
for example (Donat & Wallen, 1988)), applied to this new domain. This may only 
produce a correct cut formula if the structure of the cut formula is the same as 
that of the original goal; if additional structure such as accumulators are required, 
modification of the method is required, as shall be seen in Subsection 8.2.2. This 
procedure is amenable to automation, and has been implemented, so that a cut 
formula may be produced automatically from a general proof (see Chapter 10). 
Examples of a cut formula which may be suggested by this method of generali- 
sation but not alternative ones are given in Chapter 11. The explanation -based 
generalisation method of proof for this example is given in detail in the following 
section. 
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8.1.4 Explanation -Based Generalisation 
In this section the explanation -based method used is described in more detail. 
Section 3.4 provides a background to this approach, mentioning other systems 
using various domains including integration problems. In general terms the process 
works by generalising a particular solution to the most general possible solution 
which uses the rules of the original solution. It does this by applying these rules, 
making no assumptions about the form of the generalised solution, and using 
unification to fill in this form.2 
The method is applied in this instance to a new domain, namely that of general 
proofs. For the purposes of illustration I shall first consider the example given 
in Section 8.1, namely the proof of Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x). The general 
proof is repeated below from Figure 6 -1, with the difference that the subpositions 
to which each rule is applied are given here; relevant rewrite rules used are those 
defining addition, namely rulel : s(X) + Y s(X + Y) and rule2 : 0 + Y Y, 
corresponding to axioms 6.2 and 6.1. The rules applied are given in the nota- 
tion described in Section 6.1: the first argument of the rule is the subposition of 
the expression corresponding to the domain of its application, using the notation 
described in Appendix B.3 (the relevant subposition is underlined in the general 
proof for clarification) and the second argument is the number of times the rule 
is applied. Thus; the general proof as written is a (shortened) description of the 
whole proof, since it just indicates the application of whole blocks of rewrite rules. 
(n+ LI) +n 
(sn(0) + s'n(0)) + sn(0) 
sn(0 +¡¡sn(0)) + s"(0) 
snlsnl¡¡0)) + sn(0) 
sn(sn(0)) + sn(0) 
sn(sn(0)) + sn(0) 
sn(sn(0) + sn(o)) 
= n+(n+n) 
= sn(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= sn(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= sn(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= sn(0 + (sn(0) + sn(0))) 
= sn(sn(0) + sn(0)) 
= sn(sn(0) + sn(o)) 
Rules 
ru/el( [1,1] , n) 
rule2([2, 2, 1,1] , 1) 
rulel([2],n) 
rule2( [2, 2, 2], 1) 
rulel([1],n) 
equality 
As mentioned earlier, a simplified approach towards generalisation would be to 
look at the proof to see which terms remain unchanged, and generalise these to a 
2This process has already been illustrated in Figure 3 -1. 
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new variable. A further development is to instead look at the rules of the general 
proof, and work out what the most general statement could be which was proved 
using these rules. This is the approach of explanation -based generalisation, and 
would justify that the cut formula suggested was indeed a proper generalisation. 
By the `unaltered variable' method, a cut formula is suggested of Vx (x + ?) +? = 
x + ( ? + ?), where the ?'s may be rewritten as the same new variable, or different 
variables using some sort of heuristic, such as that the nth new variable of the left 
hand side of the equation would be set equal to the nth new variable on the right, 
depending on whether simply a generalisation, or the most general generalisation, 





Now let us construct the generalisation using the rules R, for this example. The 
right hand column are the instantiations of variables, which are finally to be filtered 
back up into the original expression. Essentially what is happening is that the 
application of the rules are matched to see what the generalisation could be. So 
if 6.2 is applied m times, this will match with the form 
sm(X)+Y sm(X+Y) 
The process is given in Figure 8 -1. Nothing more is supposed about the original 
form of the general proof than that it is of the form U = W. The rule application 
blocks on the left hand side of this figure are identical with those of the general 
proof given in the preceding paragraph. The procedure is to form the most general 
proof which could use those same rules to achieve equality. Hence, these same 
rewrite rules are applied at the specified subpositions to give a new general proof. 
In so doing the structure of U and W is revealed. For instance, the fact that 
rule 6.2 may be applied n times at subposition [1,1] of U = W reveals that U 
must be of the form f nO([s'n(X) +Y /K]) (which represents some functor f nO of as 
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yet unknown arity with initial argument sn (X) + Y and additional arguments K) 
before the rule application, and of the form f nO( {sn(X +Y) /K]) afterwards. This 
process is repeated until all the given rules are exhausted. Finally, the left -hand 
side and the right -hand side of the general proof are unified (since the original 
proof resulted in equality). Throughout this process, information will have been 
obtained regarding the structure of some of the postulated variables in this new 






1] , n) 
2, 1, 1] , 1) 
6.2([2] , n) 
6.1([2,2,2],1) 
6.2([1] , n) 
EQUALITY 
form of general 
f n0([sn(X) + Y/K]) 
f n0([sn(X + Y)/K]) 
f n0([sn(Y)/K]) 
f n0l ¡[sn(Y)lK]) 
sn(Y + K) 





= sn (P + (2) 
= sn(Q) 




W = sn(P) + Q 
P=O, fn0=+ 
Q=Y+K 
Figure 8 -1: Illustration of Explanation -Based Generalisation on Rules of General 
Proof 
Feeding such variable instantiation information back to the original expression 
U = W shows that it must be of the form: 
(n +Y) +K= n +(Y +K) 
This gives the most general generalisation as being 
Vxbybk (x +y) +k= x +(y +k) 
The whole process is really just a term -matching exercise, and has been successfully 
automated, as described in Chapter 10. This process has been applied in various 
other domains, and is the approach of explanation -based generalisation (denoted 
`EBG' as an abbreviation). 
The EBG method proposed in this section will succeed in the sense that there 
does exist some general proof such that a correct cut formula could be found by 
EBG (so long as inductive proof by generalisation apart is possible). However, it 
will not necessarily work with any given general proof, nor if generalisation apart 
is not appropriate for the example under consideration. 
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In conclusion, the heuristic for generalisation suggested is of seeing what remains 
unaltered in the nth case proof, (viz. the "general proof ") and then writing out 
the original formula, but with that variable re- named. Although this heuristic is 
suitable for implementation (and was successfully implemented), the method of 
explanation -based generalisation extends this idea to provide a uniform algorithm 
based on the underlying structure of the proof. The implementation of EBG 
described in Appendix E follows the unification process described above, and thus 
subsumes the implementation of the heuristic method. Note that I do not intend to 
develop heuristics which, together with this information, might provide a choice 
of solutions which may be evaluated. I have instead proposed a method which 
involves less of an ad hoc approach, and relies on an analysis of the proofs. 
8.1.5 Further Examples which Illustrate How a Cut For- 
mula Might be Provided 
The preceding sections have discussed how a method of generalisation may be 
provided. A selection of further arithmetical examples for which this method 
works in a straightforward manner is given in Table 8 -1 and details of the cut 
formulae suggested are given in Table 8 -2. It may be interesting to consider an 
example involving multiplication and one involving the use of conditionals plus a 
destructor function, to illustrate that such extensions do not pose a problem for 
the method, and because of the questions of cancellation and use of associativity 
of plus that they highlight. 
An Example Involving Multiplication (8.5): (x + x).x = x.x + x.x 
The axioms to be used are the Peano axioms defining addition and multiplication, 
namely 6.2 and 6.1 plus: 
O.y = 0 












Induction is blocked for the above expressions, but they may all be 
proved by the method proposed (namely by using the constructive w- 
rule) and a correct cut formula produced as appropriate. 
Table 8 -1: Some Examples of Arithmetical Theorems Proved 
Note that axiom 8.10 applied n times corresponds to: 
sn(X).Y = ((. (X.Y + Y) +...) + Y) 
n times 
(written X.Y + Y as shorthand). 
n times 
Using the axioms 6.2, 6.1, 8.9 and 8.10 given above, the general proof is as follows: 
(n + n)¡¡.n 
(871(0) + sn())sn\) 
sn(0 + sn(0)).sn(0) 
¡¡ 
sn(s¡¡n(o))sn(0) 
snl)sn\) + sn(o) 
i 




n.n + n.n 
sn(0)sn(0) + sn(0)sn(0) 
sn(0).sn(0) + sn(0).sn(0) 
sn(0)sn(0) + sn(0)sn(0) 
sn(0).sn(0) + (0.s(0) + sn(0)) --.r 
n times 
sn(o)sn(o) + (sn(o)) 
n times 
6.2 n times 
6.1 
8.10 n times 
8.9, 6.1 
EQUALITY by assoc 
The final goal necessitates proof of (... (sn(0).sn(0) + sn(0)) + ...) + sn(0)) _ 
n occurrences 
sn(0).sn(0) + (. ((sn(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0)) ... + sn(0)). See Section 8.6 for dis - 
n occurrences 
cussion of the use of associativity of plus in such proofs in order to obtain the final 
equality in the general proof. 
The generalisation suggested is 
b'x by (x + y).y = yy + x.y 
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This is a correct generalisation, as shown below. 
CLOSES 
equality 
by (r +y).y = y.y +r.y HVy y.y +r.y +y = y.y +r.y +y 
Vy (r +y).y = y.y +r.y HVy (r +y).y +y = y.y +r.y +y 
8hyp 10 
Vy (r +y).y = y.y +r.y H Vy s(r +y).y = y.y +r.y +y 
6.1 
Vy (r + y).y = y.y + r.y H Vy (s(r) + y).y = y.y + s(r)y 
2nd 
HdxVy (x + y).y = y.y + x.y 
Note the difference between this cut formula and the one suggested for the corre- 
sponding Example 8.4, which suggests VxVy x.(y + y) = x.y + x.y. 
By EBG, a more general generalisation of VxVyVz(x+y).z = y.z +x.z is obtained, 
which is also a correct generalisation. 
An Example Involving Conditionals and Destructor Functions (8.8): 
dxx00- - p(x) +s(s(x)) = s(x) +x 
This type of example would pose a problem for most of the other generalisation 
methods; see Chapter 11 for a comparison. The axioms used will be as follows: 
x = 0 -+ p(x) = x (8.11) 
x 0 0 -+ p(s(x)) = x (8.12) 
The general nth case proof will be of the following form (case splits are ignored in 
order to simplify the presentation): 
p(sn(0)) + s(s(sn(0))) = s(sn(0)) + sn(0) 8.12, 6.1 
unchanged unchanged 
sn -1(0) + s.s.sn(0) = s(sn(0) + sn(0)) 6.1 
sn -1(0 + s.s.sn(0)) = s.sn.(0 + sn(0)) 6.2 
sn- 1(s.s.sn(0)) = s.sn.sn(0) EQUALITY by cancellation 
To obtain the general proof, it is only necessary to know that sn(0) stands for 
ßs(0), and to use cancellation (see Section 8.6 for further discussion on this 
n times 
topic). According to the generalisation method suggested, the unchanged terms 
are renamed, to avoid induction being applied to them. Hence, the generalisation 
is: 
x 0 0 -÷ p(x) + s(s(z)) = s(x) + z 
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and the solution yielded (in PA) is as follows (base case omitted): 
0 0 s(s(z)) = s(z) H 0 = s(0) s(m) = s(m) 
6.1, 6.2 8.12 
..p(0) + s(s(z)) = s(0) + z f- 0 = s(p(0)) m = s(p(m)) f- s(m) = s(p(s(m))) 
ind 
r 0---> ...I-r=s(p(r)) 
structural rule 
r + s(s(z)) = s(p(r)) + s(s(z)) 
6.1 
I- r + s(s(z)) = s(p(r) + s(s(z))) 
hyp(subst) 
f- (s(r) 0 0 --->)r + s(s(z)) = s(s(r) + z) 
8.12, 8.10 r0 0 -->p(r) + s(s(z)) = s(r) + z H s(r) 0 0 -> p(s(r)) + s(s(z)) = s(s(r)) + z 
ind 
I- x 0 p(x) + s(s(z)) = s(x) + z 
Comment 
Note that what is allowing this method to solve many of these examples, which 
could not be solved by straightforward induction, is that the general proof deals 
with numerals rather than numeric variables and thus if n was previously in a 
blocked position with regard to some axiom which could not be applied, the new 
structure would allow the application of a rewrite rule. As an illustration, for the 
example Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x +x) considered above, the second, third and sixth 
occurrences of x are unaffected by the rewrite rule corresponding to axiom 6.2, 
and hence induction is blocked. The general proof continues from this stage by 
exploiting the structure of the terms in the first and fourth position, in such a way 
that further rewrite rules may be applied. 
The way in which the general proof often seems to allow extension of the failed 
(blocked) induction proof, by means of further rewrite rules being applied to ad- 
ditional structure, may be seen for the case of list examples in Appendix C. In 
Section 8.2 I consider an analogous approach to other domains which would allow 
solution of generalisation problems. 
8.1.6 Conclusions 
The generalisation heuristic proposed is to rename terms which are unaltered 
throughout the general proof, and it works on basic examples by providing an 
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insight into the actual structure of the proofs. A more general method of per- 
forming such a process is provided by explanation -based generalisation. Further 
discussion of why the formula suggested by EBG is suitable for induction is given 
in Subsection 8.3.3. Just as the heuristic proposed of renaming unchanged terms 
is subsumed by the more general method of EBG, the latter in turn shall be shown 
in Section 8.3 to be an instance of the more general approach of linearisation of 
general proofs. The following sections develop the algorithms given in this sec- 
tion in order to allow generalisation of more complicated examples in a variety of 
domains. 
8.2 Application of the Proposed Generalisation 
Method to Domains Other Than Arithmetic 
A new approach to generalisation over the natural numbers has been developed 
above. However, the approach applies more generally to other domains. So long 
as a general procedure for constructing a proof for each individual of a sort is 
specified, universal statements about objects of the sort can be proved. The data - 
types of lists and sets are considered below; the domain of lists is highlighted in 
particular, in preparation for consideration of examples in the following section of 
how generalisation may be suggested. An extension of this approach to arbitrary 
data -types is discussed in Subsection 12.1.3. 
8.2.1 The Omega Rule over Various Domains 
What form would the w -rule take for domains other than arithmetic? For the 
domain of arithmetic, numerals are used in the numerator: a numeral is a term 
which canonically represents an integer, cf. (Girard, 1987, P47). In the same way, 
given some canonical representation r(n) for lists, the w -rule would take the form 
A(G(0)) A(r(1)) ... A(G(n)) ... 
Vl E typelist A(l) 
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For an arbitrary datatype D, so long as a canonical representation K(n) may be 
given of D, then the following w -rule may be used: 
A(1C(0)) A(1C(1)) ... A(K(n)) 
co rule VxEDA(x) 
8.2.2 Lists 
Just as the representation of a natural number n may be seen so be sn (0), the 
general representation of a list G may be seen to be [xi, x2i x3, ... , xL] , where m 
is the length of the list, and the xi are terms of a specified type eg. the natural 
numbers. These general representations may be deduced from the definitional 
equations of the system. 
Note that some recursive representation which generates all lists is required. In 
the same way as the natural number hierarchy 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... might be defined 
as follows: 
s°(0) = O 
ss(n)(0) = (Sn (0)) 
one may define the list hierarchy £(0), G(s(0)), G(s(s(0))), ... where L is a poly- 
morphic function as follows: 
£(0) = nil 
G(s(n)) = xsn.(°) :: £(n) 
Thus there is the structure 
nil - G(0) 
x° :: nil - G(s(0)) 
xs(°) :: x0 :: nil - G(s(s(0))) - and so on. 
Of course, £(n) is not unique, since it only defines a list of length n, and does not 
stipulate anything about the behaviour of its members. Such information might in 
some cases influence the structure of the proof, or give different proofs for different 
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values. As far as equality is concerned, n = m sa(0) = sm(0). However, it is 
non deterministic whether n = m G(n) = .C(m), for these will only be lists of 
the same length. The definition of this structure may well affect the shape of the 
general proofs produced; for example, a split- definition into odd or even cases for 
instance would cause corresponding split cases in the general proof. 
In Section 8.5.1 attention is drawn to the fact that for datatypes for which the 
given structure and function definitions are analogous, general proofs will have 
an analogous structure. One such relevant factor considered in that section is 
that the structural definitions should release structure in a similar manner: for 
example, the numerals could instead be generated by defining equations 0 = O 
and n + 1 = s.n. This corresponds to lazy evaluation, as opposed to the strict 
evaluation given above, and is analogous to the lazy list definitions given above. 
The strict definitions tend to be more useful for arithmetic, because arithmetical 
functions often require the whole structure of a numeral, but list operations nearly 
always divide the list into head and tail, and hence the lazy definitions provide a 
more concise expression and may save unnecessary evaluation. 
Note that not only is it the case that certain new structural patterns may be seen 
in the general proof which may guide generalisation, but also that the general 
representation enables the structure of the particular data -type to be exploited, in 
the sense that rewrite rules may be used which would not otherwise be applicable. 
Also, additional structure may be revealed, as shown in the examples given in 
Section 8.4. 
8.2.3 Sets 
I shall move on to consider the domain of finite sets. An arbitrary set may be 
represented by C(n), where: 
C(0) -0 
C(s(n)) - {xsn(o)} U C(n) 
Thus there is the structure (where {a} U {b} - {a, b }): 
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0 - C(o) 
{xi} - C(s(0)) 
{xl, x2} - C(s(s(0))) 
It is important to appreciate that sets are rather like lists, but with the problem 
of identity statements. For with sets, unlike lists, it is not the case that 
{xi}uS - {x;}US' xi =x;. 
Since the theory of sets does not have the same uniqueness property as other 
theories like strings, lists and trees, one has to bear in mind that augmenting the 
theory with axioms of recursive form may destroy the consistency of the theory. It 
is necessary to work out some way to deal with equality statements. Rather than 
doing this via the representation, one may add the identity axioms (for sets S,T 
and set elements xi, x3, where = is the equality between set elements, and - the 
equality between sets):3 
{xi }US - {xi} UT if xi = x; and S T 
{xi }US- {xi }u {xi }uS 
{xi }u {x; }US- {xi}u {xi }uS 
Example: VC C U( {a} U C) -( {a} U C) U C 
This is very similar to the natural numbers example: Vn n + (a + n) = (a + n) + n, 
plus Example 8.3. The general proof is as follows: 
C(s(n)) U ({a} U C(s(n))) = ({a} U C(s(n))) U C(s(n)) 
({xsn(o)} U C(n)) U ({a} U({xsn` /oI 1} U C(n)))) = ({a} U({xsn(o)} U C(n))) U({xsn` /o/ \} U C(n))) 
and so on 
EQUALITY by identity axioms 
3See, for comparison, Chisholm's representation of sets (Chisholm, 1988). 
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Conclusions 
It is interesting and possible, as shown above, to extend the approach of generali- 
sation suggested via a general proof within the domain of natural numbers to other 
domains, such as sets, trees and other data types. It can be seen that it might 
be possible to automatically generate the general representation of an object of 
a certain type from the system definitions (and then to automatically produce a 
general proof and use this to guide proofs in the system). The approach described 
enables the structure of the particular data -type to be exploited (at least for freely 
constructed types) and a proof to be reached when otherwise it might not have 
been. Further evidence and examples will be considered later in the chapter. 
8.3 Linearisation 
In this section the idea of linearity will be discussed, in order to draw a comparison 
between the linear form of a general proof and the possibility of carrying out 
induction on the analogous initial formula. This will be seen to provide a more 
general method of generalisation which may be used when the explanation -based 
generalisation method is not applicable - for example in the case of accumulator - 
type generalisation (and which in fact subsumes this method). 
8.3.1 The Relationship between Linearity and Induction 
In this subsection the relationship between linearity and induction will be con- 
sidered. First, it is important to clarify the notion of linearity, since it may be 
used in different senses. Such differences may depend on whether the w -rule un- 
der consideration is constructive: in the case of the constructive w -rule operating 
on Vx A(x), the A(i) are uniformly generated, and there will be a relationship 
between their proofs - otherwise, this may not be the case. The general form 
of a linear proof involving a single use of the constructive w -rule is given in Fig- 
ure 8 -2, with the proviso that there may be additional leaves if the P(i) consist 
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of branching proof rules. Hence proofs are regarded as linear in the sense of their 
construction, rather than in their representation; that is to say that any w -proof 
which is of the form of Figure 8 -2 (with additional leaves in the case of inductive 
proofs with branching in the step proof) is (strongly) linear, with the constraints 
that A(k) is reduced to A(k - 1) in a uniform way for each k, and that the proof 
is cut -free. 
A(0) 
: kth subtree 
A(0) A(k -1) 
: P(0) : P(1) : P(k) 
A(0) A(1) ... A(k) 
Vx A(x) 
constructive w rule 
Figure 8 -2: Form of Linear Proof in PAS,, 
As discussed in Section 7.2, induction is taken to be a derived rule in PA,. So, 
if the cut rule is not used explicitly, use of such a rule will take the form shown in 
Figure 7 -1. However, the proof given in this figure is not the final form of the proof 
without the use of cuts, and even as it stands there are other leaves present in the 
tree which prevent Figure 7 -1 from having the linear structure of Figure 8 -2. It 
is the aim of this section to show that use of induction does however correspond 
to a linear form, in the sense that a linear general proof will correspond to some 
standard inductive proof (and vice versa). 
Incidentally, the structure of an w -rule proof may also take what I shall call a step 
linear form, in which different subtrees may be developed in different ways, yet 
with there still being a recognisable algorithm for their construction; for example: 
; P(0) ; P(1) 
A(0) A(1) 
: P(0) : P(1) : P(2) : P(3) 
A(0) A(1) A(2) A(3) .. 
VxA(x) 
w rule 
Note that the splitting of the general proof (ie. branching via rewrite rules) cor- 
responds to step linearity; in practice this does not happen very often, but an 
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example of this type would be Vx(even(x) V even(s(x))). No examples which split 
in this way are in fact considered in Appendix E.8.3 (in which the transcripts 
of the implementational system running are provided), although the implementa- 
tional system is designed to allow such splits; thus, these general proof examples 
have a "linear" shape in one sense within the implementational tree representation, 
but this should not be confused with the criterion for linearity which is presented 
above and which is what shall be meant by "linear" in this thesis. 
The nested case, in which there is more than one use of the w -rule, is discussed 
further in Section 9.6. Use of two inductions should be compared with P. Madden's 
transformations which linearise proofs defined by functions with two inductive 
variables (see Section 11.2) (Madden, 1989). In general, of course, any number of 
inductions could be used. 
8.3.2 Linearity and General Proofs 
As discussed in Chapter 6, a general proof is a parametrised version of an arbitrary 
subtree of an w- proof, which is a proof in PAS,, of a universal statement. Thus, a 
"linear" general proof will correspond to the kth subtree of Figure 8 -2, which will 
have the form A(k) reducing in a uniform manner to A(k - 1) to A(k - 2) down 
to A(0). 
I wish to describe a procedure for standard induction proofs which yields w- proofs, 
and to characterise proofs obtained by carrying out this transformation; by these 
means, if it is possible to put a general proof in a linear form, then one could obtain 
an inductive proof in PA by inverting this process. Analysis of this process would 
suggest the provision of a suitable cut formula. I shall show in this subsection that 
if VxA(x) is provable by induction in PAc,,, then a proof is of the form given in 
Figure 8 -2, and thus that this corresponds to strong linearity. 
Note that the general proofs considered are a special case of w- proofs, in that in 
practice manipulations are just being carried out on a single formula (cf. use of 
rewrite rules in the general proof), as opposed to arbitrary sequent manipulations. 
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Hence, the linearisation of the general -proof is its transformation, via the definition 






where the proof of Q(m) is an extension of the proof of Q(m - 1), by the proof 
steps (via rewrite rule block) i. For the step version of linearity, Q would be 
different in different subtrees. So long as there is not a case -split in the w- proof, 
the notion of linearity considered will be the strong one. 
I shall show that the linear shape, and "inductive" structure of such a proof would 
suggest that induction could be used on it, and hence that the original proof might 
be completed using a cut with cut -formula VmQ(m), and then induction. 
The idea is to turn the general proofs into a linear form, which will suggest that 
induction can be done on the original formula (that is to say that this formula is a 
suitable cut formula). Hence it is necessary to recognise Q such that the following 
may be transformed: 
Original General Proof: 
into 










These correspond to the proof in PA, where Vx P(x) was the original formula:4 
4As mentioned above, one is concerned for the stages i and j with application of 




Q(0) Q(r) F- Q(s(r)) 
ind(x) 
b'x Q(x) I- bxP(x) F- bx Q(x) 
cut 
`dxP(x) 
Given such an inductive proof, would it be possible to generate a proof in PA, (ie. 
an w- proof)? In order to do this, one needs Theorem 8.1. The fact that if a proof 
of r, A(k) F- A(s(k)) is provided, then there is a derivation of r F- A(s(k)) from 
r I- A(k) (in the sense of there being a natural deduction proof of the former from 
the latter, possibly using additional axioms) forms an analogue of the deduction 
theorem.5 
Theorem 8.1 (Deduction Theorem for Sequents) The sequent r, A H B is 
provable in PAW if and only if there is a derivation in PA, of 
FHA 
F 
Proof of Theorem 8.1: 
Suppose r, A H B is provable in PAS,,. The cut rule may be used to derive 
r H B from r H A and r, A H B. Hence, given r, A H B, then there is a derivation 
of r H B from r H A. By the cut elimination theorem, there must be a cut -free 
derivation (in PAS,,,) of r F- B from r H A. 
Suppose that there is a proof in PAS,, of F H B from r H A. By using the 
same rules, there must be a proof of r, A I- B from r, A H A. However, F, A H A 
is an axiom. Hence, there is a proof in PAS,, of F, A H B. 
Theorem 8.2 (Linearisation Theorem) Q can be proved using a single induc- 
tion if and only if there is a strongly linear w -proof of Q 
5If I', B F-K A, then F F-K B -+ A, for some logical system K (Dummett, 1977, P127). 
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Proof of Theorem 8.2: 
Induction Linear General Proof 
By means of Theorem 8.1, the fact that induction carries through for Q will imply 
directly that the general proof is linear. So, if Q(x) is such that induction can be 
done, ie. Q(s(x)) reduces to Q(x), by the rules i, and H Q(0), then the general 
proof will be of the form: 
Q(sn(0)) 
reduces to 






The rules i(k) here form a repeated (parametrised) rule -block. This is what has 
been described above as a linearisable general proof. So, for arithmetic, if Q is 
suitable for induction, then the general proof is linearisable. 
Incidentally, the general proof may then be used as the kth (for arbitrary k) subtree 
of the w -rule, to give a linear w -proof of VxQ(x), and also such that if induction 
carries through for Q, then there is a suitable cut formula provided for the proof 
in PA,, too, as follows (cf. discussion in Subsection 7.2.1): 
Q(0) 
H Q(0) kth subtree 
Q(0) Q(1) . . . I- Q(k) 
b'xQ(x) I- bxP(x) I- b'x Q(x) 
cut 
VxP(x) 
Linear General Proof Induction 
w rule 
Does the converse hold, that is, does a linear form of the new general proof imply 
that induction may be used directly on Q, such that Q would be an appropriate 
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cut formula? Given a general proof (cf. representation of an arbitrary subtree of 





then Q(s(k)) reduces to Q(k) for all numerals such that k < n, where n was 
arbitrary - hence k is arbitrary. (The rules i(k) here form a repeated rule -block 
(parametrised over k): this is what has been described above as a linearisable 
general proof.) By the soundness of the general proof representation with respect 
to PAS,, (cf. Section 6.4), there is a proof in PA, of 
I- Q(k) 
I- Q(s(k)) 
and by Theorem 8.1, there is a proof of Q(k) I- Q(s(k)), for each numeral k. By 
the form of the original strongly linear proof, each proof segment P(k) is obtained 
by taking the same shape of proof with a numerical parameter that is replaced by 
the appropriate value of k. So, there is a uniform correspondence between how the 
different instances of the numeral k are treated in each proof of Q(k) I- Q(s(k)), 
which suggests that the free variable version Q(r) I- Q(s(r)) is provable. The final 
lines of the general proof provide a proof of Q(0), and therefore the prooftree in 
PA using induction may be completed. 
Hence, general proof of Q strongly linear - induction will succeed on Q. 
8.3.3 Illustration with Respect to a General Proof 
In this subsection the discussion above shall be related to an actual general proof, 
with the aim of demonstrating how it is necessary to generalise in order to get 
a linear shape. The (meta)inductions involved in the correctness of rewriting 
within the general proof will be highlighted, to show how the variable candidates 
for generalisation apart are revealed by such meta -inductions, and thus also the 
induction that appears from the linear general proof. 
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n - sn(0) 
USE 6.2 n TIMES BOTH SIDES 
USE 6.1 BOTH SIDES 
USE 6.2 n TIMES ON LEFT 
(n+n)+n=n+(n+n) 
(sn(o) + sn(0)) + sn(o) = sn(o) + (Sn (0) + Sn (0)) 
sn(o + Sn (0)) + Sn (0) = Sn (o + (Sn (0) + Sn (0))) 
sn(sn(0)) + Sn (0) = sn (Sn (0) + Sn (0)) 
sn (Sn (0) + Sn(0)) = sn (Sn (0) + Sn(0)) 
EQUALITY 
Figure 8 -3: Another General Proof of Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) 
Figure 8 -3 forms a counterpart to Figure 6 -1, in which the order of the applications 
of rewrite rules is the same, but the blocks of application of individual rewrite rules 
have been underlined for clarification. For this example, it is the case that (for 
0 < i < n) the first step of the general proof given in Figure 8 -3 may be represented 
by: 
Q(Z) = SZ((Sn-Z(0) + sn(0)) + Sn (0) = SZ(sn-2(0) + (Sn (0) + Sn (0))) 
Induction on i (requiring proof of the step case Q(i) I- Q(s(i))) is proved by an 
application of 6.2 on each side (ie. s(X) + Y = s(X + Y)). Q(0) is the original 
sequent of the general proof. 
Q(n) - sn(0 + Sn (0)) + Sn(0) = Sn (0 + (Sn (0) + Sn(0))) 
which is the next line of the general proof, obtained after n such individual appli- 
cations of 6.2 on each side. 6.1 is then used once on each side of the general proof 
to remove surplus zeros. Finally, the conversion 
sn(X) + sn(0) =- sn(X + sn(0)) 
is used to alter the left hand side. Each intermediate line of the general proof will 
be of the following form (after j applications of 6.2), and (linear) induction (for 
0 < j < n) may be used to justify this 
Q'(i) = S'((sn-'(X )) + Sn(0)) = 
Combining Q and Q', such that each rewriting step may be made individually, at 
any appropriate stage, one obtains the general form of a line within the general 
proof as being of the form 
Q"(2, j) = 83 (sZ-3 (Sn-Z(0) + ?N. sz(sn-Z(0) + (Sn(0) + Sri (0)) (*) 
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This does not simplify. Such a Q" representation allows many different orders of 
proof lines, and hence represents several shapes of proofs, all of which will result 
in a correct general proof. It is possible to use induction on i and j (provable by 
use of 6.2, and dealing with first i and then j, for instance) to get from Q "(0, 0) 
to Q "(n, n). 
Q"(o,0) - (sn(o) + sn(o)) + Sn(o) = sn(o) + (sn(o) + sn(o)) 
Q"(n,n) = sn((0 + sn(0)) + sno)) = sn(0 + (sn(0) + sn(0))) 
Q"(n, n) may be proved by using 6.1 (ie. 0 + Y Y) twice. 
By looking at the structure of Q ", one can see that induction is taking place on 
the first and fourth terms only, and this suggests that the generalisation should 
involve replacing these terms by a new variable, and doing induction on this, ie. 
by (y + x) + x = y + (x + x). Note that in this example the linear nature of the 
general proof is being made explicit, because the repeated blocks from Q(s(n)) to 
Q(n) are not present without reordering (ie. the unreordered proof is not linear). 
Other examples will involve an even more obvious linearisation of the proof. The 
structure given by ( *) in the previous paragraph is in fact here just formalising 
the process occurring in the general proof, by which it may be seen that certain 
of the terms in the proof remain unaltered. This will not occur in many proofs, 
notably the list examples. 
The way that the linearisation process ties up with the general proofs is that, from 
the structure of the rewrite rules, it is apparent that terms in certain argument 
positions must remain unaltered. This may be seen from the form of Q ", for 
example. Note that from an initial inspection of the formula (x1 + x2) + x3 = 
x4 + (x5 + x6), it is not necessarily possible to deduce that x3 and x6 cannot be 
altered using just the recursive definitions of addition, for x2 might be altered 
if x1 could be made to `disappear', because then it would be in the definitional 
argument position, and similarly x3 could be altered if xi and x2 could be made 
to disappear. So, another approach would be preferable. The general proof shows 
that it is not necessary to achieve equality, ie. one does not have to alter x2, 
although it is possible to do so. Similarly, from the general proof, one concludes 
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that x5 may remain unaltered. So there does exist more information than would be 
provided by an initial guess. The explanation -based generalisation (EBG) proof, 
of course, must express this information too, ie. it must express that x3 and x6 
are distinct from, say x1 and x4, and also that x2 and x5 are too (since they are 
unaltered in the general proof, and the same rules are used). What the EBG proof 
does is to provide a most general generalisation of the initial formula which can 
be proved using the rules given in the general proof. However, in some cases (and 
especially in the list examples), such a generalisation will be the same, and still 
not provable by induction, since what is needed is the addition of new structure 
(ie. an `accumulator'). 
Next, the case of the general proof of the generalisation obtained from the EBG 
method is considered. This proof is linear. Define 
Q(n) - (sn(0) + sr' (0)) + sk(0) = sn(0) + (sm(0) + sk(0)) 
Then Q(s(n)) reduces to Q(n), for all n: 
(s(sn(0)) + sn(0)) + sk(0) = s(sn(0)) + (sm(0) + sk(0)) 
s(sn(0) + sm(o)) + sk(0) = s(sn(0) + (sm(0) + sk(0))) 
s((sn(0) + sm(0)) + sk(0)) = . . . 
EQUALITY using Q(n) 
Q(o) = (0 + sm (0)) + sk(0) = 0 + (sm (0) + sk(o)) 
which is provable by two application of 6.1. Thus the general proof is of the form: 
EQUALITY 
Note the connection between this linearity and induction on the generalisation 
obtained, and how it is possible to see that this generalisation will be provable by 
induction, unlike the original formula. The (internal proof) structure corresponds 
to Q ", described above in the linearisation of the general proof, since the rules 
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are the same. However, rather than directly suggesting what the first and fourth 
terms should be, Q" really tells us that inductive processes are taking place on the 
first and fourth terms in the proof, and so these are the candidates for induction. 
Note that the general proof of the generalisation is the EBG proof with the final 
(instantiated) result. Thus, the EBG proof will necessarily be linear, if it provides 
a correct cut formula, ie. if the top sequent is provable by induction. By doing 
EBG, we rename the parts which should not be altered when using induction. 
This puts the general proof into a linear form, in that (for inital line P(n)) P(n) 
reduces to P(n -1), whereas it did not before. By the linearisation argument, this 
must be suitable for induction. See Subsection 8.5.1, where Q(n, n, n) reduces to 
Q(n - 1, n, n), where the second and third arguments are renamed by the EGB 
process. Hence, if a solution is possible by generalisation of variables apart, then 
this method will find it (so long as a correct general proof is given initially!). 
Thus, EBG is a way of linearising the general proof. See the following section for 
a development of this approach, with respect to lists. 
8.4 Linearisation for List Examples 
A more detailed examination of linearisation for the list examples is presented 
in this section. These are discussed with reference to the different categories of 
generalisation presented in Section 3.1, namely generalisation of terms to variables, 
generalisation apart and generalisation of a constant in an accumulator position 
to a variable. 
In Appendix C a summary is provided of the results related to the various of the 
more interesting list examples already considered, and also it is shown that the 
generalisations suggested really are suitable cut formulae in the sense that ordinary 
induction may be performed upon them. 
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8.4.1 Generalisation Apart: 
V/.(l< >l) < >1= 1 < >(l < >l) 
In this subsection the corresponding list example to the arithmetical example 
Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) ( *) given in Section 8.1 is considered, namely 
V/. (1 <> l) <> l = l <> (1 <> l) (where <> denotes list concatenation). The 
following rewrite rules are used: 
nil <> X = X 
(H :: T) <> X H :: (T <> X) 
The general proof is as follows: 
(r(n) <> G(n)) <> 1(n) 
((xsn -1(o) :: G(n - 1)) <> G(n)) <> G(n) 
(xsn -1(o) :: (G(n - 1) <> G(n))) <> G(n) 
xsn -1(0) :: ((G(n - 1) <> G(n)) <> G(n)) 
en-10) (nil <> G(n)) <> G(n) _ 
xsn-1(0) :: ... :: (r(n) <> G(n)) _ 
(8.13) 
(8.14) 
G(n) <> (G(n) <> G(n)) 
(xsn-1(o) :: G(n - 1)) <> (G(n) <> G(n)) 
by de f of G(n) 
xsn.-1(o) :: (G(n - 1) <> (G(n) <> G(n))) 
by 8.14 
xsn-1(0) :: (G(n - 1) <> (G(n) <> G(n))) 
by 8.14 
similarly, n - 1 times 
xsn-10) :: (nil <> (G(n) <> G(n))) 
xsn -10) ....... (G(n) <> G(n)) 
EQUALITY 
Compare this with the (general) proof for Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) x E l 
given in Figure 6 -1. Just as sn (0) remains unchanged in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th 
places, £(n) remains unchanged in these positions too. So, one could generalise 
to (1 <> p) <> p = l <> (p <> p) and so induction on 1, in a similar manner. 
For simplification the proposed generalisation heuristic is being used here in order 
to prove a generalisation to enable the proof to be completed using the cut rule, 
rather than the most general generalisation, which could also be extracted from the 
proof by the explanation -based generalisation method described in Section 8.1.4 
and written as V1Vpbq (1 <> p) <> q = l <> (p <> q) (see the following page). 
There is also an analogy to the use of "general" rules such as sn(0) +Y sn(0 +Y) 
from s(X) + Y s(X + Y), namely rules like 1(s(n)) <> m xsn(o) :: (xsn-1 (o) 
..... (x0 :: m))) from xsn(o) :: 1(n) <> m xsn(0) :: (1(n) <> m). 
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This example is not unique: any examples of this type will carry through in a 
similar manner; for instance, `dl. l <> (a :: l) = (a :: l) <> 1, where :: denotes 
appending an element to a list (note that this is actually a non -theorem), compares 
with "x +s(x) = s(x) +x" - it would be directly comparable if [a, b] - [b, a] . The 
second l in the general proof on each side is left unchanged, so the generalisation 
I <> (a :: p) = (a :: l) <> p, with induction on 1, would be guessed if list order 
were not important, ie. if the general proof resulted in equality. 
Both these cases are directly analogous to the natural numbers case, and the 
heuristic is to see what remains unchanged throughout the general proof and 
replace this by a new variable (on which induction is not carried out). Hence, a 
heuristic for this case is: 
"try replacing l by p if L(n) is obviously left unaltered in the general proof, and doing 
induction on l" 
where "left unaltered" is taken in the same sense as for the heuristic for arithmetic 
mentioned earlier - that it is not broken down in the general proof. 
Explanation -Based Generalisation Proof 
EBG Proof 
rule 
8.14( [2] , n) 
8.14( [1,1],n) 
8.14( [1] , n) 
6.2( [2, 2, 1, 1] , 1) 
6.2( [2, 2, 2] , 1) 
EQUALITY 
general proof 
W = (Yi P) <>X 
= yl .. . . yn . (P <> X) 
= yl . . . y", . (P <> X) 
= yl .. . . . yn :. (P <> X) 
= yl .. . . yn . (P <> X) 
= yl .. .. . X 
= Y<>Z 
W 
f n(zl . . . . .: zn :. (Q <> Y) 
I Z) 
zl . . . . zn :. ((Q <> Y) <> Z) 





f n -<> 
Q=nil 
P=nil 
yZ = zz 
b : W = fn(((zi ......: zn :: Q) <> Y)IZ) 
Filtering back, ((z1 .. ... .. zn .. nil) <> Y) <> Z = (zi .. ... zn .. nil) <> 
(Y <> Z) is obtained. This suggests the cut formula of Vl (l <> y) <> z = l <> 
(y <> z) (C). This method works for lists, in an analogous way to the provision 
of an EBG proof for ( *). However, this cut formula does not involve accumulators 
- for these examples the EBG proof cannot produce the cut formula since the 
given formula is not an instance of the "generalised" one. Induction on (C) carries 
through by weak fertilisation, in an analogous way to the ( *) example, as follows: 
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(T <> T2) <> T3 = T <> (T2 <> T3) 
I- (H :: T <> T2) <> T3 = H :: T <> (T2 <> T3) 
... I- H :: ((T <> T2) <> T3) = H :: (T <> (T2 <> T3)) 
Hence, explanation -based generalisation will again produce a correct most general 
generalisation in an analogous manner to the explanation of Subsection 8.1.4. 
Linearisation of the General Proof 
This may be carried out by noting, in the case of lists, that 
(r(m) <> G(n)) <> G(n) = G(m) <> (G(n) <> G(n)) 
reduces via the general proof to: 
xm -1(0) :: (G(m - 1) <> G(m)) <> G(n) = xm -1(0) :: (r(m - 1) <> (G(n) <> G(n))) 
and hence, by defining 
Q(m) = (G(m) <> G(n)) <> G(n) = G(m) <> (G(n) <> G(n)) 
one may obtain the general proof structure 
Q(n) 
2 
Q(n - 1) 
Q(0) 
This suggests the generalisation dl (l <> p) <> p = l <> (p <> p). (Note 
that the EBG method above will give the most general generalisation of this type, 
although the above would suffice). Alternatively, the final line of the general proof, 
namely xsn -1(0) : : ... .. xs(o) :: (nil <> G(n)) <> G(n) = xsn -1(o) ..... :: xs(o) .. 
(nil <> (G(n) <> G(n))) could have been generalised with respect to G(0), to 
give Q. 
General Proof of Generalisation 
The generalisation under consideration is (C) above. The general proof will reach 
equality using the same rules as in the general proof of ( *). This proof is linear. 
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Note that this corresponds exactly to induction, where it is necessary to show that 
Q(k) H Q(s(k)), and H Q(0). In other words, both methods equate to showing 
that the proof of Q(s(k)) reduces to the proof of Q(k) by certain rewrite rules. 
In this case, Q(n) - (G(n) + G(m)) + G(k) = G(n) + (G(m) + G(k)) rewrites 
to xsn -i(o) :: Q(n - 1), in an analogous manner to that shown in the previous 
subsection. 
Rule Permutation 
However, there is also the case of rule permutation to be considered. In fact the 
order of the rules used may be rearranged, so that the structure of the first and 
fourth G(n) is expanded totally at the outset, and then the same rule applied as 
many times as possible. Hence, one may apply R1R2R3 ... R1R2R3i or, equiv- - -
block one block N 
alently, Rte. R1 R2 R2 R3 R3. Compare this with the general proof of ( *), 
N times N times N times 
given in Figure 6 -1. Just as sn(0) remains unchanged in the second, third, fifth and 
sixth places, G(n) remains unchanged in these positions too. Note also the corre- 
spondence between the rules in both general proofs, the rules written in the order 
corresponding to the second representation above, ie. 8.14( [2] , n), 8.14( 11, 1] , n), 
8.14( [1] , n), 8.13(P1), 8.13(P2) directly correspond to 6.2( [2] , n), 6.2([1, 1] , n), 
6.2([1] , n), 6.1(P1), 6.1(P2), the latter being one ordering of the rules in the 
general proof of ( *) (although several are possible).6 
8.4.2 Generalisation by Adding Accumulators: 
bl. rotate(len(l), l) = l 
This example requires the use of new methods, since extra structure is introduced 
into the general proof, and it is no longer possible to use the heuristic proposed in 
6For comparison, recall that 8.14: (H :: T) <> X = H :: (T <> X); 
6.2:s(X) +Y s(X +Y); 8.13:nil < >X X; 6.1:0 +Y Y 
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Section 8.1, nor the explanation -based generalisation method of which the heuristic 
is a simplification. 
If it is not the case that there are £(n) left unchanged throughout the proof, it 
might however be possible to glean some information. For example, if the original 
proof is P(m), and this can be seen to reduce to P(m - 1) in some way, this 
would suggest that induction might be used. This example shall be considered 
in order to see what is happening in the general proofs and whether a general 
pattern is seen to emerge; it is also considered in Appendix C.2, in which proof 
by induction is shown to be blocked, whereas induction is shown to carry through 
for the suggested generalisation. 
It is necessary to make use of the following rewrite rules (in addition to those given 
above) : 
rotate(0, L) 
rotate(s(n), H :: T) 
L 
rotate(n,T <> (H :: nil)) 
len(nil) 0 
len(H :: T) s(len(T)) 
The general proof is as follows: 
rotate(s(len(C(n - 1))), G(n)) 
rotate(len(G(n - 1)), x8.-1(0) :: G(n - 1)) 
rotate(len(C(n - 1)), G(n - 1) <> (æn_1(0) :: nil)) 
rotate(len(G(n - 1)), (æ3n -2(0) :: G(n - 2)) <> (æ3n_1(0) :: nil)) 
rotate(s(len(C(n - 2))), æs,._2(0) :: (G(n - 2) <> (æ3n -1(0) :: nil)) 
rotate(len(G(n - 2)), (r(n - 2) <> æ3n -1(0) :: nil) <> (æ3n -2(0) :: nil)) 
rotate(len(G(0)), (G(0) <> æn -1(0) :: nil) <> ... <> æo :: nil) 







by len, G deis 
= æsn_1 (o) :: G(n - 1) 
by 8.16 
= æsn-1 (o) :: G(n - 1) 
by G def 
= æ3,.-1(0) :: G(n - 1) 
by 8.14 
= æsn-1(0) :: æsn-2(0) :: G(n - 2) 
by 8.16, G de f 
similarly, n times 
æ3n -1(0) ::...:: æo :: nil 
æ3n _1 (0) .. æo :: nil 
Is there a general pattern in the proof which would suggest a generalisation? For 
the mth case of the above proof, such that m < n, 
rot ate(len(.C(m)), (... (C(m) <> xs,.(o)) <> ...) <> xsm(o) :: nil)) 
= rotate(len(r(m)), £(m) <> (xsn(o) ::...:: xsm(o) :: nil)) 
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= xsn.(o) ......: xsm(o) :: nil <> G(m) 
= xsn(o) ....... xsm(o) .. G(m) 
Let am = xsn.(o) ......: xsm(o) :: nil. 
Then rotate(len(G(m)), G(m) <> am) = am <> G(m) is a suitable generalisation, 
the right hand side of which is produced by setting F(xsn(o) :: 
nil, G(m)) = xsn.(o) ::...:: xsm(0) :: G(m) and solving for F. 
In fact, it is only necessary to note that 
R(s(n)) - rot ate(len(G(s(n))), G(s(n))) = G(s(n)) 
xsm (o) 
reduces to 
R'(n) - rotate(len(G(n)), G(n) <> (xsn(o) :: nil)) = xsn(o) :: G(n) 
= (xsn.(o) :: nil) <> G(n) 
and compare R with R' to arrive at the generalisation 
rotate(len(l), 1 <> a) = a <> 1. 
Note that in fact the xsn(o) :: nil on the left hand side of R' has caused the goal of 
writing the right hand side as some F(xsn(o) :: nil). 
In both cases, the step of getting from x :: list to (x :: nil) <> list is a key step 
which is not obvious. However, it can be seen from the proof that what is needed 
is to rewrite x :: list into some form involving x :: nil, in order to rewrite the 
same terms on either side. The provision of any expression which was equivalent 
to x :: list involving x :: nil would suffice, and this stage could be carried out 
even mechanically, by using various stored rewrite rules, together with pattern 
matching. However, this process could be regarded in general as open- ended, and 
provides a topic for further work. 
Generalising from Q(0) 
The general method suggested in this section has been to consider R(n) and R'(n- 
1): various lines in the general proof, where R(n) reduced to R'(n - 1), and both 
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were at their most structurally similar state. In other words, R(n) reduced to 
R'(n - 1) using i steps, just as R(n- 1) would reduce to R'(n - 2) using the same 
i steps. A heuristic would be to leave structure common to R and R' the same, 
do induction on l if G(n) is at the same structural point in R(n) as G(n - 1) in 
R'(n - 1), and to generalise any other common subexpressions in R'. I shall now 
consider in more depth the suggestion that instead R'.'(0) is the appropriate object 
of generalisation, primarily because some of the term rewriting stages to equality 
would only be done at the end of the general proof, but these might be needed to 
provide equal generalisation candidates on both sides of the equation, rather than 
R(n) being compared with R'(n - 1). So, this example will be considered with 
reference to this suggestion. 
In this case, 
Q(0) - rot ate(len((G(0))), (G(0) <> xsn(o) :: nil) <> ... <> xo :: nil) 
= xsn(o) ....... x0 :: G(0) 
This rewrites to (using `new' rewrites): 
rotate(len(G(0)), G(0) <> (xsn(o) .....:: x0 :: nil)) 
= xsn(0) .. ....: xo .. G(0) 
= xsn(o) ....... xo :: nil <> G(0) 
The generalisation suggested is, as before, 
rotate(len(l), l <> a) = a <> l 
Hence, in this case there is no advantage to one approach over the other. 
Rule Permutation 
In this subsection the same example is considered, with relation to the correspon- 
dence between linearisation and permutation of rules within the general proof. 
As seen above, the rules of the general proof are 
(8.16 + 8.14) n -i times + 8.13 once + 8.15 




8.16 +8.14 +8.16 +8.14 +... +8.14 +8.13 +8.15 
repeat repeat 
There are not any other possibilities, using the given rewrite rules. 
The normal EBG proof, using the same rules as in the general proof and filtering 
back, suggests rotate(sn(0), H .. z1 :...... zn_1 :: nil) = H :: z1 ..... zn_1 :: nil, 
which is not a correct cut formula. This is because the generalisation required 
involves accumulators, and hence will not use this sequence of rules. 
Induction on the original equation is blocked (although the general proof essentially 
allows a continuation of this blocked proof). Induction on dal rotate(len(l), l <> 
a) = a <> l works, with one induction, plus use of the axiom (X <> Y) <> Z = 
X <> (Y <> Z). (See Appendix C.2 for details.) 
Upon attempting to linearise the general proof, it will be found that P(s(n)) does 
not reduce to P(n): 
P(s(n)) - rot ate(len(C(s(n))), G(s(n)) = G(s(n)) (1st line of GP) 
- rotate(sn(0), xsn(o) :: G(n)) = xsn.(o) :: G(n) 
rotate(len(G(n)), G(n) <> (xsn.(o) :: nil)) = xsn(o) :: G(n) 
which is not equivalent to P(n). 
The general proof of the generalisation rotate(len(G(n)), G(n) <> a) = a <> 
G(n) shall now be considered. This uses different rules to the general proof of the 
original equation, and hence the explanation -based generalisation method on the 
original goal will not produce this generalisation. The rules in the general proof 
will not apply immediately to this case, since the second argument of rotate is not 
of the form H :: T. As shown below, the same rules are present, but in a different 
order, plus final justifications. 
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rotate(sn(0), (xsn -1(o) ::.. xo :: nil) <> a) = a <> C(n) 
8.14 n - 1 times 
rotate(sn(0), xsn -1(o) ::...:: xo :: (nil <> a)) = a <> G(n) 
8.13 once 
rotate(sn (0), xsn -1(o) ::...:: xo :: a) = a <> G(n) 
8.16 
rotate(sn -1(0), xs -2(0) : so :: a) <> (x -1(o) :: nil)) = a <> L(n) 
8.14 n -2 times 
rotate(sn -1(0), xsn -2(0) :: xo :: (a <> (x.0-1(o) :: nil))) = a <> G(n) 
r(sn -2(0), (xsn -3(0) :. so :: (a <> (xs -1(o) :: nil))) <> (xsn -2(0) :: nil)) = a <> G(n) 
rotate(0, ((a <> (x 8.-1(0) :: nil)) <> ...) <> (so :: nil) = a <> G(n) 
(... (a <> (x5._1(o) :: nil)) <> (so :: nil) = a <> G(n) 
The rules used are: 
or else: 
can swap 
8.14 n -i times + 8.13 once + 8.16 +8.15 +8.14 +8.13 
repeat repeat n -1 
can swap 
8.14 +8.16 +8.14 +8.16 +... +8.15 +8.14 +8.13 
repeat repeat n -1 
Note the correspondence between these alternative rule application sequences. 
They consist of essentially the same rules, but used in a different order. The main 
difference lies in the fact that in the case of the general proof of the generalised 
goal, the rotate definition (as given, but note that there are other forms) cannot 
be used immediately, and instead an append rewrite rule must be used to put the 
goal into the form to which the rotate definition could be applied. Now, if one 
could work out the nature of the transformation from the rules in the general proof 
of the original equation to those in the general proof of the generalisation, then 
it would be possible to use the EBG method on the rules in the latter to suggest 
a cut formula. (Or perhaps one should alter the goal before applying EBG, or 
modify the way EBG is carried out, for example by evaluating extra terms before 
applying a rule). The questions of when this new method should be used, how the 
inversion of the rules is relevant and whether the goal is a more general expression 
where the rules may be inverted will be considered below. 
Now, the generalisation proves the original theorem by setting a = nil. What will 
the rules of the generalised general proof be in this case? 
rotate(sn(0), (xsn -1(o) ::... :: xo :: nil) <> nil) = nil <> G(n) ( *) 
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A new rule, 
X <> nil = X (8.19) 
may be used, together with rule 8.13 to reduce ( *) to the original goal. Alter- 
natively, the rules of the generalised general proof will carry through as normal. 
But 8.19 + 8.13 + the rules of the original general proof must be equivalent to 
the latter. So is there any way of getting from the original general proof to the 
generalised general proof? This is the proof transformation process of linearisation 
which will be considered with reference to examples in further sections. 
Now, previously lines from the general proof have been inspected, and it has been 
attempted to linearise these in order to see the inductive process. Here, the rules 
of the general proof are going to be considered and altered, and EBG used on 
them to produce a cut formula. It has been shown above that the EBG in the 
case of accumulator examples, on the original general proof rules, will just return 
the original formula. Either this could be used, or else the linearisation methods 
detailed in Section 8.3 (by which P(n) reduces to P' (n - 1), where P and P' have 
completely different structure), in order to suggest that the new methods detailed 
below should be used. 
Alternatively, the structure of P' could itself suggest the reordering of the original 
rules in the general proof. 
Let us recall the rules of the two general proofs: 
general proof: 
8.1166+,. +8.14+8.13 +8.15 (A) 
repeat repeat 
or 8.16 + 8.14 +8.13 +8.15 (B) 
repeat 
general proof of cut formula: 
814 +8.13 +8.16+ 
repeat 
repeat 
tidying up of expressions 
8.14 +g +8.15 (C) 
repeat 




The similarity between the pairs (A) and (D), plus (B) and (C), is apparent. 
So, by the methods mentioned above, if it has been ascertained that the cut 
formula must be of a different structure than the original formula, one could try 
a reordering of the rules of the general proof and then try EBG methods on this 
rule set to produce a cut formula. 
Note that it is not a question of the permutation of rules being equivalent to the 
previous rule set (in the sense of resulting in the same final conclusions of rule 
blocks), for then one could have derived the cut formula directly from the general 
proof by EBG. 
In this case, a permutation of the rules of the general proof should be tried, the 
result inspected, and then a proof given that the original formula is derivable 
from this. Now, there is a choice between doing an EBG from X = Y, or by 
starting with rot ate(len(f'(G(n), a)), f (G(n), a)) = f "(G(n), a), and then working 
out what the functions f, f' and f" might be.7 
So, taking (A) with the first two rules swapped (or else just applying whatever 
rules are possible to ( *), in order), by the EBG method: 
rotate(len( f'(G(n), a)), f (G(n), a)) = f"(G(n), a) 
[8.14 sets f to G(n) <> a] 
rotate(len(f'(G(n),a)),xsn-1(o) :: (G(n - 1) <> a)) = f"(G(n),a) 
[use 8.16] 
rotate(len(s-1(f'(G(n), a)), (G(n - 1) <> a) <> (x sn-1(o) :: nil)) = f"(G(n), a) 
repeat 
rot ate(len(s'(f'(G(n),a)), ((G(0) <> a) <> (x5n -1(o) :: nil) <> ... <> xs(o) :: nil)) 
= f "(G(n), a) 
[8.14- 8.13 - repeat] 
rot ate(len(s'(f'(G(n), a))), a <> (xsn -1(0) ::...:: xs(o) :: nil)) = f "(G(n), a) 
7Although in most cases these functions will be second order, they might also be 
higher- order; this would potentially cause problems in that unification might involve 
infinite digressions in some cases. 
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[use 8.15] 
a <> (xsn -(o) ::...:: xs(o) :: nil) = f"(C(n), a) 
f'(. (0), a) = nil; set f'(L(n), a) = L(n). 
EQUALITY 
[set f"(G(n), a) = a <> G(n).] 
It is then necessary to prove that this entails the original expression. If a is nil, 
then the original equation holds, but one must check the values for f, f' and f" 
- in this case X <> nil -X (cf. equation 8.19) is also needed. Note that it will 
not be known if this will work out in advance, but there are usually only a small 
number of possibilities. 
Now, it is known that the rules of the general proof are an injection into `the rules 
of the general proof of the cut formula, together with the justification that the cut 
formula entails the original formula'. Hence, the rules of the general proof of the 
cut formula must be very similar to those of the general proof. When reordering is 
allowed, if this is carried out within the repetition blocks, this will be most likely 
to succeed. From other sources, it is known that a more general form of the object 
must be tried. So, one could try (proper) EBG with a rotation of the rules, and 
see if a suitable cut formula were reached (or, equivalently, using accumulators on 
the original expression). So really, the general procedure is to stick as close as 
possible to the general proof, but swap in the first rule block to obtain different 
structure in the original expression. 
Hence, if using accumulators, there are two approaches. The first is a heuristic to 
try to construct a new general proof by means of permuting the rewrite rules in 
the original general proof. These rules would be applied either to X = Y (cf. EBG 
method), or to a generalised original function (for example rotate(len(f'(G(n), a)), 
f (G(n), a)) = f "(G(n), a)), and then the explanation -based generalisation method 
used to find f , f' and f ". Extra axioms such as X <> nil = X are needed. The 
second approach is to inspect the original general proof and try to work out the 
cut formula from this directly. The first heuristic is worth a try, but I shall use 
the second approach, which is more rigorous. 
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In conclusion, I shall turn to the solution of trying to linearise the proof, by looking 
for repeated structure while allowing some generalisation. 
8.4.3 Generalisation of Constants to Variables: 
Vi. rev2(l, nil) = rev(l) 
Note that this example is also considered in Appendix C.3, with reference to 
showing that induction is blocked for the original formula but not for the suggested 
cut formula. The following rewrite rules are needed in addition to those given 
above: 
rev(nil) nil 
rev(H :: T) rev(T) <> (H :: nil) 
rev2(nil, L) L 
rev2(H :: T, L) rev2(T, H :: L) 
The general proof is as follows: 
rev2(G(n), nil) 
rev2(xs_i (0) :: G(n - 1), nil) 
rev2(G(n - 1), xsn -1 (0) :: nil) 
rev2(xsn -2(0) :: G(n - 2),xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
rev2(G(n - 2),xsn -2(0) :: xn -1(0) :: nil) 
rev2(G(0), x0 ::...:: xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
rev2(nil, so ::...:: xsn -1(0) :: nil) 






rev(xsn -1(0) :: G(n - 1)) 
rev(C(n - 1)) <> (x3n -'(0) :: nil) 
rev(xsn -2(0) :: G(n - 2)) <> (xsn -1 (0) :: nil) 
(rev(G(n - 2)) <> (xsn -2(0) :: nil)) <> (x.0-1(0) :: nil) 
similarly, n -2 times 
(rev(G(0)) <> x0 :: nil) <> ... <> (xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
(... (nil <> x0 :: nil) <> ...) <> (xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
x0 ::...:: xsn -1(0) :: nil 
The following holds: 
R(n) = rev2(G(n), nil) = rev(G(n)) 
R'(n - 1) - rev2(G(n - 1),xsn -1(o) :: nil) = rev(G(n -1)) <> (xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
The generalisation suggested is 
rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a. 
This is the correct one. Note that this method has enabled the generalisation of 
nil (a constant) to a variable. Note also that the same block of rules is being 
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carried out a set number of times, such as n, which is analogous to the same rule 
being applied n times in the general proofs of natural number examples. 
Hence, the heuristic for this case is: 
"to provide the cut formula, retain structure common to R and R' the same, do 
induction on l if ,C(s(n)) is at the same structural position in R(s(n)) as £(n) is in 
R'(n), and generalise to a new variable any other common subexpressions in R'" 
In a further section these heuristics will be conjoined, and a more general method 
will be seen to emerge. 
Generalising from Q(0) 
If the general proof is thought of as being linear in some way, it might also be 
interesting to consider Q(0) (ie. R''(0)), because it is hard to describe Q(m) in 
terms of Q(m - 1) . For this example, 
Q(0) - rev2(G(0), xo : : ... :: xsn. -1(0) :: nil) 
= (rev(r(0)) <> x0 :: nil) <> ... <> (xsn -1(o) :: nil) 
Note that it is not desirable to replace G(0) by nil here (although this may be 
necessary in order to justify the final equation), since the idea is to generalise 
from Q(0). In order to generalise, one would wish to rearrange expressions so that 
similar terms were on both sides of the equation. It is necessary to prove some 
extra information (which could be stored as it reoccurs again and again). Using 
(H :: T) <> X = H :: (T <> X) and (X <> Y) <> Z = X <> (Y <> Z) 
(which is provable by induction), then: 
(X <> (H :: nil)) <> H2 :: nil = X <> ((H :: nil) <> H2 :: nil) 
= X <> (H :: (nil <> H2 :: nil)) 
= X <> (H :: H2 :: nil) 
Continuing in this manner, there is on the right hand side, 
(rev(G(0))) <> x0 ::.. . xsn -1(o) :: nil 
a 
178 
Thus, Q(0) - rev2(G(0), a) = rev(G(0)) <> a. From this, the generalisation 
rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a is suggested. Note however that it was necessary to prove 
various lemmata in order to be able to do this (cf. Section 8.6, which discusses 
control of the application of lemmata). 
8.4.4 Generalisation of Terms to Variables: 
Vl. rev(rev(l) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(l)) 
The general proof runs as follows: 
rev(rev(G(n)) <> y :: nil) = 
y :: rev(rev(G(n))) 
rev(rev(xsn -10) :: G(n - 1)) <> y :: nil) = 
y :: rev(rev(xsn. -1(o) :: G(n - 1))) 
rev((rev(G(n - 1)) <> xsn. -1(0) :: nil) <> y :: nil) = 
y :: rev(rev(G(n -1)) <> xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
similarly . 
rev(((xo :: nil) <> ... <> (xsn -1(0) :: nil)) <> (y :: nil)) = 
y :: rev((xo :: nil) <> ... (xsn -1(0) .: nil)) 
by 8.20, 8.21 & 8.14 
y :: xsn. -1(0) : : ... :: WO = 
y :: xsn -1 (0) :: ... :: WO 
In this example, it is the case that: 
R(n) - rev(rev(r(n)) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(r(n))) 
R'(n - 1) - rev((rev(r(n - 1)) <> xsn -1(o) :: nil) <> y :: nil) 
= y :: rev(rev(G(n - 1)) <> xsn -1(o) :: nil) The procedure is to leave structure 
common to R and R' the same, do induction on 1 if G(n) is at the same structural 
point in R(n) as G(n - 1) in R'(n - 1), and to generalise any other common 
subexpressions in R'. 
This suggests the generalisation 
rev(a <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(a) 
This is the correct generalisation, but note that other methods could have reached 
it more quickly in this case by generalisation of common subexpressions initially 
(cf. (Boyer & Moore, 1979), where this example is considered). Thus, this example 
does not fail by means of contravening the restriction placed in Subsection 8.1.2 
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that redundant rules in the general proof should be omitted, but rather provides 
a demonstration that, although the method works, it is in this case not the best 
generalisation method to use. However, note that the structure of the proof has 
actually been investigated and it has been checked that such a generalisation (from 
a linear general proof) is the correct one and so will not produce a non -theorem. 
Generalising from Q(0) 
Q(0) - rev((rev(G(0)) <> xo :: nil) <> ... <> (xsn -1(0) :: nil)) <> y :: nil) 
= y :: rev((rev(r(0)) <> (xo :: nil)) <> ... <> xsn -1(0) :: nil)) 
which reduces to: 
rev(((rev(G(0)) <> (x0 ......: xsn -1(0) :: nil)) <> y :: nil) 
= y :: rev(rev(r(0)) <> (xo : ..... xsn. -1(0) :: nil)) 
Now, in fact the suggested generalisation above should have initially been of 
rev((rev(l)) <> a) <> y :: nil) = y :: (rev(rev(l) <> a)) 
This is what is suggested in this case, too. b is set to rev(l) <> a, which suggests 
rev(b <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(b) 
However, if substitutions of this sort are going to be carried out, one might as well 
have put b = rev(l) in the original equation! There is a gain, though, in the sense 
that by inspection of the general proof, it will be known that this generalisation 
will work. 
8.4.5 Summary 
To summarise, a general representation for lists has been defined, and various 
methods suggested for the provision of a cut formula via the general proof. Note 
that in fact a cut formula for the examples in Subsection 8.1.5 could also be pro- 
vided by the method described in this section, which subsumes the original sug- 
gestion. However, there are problems with the comparison of R(n) with R'(n - 1). 
It may be argued that one should instead compare R(n) with R''(0), since there 
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may be special rules simplifying expressions at the end of the general proof. How- 
ever, it should be possible to get round this problem if it is insisted that similar 
constants on each side of the equality within /71(n - 1) would be identified this 
way via using appropriate rewrite rules. Using the method described above, in 
many differing types of cases a correct cut formula may be found. 
The generalisation of R'.'(0) corresponds to linearising the structure of the general 
proof as follows. R'.-'(0) is inspected, l is substituted for r(0), and any new 
expressions introduced (compared with R(n)) are rewritten to the most general 
form, with equivalent expressions either side of the equality. This captures the 
whole transformation occurring in the general proof. This process is in fact reached 
in stages, with equal blocks of rules used for each stage, and it is the representation 
for this (linear) process which I hope to capture. In other words, there is a sort of 
induction going on, as may be seen from the equal blocks of rules, but this is not 
directly seen in the original general proof. However, the generalisation of R'--.'(0) 
is exactly that which captures this induction; by the way it has been formed, 
induction on it will be the latent induction of the general proof, and so it may be 
proved by just one induction. This corresponds to a linearisation of the structure 
of the general proofs. 
8.5 Summary of Linearisation Approach 
This section provides a summary of how the transformation of the general proof 
into a linear form is made. As discussed in Section 8.3, if the proof is linear 
induction may be carried out directly. If the proof is not linear there are two 
cases: 
The explanation -based generalisation method may be used to generate a 
linear general proof. 
Otherwise, linearisation of the proof is attempted by looking for repeated 
structure while allowing some generalising. 
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(Note that when making the transformation, it might become apparent that a new 
lemma would have to be cut into the proof in PA, most commonly an associativity 
or commutativity axiom. The axioms needed in the proof in PA will also be needed 
to obtain equality in the general proof. Section 8.6 discusses this in further detail.) 
The following are further examples of various types of proofs, and illustrate how 
the linearisation process may be carried out. 
8.5.1 Easily Linearisable Proofs 
Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) 
It is necessary to define Q(n) and the rule block i (cf. discussion of this 
example in Subsection 8.3.3). 
Q(x,y,z) =bxb'yb'z (x+y)+z=x+(y+z) 
(So Q(x, x, x) = b'x (x + x) + x = x + (x + x).) 
An alternative arrangement of rules for this proof is: 
Q(n, n, n) - (sn(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0) = sn(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
rule s(sn -1(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0) = s(sn -1(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0))) 
block i s((sn -1(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0)) = s(sn -1(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0))) 
Q(n - 1,n, n) = (sn -1(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0) = sn -1(0) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
repeating i 
Q(0, n, n) - (0 + sn(0)) + sn(0) = 0 + (sn(0) + sn(0)) 
rules j 
sn(0) + sn(0) = sn(0) + sn(0) 
I shall consider the questions of what permutation of the original rules to 
this rule block is allowed, and also how far the linearisation process may 
be automated. Note that cancel represents the use of the cancellation rule 
s(x) = s(y) x = y. 
Original Rules: 
6.2(n), 6.1(1), 6.2(n), 6.1(1), 6.2(n), cancel(n), cancel(n) 
Rule Block i: 
6.2(1), 6.2(1), 6.2(1), cancel(1), cancel(1) 
Rule Block j: 
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6.1(1), 6.1(1) 
(Note that the rules are applied in the same relative subpositions in both 
general proofs, but I have not bothered to distinguish the subterms with this 
representation) . 
The generalisation may be detected from this new (linearised) proof. Al- 
ternatively, the EBG method could be used, using the previous set of rules. 
Perhaps the way of trying to linearise the proof is, given rules: 
A(n), B, C(n), D, E, F(n), etc. 
to apply A once, try to apply B, else C, then try to apply D, etc. The rule 
blocks would be expected to be: 
i:A,C,F. 
j : B, D, E. 
Linearisation here has a symbolic appearance, namely to group together the 
rules which are applied repeatedly, and those which are only applied once. 
If this gives a complete general proof, all variables are generalised apart, 
the rewrite rules i are performed, and then the result compared with the 
original. 
eg. Q(n', m, p, q, r, t) - (sn' (0) + sm. (0)) + sr (0) = sq(0) + (sr(0) + st(0)) 
converts by rules i to: 
Q(n'- 1 
¡¡,m,p,q- 
1,r,t) _ (s¡n'- 1(0) +sm(0)) +sP(0) = sq-1 (0) + (sr (0) + st (0)) 
Also, Q(0) = (Sn' -n(0) + sm (0)) + SP (0) = Sq -n(0) + (Sr (0) + st(0)), 
which gives equality using 6.1 by setting n' = n, q = n, m = r, p = t. 
So, Q(x) = dx (x + y) + z = x + (y + z) is the generalisation. 
Vx x.(x + x) = x.x + x.x 
General Proof: 
sn(0)(sn(0) +sn(0)) = s"(0).sn(0)+sn(0)sn(0) 8.10(n) 
0.(sn(0) + s"(0)) + (sn(0) + s' (0)) 8.9; 6.1 ---v- 
(S" (0) Sn (0)) - sn(0).s"(0) +sn(0)sn(0) 8.10(n); -v- 
= (0.s'n(0) + sn(0)) + (0.sn(0) + sn(0)) 8.9; 6.1 
EQUALITY 
n n 
= sn(0)+sn(0) s 
n n 
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The equality is achieved in the last line using the associativity of plus, A + 
(B +C) = (A +B) +C, in order to show (sn(0) +sn(0)) +... +(sn(0) +sn(0)) = 
(((sn(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0)) + ...) + (((sn(0) + sn(0)) + sn(0)) + ...) 
An alternative arrangement of rules is: 
sn(0).(sn(0) + sn(0)) = sn(0).sn(0) + sn(0).sn(0) 
sn- 1(0).(sn(0) + sn(0)) + (sn(0) + sn(0))... by 8.10(1) 
= (sn- 1(0).sn(0) + sn(0)) + (sn-1(0).sn(0) + sn(0)) by 8.10(1); 8.10(1) 
= (sn- 1(0).sn(0) + sn- 1(0).sn(0)) + (sn(0) + sn(0)) using ass -of -plus and 
comm -plus (or alternatively, (A + B) + (C + D) = (A + C) + (B + D)) 
ie. sn- 1(0).(sn(0) + sn(0)) = sn- 1(0).sn(0) + sn- 1(0).sn(0) using A + B = 
C +BSA =C. 
So, Q(x) - x.(y +z) = x.y +x.z reduces to Q(x -1), given these extra rules 
(ie. commutativity). 
Also, Q(0) - 0.(sn(0) + sn(0)) = O.sn(0) + 0.sn(0), which reduces to 0 = 0 
using 8.9 and 6.1. 
Original Rules: 
8.10(n), 8.9(1), 6.1(1), 8.10(n), 8.10(n), 8.9(1), 8.9(1), 6.1(1), 6.1(1), ass -of- 
plus(n) 
Rule Block i: 
8.10(1), 8.10(1), 8.10(1), ass -of -plus, comm -plus * 
Rule Block j: 
8.9(1), 6.1(1), 8.9(1), 8.9(1), 6.1(1) 
* shows that associativity of plus and commutativity of plus are needed in 
the inductive proof, to get the final answer. This is suggested by the fact 
that associativity of plus is used in the original proof, which shows that there 
will have to be some forms of rewriting at the end. 




Note that the definitions used in the arithmetical examples are slightly dif- 
ferent than those used for lists: in the latter, the structure is released slowly, 
rather than all at once. That is to say, in the former n is replaced by sn(0) 
and not s.n - 1, which is the equivalent of what has been substituted in 
the list examples. This is primarily for brevity, since it is easier to write 
xsn -1(0) :: r(n - 1) than xsn -1(o) ::...:: xo :: nil. In addition, it will alter the 
structure of the general proof - for lists, the linear structure will become 
much more apparent. 
With the example above, the general proof corresponds to the alternative 
way of writing the blocks of repeated rules i, and then finally the rules j 
to reach equality. Thus, the generalisation of Q(n) - (r(n) <> G(m)) <> 
G(m) = r(n) <> (G(m) <> G(m)) may be read directly from the general 
proof. From the fact that Q(r) reduces to Q(r - 1) in the general proof for 
r < n, and also that Q(0) is provable, the general proof is in a linear form, 
and also Q will be a suitable candidate for induction. 
Alternatively, Q can be obtained by EBG, and the resulting general proof 
checked to see that it is in a linear form (ie. that that generalisation will be 
amenable to induction). 
8.5.2 More Difficult Examples 
These are cases when EBG on the original rule set will not suggest an appropriate 
induction. Hence, the process of linearisation of the general proof is particularly 
appropriate in this case as a method of suggesting a cut formula. 
Such a process is illustrated by the len(rev(l)) = len(l) example: 
by rule block i 
len(rev(G(n))) = len(G(n)) reduces to 
len(rev(G(n - 1)) <> xsn. -1(0)) = len(x3n -1(o) :: G(n - 1)) 
by rule block j 
len((rev(G(0)) <> (x0 :: nil)) <> ... <> x8n -10o0 :: nil) = len(xsn -1(o) :: nil) 
len((nil <> (xo :: nil)) <> ...) = .. . 
185 
len((xo :: nil <> xs(o) :: nil) <> ... <> xsn -1(o) :: nil) _ .. . 
len(xo :: (nil <> xs(o) :: nil) <> ...) = .. . 
len(xo .: xs(o) .....) = len(xsn -1(o) ..... :: nil) 
s.. s len(nil) = s . . . s len(nil) 




Q(r) = len((rev(r(r) <> xsr(o) :: nil)) <> ... <> xsn -1(o) :: nil) 
= len(xsn -1(o) ......: xs,(o) :: G(r)) 
The current goal is to gather together the x2 into a new list a. Q(r) will be the gen- 
eralisation, since the proof described by Q is linear. The following transformation 
is being performed on the general proofs: 
P(x, x) P(x,g) 
P(x - 1, x) P(x -1,g) 
P(o, x) P(o, g) 
where P(x, x) is for example P(x, x, x) and P(x, ÿ) is for example P(x, y, z). The 
structure of P is not apparent from the first line of the proof, since for r = n, the 
extra structure will not yet appear. 
Q is a different structure to P, and hence the EBG method will not work. 
General Proof: 









suggests the general proof below, which is linearisable, and therefore the associated 
formula is suitable as an induction candidate. 
General Proof: 
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Theorem Cut Formula 
Vx(x+x)+x=x+(x+x) bx`dydz (x + y) + z = x + (y + z) 
bx x + s(x) = s(x + x) dxby x + s(y) = s(x + y) 
dx x+ s(x) = s(x) + x dxdy x+ s(y) = s(x) + y 
Vx x.(x + x) = x.x + x.x VxVyVz x.(y + z) = x.y + x.z 
Vx (x + x).x = x.x + x.x VxVyVz (x + y).z = y.z + x.z 
Vx(2+x)+x=2+(x+x) dxb'y(2+x)+y=2+(x+y) 
VxVy(x+y)+x=x+(y+x) dxdydz (x+y)+z=x+(y+z) 
Vx 0 0--> p(x) + s(s(x)) = s(x) + x dxby x0 0---> p(x) + s(s(y)) = s(x) + y 
Vx even(x + x) Vx even(2.x) 
VI len(rev(l)) = len(l) VI len(rev(l) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> l) 
VI rotate(len(l), l) = l dl rotate(len(l), l <> a) = a <> l 
VI rev(rev(l) <> y :: nil) = y :: rev(rev(l)) dl rev(a <> y :: nil) = y :: nil 
dl rev2(l, nil) = rev(l) `dl rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a 
b'l (l <> l) <> l = l <> (l <> l) b'ldpdg (l <> p) <> q = l <> (p <> q) 




To get back from Q(r) to a generalisation not dependent on those particular xi, it 
is necessary to clump together all the xi into a list a. Since Vxi holds in the first 
place, and it is true for all n, then the generalisation will be true for all a. Even 
if it is not, one could generalise Vx 2a Q(x, a) to Vx Va Q(x, a), and use the latter 
as the cut formula. 
8.5.3 Suggested Cut Formulae 
The revised solutions using this method for the various list examples considered 
in this chapter are: 
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 Q(r) - len(((rev(G(r))) <> xsr(0) :: nil) <> ... <> xsn. -1(o) :: nil) = 
len(xsn. -1(o) : :...:: xsr(o) :: G(r)) 
suggests a (correct) generalisation of len(rev(l) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> l), 
for which step it is necessary to use the associativity of append (for the 
left -hand side) . 
Q(r) - rotate(len(G(r)), (((G(r) <> xsn(o) :: nil) <> ... <> (xsr /o1 :: 
nil)))) = xsn(o) ::...:: xsr(o) :: G(r) suggests a (correct) generalisation of 
rotate(len(l), l <> a) = a <> 1. Again, the associativity of append must be 
used. 
Q(r) - rev((rev(C(r)) <> (xsr(o) :: nil) <> ... <> (xsn -1(o) :: nil) <> (y :: 
nil))) = y :: rev(... (rev (G(r)) <> (xsr(o) :: nil)) <> ...) <> (x8 -1(0) :: 
nil)) suggests a generalisation of rev(rev(l) <> a) <> y :: nil) = y :: 
rev(rev(l) <> a) (using associativity of append). This is if just the a is 
replaced. But in fact it is desirable to replace as much common structure as 
possible, since G(r) is only a random list anyway, and so instead rev(l) <> 
a (which occurs on both sides) should be replaced to get rev(b <> y :: 
nil) = y :: rev(b), which is the best generalisation. It would have been 
possible to have reached this generalisation from the original formula by 
replacing common subterms by a new variable, but this heuristic can result 
in overgeneralisation, and at least in this case it is known that this result is a 
correct generalisation in the sense that induction upon it will carry through, 
so that is an improvement. 
Q(r) - rev2(G(r), xsr(0) : : ... :: x8n -1(o) :: nil) = (rev(r(r)) <> (x sr /o\ :: 
nil)) <> ... <> (x sn -1(o) :: nil) suggests a (correct) generalisation 
/ 
of 
rev2(l, a) = ( rev(l)) <> a. 
In each case xsr(Q) :: ... :: xsn -1(0) :: nil has been replaced by a. Recall that G(r) is 
in fact by definition xo :: ... xsr -l(o) :: nil. The final stages of generalisation, with 
rearranging to achieve equality, were achieved by guessing (since there are only a 
small number of possibilities, and pre- stored information could be used, since the 
same or similar justifications arise each time), and then checking this result. As 
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mentioned in Section 8.4.2, there are only a small number of possibilities, and these 
may be found, and checked, mechanically. Automation of linearisation is possible, 
since there is literal repetition of rules (with parameters denoting where and the 
number of times they are applied), and from these rule blocks may be formed, if 
necessary by rearranging the rules. The rth case provides the generalisation, by 
means of the collection and rearrangement of terms, as described above. 
In conclusion, the approach also applies generally to many data -types. Not only is 
it the case that certain new structural patterns may be seen in the general proof 
which may guide generalisation, but also that the general representation of an 
arbitrary object of that type (eg. sn(0) for natural numbers, [xi, x2, ... x,,,,] for 
lists, etc.) enables the structure of that particular data -type to be exploited, in 
the sense that rewrite rules may be used which would not otherwise be applicable. 
For the natural number examples given in this chapter, the general proof is linear 
in the sense that the proof of P(s(n), n) reduces to that of P(n, n). Renaming of 
variables via explanation -based generalisation results in a general proof of form 
Q (n) reducing to Q(n - 1) . However, in many examples involving lists, this is 
not so, and a new method for providing a cut formula is needed. The result is an 
approach which subsumes the previous suggestion: the linearisation of the gen- 
eral proof. The general proof is put into a form such that there is a repeated 
rule block i. Thus the rth line after r uses of i is Q(r), such that Q(r) reduces 
to Q(r - 1). xsr(o) :: ... xsn. -1(o) :: nil is replaced by a in Q(r), and rearrange- 
ments made as appropriate, to suggest a generalisation for which induction will 
carry through. In this way, correct cut formulae are suggested for the list exam- 
ples considered in this chapter. In particular, one generalisation provided by this 
method of Va V/ len(rev(l) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> l) (from len(rev(l)) = len(l)) 
is a better result (since it only requires one induction) than the only alternative 
suggestion provided for this example of Va V/ len(rev(l) <> a) = len(a <> l)$ 
(requiring two inductions). 
8Provided by Jane Hesketh's method (Hesketh, 1991b); see Subsection 11.3.3. 
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In examples where none of the heuristics suggested in this chapter work, it may 
still be appropriate to examine the general proof to see if some new structure has 
emerged. For example, the general proof of even(sn(0) + s'ß(0)) reduces to that of 
even(s'(0)), which suggests a cut formula of even(2.x), with induction on x (see 
Section 9.1). Such examples, where these heuristics fail and yet some information 
is provided by the general proof, are considered in Chapter 9. 
8.6 Requirement for the Use of Lemmata 
The question to be considered in this section is that of when lemmata such as the 
associativity of append or the commutativity of plus are needed in the (linearised) 
general proofs. 
As seen from the previous sections, the associativity of append (cf. Axiom C.1 of 
Appendix C) is needed for all of the generalised list proofs. This is because there 
is a definitional position in all of the examples in which the appropriate rewrite 
rule cannot be used until the structure of the term in this position has been broken 
down, or else it is necessary to use the definition of append n times in the rule 
block j. If a rule is used n times in j, that means that the structure cannot be 
distributed earlier in the proof as normal, in other words into the rule block i (as 
considered above) one rule each time. So if this rule is used n times in j, it means 
that it is necessary to use an associativity rewrite rule whenever the generalisation 
stage is carried out. In other words, as seen from the examples considered in this 
chapter, if an additional lemma is used in a general proof, there will have to be 
some forms of rewriting at the end of the corresponding linearised general proof 
in which such lemmata will also be needed. 
Note how this corresponds to the use of cancellation in arithmetical proofs. What 
is normally referred to as cancellation is the rule s(X) = s(Y) X = Y (or 
the equivalent rule for the operator under consideration) . This rule is essentially 
redundant in the general proofs, since equality may be achieved without it (since 
rules may be applied at subpositions of formulae), and is normally used just to 
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condense lines of a general proof. A rule which is often useful in general proofs, and 
which may be necessary to achieve the final equality, is the associativity of times: 
(A.B).0 = A.(B.C), which compares directly with the associativity of append: 
(A <> B) <> C = A <> (B <> C). 
From the examples considered in this chapter, it is apparent that associativity 
brings benefits as far as theorem- proving is concerned: use of associativity of plus 
or append, as appropriate, enables linearisation of the general proof, and hence 
the suggestion of a cut formula. 
8.6.1 The Orientation of Rewrite Rules 
The rewrite rules are set to be in a pre- defined direction (to give a normalisation 
procedure and avoid looping). The orientation of recursive definitions are set in 
the direction s(X) + Y s(X + Y) and 0 + Y Y, etc., although it is possible 
for the user to change this if desired. Moreover, the same approach is adopted by 
Boyer and Moore, in that associativity of append is oriented in one direction only 
in each example (in practice this works, since for none of the examples considered 
is use of associativity in both directions needed in the same proof). 
8.6.2 Circularity 
The question might be raised about whether there is circularity in the general- 
isation method suggested in this chapter, in the sense that the same problem 
is being re- represented at the meta -level in the general proofs. Such circularity 
would be obviously present if an original goal of x + (y + 1) = (x + 1) + y re- 
duced finally to ss+(y +1) (0) s(s+1) +Y (0) in the general proof. Although general 
proofs might be carried out in such an entirely circular manner, as for example, 
counting the number of brackets of a numeral representation of a number, this is 
not the case with the representation presented. For example, the general proof of 
(x +x) + x = x + (x + x) reduces to sn (sn (0) + sn (0)) = sn (sn (0) + s'n (0)) , and not 
(sn(sn))sn(0) = sn(sn(sn(0))) When charged with circularity in the proofs, for 
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instance when showing equality from sP.sr (0) = s''.sP(0), it is often only the use of 
an associativity or commutativity rule as a rewrite rule which is occurring. So long 
as this is does not occur in the general proof of the corresponding associativity or 
commutativity rule, its use is not necessarily circular. 
Sometimes within the general proofs some notation may be used as shorthand, and 
the impression given that something subtle is being carried out at the meta -level, 
for example sx +y(z) written instead of sx.sy(z). However, this is just a notational 
convenience rather than a logical step. What is important is to understand the rel- 
evant syntactical definitions: in this case sn(x) is defined recursively as a shorthand 
for s(. s(x)) ...) (cf. the definition of numeralstring: natxstring -* string in Sec- 
n times 
tion 5.2.1). Therefore, sx.sy(z) will represent s(. s(s(... s(z)) ...). Thus Note 2 
x y 
of Subsection 8.1.3 does not introduce circularity, but merely makes use of such 
notation: it does not reformulate the same question, as may be shown by the fact 
that x + s(x) = s(x) + x is not provable by induction, whereas s (sn (x)) = 572(5(X)) 
is provable by induction on n. 
However, circularity might occur if a statement such as "if rule R is applied n 
times at Pos, the result is Seq" were proved via the use of the cut rule, and hence 
the associated generalisation problems. However it is not, and although we do not 
know that we have the property of non -circularity, standard examples such as those 
given in the Appendix and in Chapter 8 show that generalisation is not needed in 
order to form the general proof in normal practice, and provide empirical evidence 
that proofs are easier to obtain in PAS,, than in PA. Analogously, the fact that 
there has been above an appeal to induction over trees to show correctness raises 
the question of whether there is a problem of circularity, but again, in practice 
such meta -induction applies to simpler problems, the generalisation problem does 
not arise and there is a gain after all. 
To summarise, in the examples given in this chapter especially the question of 
circularity arises - is the general proof just reducing the problem to what we 
were trying to prove in the first place? This charge may be drawn against some 
methods of provision of a general proof, but in the main it is not true, since the 
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general proof can usually be completed using just the original rewrite rules given 
plus associativity or commutativity (cf. Sections 6.4.1 and 8.6). 
8.7 Final Conclusions 
A new method of generalisation has been proposed which has met with a sub- 
stantial amount of success. Three main approaches have been described in this 
chapter. The first is a generalisation heuristic which consists in renaming unal- 
tered variables in the general proof. This approach has been implemented, but 
was dropped as it was subsumed by the second method. The latter is a form of 
explanation -based generalisation, which works if the generalisation required is the 
most general form of the original goal. This approach has the advantage that the 
generalisation suggested is shown to be the most general form of the original goal 
(having that structure). This method has been implemented (see Appendix E), 
and produces more general generalisations than the first approach. A third, yet 
more general, approach (which has not yet been implemented) is that of linearising 
the general proof. If accumulators are needed, or in some complicated cases, the 
linearisation approach suggested is able to provide a suitable cut formula. More- 
over, when a cut formula is suggested, it will have been shown via linearisation of 
the general proof that induction may be successfully carried out upon it. Hence, 
it is not necessary to actually carry out the induction to know that the proof may 
be completed by using the cut rule and induction. 
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Chapter 9 
Extension of the Generalisation 
Method 
"Generalisation is necessary to the advancement of knowledge." 
Macaulay 
This chapter extends the generalisation method suggested in the previous chapter 
to more speculative examples than the latter. Although there is a general ap- 
proach, it does not work in all cases; even so, a pattern is seen to emerge, and 
this may be helpful to the user. In some cases it is not appropriate to look for 
generalisation but an co-proof may still be provided. 
9.1 Indication of a Cut Formula 
A selection of the theorems proved automatically by the generalisation method 
suggested in the previous chapter is listed in Table 8 -1. Note that these exam- 
ples involve generalisation apart, generalisation of common subexpressions, or else 
introduction of accumulators. In these cases the method works fairly straightfor- 
wardly. Although the examples listed in the table are of a similar simple form, 
this method may also be applied to complicated examples containing nested quan- 
tifiers, etc., for the w -rule applies to arbitrary sequents (see Section 9.6). For the 
example Vx even(x + x), which is considered below, a cut formula of even(2.x) 
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may be extracted from the form of the general proof, which is an improvement 
over other methods (see Chapter 11 for a discussion of this example). However, 
in some cases where an w -proof may be provided, it is not clear what the cut 
formula might be. The following are some examples in which a general proof is 
(informally) suggested, together with cut formulae if appropriate. However, the 
algorithms of the previous chapter do not apply rigorously to these examples, and 
it is more a question of the general proof indicating a generalisation. 
The following are examples which demonstrate how the general proof may provide 
information which other methods do not, even if the guiding method as described 
in the previous chapter does not carry through directly. 
1. Vxx+x=0->x=0 
For this example the step case of induction is trivially true, since s(n) 0 0 
for any n. The general proof is given below (there is a casesplit: the case for 
n = 0 involves proving that 0 + 0 = 0, and the case for n 0 0 is as follows) : 
n+n=0 -> n=0 
sn(0) + sn(0) = 0 -+ sn(0) = 0 
sn(sn(0)) = 0 -+ sn(0) = 0 6.1, 6.2 
This "suggests" the generalisation Vx x + y = 0 -+ x = 0, which is the 
correct one. 
2. Vx even(x + x) 
Given the axioms and general proof as follows: 
The following axioms are used: 
even(0) = true (9.1) 
even(s(0)) = false (9.2) 
Vn even(s(s(n))) = even(n) (9.3) 
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General Proof: 
even(n + n) 
EXPAND n -* sn(0) even(sn(0) + sn(0)) 
USE 6.2 n times even(sn(0 + sn(0))) 
USE 6.1 even(sn(sn(0)))* 
USE 9.3 n times even(0)** 
USE 9.1 true 
Obvious choices for the cut formula here would result in circularity or a non - 
theorem, but the general proof gives some clues as to what is happening, 
and does not suggest an incorrect cut formula. Indeed, a cut formula which 
is suggested is that of Vy even(2.y), because of the way a successor function 
from each of the original variables pairs off together in the general proof. 
Notice that the sub -part of the general proof from * to ** is linear: 
even(sn(sn(0))) 
even(sn-1(sn-1(0))) by 9.3 
even(0) by 9.3 
This linear structure from even(sn(sn(0))) suggests that this is a suitable 
candidate for generalisation. What is happening in the general proof is that 
even(sk (sk (0))) is being proved at the meta -level (the linearisation process 
corresponding to induction on k, as shown in the previous chapter). The gen- 
eralisation suggested will therefore be Vk even(z(k)), where z(k) = sk (sk (0)), 
ie. z(k) = 2.k. 
In a similar manner, the cut formula suggested for Vx half int(x + x) = x is 
Vx half int(2.x) = x, using axioms 
halfint(0) = 0 (9.4) 
halfint(s(0)) = 0 (9.5) 
halfint(s(s(n))) = s(halfint(n)) (9.6) 
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3. Vx Vy odd(x) A odd(y) -* even(x + y) 











n -1 s's 
odd(s(0)) 







-* even(sn(0) + sm(0)) 
-+ even(sn(sm(0))) 
strip off 







The nth proof depends really on whether n is even or odd. Given the w -rule 
applied to Vx.1 (x) giving subtrees (ie. general proofs of) .1.(n): 
P(even) 
(0) 
P(odd) P(even) P(odd) 
General Proof: 
(I)(1) .(2) iT(3) 
Vn(1)(n) 





w - rule 




(n not even) 
When there is a disjunction in the general proof, there is a case split (see 
Section 6.6 above). 
5. Vx even(x) --> even(x.x) 
General Proof: 
even(sn(0)) .- even(sn(0).sn(0)) 
even(sn(0)) -4 even(sn(0) + ... + sn(0)) 8.10 
n times 
-> even(sn(sn ... (0) ...)) correct 
n times 
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The general proof is shown to be correct by a process of stripping off the n's 
analogous to that in the even examples above. The cut formula suggested 
is áx dy even(x) even(x.y), in an analogous manner to the example 8.8 
given in Subsection 8.1.5 above. 
9.2 Generalisation of Constants to Variables 
In this section it is considered whether rewrite steps may be saved and a more 
`natural' proof produced by enabling the generalisation of constants. For example, 
in order to prove that 1, 000, 000 + 1 = 1 + 1, 000, 000, the method approximating 
most closely to what a human mathematician would do would be to generalise the 
figure 1, 000, 000 to a variable x, say, and then consider the problem x +1 = 1 +x. In 
this way it could be seen that a variation in the figure 1, 000, 000, say to 1, 070, 006, 
would not produce a totally different proof, which is obviously what is required. 
Generalisation of constants to variables arises in van der Waerden's account of 
the discovery of a proof of Baudet's conjecture (der Waerden, 1971). There is a 
strong analogy with the generalisation of terms to variables, as is shown by the 
prooftrees below (the first being a representation of Boyer and Moore's method of 
generalisation of terms to variables, and the second being an example of the sort 
of generalisation of constants to variables which is required). 
P(f (t)) H P(f(t)) 
VL 
VyP(y) H P(f (t)) V 
I' f- VyP(y) VyP(y) I- dxP(f (x)) 
cut(VyP(y)) 
I' H dxP(f (x)) 
I- s(0) = s(0) 
F- 0+ s(0) = s(0) + 0 
r + 1 = 1 + r H s(s(r)) = s(s(r)) 
hyp 
r + 1 = 1 + rl- s(r + s(0)) = s(0 + s(r)) 
6.1,6.2 6.2 








Note that the proof of I- 1, 000 +1 = 1+ 1, 000 is just an individual instance of the 
general proof of H n +1 = 1+n. By the algorithm described above, a general proof 
of n + 1 = 1 + n could be "guessed" from that of 1, 000 + 1 = 1 + 1, 000 (although 
of course, setting n = J in the proof of P(n) for some number J 0 1, 000 might 
not give a correct proof). But the problem is precisely to know which constant to 
generalise, and not to guess a proof knowing this. More relevantly, by inspection 
of the proof of 1, 000 + 1 = 1 + 1, 000 (given below), it may be seen that neither 
the 1 nor the 1,000 remain unchanged throughout the proof. 
I- ....s,.._s, (0) + s(0) = s(0) + s ... s(0) 
1,000 1,000 
H (0 + s(0)) = s(0 +s .(0)) 
1,000 1,000 
H s .(0) _ `(0) 
1,001 1,001 
The `guiding' heuristic will result in the unchanged terms being renamed so that 
they are not affected by induction. The result will be the suggestion of s999(x) +y = 
x + s999 (y), which is obviously not what is required. Aubin's method does not fare 
very well either. The expressions s(p(sl,000(0)) + s(0)) and s(p(s(0)) + sl,000(0)) 
are reducible and hence do not provide an ugly expression, so his method fails. 
Perhaps the answer is that a heuristic should be used such that large numbers 
which are the same on either side of the ` =' sign should be generalised to the same 
variable, and in the case of small numbers, the same procedure for generalising 
terms to variables should be followed (should the latter be desired, for it would 
normally be large numbers for which generalisation would be of benefit). 
The explanation -based generalisation methods suggests a generalisation of 
bz s1'000 (0) + z = i + s999 (z), which works, but is not the generalisation which is 
desired. However, it does capture the process of what is happening in the proof, 
and so perhaps should not be regarded as a failure. 
In other cases, generalisation of constants to variables may be more successful. 
Such a generalisation in the domain of lists for dl rev2(l, nil) = rev(l) was suc- 
cessfully carried out in Subsection 8.4.3, and is also discussed in Appendix C.3. 
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9.3 Generalisation on a Non -Recursive Position 
If there were an example of an arithmetic proposition which required generalisa- 
tion on a term which was in a non -recursive position of some function (within the 
proposition), this would provide an additional incentive for the proposed "guid- 
ing" method, since the latter should be able to provide a proof, whereas the other 
methods considered simply do not allow for generalisation on a non -recursive po- 
sition (unless it is achieved by trying out every single possibility of generalisa- 
tion in turn!). The type of example which is relevant is, for instance, to prove 
Vx even(x) -+ even(x.y), using axioms 9.1 -9.3. Ideally, it would be desirable to 
show (using commutativity: x.y = y.x) that this reduces to even(x) -+ even(y.x), 
which is easy to prove. The alternative is to allow the use of rewrite rules on a non - 
recursive position, namely on y in the initial expression. An alternative example 
where it might be necessary to generalise on a non -recursive position might occur 
in the type of case when there is z.len(w) (perhaps nested as a substructure) on 
the left -hand side of an equation, and len(w).z, say, (nested) on the right, and one 
might wish to generalise /en(w) to y, in order to be able to apply an appropriate 
rewrite rule. 
Such examples are too complicated for the generalisation algorithm to attempt at 
present, but this type of example would provide a useful domain for future work 
and extension of the method. 
9.4 Generalisation by Inspection of the General 
Proof for Course of Values Induction 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, so long as a general procedure for 
constructing a proof for each individual of a sort is specified, universal statements 
about objects of the sort could be proved. This section investigates whether the 
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generalisation method proposed would suggest a generalisation for course of values 
induction. 
The problem may be stated as follows: given standard induction, one might wish 
to show 
Vx(Vy(y < x P(y)) P(x)) F- P(z). 
Finding the generalisation is tantamount to finding a B such that: 
Vx(Vy(y < x -* P(y)) -* P(x)), B I- P(z) Vy(y < x -* P(y)) - P(x)) H B 
Vx(Vy(y < x -> P(y)) -* P(x)) H P(z) 
cut(B) 
Now, define 
Q(z) - Vx(Vy < xP(y) -> P(x)) F- P(z) 
For brevity, let A - Vx(Vy y < xP(y) -+ P(x)). The goal is to show VzQ(z). 
The general procedure using the (constructive) W -rule is to look at proofs for 
Q(0), Q(1), ..., then the general proof, Q(r), and from the latter to construct a 
generalisation of Q. 
The proof of Q(0) is: 







A F- P(0) 
y=0 
A,y<1F-P(y) 
A f- Vy(y < 1 -4 P(y)) 
x =1inA 
A F- P(1) 
However, the proofs do not in general display a linear proof structure. For example, 
the proof of Q(2) is: 
AF-P(0) 
A F- P(0) Al- P(1) 
Al- dy(y<2-4P(y)) x=2inA 
AF-P(2) 
201 
So, it can be seen that the (succedents of the) individual proofs are of the form 
P(0) P(0) R. 
p(0), P(1)' P(2) .. . 
The general proof is to prove A I- P(n), for arbitrary n, or, in other words, Q(n). 
This will have the form: 
Q(0) ... Q(n - 2) 
Q(0) ... Q(n - 1) 
Q(n) 
Note that the general proof has the same shape as the set -theoretic representation 
of the nth number, where 0 - .0, 1 - {0 }, 2 - {0, {O } }, 3 - {0, {0 }, {0, {0 } } }, ..., 
for it can be seen that the structures are isomorphic. 
In order to be able to use standard induction on the generalised goal to complete 
the proof -tree, it is necessary to have a linear form for the general proof of the 
generalisation. Therefore, the problem of generalisation may be described in terms 
of converting a non -linear general proof shape, such as that under consideration 
above, to a linear proof shape. 
So, in this case, the aim is to define some W(n) in terms of Q(n) such that the 






First, note that the proof of P(s(r)) may be given in terms of a sub -tree 0, plus 




D is in fact P(0) n... n... P(n - 1). 
So, for any point in the prooftree the pattern holds: 
P(0) A...P(r) 
P(0) A . . . A P(r) A P(s(r)) 
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This explanation is provided without using the symbol ' <' at all, at this level. This 
information may be captured by saying that the general representation required 
will have proof form 
P(0) 
P(0) A P(1) 
P(0)n...nP(n-1) - dy(y<n P(y)) 
P(0) A . . . A P(n) - Vy(y < s(n) P(y)) 
which is a linear form. 
Defining 
then there is as required: 
W(z) - Vy(y < s(z) P(y)) 
W(0) 
W(n - 1) 
W(n) 
This would suggest that the generalised goal might be: 
bx(b'w(w < x P(w)) P(x)) I- Vy(y < z P(y)) 
Thus, the required B at the beginning of the section is suggested as Vy(y < z -* 
P(y)). The general proof of this generalised goal, (1.(z), follows the linear form, 
and hence the generalisation may be proved by induction, as would be wished. 
This is shown below, as the generalised goal .(s(m)) reduces to <1.(m): 
AI- Vy(y <m- +P(y)) 
(1.(m) 
A I- Vy(y < m -* P(y)) A P(m) - (s(m)) 
A H Vy(y < s(m) -* P(y)) 
In conclusion, the proposed method does indeed suggest a generalisation for course 
of values induction, although I have no general heuristic for spotting the gener- 
alisation. Moreover, it allows a greater insight into how the general proof does 
suggest a generalisation, and indicates a general procedure for allowing generalisa- 
tion over various domains, namely of applying proofs transformations to linearise 
the general proof, and then of generalising the rth case produced. The whole 
process which is proposed may be regarded as a new way of directing search for 
inductive proofs. Note that this is a similar approach to that taken for lists. 
203 
9.5 Different Induction Schemata 
The general approach provided in Chapter 8 encapsulates only "simple" induction, 
and could be extended to cope with more advanced induction schema, if necessary. 
For instance, the same kind of induction as at the object level might be used, but 
a new successor functions defined as:1 
,§° (X) = X 
s1(X) = s(X) 
gs(s(n)) (X) = s(s(sn(X))) 
The proof of an `even' example shall be considered: in order to obtain a linear 
proof, it is necessary to try to reduce the (n + 2)nd case to the nth case. The ap- 
plication of rewrite rules n times will use this (as it will provide a sort of induction 
in order to prove n applications of the rewrite). 
Using axioms 9.1 -9.3, the general proof of Vx even(x + x) under such a schema 
starts: 
even(n + 2 + n + 2) 
even(ss(s(n)) (0) + Ss(s(n)) (0) ) 





In the proof, even(ss(s(n)) ss(s(n))(0)) reduces to even(sn.8n(0)), which by the lin- 
earisation process suggests that the cut formula should be even(sk.sk(0)), ie. 
even(s2.k(0)) (by syntactic definitions), which would translate back to give even(2.k) 
1In this case, nested induction could be used as an alternative, since the step case 
s (n) from the first induction would by another induction yield the base case (0, thus 
corresponding overall to 1), and the step case (s(m), thus corresponding overall to 
s(s(n))). 
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as a suggested cut formula, which works. The base case carries through fairly triv- 
ially. Note in addition that the linearisation process works here, but the linearised 
general proof will have the structure. 
P(n) 
P(n - 2) 
2 
P(n - 4) 
:j 
P(0) 
where P(x) = even(x + x). Other structures will be analogous to the particular 
induction schemata used. 
9.6 Nested Use of the w -rule 
For an example such as Vx Vy (x + y) + x = x +(y +x), x may be converted to sn (0) 
and y to sm(0), say, and exactly the same rule -set used as given in the w -proof 
for Vx (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) to reach a complete w- proof. The generalisation 
suggested will be Vx Vy' Vz (x +y') +z = x +(y' +z), as with the former. However, 
the `m' is not broken down in the proof at all, and so this is not a fair example of 
nested use. Instead the example Vx Vy (x+ y) + (y + x) = (x + x) + (y + y) shall be 
considered. For this example, Aubin would have to try many combinations, and 
J. Hesketh's method would essentially pick induction candidates in the recursive 
positions, suggesting a suitable generalisation: 
dxb'ydzb'w(z+y)+(w+x) = (z+x)+(w+y) 
The general proof is as follows: 
(sn(0) + sm(0)) + (en (0) + sn(0)) 
sr' (0 + sm(0)) + sm(0 + sn(0)) 
sn(sm(0)) + sm(sn(0)) 
sn(sm(0) + sm(sn(0))) 
sn(sm(0 + sm(sn(0)))) 
snl¡sm(sm(sn(0)))) 
equality by 
Gs' (0) + sn(0)) + (sm(0) + sm(0)) 
sn(0 + sn(0)) + sm(0 + sm(0)) 
sn(sn(0)) + sr' (en (0)) 
sn(sn(0) + Sm (en (0))) 









It is possible to reach equality from the previous line of the general proof using 








general form instantiations 
(Sn (X) + Y) * (sm (P) + Q) _ (sn (W ) + Z) *1 (sm (V) + U) original 
sn(X + Y) * sm(P + Q) = sn(W + Z) *' sm (V + U) 
sn(Y) * sm(Q) = sn(Z) *' sm(U) X, P, W, V = 0 
sn(Y + sm (Q)) = sn(Z + sm(U)) *,*1 = + 
sn(sm(M + sm(Q))) = sn(sn(N + sm(U))) Y = sm(M), Z = sn(N) 
sn(sm(sn`(Q))) = sn(sn(sm(U))) M,N = 0 
sm(Q) = sn(U) U = sm-n(Q) m > n 
sm(Q) = sn(sm-n(Q)) olw Q = sn-m(U) 
The original expression must have been (assuming m > n and z > x): 
sn(o) + sm(o)) + (sm(o) + Q) = (sn(o) + sn(o)) + (sm(o) + sm-n(Q)) 
which suggests a generalisation of Vx(x + y) + (y + z) = (x + x) + (y + (y + z - x)) 
(which works with one induction). 
Via the general proof, it may be seen that the problem reduces to that of bxby y + 
(y + x) = x + (y + y), but a suitable cut formula has not really been provided. 
There is no problem in providing a general proof, but just in providing a method 
of suggestion of a cut formula from the general proof. 
9.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has considered more speculative instances of application of the pro- 
posed generalisation than the previous chapter. In some cases the method is seen 
to suggest results when other current methods fail. A more detailed comparison 




This chapter describes the proof development system Seldon used as an operat- 
ing system, plus the implementation of the system PAS,, (including generation 
of individual proofs, forming general proofs, showing correctness of the general 
proof, and the application of rewrite rules). In addition, a system in which the 
general proofs may be displayed and investigated is described, and also the im- 
plementation of the generalisation method (namely the provision of a cut formula 
via explanation -based generalisation methods) for simple arithmetical cases. More 
technical details of the implementation of the system of arithmetic with the w -rule 
and of the generalisation method may be found in Appendix E, and the code is 
presented in (Baker, 1992). 
10.1 Goals of Implementation 
The thesis project divides into three main areas of interest: implementational 
considerations on the one hand, and formal considerations on the other (plus 
the application of this to generalisation), for the main goal is that the w -rule 
would be implemented, and the properties of the resulting arithmetic system 
extended by the w -rule investigated further. On the implementational side, it 
was necessary to write code which would guide theorem -proving, such that typ- 
ing "constructive_omega_rule ", for example, causes the relevant subtree of the 
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prooftree to be completed. Such a tactic is initially presented with the goal 
`VxP(x)', generates the hypotheses `P(r) for uniform r', and subsequently en- 
ables this subtree to be completed. Various problems had to be overcome as to 
how the rule and subgoals might be represented, how to input the individual proofs 
P(0), P(1), P(2), ... etc. to the system (for proof environments usually only deal 
with one proof at a time) and how to incorporate these proofs into the main 
proof. It was desirable to be able to generate these proofs, rather than inputting 
them, since they might not be available for input. Other implementational issues 
included consideration of how the constructive w -rule would be implemented, de- 
tails of the new implementational system, and in particular what a proof using 
the constructive w -rule would look like. Another problem which was implemented 
concerns how it could be known whether the general proof is the right one - in 
other words, how one could know that the next individual proof example selected 
would not falsify it. This involves some kind of meta -level reasoning as a check to 
ensure that the general method is the required one (cf. Subsection 10.3.1). 
10.2 Seldon 
This section is intended as an overview of the Seldon proof development system. A 
basic acquaintance with the workings of OYSTER is necessary to understand Seldon, 
within which framework the programs of this project were written. 
In order to carry out the implementation, a domain was required in which proofs 
could be manipulated. An obvious candidate was the Nuprl program development 
system (Constable, 1986), reimplemented in Prolog by Christian Horn, a visitor 
to the Mathematical Reasoning Group in Edinburgh (Horn, 1972) . This system, 
called Oyster, is a proof checker for a version of Intuitionistic Type Theory based 
on that developed by P. Martin -Löf (Martin -Lof, 1970). Thus it embodies a higher - 
order, typed constructive logic in sequent- calculus form (see Subsection 3.2.2 for 
further details). 
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As well as being written in Prolog, Oyster is run at the Prolog prompt level. In 
order to introduce a theorem to work on, one may either load a previous theorem or 
create a new theorem. Oyster reasons backwards from the theorem to be proved, 
and the rules of inference are the usual rules of sequent calculus, together with 
mathematical induction. It is important to note that only one proof at a time may 
be operated upon in the system, although others may be stored and recalled later. 
A theorem initially consists of a sequent. The proof tree is developed by telling 
Oyster which rule of inference to use at each node. Some of these rules will result 
in new nodes being attached to the tree - others will complete the branch (giving 
status complete). One may traverse the tree by means of the commands given in 
Appendix B. The proof is complete when all the branches end in completed proofs. 
It is possible to save a proof at any stage as either an internal representation or a 
readable version. 
The system in which the programs of this project are written is Seán Matthew's 
implementation of Peano and Heyting arithmetic in the Oyster framework, called 
Seldon'. This has all the advantages of a system like Oyster, but uses a much sim- 
pler logic. In addition it contains various useful tactics, and moreover dispenses 
with the need for copious trivial type -justifications. The behaviour of the system 
is very similar to that of Oyster, principally because it is constructed by replac- 
ing the object -level logic of Oyster with Peano and Heyting arithmetic. There 
are three sentential operators and a constant used in the propositional calculus'. 
`A -+ 1' is preferred to A' on the grounds that it is more intuitive in a con - 
structive system. The rules that can be applied are those of the sequent calculus 
axiomatisation of first order logic given in Dummett's "Elements of Intuitionism" 
(Dummett, 1977, P133), together with mathematical induction. The rule of repe- 
tition is allowed, in order that the primitive recursive w -rule may be implemented 
(cf. Subsection 4.3.1). 
1See Table A -1 for further details of the connectives. 
2See Table 10 -1 for further details of the connectives. 
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Representation Explanation 
/\ X : : Y for all X, Y is the case 
\/ X : : Y there exists X such that Y is the case 
A => B A implies B 
A #B AandB 
A \B AorB 
void absurdity 
A =B AequalsB 
s(X) successor of X 
Table 10 -1: The Connectives in Seldon 
The rules of arithmetic are essentially Peano's axioms3 plus induction. All of the 
axioms (except induction) are called by the basic rule, and will succeed with no 
subgoals if they unify against the consequent of the current sequent. In the case 
of induction, induce and induce (X) both generate the appropriate subgoals for 
an induction from a universally quantified goal. If the latter is used, the variable 
of the universal quantifier will be renamed to X in the induction cases; otherwise 
it will remain as given. 
The search for a proof must be guided either by a human user or by a proof tactic. 
The latter is a Prolog program which incorporates OYSTER or Seldon commands, 
whichever is appropriate. The tactic may, for example, recognise if the sequent 
to be operated upon corresponds to a certain pattern, and in this case perform 
certain rules of inference upon it. It is possible to switch within Seldon from 
the representation of Peano Arithmetic to that of its intuitionistic counterpart, 
Heyting Arithmetic. Therefore this allows the representation of either PA, or 
HAw; PAS,, is normally used as there are more desirable theoretical results for 
this system (see Section 2.5). 
Each proof is built up in the form of a tree, and every stage of the tree may be 
3See Section 4.1. 
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displayed on the screen with information as to the hypotheses, goals, position in 
the tree and whether the subtree is proved below it. A typical such position is 
shown below, as shown on the screen by the display command, which displays the 
current node of the prooftree. This partial proof corresponds to the application of 
the rule -+ -r to I- a V -ia -} ( -i -ia -* a); comments on the right -hand side have 
been added afterwards. 
t : [] partial autotactic(idtac) 
= => (a \a= >void)= >((a= >void)= >void) = >a 
by rimp 
[1] incomplete 
v0. a \a = >void 
= => ((a= >void) = >void) = >a 
by 
%%% Status - partial 
% %% Top of tree 
% %% sequent to be proved 
% %% rule used 
% %% the only subgoal 
% %% the hypothesis 
%%°/ the goal 
%%% next rule not yet 
%%% given 
In order to gain the flexibility of classical proof techniques without losing the 
advantages that a constructive proof offers, it would be desirable to have both the 
option of a classical and of a constructive system. This is done by introducing the 
law of excluded middle: 
F I- (A - ±) ext 'text 
F F- A ext because(Aest) 
which may in fact be optionally included in the system by the user. 
For further details about the system, see Appendix E. 
10.2.1 Extract Terms 
As might be expected from the underlying philosophy,4 constructive mathematics 
is motivated by the conviction that "there exists" means, or rather should mean, 
"we can find explicitly". The view of one famous proponent, Bishop, is that if 
4See Subsection 2.1.1. 
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mathematics is properly written, one should be able to extract what he called 
"numerical information" from the proof (Bishop, 1967).5 This may be regarded 
as a program, which contains the computational information implicit in the proof. 
Thus I- G ext Gest is a proof of G, where Ge5t is a member of the type identified 
with G, called the extract term of G. The extract term is also known as a witness 
term for G, because it is the object whose existence provides a proof of G. In 
Seldon, in order to be able to refer to hypotheses, labels are used, so that sequents 
will have the form: 
a: A, ... ,y:YI- Z ext Zest 
where a, ... , y are the labels and may be free in Zext. 
For each rule of inference there is a constructor which links together the con- 
structions corresponding to the arguments (subgoals) of the major connective the 
rule involves. The extract term is the constructor applied to the appropriate ar- 
guments. The extract terms may be executed by application to arguments and 
symbolic evaluation, in other words they themselves may be run as a program to 
perform the function described by the proof. 
In extending the system to arithmetic, rather than providing Peano's axioms with 
complicated witness terms as appropriate, the witness terms in the rules other 
than the induction axiom are replaced with the simple `axiom'. This does not 
affect the computational part of the generated witness terms, and merely makes 
the witnesses easier to read. For example, 
F I- a + 0 = a ext axiom 
The particular case of the induction rule is as follows: 
F I- A(0) ext Base F I- Vx.A(x) -- A(s(x)) ext Step 
F H dx.A(x) ext Ax.induce(x, Base, Step) 
where 
5Bishop did not use type theory, however. 
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induce(0, b, s) = b; (base case) 
induce(s(n), b, i) = i(n)(induce(n, b, s)). (induction step) 
As a way of explaining the above notation, factorial (x) could be defined as 
induce (x, s (0) , lambda (a, lambda(b, s (a) *b))) , where lambda(a,b) is the code 
used to represent the lambda term Aa.b. This expression represents the defining 
equations `factorial(0) = s(0)' and `factorial(s(n)) = s(n).factorial(n)'. 
So, what is the extract term corresponding to the w -rule? Yoccoz's result about 
the equivalence of encoding with recursive trees (Yoccoz, 1989a) discussed in Sec- 
tion 2.5 has implications relating to the `justification' or `extraction' associated 
with the w -rule, and the consequences for program synthesis. For a proof in Heyt- 
ing arithmetic (HA)6, we will have 
P(0) ext e(0) . . . P(k) ext e(k) . . . 
xP(x) ext an.e(n) 
w - rule 
V 
If the prooftrees P(i) are generated in some uniform manner, there is no problem, 
because e(i) will be dependent upon i in a uniform way, and the extract may be 
calculated as just being )k .e(k). However, if the prooftrees are not generated, there 
will not be a uniform function e of n. The standard way of obtaining an extract 
e(i) from P(i) may be used, but it is not obvious how to obtain the extract term for 
the denominator. One possible solution, with reference to Subsection 2.1.2 above, 
is that the prooftrees may be converted to a canonical form, and thus a general 
pattern calculated. Note also that it would be possible to store information about 
the structure of the individual proofs for the sequents in the numerator of the 
w -rule by means of extract terms. 
6The intuitionistic counterpart of PA. See Section 4.1 for further details. 
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10.3 Implementational Representation of Gen- 
eral Proofs 
In this section I consider how the general proofs described in Chapter 6 are rep- 
resented from an implementational point of view. The basic implementational 
approach has already been briefly presented in Subsection 6.1.2. For an applica- 
tion of the w -rule, a description of the nth subproof, uniformly with respect to the 
parameter n, is required. An example representation, in the linear case, for the 
general proof for P(n) is:. 
gen( CR1(Posl, f l'(n)), R2(Pos2, f 2'(n)), . . .] ). 
This represents the application of each rewrite rule RJ f J' (n) times at subposi- 
tion PosJ of the resulting formula of the general proof. For example, this might 
be gen([rulel ([], n), rule2([2], 3), ru/e1([1], 2 * n)]). The representation for each 
individual proof for P(J) would be of the form: 
proof (J, CRulelj(Poslj, T1 J), Rule2J(Pos1 J,T2j), . . .] ) 
This is a predicate, its first argument being the natural number J, and the other 
argument being an ordered list of predicates such that RuleK j is the Kth rule 
to be applied in the proof, and is applied TKO times, with PosKj specifying the 
position at which it is applied. Note that we may have RuleAj = RuleBj. 
In order to automatically recognise a general pattern, and hence form the basis 
for an implementation, upon input of individual proofs for P(1), P(2), ..., it is 
necessary to provide an algorithm to do this.? (However, in this thesis it is the 
underlying structure of the general proof which we wish to exploit, rather than 
the way in which the general proof is obtained.) 
The algorithm which is automated in the code (see Appendix E.5) and which 
performs the required function is described below. Essentially, it generalises an 
7cf. Inductive inference (Section 3.3). 
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initial individual proof, and then updates this generalisation according to other 
individual proof examples until the general proof representation satisfies all of the 
(large number of) cases considered. 
First pick some proof of P(J). In general it is best to have J as some fairly low 
number, but not too low or the proof might exhibit some individual variance. For 
instance, the proofs for 0 or 1 are nearly always special cases. 
For each P(J) as it is considered, guess the various hKN (n) such that hKN(J) = 
TNJ, and store these in the form 
list(J, RuleN (PosN , TNJ), [h1N(n), . . . hrN(n)] ). 
Each hKN(n) is a guess of how to generalise TN,' with respect to J, ordered such 
that hJ is more likely to be correct than hK, if J < K. Some sort of heuristics 
would have to be applied to enable choice of the most likely functions. For example, 
products could be preferred to sums, which were preferred to powers, so that upon 
input of J = 2 and T1 j = 4, the machine would `guess' hl N (X) = 2X, then 
h2N(X) = X + 2, then h3N(X) = X2, say, and so on. 
The next stage is to rewrite the individual representation of the proof P(J) to 
that of a general proof by setting fN = h1 N, ie. 
gen( [Rulel (Pos1, f 1(n)), Rule2(Pos2, f 2(n)), . . .] ) (*) 
where fK(J) = TKO VK.(0) 
This is the initial guess of the general proof from one proof example (and hence 
may well not be the correct guess). 
Then inspect the representation of the next individual proof (ie. P(K), where 
K = J + 1), which will be of the form: 
proof (K, [RulelK(Pos1K,T1K), Rule2K(Pos2K,T2K), ...] 
Compare this with ( *) to see if the general proof guess should be revised: 
1. If Rulel = RulelK and Posl = PosK and 
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(a) f 1(K) = T1K, set fl' = 3'1 (ie. the guess f 1 looks as if it might be 
correct) and move on to consider the second predicates in the lists. 
(b) (i) If Ti j = TiK, (ie. T1 j +1) then T1 j must be a number, since it is 
not dependent on J. So assert the following in place of the previous 
statement: `list(K, Rule1K(Pos1K,T1K), [T1K] )'. Set T1' = T1K, 
and by the above other guesses will not be allowed. 
(ii) If Ti j T1K, recurse to try other possibilities at (0). Note that 
the functions we originally chose could be the wrong ones, and this 
stage is an indication of that fact. What will be done at this stage 
is to remove f 1(n) from the stored list of guesses for the Nth list 
(ie. to assert instead `list(N, Rule1K(Pos1K,) , [L -f 1(n)])' . Then 
VM < N inspect 'list(M, Rule1K(PoslK,) , LM)' and pick Z such that 
Z E LM,VM. Set T1' = RulelK(Pos1K, Z). 
2. If Rulel RulelK, 
find h st. h(K) = T1K. 
If h(N) = 0 for N <K, then add RulelK(Pos1K, h(n)) to the general list. 
Otherwise, something has gone wrong. 
Continue in this manner, comparing the two lists and extending the general form 
where necessary. Repeat with the new general form and the next particular proof 
(of P(J + 2)), and so on. After a finitely large number of examples, if there 
is a general pattern to the proofs, then it will be seen to emerge and will be 
encapsulated by the final representation of the general proof. In the code there is 
a check such that if the general proof has not been altered a set number of times 
when undergoing comparison with particular proofs, the process will terminate 
and output the general proof. Note that this general proof is still only a guess, 
and needs to be checked, as described in the next section. 
In practice, this algorithm needs modification due to the fact that some rules may 
be applied in a different order and yet have the same effect, so that proofs which 
do not have the same surface structure could yet have an identical general proof. 
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There would have to be some check made at the beginning as to whether the rules 
of the proofs could be permuted in order to give the same end result, and whether 
this would indeed provide a general proof. In particular, problems are caused 
because the automatic generation of individual proofs described in Appendix E.4 
may result in the rewrite rules needing to be permuted before the algorithm above 
may be applied. The example considered in Appendix E.4.2 demonstrates that 
account must also be taken of the fact that there are alternative forms of the no- 
tation, in the sense that rule([1,1], 2) may be equivalent to rule([1, 1], 1) followed 
by rule([1, 1, 1], 1) for example. Hence, the algorithm described above depends 
heavily on how the individual proofs have been generated: it will only work if 
they have been generated uniformly (cf. make_thms2 of Appendix E.5); if not, a 
more advanced algorithm is required. Given as input individual proofs for which 
the common structure is already apparent and which do not require internal re- 
arrangement within each proof, the implementation is able to provide a guess in 
polynomial time for the general proof for any arithmetical examples for which the 
appropriate rewrite rules are defined in advance within the system: examples (8.1) 
to (8.8) from Table 8.1 illustrate the type of examples involved. 
The algorithm described in this subsection is needed in order to be able to procede 
to the next stage of implementation; however, as discussed above, the one used is 
not particularly clever, and could be replaced instead by any appropriate inductive 
inference algorithm (such as Plotkin's least general generalisation (Plotkin, 1969)). 
In general, the main body of work is done at this stage because the complexity of 
the algorithm needed to guess a general proof from non -uniformly generated ex- 
amples is exponential, whereas the stages to be described in the following sections 
of checking the general proof and suggesting a cut formula are only polynomially 
complex, and this is reflected in the time taken to produce the result. In conclu- 
sion, the algorithm described above needs a fair amount of modification to work 
satisfactorily on relatively simple examples if they do not already show a common 
structure, although it works straightforwardly on examples which do, and in gen- 
eral one is forced to rely heavily on others' attempts to show that the inductive 
inference process may succeed: such as the work of Rouveirol, who has tackled 
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the problem of controlling the hypothesis generation process to get only the most 
relevant candidates (Rouveirol, 1990). As an alternative, the user may bypass this 
whole stage by specifying the general proof directly. 
10.3.1 Checking for Correctness of the General Proof 
This subsection describes the implementational algorithm corresponding to the 
process of justifying derived rewrite rules via meta -induction, which has been 
discussed in Section 6.4. Note that the algorithms described in both this and the 
previous section have been implemented (see Appendix E for further details). The 
"checking" stage of implementation deals with the problem of how it could be 
established that the general `proof' is indeed a proof of the formula of interest - 
in other words, how it could be known that a selected individual proof example 
could not falsify it. This necessarily involves some kind of meta -level reasoning 
as a check to ensure that the proposed general rule applications do indeed give a 
proper proof when applied to the general case of the sequent to be proved. Thus, 
there is a need for some sort of checker separate from Seldon to be developed. 
The whole process should not be confused with inductive inference, that is the 
action of building up the general proof from individual proof instances, which is 
the concern of the previous section. 
Initial Solution 
The general idea is to take the nth case, and apply the rules in the manner 
indicated by the general proof, in the hope of reaching equality. For example, if 
one were trying to prove Vx(x + x) + x = x + (x + x) by means of the constructive 
w -rule, and the general proof was of the form 
gen( [rulel ( [1,1] , n), rulel ( [2] , n), rule2( [2, 2, 1, 1] , 1), rule2( [2, 2, 2] , 1), rulel ( [1] , n)] ) 
(which had been inferred from individual instances), then the method of checking 
would be along the lines of that indicated below. 
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Problem 
There is a problem as to how it is actually possible to carry out the checking 
detailed above within the framework of a computer program. In particular, how 
is it possible to apply a rule n times, when the value of n is not known? If a rule 
transformation is applied repeatedly, it will not be known when to stop. Without 
having a numerical value for n, which by the nature of n is not possible, this is 
what will happen: 
s(s(sn-2(0))) 
s . . . 8(Sn 123(0))) 
rule R repeated 
rule R repeated 
It is not possible just to apply the rule a few times, and then guess the general 
form of the rule after a random transformation, because this does not constitute 
a proof and besides is the stage which is being justified. 
Revised Solution 
As an example, let us imagine we are trying to prove dx x + 3 = 3 + x by means 
of the constructive w -rule, and a proposed general proof has been obtained via the 
previous stages of the implementation. A random case is inspected for the number 
n', namely n' + 3 = 3 + n'. 
1. Substitute n' sn(0), and similarly for other numbers. The result in this 
case is sn(0) + s3(0) = s3(0) + sn(0). 
2. Recall that the general solution is stored in terms of rules such as "apply 
R n times at position P" . Try applying such a rule a few times in order 
to guess the general pattern in terms of m, the number of times the rule is 
applied. In other words, from A(0), use the rule to get A(1), A(2), A(3), ... 
and then substitute m for these variables in the resulting expression (where 
A(i) ... is the sequence of formulae in the general proof). 
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So, 
A(1) - s(sn-1(0) + y) 
A(2) - s(s(sn-2(0) + y)) = s2(sn-2(0) + y) 
A(3) = s(s(s(sn-3(0) + y))) = s3(sn-3(0) + y) 
GUESS A(m) - sm(sn-n`(0) + y) 
Actually, it might be that a number was actually a constant throughout 
all cases, and so we would not wish to substitute m for it. Hence a list of 
possible guesses should be made for each A(r), and the intersection of these 
given as A(m). 
Note: We are defining A(m) for all m < n. If we had m = n + 1, A(m) 
would be sn +l(s-1(0) + y), which would not be obtainable using rules (1) 
and (2) because these rules do not introduce sX with negative x. A similar 
argument applies for any other m > n. 
3. Now, prove this guess using meta -induction. If this does not work, move 
back to Step Two and try again with a more complicated A(m), dependent 
on a larger number of base examples. 
The fact that A(0), the original formula, may be transformed by rewrite 
rules to A(m), for any m, may be represented as: 
A(0) A(r) Htransforrnation A(s(r)) 
A(m) 
For the example above, we have: 
sn(0) 
+ 
y(1) sr(sn-r(0) .+ y) sr+l(sn-(r+1) (0) + y)(2) 
sm(Sn'-m(0) + y)(3) 
where (1) is the original (sub)formula under consideration, (2) is to be proved 
and (3) is the result of Step Two above. 
To prove (2), take A (s(r)), apply R in reverse, and tidy up the expression 
using definitions such as sn(0) = s(sn- 1(0)), to give A(r). 
Ze. Sr+1 ¡sn-(r+1) (0) Rrev -- y) Sr (Sn-r (0) + y) \ l 
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4. We have now proved that A(0) may be transformed by rewrite rules to A(m), 
for any m < n. In particular, we are interested in the case when m = n. We 
have then proved that A(0) is transformable to A [m /n] - in this case that 
s'n(0) + y reduces to s'n(0 + y). 
5. Substitute sn(y) for sn(0 +y) by using rule (2). If f (n) is constant, as in this 
case, carry out a straight substitution, otherwise follow steps two onwards 
for the particular rule given by the general proof. Substitute f (n) for m 
at step four. Continue in this manner, recursing along the members of the 
rule -list of the general proof. 
Substitution of the transformation given by the last rule provided by the 
general proof should result in an axiom of the form X = Y, where Y is re- 
ducible to X by various syntax definitions (viz. when the rule -list is empty). 
If it does not, then the general proof is not a correct one as there must be 
cases in which it could be falsified. 
In conclusion, meta -induction was used to prove the guess for the new line of the 
general proof, as discussed in Subsection 6.4.1. 
10.4 System Description (cf. PACW) 
The implementation is carried out within the framework of an interactive theorem - 
prover with Prolog as the tactic language, in which the object -level logic is replaced 
by classical and constructive theories of arithmetic. Any finite number of individ- 
ual instances of proofs of a proposition may be generated automatically by the 
use of various tactics. The general representation of the proofs is provided by 
having an initial generalisation from a `starting' proof, and then by updating this 
general proof using the other individual proofs, until the general proof seems to 
have reached a stable form. This general proof is then checked to see if it is indeed 
the correct one, as described above. The whole of this stage has been automated. 
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There are two options which are allowable from the Seldon proof (in PA or HA) 
with goal r I- bxP(x). One is to ask to use the constructive w -rule, whereby the 
system will check to see whether there is a correct general proof, and then return 
to the former system and close the subtree, or else state that the application of 
the rule failed. The user may then continue to investigate other positions in the 
prooftree. The other option is to ask for an appropriate cut to be carried out 
in PA (the cut being worked out by the system from the general proof), with a 
further option to complete the tree as far as possible (using standard theorem - 
proving techniques). The general proof may be provided automatically, but there 
is an option in each case to switch temporarily to another system which will allow 
for the description, manipulation and display of the general proof. The user may 
specify the proof incrementally, in terms of applications in positions in the tree, 
plus induction over a distinguished parameter, or all at once - and this is checked. 
The system builds up a recursive function description of the general proof, and is 
able to display individual proofs in addition to the general case. A cut formula is 
automatically suggested from general proofs using an implementation based on the 
method of explanation -based generalisation. This whole process is summarised in 
Appendix E.8.2. 
Branching proofs have been discussed in Section 6.6. A tree representation is 
included in the implementation, and hence extra branching code is not needed. 
Transcripts of the system running are given in the Appendices. See Appendix E for 
technical details of the implementational representation of the w -rule. For further 
details of the implementation, and the code written, see (Baker, 1992). 
In summary, code has been written for: 
representation of PA,,. This involves implementation to: 
- represent the w -rule (and subgoals). 
- produce or input the individual proofs. 
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- allow interaction with user to define general proof recursively, or else 
produce the general proof automatically. This involves application of 
rewrite rules, and a tree representation. 
- check correctness of the general proof. 
generalisation: suggestion of cut formula (only arithmetical case imple- 
mented). 
implementation of cut elimination - see (Baker, 1990). 
10.5 Summary 
The implementation was carried out within the framework of an interactive theorem - 
prover with Prolog as the tactic language, in which the object -level logic is replaced 
by classical and constructive theories of arithmetic. The implementation allows 
both the automatic or incremental construction of w- proofs, and the validations 
of descriptions of w- proofs. 
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Chapter 11 
Comparison with Related Work 
"Men are more apt to be mistaken in their generalisations than in their 
particular observations." 
Niccolò Machiavelli 
This chapter presents first of all relevant work for which no direct comparison 
will be made, namely reflection and proof transformation, and then moves on 
to provide a comparison of relevant contemporary approaches with the methods 
proposed in this thesis. The following section introduces so- called reflective sys- 
tems, and compares these with the closely- related semi- formal systems including 
w- rules, which have been considered in Section 2.5. Next, in Section 11.2, an 
analogous process to the linearisation of the general proof described in Section 8.3 
is considered, namely that of proof transformation. Note that related work in 
the fields of inductive generalisation and explanation -based learning has already 
been presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, and that in these areas the work described 
in this thesis does not offer more highly developed algorithms, such as to carry 
out inductive inference, but rather provides a new domain for these methods (see 
Section 3.4 for details) . 
The main field which is a candidate for comparison with existent methods is 
the generalisation method suggested in Chapters 8 and 9; this is contrasted in 
Section 11.4 with the alternative methods available, which are discussed in Sec- 
tion 11.3. There is little work being carried out which is analogous to the process 
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described in the thesis of one logical system guiding the provision of cut formulae 
in another, and so this provides a new approach. 
11.1 Related Theoretical Work: Reflection 
In this section systems of reflection will be considered, since there is a strong 
parallel between rules of reflection and co- rules. Generally, reflection principles 
extend a system with a statement of confidence about that system: by reflecting 
upon the meaning of the system, it might be able to code insight into further true 
mathematical statements that were not deducible beforehand. As was discussed 
in Chapter 2, Penrose has put forward the argument that reflection, in the sense 
of insight, allows "natural reasoners" (ie. mathematicians) to outperform formal 
systems (Penrose, 1989). Gödel writes in the opening paragraph of (Gödel, 1958): 
"An extension of finitism by such concepts was explicitly suggested 
by Bernays in (Bernays, 1983, P258 -271). By abstract concepts, in 
this context, are meant concepts which are essentially of the second 
or higher level, ie. which do not have as their content properties or 
relations of concrete objects (such as combinations of symbols), but 
rather of thought structures or thought contents (eg. proofs, meaning- 
ful propositions, and so on), where in the proofs of propositions about 
these mental objects insights are needed which are not derived from a 
reflection upon the combinatorial (space -time) properties of the sym- 
bols representing them, but rather from a reflection upon the meanings 
involved." 
An example of such a reflection principle would be, for a given system 'T, an 
assertion about the soundness of T of the form: "For every formula A in the 
language of T, if A is provable in T, then A is true". However, for any theory 
T to which Tarksi's theorem on the undefinability of truth is applicable, a truth 
predicate is not definable in the language of T (Feferman, 1962). The notion that 
whatever is provable in T is true may be conveyed without use of the formal 
notion of truth by what is called the local reflection principle (for each sentence A 
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of the language, where 7 denotes Gödel encoding' and PT is a formal provability 
predicate for the system 'T):2 
3y PT(y, rA,) -> A 
This makes sense for any theory 'T containing So, where the latter is defined as in 
(Feferman, 1991, P10).3 Indeed, Turing was the first to use `Pr fy('A') -+ A' to 
achieve completeness for all sentences with only universally quantified variables in 
arithmetic. This work was extended by Feferman, who put forward the uniform 
reflection principle, one form of which is 
dn(3y PT(y, subst(7 A, n)) A(n)) (RP) 
where subst(rA7, n) is the Gödel number of the sentence obtained by substituting 
n, the numeral representing the number n, for x in A(x). Feferman used this to 
achieve a partial completeness result, in the sense that every proposition that is 
true in the standard model is provable eventually in one of the systems obtained 
from iterating this extension. For H1- statements local reflection and uniform re- 
flection over PA are equivalent, but generally the latter is stronger than the former 
(Feferman, 1962). Kreisel and Lévy have shown that PA extended with the rule 
RP is equivalent to PA extended with TIED, where TIEÓ is transfinite induction up 
to Eo (definable by Vn Vm (m -< n Vn (1.(n), where -< is a well -ordering 
on the natural numbers of ordinal type e0) ( Kreisel & Lévy, 1968). This result is 
a good illustration of how addition of a reflection principle allows generalisation 
to a universally quantified sentence from individual cases (which is also the effect 
'See Section 2.4 for discussion of Gödel numbers. 
2Gödel's system has both the provability predicate Py(m, n), which is defined as 
holding if and only if in the system 'T, m is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula 
with Gödel number n, and the proof predicate Pr fy(n), which holds if and only if n is 
the Gödel number of a proof in the system T. 
3In other words, any theory 'T strong enough to formally represent the basic syn- 
tactical notions for arbitrary effectively generated axiomatic theories, and to derive the 
basic properties concerning them. 
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of the w- rule); in this case the individual cases are provided by Gentzen's proof 
that induction up to 'q is provable in PA, for any particular ordinal n less than fo. 
From this it may be seen that reflection systems are closely related to w- rules. In 
general, the former add to a system statements of the form "if there is a formal 
prooftree, then the statement S should hold" , and are more efficient because the 
meta -level is at least partly represented within the system. However, they do not 
explicitly represent prooftrees, but rather deal with provability in a system. w- 
rules, on the other hand, allow an explicit representation of infinite proofs, and 
allow manipulation of individual proofs, rather than concentrating on provability. 
So there is a proof predicate in the systems with the w -rule, as opposed to the 
provability predicate in the reflective systems. 
Hence with the w -rule it is possible to examine individual proofs and, in particular, 
to think in terms of producing a generalisation, which is a useful application of 
the work presented in this thesis.' In addition, as may be seen from a comparison 
of completeness results of the various systems,' the addition of an w -rule may well 
produce a stronger system than the addition of a corresponding reflection rule. 
Several systems have been developed which implement reflection rules. Perhaps 
the most famous is the system FOL, which is an interactive system developed 
by R. Weyhrauch at Stanford (Weyhrauch, 1980). It implements first order logic 
via a modified form of natural deduction. Meta -theory is used in the manip- 
ulation of algebraic expressions in a way which is not explicitly used by most 
other theorem -proving systems: the system has a separate meta -theory, which is 
not given in the form of Gödel encoding. Reflection is enabled by a theory of 
knowledge represented via reflection principles. The automation of the system 
is very restricted: only certain limited types of deduction may be made auto- 
matically, although very complicated ones may be guided by a user. The use of 
meta -theoretic knowledge can shorten proofs at the object- level, and the interac- 
4See Chapter 8. 
5See also Section 2.5. 
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tion between meta- and object -level theory may increase the power and efficiency 
of the theorem -prover. Weyhrauch and Aiello have also carried out related work 
to show how the use of meta -theoretic knowledge results in improving the quality 
of various algebraic proofs, making them both easier to find and to understand 
(Aiello & Weyhrauch, 1980). 
Kowalski has developed an alternative system which effectively mixes the meta - 
and object -level (Bowen & Kowalski, 1982). The object -level language is extended 
to cover the part of the metalanguage which deals with the former's provability 
relation. This is intended to overcome the problem of database management, due 
in particular to changing databases. By amalgamating the object -language and 
part of the meta -language it is possible to explicitly refer to theories and discuss 
derivability from these theories. Rules from the meta- to the object- language are 
linked by pairs of reflection principles. The main difference between this work 
and Wehyrauch's is that the latter does not completely amalgamate object- and 
meta -language. More recently, S. Matthew at Edinburgh University has also im- 
plemented a reflective system (Matthews et al, 1991). 
As discussed above, although there are strong parallels between such systems and 
the implementation described in this thesis, the latter is a more suitable method 
both for manipulating and for generalising individual proofs. 
11.2 Transformation of Proofs 
The approach of linearising the general proof to obtain another general proof from 
which the cut formula might be obtained is analogous to work being carried out to 
linearise programs with more than one recursive call. In particular, P. Madden has 
optimised recursive programs by substituting induction schemata related to cor- 
responding synthesis proofs (Madden, 1989). For example, starting with a course 
of values inductive proof to produce the Fibonacci sequence 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, ... 
represented by the algorithms 
f ib(0) = 1 (11.1) 
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f ib(1) = 1 (11.2) 
V fib(s(s(x))) = fib(s(x)) + fib(x), (11.3) 
in order to calculate f ib(n), two recursive calls (on f ib(n - 1) and f ib(n - 2)) are 
made, which in their turn do the same. Hence the computational complexity is ex- 
ponential. Madden transforms this proof into one corresponding to the algorithm 
(where <> denotes the pair constructor) 
new f n(0) _< 1,1 > 
new f n(n + 1) =< v1 + v2, v1 > where new f n(n) _< v1, v2 > 
The values of the two step cases of the less efficient algorithm above have been 
combined (within f n), so that the function new f n requires only n recursive calls 
(to new f n(0)), and hence the computational tree resulting from this type of in- 
duction is linear. It can be seen that this work is related to the linearisation 
process described in Section 8.3, in the sense that the solution of the n + 1st case 
is achieved by reducing this to the nth case. 
Other the of program and proof transformation includes 
Burstall and Darlington's system for transforming programs which are expressed 
as recursion equations (Burstall & Darlington, 1977), and W.N. Chin's doctoral 
work (Chin, 1990). 
The following sections directly compare the generalisation method presented in 
Chapters 8 and 9 with current alternatives. 
11.3 Methods of Generalisation 
The generalisation method proposed in Chapter 8 makes it relevant to assess 
current generalisation methods. The major generalisation heuristics are given 
below: systems such as INKA and CLAM6, borrow heuristics from Boyer and Moore 
6See Section 3.2. 
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and Aubin. A more thorough overview of current generalisation techniques may 
be found in (Hummel, 1987). 
11.3.1 Boyer and Moore's Heuristics 
In order to ascertain its usefulness, the method of generalisation proposed in this 
thesis should be compared with current methods. Of these, perhaps the most 
famous is that implemented by Boyer and Moore,7 and described in Section 3.2, 
in which the main heuristic for generalisation is that identical terms occurring 
on both the left and right side of an equation are picked for rewriting as a new 
variable (with certain restrictions) (Boyer & Moore, 1979). This may be a quick 
method if it happens to work, but may also entail the proofs of many lemmata, 
which might need to be stored in advance in anticipation of such an event in 
order to be more efficient. The proof is not `tailor -made' to the axioms given 
in the sense that the proof provided by the guiding method would be, and may 
in general be considered an `ad hoc' approach. Moreover, this method will not 
always work, notably when the generalisation of variables apart is required, and 
overgeneralisation is also possible. The method for generalisation used by the 
CLAM system (see Section 3.2) is based on the same heuristic as that of NQTHM, 
and thus the same criticisms may be levelled against it. 
11.3.2 Aubin's Method 
The problems inherent in Boyer and Moore's approach led Raymond Aubin to 
develop their work (Aubin, 1975). Aubin's PhD thesis deals with the question of 
generalisation, and in particular how one might generalise a formula so that it 
would be provable by induction. 
7It is possible for the user to turn the generalisation heuristic off for Boyer and 
Moore's system. The heuristic does not rely upon anticipation of any future induction 
which may be needed (cf. Section 9.3). 
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In order to explain Aubin's method in more detail, it is first necessary to explain 
what is meant by "symbolic evaluation" , "ugly expressions" and "destructor func- 
tions" , and give some background to his work. This was heavily influenced by 
the approach of his supervisors, Boyer and Moore. Although the famous theorem - 
prover of the latter was written in LISP, whereas Aubin's thesis is implemented 
in POP -2, Aubin's work is essentially a specialised development of part of their 
work, in the sense that the positive information value of the failure of symbolic 
evaluation is used to even greater effect. Using a LISP -like language including the 
function cond, it is not necessary to use multiple equations when making recursive 
definitions. (Cond(x, y, z) is defined as follows: if x = nil then z else y.) The func- 
tion append (viz. that function which joins two lists) may be defined recursively 
as follows: 
append (X, Y) = cond (X, cons (car (X) , append (cdr (X) , Y)) , Y) . 
Symbolic evaluation is essentially the rewriting of an expression using a set of 
(rewrite) rules. Given the axioms that 
car(cons(X, Y)) = X 
cdr (cons (X, Y)) = Y 
if an expression of the form "append(A, B)" is (symbolically) evaluated by means of 
the definition above, then if A is of the form cons(X, Y)', or if A is nil, the car and 
cdr may be eliminated. If it is not, there will not be rules which- will eliminate the 
car and the cdr, and so it will not be possible to eliminate `append'. In this case A 
will be called an "ugly expression". Generally, if a rewriting threatens to produce 
an ugly expression then the rewriting is prohibited and symbolic evaluation is 
terminated. 
Boyer and Moore's theorem prover was able to use the ugly expressions as a guide 
to choosing the correct induction scheme for a particular expression. However, in 
a case such as proving 
append(rev(A), append(B, C)) = append(append(rev(A), B), C)) 
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their theorem -prover would fail, basically because the induction hypothesis is not 
strong enough to support the induction conclusion. This example may however be 
generalised to the associativity of append, which may be proved fairly straightfor- 
wardly, by replacing the term rev(A) with a new variable, say D. Induction would 
then be carried out on D. Aubin stressed that in fact the term to be replaced 
should be an ugly expression. The procedure is that there must be the same ugly 
expression produced from either side of the equation, and if so, this expression is 
replaced by a new variable and then induction is carried out on this new variable. 
The exact mechanisms will become clearer when going through worked examples 
later in this chapter. 
One major problem which occurs is that of over -generalisation (the generalisation 
of a theorem into a non -theorem). For example, 
length(length(X)) = length(X) 
where length(X) is defined as taking an argument X of type list, and returning 
a list of nils (representing a number denoting the length of the list)$. One of 
the occurrences of length(X) becomes trapped as an ugly expression during the 
symbolic evaluation of length(length(X)). If both occurrences of the term are 
replaced by a new variable, the result is no longer a theorem, because length(Y) = 
Y is true only when Y is a list of nils. Boyer and Moore's solution was to add extra 
information, in this case of the form "if Y is a list of nils, then length(Y) = Y". 
Aubin preferred to avoid over -generalisation by noting which occurrences of the 
ugly expression (ie. length(X) in this case) are trapped, and allow only these terms 
to be replaced by a variable, rather than all the equivalent ones. In this example, 
there is only one trapped ugly expression, so generalisation should not be allowed 
on the grounds that there is no trapped ugly expression equivalent to this on the 
other side of the equation. 
In summary, Aubin's method is to "guess" a generalisation by generalising occur- 
rences of variables in the argument positions of functions in which the recursive 
8See definitions given by axioms 8.17 and 8.18. 
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cases are defined, and then to work through a number of individual cases to see if 
the guess seems to work. If it does work, he will look for a proof. If it does not, 
then he will "guess" a different generalisation. J. Castaing adopts a very similar 
approach: she replaces, by universally quantified variables, all those positions in 
the induction hypothesis which do not match with those of the induction conclu- 
sion, and then identifies those variables which replaced identical terms and were 
primary recursion variables, separately identifying all the others (Castaing, 1985). 
Example One 
As an introductory example, we will consider how Aubin's method would produce a 
generalisation for `Vl append(l, append(l, l)) = append(append(l, l), l)'. His whole 
approach is summed up on pages 4 -5 of his thesis; 
Firstly, how is it possible to generalize only certain occurrences of a 
term in a goal? For example, can we get 
from 
app(k app(l, l)) = app(app(k , l), l) 
app(l, app(l, l)) = app(app(l, l), l)? 
Answering this question requires a deeper understanding of general- 
ization than what can be found in Boyer and Moore, or Brotz: they 
generalize by replacing all occurrences of a term by a new variable. My 
solution derives from thinking of generalization and selection of induc- 
tion variables as two facets of the same problem. That is, I generalize 
only those term occurrences which would be suitable to do induction 
upon had they been variables. Grossly speaking, a variable is a suitable 
candidate for induction if it is the first variable which a call -by -needs in- 
terpreter tries to evaluate (unsuccessfully) in the induction goal. With 
this method, I can earmark the first and fourth occurrences of 1 in the 
above problem, and then, generalize only these to a new variable k. 
9Aubin is describing the process by which rules are applied during symbolic evalua- 
tion: the interpreter will consider what it needs to know in order to evaluate the whole 
term, then what it needs to know in order to evaluate that, and so on recursively. This 
is the call -by -need part. 
233 
Symbolic evaluation on the original equation would result in four basic expansions 
of append, as outlined below (the original equation is written in this instance as 
"append(la, append(lb, le)) = append(append(ld, le), li)" to clarify the positions of 
the particular `l' under discussion): 
append(lQ, lb) = cond(lQ, cons (car (lQ), append(cdr(ld), lb)), lb). 
append(lb, lc) = cond(lb, cons (car (lb), append(cdr(lb), lc)), lc). 
append(lc, . . .) = cond(lc, . . . append(cdr(lc), .), .). 
append(append(lc, la), lc) = 
cond(append(le, la), cons(. . . , append(cdr((append(lc, la) , .), lc). 
The ugly expressions are underlined - note that they are the argument to a 
destructor function (in this case, cdr') such that the complex structure containing 
them cannot be broken down by rewrite rules, since there are none applicable. 
It can be seen that append(lc, la)' is not suitable to be generalised as an induction 
variable, since only one of its occurrences would be unpacked by symbolic evalu- 
ation. Aubin stresses this by essentially giving the condition that the induction 
candidate should both be one of the ugly expressions and have resulted from both 
sides of the equality as an ugly expression. In this case the only terms to fit this 
description are I a' and `ld', or `lb' and 'ld'. Aubin chooses the first pair, since these 
appear in recursive argument positions, and hence would be evaluated first by a 
call -by -need interpreter. Hence, the `l' in the first and fourth positions should be 
generalised into a new variable, say k, and then induction should be done on k. 
So the generalisation for the original formula is 
`dldk append(k, append(l, l)) = append(append(k, l), l). 
This is the method Aubin proposes, and the induction does indeed work. My 
treatment of this example has been given in Section 8.4, in which the more general 




I now move on to consider an arithmetic example, namely Vx x +(x +x) = (x +x)+ 
x. This has strong parallels with Example One. In Peano arithmetic, the role of 
lists in the previous example is played by the natural numbers 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... , 
etc. The sucessor function, s, plays the part of the constructor function, cons, and 
the predecessor function, p, plays the part of the destructors, car and cdr, where 
p(s(X)) = X and p(0) = O. 
An analogous function to cond is defined, namely cond2 such that cond2(X, Y, Z) 
represents "if X = 0, then Z, else Y". Thus, addition (with X as the induction 
variable) may be defined as: 
X + Y = cond2(X, s(p(X) + Y), Y) 
So, to return to the example under consideration, symbolic evaluation using the 
definition of plus would result in the following sub -expressions (with positions 
clarified as before): 
xi + . . . = cond2(xi, s(p(xi) + . . .), . . .) 
where i is a, b, or d (or indeed, xi is xd +xe7 but this is ruled out for generalisation 
since it occurs only once). 
The ugly expressions here will hence be xa, xb, and xd, since these are the ar- 
guments of the destructor function which cannot be broken down. Again taking 
the left -most, the first and fourth occurrence of x will be generalised into a new 
variable, y, giving: 
bxb'y y+ (x+x) _ (y+x) +x 
Induction is then done on y. Note that this is essentially the same generalisation as 
given by the simplified version of the guiding method, where structure remaining 
the same in the general proof is renamed. The guiding method for this example 
is given in Subsection 8.1.3. 
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Example Three 
In addition, Aubin describes a technique for generalising terms with a constant in 
an accumulator position, namely his indirect generalisation method (Aubin, 1976), 
which is applicable for recursive formulations of iterative computations such as 
the factorial representation it_f ac(n, m) if n = 0 then m; if n 0 0 then 
it_f ac(p(n), n.m). The local variable m stores the intermediate results of the com- 
putation, ie. it "accumulates" what has been computed so far, and is therefore 
called an accumulator variable. Iterative programs use accumulator variables 
which are usually initialised with specific values (eg. m = 1) before the loop is 
entered. 
However, Aubin's approach requires the use of lemmata, such as f ac(n) = f ac(n).1. 
From Vnfac(n) = it_f ac(n, 1) he replaces f ac(n) by f ac(n).1 and then replaces 1 
(the initialisation of the accumulator) on both sides of the equation by a new vari- 
able m. Thus, he suggests a generalisation of dn`dm f ac(n).m = it _f ac(n, m) from 
Vnfac(n) = it_f ac(n, 1). This is equivalent to inverted application of replacement 
and substitution rule (cf. Subsection 3.1.2). See also (Hesketh, 1991b, P39 -41) for 
an analysis of his method with regard to the rev2 example (cf. Appendix C.3). 
11.3.3 Hesketh's Approach 
Aubin's work has been extended by Jane Hesketh, for example to include the in- 
troduction of accumulators to solve certain generalisations which had hitherto not 
been possible (Hesketh, 1991b). Rippling paths generalise Aubin's notion of recur- 
sion paths (in the sense that other sorts of rewrite rules may be used). Essentially 
the method she advocates is to look at the proof of P(s(x)) and to try to use the 
available axioms to reduce this to P (x); generalisation is directed by the failure of 
heuristics employed in proof planning. Hesketh has extended CLAM to deal with 
generalisation apart in this manner (Hesketh, 199lb), but getting a solution nec- 
essarily involves a fair amount of heuristic knowledge and the testing of alternative 
proposed generalisations. However, she does have access to extra information over 
236 
and above the method proposed in Chapter 8, such as access to a strong sense of 
directionality which the rippling heuristic provides (Hesketh, 1991b). 
11.3.4 Summary 
The main methods of generalisation have been presented in this section. In sum- 
mary, Boyer and Moore only generalise common terms to variables (and are liable 
to overgeneralise), while Aubin concentrates on this (via generalising variables 
apart), plus the generalisation of terms with a constant in an accumulator posi- 
tion. First of all Aubin will try to use induction upon variables in the primary 
recursion position (that is, those on which a function is recursively defined). If 
that fails he will try other recursive argument positions. However, there are many 
possibilities, and so he has to try out some instantiation of variables to give in- 
dividual cases in the hope of finding a counterexample which would refute that 
particular generalisation. Aubin's method is partially theoretically justified - he 
will pick out at least some of the `problem cases', but not necessarily all of them, 
and easily too many, by his method of finding ugly expressions. Hence he has 
to have some method to guess the pairs when he has too many (he chooses the 
left -most ones), and in the case when there are too few, the method fails. If the 
arguments in primary recursion positions fail as induction candidates, as it would 
with the example 
Vx x.(x + x) = (x.x) + (x.x) 
where it would suggest that the first and fourth x's should be renamed, he would 
consider others occurring in recursive argument positions, but not primary recur- 
sive positions, such as the second and sixth x in the above equation. However, 
the number of combinations could grow fairly quickly, and so he used a program 
which instantiated some values for the variables and tested them in order to detect 
false generalisations rapidly. Hence his approach is not terribly rigorous, does not 
always work, and moreover involves a fair amount of trial and error. His method is 
a very `ad hoc' approach, and a theoretical one with a higher success rate would be 
preferable. In particular, if a constructor such as a successor function appears in 
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Methods Types of Generalisation 
vars apart terms to vars constants adding accumulators 












Table 11 -1: Scope of Applicability of Generalisation Methods 
an original goal, together with individual variables, Aubin's method may result in 
over -generalisation or indeed no solution at all. Jane Hesketh's approach succeeds 
in many cases, is more flexible than Aubin's, and does not suffer from the same 
problems, but nevertheless obtaining a solution often involves trying out several 
alternative possibilities. 
Table 11 -1 gives an overview of the types of generalisation targetted by the various 
methods. A comparison of the methods outlined in this section and the generali- 
sation method suggested in Chapter 8 will be given in the following section. 
11.4 Comparison of Different Generalisation Meth- 
ods 
In this section various examples are considered with reference to the generalisation 
methods discussed above, and an overview of the guiding method is given. 
11.4.1 Worked Examples 
Generalisation of Terms to Variables: x + s(x) = s(x) + x. 
Would Aubin's method be able to produce a correct solution for an example which 
included a successor function in the original equation, or would he over -generalise? 
Let us consider the example above, for which a correct solution was provided by 
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the `w- guiding' method. Rewriting the original equation xa + s(xb) = s(x,) + xd 
by means of the definition for plus, we have 
s(p(a) + s(xb)) = ... 
and 
= s(p(s(xc)) + xd) 
The latter reduces to s(x + x) using the relevant axiom, and so there is no trapped 
ugly expression from the right hand side of the equation. There is an ugly ex- 
pression produced on the left hand side, namely x. However, Aubin's method 
will not produce a solution here, because there is an ugly expression only on one 
side of the equation. In general, Aubin is unable to generalise expressions which 
would require a generalisation of a variable which is present in the equation both 
individually and as an argument to a function (giving a term), for example when 
x and s(x) both need to be generalised to y and s(y), in order to do induction on 
y. 
Note that NQTHM would adopt the following strategy for this example: it would 
look for common subexpressions, and hence replace s(x) by y on both sides of the 
equation, giving the commutativity of plus as the goal to be proved. This would be 
a valid approach, but it might well be that insufficient axioms were available to be 
able to prove the commutativity of plus; this is a more general generalisation, and 
so this method is liable to overgeneralise. Moreover, the generalisation x +y = y +x 
does not give the solution immediately, as shown below - the tree requires another 
induction in order to close. 
Complete 
doesn't close 






x+z=z+xf x+s(x)=s(x)+x hx+z=z+x 
cut(x + z = z + x) 
Fx +s(x)= s(x) +x 
Hence, the guiding method might be considered a more direct approach, and the 
suggested cut formula of x + s(y) = s(x) + y a preferable one (since it works with 
one induction). 
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Jane Hesketh's approach would label all the x occurrences and hence the wave - 
fronts (ie. structure given by rewrite rules - see (Hesketh, 1991b)) around them as 
potentially changeable, but it would be the second and fourth occurrences which 
would be blocked. The generalisation suggested probably would also be x +s(y) = 
s(x) +y, since this would be the direct generalisation of the blocked parts, remem- 
bering that it would be starting from the failure of s(x + s(s(x))) = s(x + s(x)), 
and would be seeking to clear the second and fourth blocked wavefronts. 
Generalisation Apart: x. (x + x) = x.x + x.x 
The guiding method for generalisation of this example has been considered in 
Subsection 8.5.1, and carries through. Aubin is able to produce a correct solution 
after an incorrect one (for further details of the proof, see (Aubin, 1975, Appendix 
3)), but this involves a fair amount of trial and error. Jane Hesketh has tried to 
improve upon his attempt, but could not get the example to work easily either. 
See however (Hesketh, 1991a) for a partial solution to Vx x. (x + x) = x.x + x.x, 
inspired by the information provided by the failed method of reduction of P(s(x)) 
to P(x). Essentially the problem with the latter approach is that guesswork, 
heuristics and trial and error must be involved to a certain extent in finding a 
solution. 
Next, a further, more complicated, example, namely x 0 --> p(x) + s(s(x)) = 
s(x) + x, will be considered in detail below, and a comparison of the various 
methods available will be given. 
Destructor Terms: x 0 -f p(x) + s(s(x)) = s(x) + x 
In this section we compare and contrast the various methods of generalisation 
which might be expected to tackle a proof such as x 0 -+ p(x) + s(s(x)) = 
s(x) + x. This example is an interesting one due to the fact that its proof must 
involve at least one cut, that it is a conditional proposition and further, that both 
constructor and destructor functions are involved. This poses problems for the 
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major generalisation methods. The general proof, and subsequent cut formula 
suggested by the `guiding method' is given above in Subsection 8.1.5. 
The Boyer -Moore Theorem Prover 
The Boyer -Moore Theorem Prover fails when asked to prove this particular exam- 
ple, using only the recursion equations (cf. 6.1, 6.2, 8.11 and 8.12). The transcript 
returned by the theorem prover (NQTHM) is given in Appendix D. Note that 
NQTHM uses a lemma to replace X by SUC Y in order to remove PRED, but 
then detects looping, in the sense of the new equation being a degenerate form of 
the original one. It then fails, as there is nothing to induct upon. In other words, 
we have the reduction from 
x 0 p(x) + s(s(x)) = s(x) + x 
to: 
x 0 -* p(x) + s(s(x)) = s(s(p(x) + x)) 
and then setting x = s(z) to eliminate p(x), to give 
z + s(s(s(z))) = s(s(z + s(z))) 
which is no advance on the original. 
In fact, straightforward generalisation of common subexpressions would be ex- 
pected to suggest a cut formula of Vx x 0 -} p(x) + s(z) = z + x. However, 
induction on x fails for this expression, too. A simplified form of this (partial) 
proof which eliminates the conditions and includes only the step part of the proof 
is given below: 
F r + s(s(t)) = s(r + s(t)) 
r + s(t) = t + s(r) H r + s(s(t)) = s(t + s(r)) 
hyp 
6.2 




dz r 00 -*pH + s(z) = z + r H p(s(r)) + s(z) = z + s(r) 
ind(x) 
dxbzx 0 p(x)+s(z)=z+x 
Hence the CLAM system is not able to provide a solution to this problem either. 
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Aubin 
By Aubin's method, using the definition 
one obtains 
and 
X + Y = cond2(X, s(p(X) +Y),Y)10 
s(p(p(x)) + s(s(x))) = ... 
... = s(p(s(x)) + x) 
The ugly expressions are underlined. The second expression reduces to ... = 
s(x +x), and so there is no ugly expression for the right hand side of the equation. 
Aubin's method requires that there should be the same ugly expression on each 
side of the equation before generalisation may take place, and hence his method 
fails. 
The destructor would not cause a problem for Jane Hesketh's method, because 
her technique would just use whatever recursion equations were available. The 
method would start by experimenting with eliminating the blocked wavefronts; 
due to the presence of axiom 8.12, the p(x) would be left and the second and 
fourth occurrences of x generalised to y, thus providing the generalisation x 0 
0 -+ p(x) + s(s(y)) = s(x) + y. 
Addition of Accumulators: Vl. len(rev(l)) = len(l) 
Note that this can also be proven using weak fertilisation followed by a generali- 
sation (NQTHM -style), as shown in Appendix C.1. 
The general proof is as follows: 
10Note that this definition is equivalent to the definitions 0 + y = y (ie. 6.1) and 
s(z) + y = s(p(s(z)) + y), so by using 8.12 we obtain, s(z) + y = s(z + y), (ie. 6.2). 
Hence this definition, plus 8.11 and 8.12, is equivalent to the axioms 6.1, 6.2, 8.11 and 
8.12 above. (cond2(X,Y,Z) represents "if X =O, then Z, else Y ".) 
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len(rev(G(n))) = 
len(rev(xs_1(0) :: G(n - 1)) = 
len(rev(G(n - 1)) <> xsn_1(p) :: nil) = 
len(G(n)) 
len(xs_l(p) :: G(n - 1)) 
by G def 
.. 
by 8.18, 8.21 
len(rev(xs_2(0) :: G(n - 2)) <> se.-.1(0) :: nil) = 
by G def 
len((rev(xo :: G(0)) <> :: nil) <> ...xs_l(p) 
len(xo :: nil <> xs(p) :: nil <> ... <> xs . -1 (0) 
len(xo :: xs(p) ::...:: xs -1(p) 
similarly, n times 
:: nil) 
:: nil) 
by 8.21, 8.13, 8.14 
:: nil) = len(xs_1(0) :: xp :: nil) 
sn(0) = sn(0) 
by 8.18 
EQUALITY 
R(s(n)) - len(rev(.C(s(n))) = len(r(s(n))) 
and 
R'(n) - len(rev(r(n)) <> xsn(o) :: nil) = len(xsn(o) :: G(n)) 
= len((xsn(o) :: nil) <> .C(n)) 
R(0) - len(((rev(G(0)) <> (x0 :: nil)) <> xs(o) :: nil) <> ... <> xsn -1(0) :: nil) 
= len(xsn -1(o) ....... G(0)) 
ie. len(rev(r(0))) <> (x0 :: xs(o) ::... xsn -1(o) :: nil) 
= len(rev(xo :: xs(o) ::...:: xsn -1(0)) <> G(0)) 
This suggests the generalisation 
len(rev(l) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> 1) 
Note the difference between this suggestion provided by the guiding method, and 
the suggestion which would be obtainable by Hesketh's method' (Hesketh, 1991b) 
of: 
len(rev(l) <> a) = len(a <> l) 
The generalisation suggested by the guiding method is preferable, as it reveals 
more structure, and may be proved using only one induction, rather than two, as 
shown in Appendix C.1. 
11This example is not actually considered by Jane Hesketh, but this is the generalisa- 
tion which it would produce. 
243 
Further Examples: Vx even(x + x); x. (y.0) = y.(y.0) 
There are also examples which demonstrate how the guiding method may pro- 
vide information which other methods do not: cf. the even(x + x) example in 
Section 9.1. The Boyer -Moore strategy does not apply here. Obvious choices for 
the cut formula here would result in circularity or a non -theorem, but the general 
proof gives some clues as to what is happening, and does not suggest an incorrect 
cut formula. Indeed, the cut formula which is suggested is that of even(2.y) (cf. 
Section 9.1). This is a useful improvement on the alternative methods. Other such 
examples are discussed in Subsection 8.1.5. Another example which illustrates the 
advantages of the proposed method of generalisation has been presented in Sec- 
tion 9.3. A comparison of the approaches relating to the generalisation of examples 
involving lists has already been given in Subsection 8.2.2. 
For the example x.(y.0) = y.(y.0), NQTHM gets lost in an infinite loop. Ba- 
sically, what happens is that an induction on x is chosen. The induction hy- 
pothesis takes the form x. (y.0) = y.(y.0) while the induction conclusion takes 
the form s(x).(y.0) = y.(y.0) (note that the NQTHM destructor -style proof has 
here been converted into constructor style). Performing a rewrite application on 
the conclusion gives: (x. (y.0)) + (y.0) = y.(y.0) and fertilisation (left- right) gives 
(y.(y.0)) + (y.0) = y.(y.0). Then the fatal generalisation (namely substituting z 
for y.0) is performed, to give: (y.z) + z = y.z. This process is repeated infinitely. 
The guiding method is not able to provide a cut formula, but a general proof is 
given. Such a pattern may be exploited by the user to suggest a cut formula, even 
though the generalisation algorithm is not sophisticated enough to do this. 
By working through the examples above, hopefully it has been demonstrated that 
there is a justification for the use of this method, at the very least for a particular 
type of example. Note that the generalisation method suggested in Chapter 8 
may still be useful experimentally even if it breaks down, to a greater extent than 
any of the alternative methods, and that it also provides a uniform approach for 
generalisation. 
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Methods Selection of Types of Example 
x. (x + x) = x.x + x.x (x + x) + x = x + (x + x) 





x.(y + y) = x.y + x.y 
x.(y + y) = x.y + x.y 
x.(y + z) = x.y + x.z 
1. 
2. 
y + x = x + y 
(x + y) + y = x + (y + y) 
(x + y) + y = x + (y + y) 
(x + y) + z = x + (y + z) 
x + s(x) = s(x) + x even(x + x) 




x + y = y + x 
fail 
x + s(y) = s(x) + y 






x 0 0 -* p(x) + s(s(y)) = s(x) + y rotate(len(l), l) =1 






x 0 0 -> p(x) + s(s(y)) = s(x) + y 




rotate(len(l), l <> a) 
rotate(len(l), l <> a) 
rev2(l, nil) = rev(l) x.(y.0) = y.(y.0) 





rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a 
rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a 




general proof only 6. 
1. Solution achieved by testing various possibilities after initial failure of 
method. 
2. Solution achieved by pruning search space. 
3. Probable result (this example was not considered in (Hesketh, 1991b)). 
4. Generalisation algorithm fails, but this cut formula is `suggested' from the 
general proof. 
5. Probable result (this example was not considered in (Hesketh, 1991b)). 
6. Generalisation algorithm fails, but user might be able to suggest a generali- 
sation from the general proof. 
Table 11 -2: Cut Formulae Suggested Using Different Generalisation Methods 
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11.4.2 Overview of the Guiding Method 
The structure of a proof according to given defining recursion equations is revealed 
by the general proof, and it is not necessary to store or prove large numbers of 
sub -lemmata as Boyer and Moore do. The general proof may be seen as revealing 
the structure of the proof. The structure which remains constant throughout the 
general proof will not be a candidate for providing induction variables, and more 
specifically, the use of explanation -based generalisation from the general proof will 
produce the most general generalisation of the original expression which does not 
involve additional structure. The problem with which Aubin is faced, namely 
candidates for induction appearing on one side only of the equation, will not 
occur, and so this will not result in a failure of the method. Formal justification 
for the claim that the cut formula suggested will be a correct one may be provided 
by standard explanation -based generalisation arguments, or else the linearisation 
comparison from Section 8.3 in the case when additional structure (in the form of 
the introduction of accumulators) is involved. 
11.4.3 What are the Types of Generalisation for which 
the Guiding Method is Advantageous? 
The type of examples for which the guiding method works and others prob- 
ably do not are examples which are not solved simply by replacing similar 
terms on each side, and in which a constructor such as a successor function 
appears in an original goal, together with individual variables (and particu- 
larly if destructor functions are also involved) eg. x O -* p(x) + s(s(x)) = 
x + s(x). 
More speculative examples, such as those given in Chapter 9. On such 
examples, if all existing methods of generalisation fail, at least the guiding 
method does provide some helpful information for the user. 
Examples involving added structure such as a on one side of the equation, 
and rev (a) on the other (cf. accumulator examples) . 
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See Table 11 -2 for a comparison of how the various methods fare with regard to 
particular examples, and Table 11 -1 for a comparative analysis of the generalisa- 
tion methods considered in this chapter. 
11.5 Conclusions 
In the theorem -proving community, there is much current interest in generali- 
sation. The almost universal approach has been to consider the goal and try 
to generalise it, but very little has been done from the viewpoint of looking at 
individual proofs and generalising these. As shown in this chapter, this latter 
approach has many advantages and can work when other methods do not. The 
proposed guiding method provides a uniform approach which captures in many 
cases what the alternative methods can do (in some cases with less work), plus it 
works on examples on which they fail. It does not have to check extra criteria, 
nor do model -checking on candidate generalisations, and there is less likelihood of 
overgeneralisation to a non -theorem. 
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Chapter 12 
Conclusions and Further Work 
In this chapter suggestions for further work are given, together with a summary 
of useful contributions achieved by means of the work described in the thesis. 
12.1 Further Work 
Suggested further work divides into three main categories: an extension of the 
implementation of arithmetic with the w -rule; incorporation with existing work 
within the field of theorem -proving; and thirdly, an extension of the generalisa- 
tion procedure suggested in Chapter 8, both implementationally and theoretically. 
These extensions will be further discussed below. 
12.1.1 Implementation of PAS,, 
There are several ways in which the implementation of PA,,, could be extended. 
Although the rules and axioms of the system are implemented, the implementation 
given could be extended, say to encompass giving ordinal assignments to arithmeti- 
cal derivations, and therefore bounds on lengths of proofs (in the manner indicated 
in, say (Buchholz & Wainer, 1987)). In addition, further automation within this 
system could be provided, either by means of automatic completion of proofs (by 
writing or interfacing with an existing system such as CLAM) or by means of writ- 
ing programs which prove various properties within this system. Examples of the 
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latter might be implementation of cut elimination for PAS,,, for which the foun- 
dational work has already been carried out as mentioned in Subsection 2.3.5 (and 
discussed in more detail in (Baker, 1990)), or a conversion of proofs in PAS,, to 
proofs in HA,,, (in an analogous manner to the conversion of classical proofs in 
PA to constructive proofs in HA presented in (Baker, 1989)). 
12.1.2 Wider Use of the System 
It would also be of benefit to reimplement those parts of the implementation which 
would prove useful for other users (such as some of the generalisation heuristics) 
within a more widely used system, in order to incorporate such ideas with current 
work in other areas. 
My present work is implemented on a system with very few users, as the main 
concern was the results, rather than the system. Yet a tactic for generalisation 
which worked in cases when others did not might be useful to many people in 
automated deduction. Therefore, it would make sense to implement this using a 
more popular theorem -prover. This would result in a wider justification for the 
work, in that it would provide a useful tool for other people engaged in automated 
reasoning. Some of the latter would be involved in practical applications of formal 
methods, such as program and hardware synthesis. Research could be carried out 
within a generic proof development environment such as Isabelle (Paulson, 1986), 
which would provide a sophisticated environment for developing theorem proving 
strategies. 
In addition, the link between inductionless induction and the generalisation ap- 
proach presented in this thesis could be further investigated, for Muffy Thomas's 
work in finding similarities in critical pairs forms an analogue of w- proofs (see 
Subsection 3.2.4). An analysis of inductive completion with respect to rippling 
may be found in (Barnett et al, 1992), but there is scope for such a comparison to 
be further elucidated, although at present it is not at all obvious how this may be 
done. 
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12.1.3 Extension of Generalisation Method 
The extension of the generalisation work described in Chapters 8 and 9 falls into 
the two main categories of extending the theory suggested therein, and extending 
the implementation which has already been carried out. 
It is hoped that by using an approach which is substantially different from previ- 
ous work in this field, cut formulae might be suggested which hitherto were not 
possible by existing methods. The work described in this thesis justifies this claim, 
especially within the domains of natural numbers and lists. However, the approach 
applies more generally to other inductively defined datatypes. The wider appli- 
cation of this approach would provide a better generalisation tactic, which would 
be of benefit to other people using theorem -proving systems, regardless of their 
motive in doing so. Hence this work would have repercussions in other, diverse 
fields. 
Further work could cover two main issues: 
The further development of a theory of validation of general proofs, which 
would encompass many different domains. 
The mechanised application of this theory to performing generalisations via 
a suitable automated deduction formalism. In fact, one could extend a gen- 
eral purpose theorem prover to include a generalisation tactic. Such an 
implementation will be of use: 
- to people involved in automated theorem -proving, particularly if the 
cut elimination theorem does not hold for the logical system in which 
they are working. 
- as a basis for further investigation of the merits of this method of 
generalisation as opposed to other methods, and also of the generalised 
theory proposed. 
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- as a basis for a co- operative theorem -proving environment, in order 
to exploit useful information given by the general proof whenever the 
generalisation algorithm fails. 
These issues are considered below. 
New Systems 
The work described in the thesis concerns mainly the domains of natural numbers 
and lists. A further canonical example to consider would be that of (binary) 
trees. It would be interesting to extend the generalisation algorithm and heuristics 
described in Chapter 8 to arbitrary datatypes. It would be hoped that by looking 
at many different types of domains and systems, a general theory could be seen 
to emerge, and that this could be encapsulated in the implementation, which 
should be generic in this sense. The approach would be taken of automatically 
generating the general representation of an object of a certain type from the system 
definitions, and then automatically producing a general proof and using this to 
guide proofs in the system. 
It would be very interesting and worthwhile to develop this approach and apply 
it to a much broader range of domains, and then to implement this work. The 
result would be a theorem -prover which would succeed in producing correct gen- 
eralisations in certain cases when others cannot, and might well be faster, more 
direct and involve less search space. As such it would prove useful for other people 
involved in theorem -proving, quite apart from any theoretical results produced 
from such an investigation. 
Development of a Theory of General Proofs 
The more general question addressed by this work may be described as follows: 
supposing the objects of a data -type may be enumerated as 01, 02, 03, ..., we 
wish to produce a proof of the general case P(07.), in order to prove Vx P(x). 
The step from the individual proofs P(01), P(02), etc. to the general proof via 
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the w -rule has analogies across various data structures. A useful generalisation 
for theorem -proving would facilitate induction proofs in the sense of producing a 
suitable generalisation P' of P such that P' could be proved by induction. Thus, 
the whole process which is proposed may be regarded as a new way of directing 
search for inductive proofs. Note also that some of the individual proofs may 
involve the use of induction, while in other systems they may also involve use of 
the cut rule. 
Further Types of Generalisation 
Most of the examples already considered in the thesis involve only generalisation 
apart, or else generalisation of common subexpressions; in these cases the method 
works fairly straightforwardly. It would be desirable to clarify the algorithm for 
the cases considered in Chapter 9, which "suggest" generalisations, and extend it 
to other types of generalisation such as generalisation of constants to variables (cf. 
Section 9.2), and in addition to extend the method to cover existential statements 
within constructive arithmetic, for which the general proofs would provide a sum- 
mary of their computational content. It is envisaged that in such cases a useful 
improvement on current methods could be produced. 
Extension of the Generalisation Implementation 
Alterations to the implementation of the generalisation method proposed could be 
the automation of the generalisation methods suggested for lists, and the imple- 
mentation of conditional rewrite rules. Longer -term goals would be automation of 
the generalisation method applied to other datatypes, as discussed above. 
12.2 Conclusions 
The following comprises a summary of the contribution of the thesis: 
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12.2.1 PA,, 
In this section the value and rôle of the implemented system PA, is assessed, 
together with the related contributions to proof theory. 
With the goal of automatic derivation of proofs within some formalisation of arith- 
metic in mind, a version of arithmetic with the w -rule has been developed that is 
suitable for use in automated reasoning. It has been put into a form in which it 
could be implemented, thereby realising the potential of the w -rule in a computa- 
tional setting. The motivation for doing this is given in Section 2.7. 
Hence, it is possible to carry out automated theorem -proving in the system of 
arithmetic with a form of the w -rule. This is a system which other people might 
use for doing proofs (ie. a proof environment). It is possible also to use automation 
to implement metatheorems within this representation of arithmetic, such as cut 
elimination. Moreover, certain expressions not provable in the normal formalisa- 
tion of arithmetic without cut (or indeed not provable in PA itself) are provable 
in this system (cf. Subsection 7.2.2). 
When a general proof is available, or proofs of instances can be found easily, it 
may be easier to use this approach than to search directly for a proof in PA. 
Furthermore, in practice there is no problem of generalisation in this system. 
In addition, there are the broader repercussions of these points with respect to 
the contribution to automated deduction (see Section 1.2), by which the work 
constitutes an aid to automated deduction. 
12.2.2 Generalisation 
In the following discussion the contribution of the thesis in the field of generalisa- 
tion is considered. 
An application of implementation of the system of arithmetic with the w -rule is 
a new method of generalisation by means of "guiding proofs" (see Chapters 8 
and 9), which sometimes succeeds when other methods fail. This is especially 
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important as generalisation is a major theorem -proving problem (cf. Section 3.1). 
Moreover, by means of the method described in Chapter 8 which involves use of 
explanation -based generalisation in a new domain, the most general generalisation 
of an expression is achieved, in a uniform manner; Jane Hesketh writes in her thesis 
that this has not been done before (Hesketh, 1991b, P271) - for her generalisation 
method 
"The generalisation from 
will be found as 
not 
bx.x + (x + x) = (x + x) + x 
b'xdy.x + (y + y) = (x + y) + y 
VxVyVz.x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z 
but I know of no theorem prover that can find this last generalisation 
in a principled way, ie. other than with just trial and error." 
By the method suggested in Chapter 8, the generalisations are found by recognising 
patterns, and a uniform approach for generalisation is provided. 
Note also how if an u -proof is provided, even without a generalisation being sug- 
gested, something has still been achieved, in the sense that a pattern might still 
emerge for the user. Thus the method may still be useful within a co- operative en- 
vironment if it breaks down (as shown by the examples considered in Chapter 9). 
This contrasts with alternative methods of generalisation, which do not provide 
much information if they fail. Moreover, because the suggested method explicitly 
exploits general patterns, it has a higher -level structure and thus greater potential 
for extension than other more special -purpose approaches. 
This method of generalisation may be automated (and has been for simple arith- 
metic examples - see Appendix E.8.3). The method works for examples for which 
others do, plus some new examples (see Section 11.4). There is also the possibility 
of extending it to arbitrary datatypes (Section 8.2). 
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12.2.3 Implementation 
The following have been carried out: 
implementation of a system of arithmetic with the w -rule, which involves 
inductive theorem proving. This work has been implemented in a way which 
allows interaction with the user and the construction of a primitive recursive 
general proof. 
implementation of the generalisation method suggested in Chapter 8 for 
simple arithmetical cases, by means of the automatic suggestion of an ap- 
propriate cut formula. 
12.2.4 Final Conclusions 
A representation of arithmetic with the w -rule has been proposed, and imple- 
mented in a way which allows interaction with the user, and the construction and 
manipulation of an effective (ie. primitive recursive) general proof. When a general 
proof is available, or proofs of instances can be found easily, it may be easier to 
use this approach than to search directly for a proof in PA. Furthermore, a new, 
uniform approach to generalisation is proposed by means of the w -proof "guiding ". 
a proof in PA, which may succeed in providing a valid proof in PA when other 
methods of generalisation fail. This general approach works for theories other than 
arithmetic and logics other than a sequent version of the predicate calculus, and 
may rather be regarded as suggesting a general framework. So long as a general 
procedure for constructing a proof for each individual of a sort is specified, uni- 
versal statements about objects of the sort could be proved. Thus it appears that 
the approach described in this thesis may be an aid to automated deduction, and 
provides a mechanism for guiding proofs in more conventional systems. 
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The following provides a brief introduction to Gentzen's Sequent Calculus 
(Gentzen, 1969), and to the syntax of Seldonl. This appendix has been included 
in order to present a grounding in the logic used in the overall implementation, 
and because it is necessary to be familiar with the sequent calculus in order to 
understand the ideas involved in the thesis. 
A.1 Syntax 
The calculus consists of the normal syntax for predicate calculus, namely vari- 
ables, constant symbols, functions and well- formed formulae built up from atomic 
propositions, the connectives V, A, -3, -I and the quantifiers V, 3. See Section 4.1 
for further details. 
A.2 Sequents 
A sequent is written in Gentzen's system as 
F1i...,Fn F- G1,...,Gm 
where FZ, G; are well- formed formulae. This corresponds to 
{F1 n...AFn} -+ {G1V...VGm }. 
If, as Gentzen did, finite lists of formulae are used (as opposed to the alternative 
of using sets) then structural rules are needed to permute and contract formulae 
in the finite lists.2 In the case of intuitionistic sequent calculus (and the Seldon 
1Seldon is the system in which implementation is carried out; for further details see 
Section 10.2. 
2However, the contraction rule á r C raises the question of assumption classes: see 
(Zucker, 1974) for further details. 
i 
system) multiple conclusions are not allowed. In either case, any sequent having 
the same formula on both sides of the entailment operator, H, is always true. 
That is to say that F, A H A is called an axiom as it is obviously not falsifiable. A 
sequent r H A is falsifiable if one can made all the members of r true and all the 
members of A false. 
The left -hand side is referred to as the antecedent, and the right -hand side as 
the succedent - they correspond to assumptions and conclusions respectively. If 
the antecedent is empty, that corresponds to the succedent being true, and if the 
succedent is empty, to the antecedent being false. (However, if both antecedent 
and succedent are empty, the sequent is false). 
The classical representation is in fact equivalent to the intuitionistic representation,3 
together with the law of excluded middle (I- A V -.A). This fact is exploited 
within Seldon to allow representation of both classical and intuitionistic theories 
of arithmetic.4 
A.3 Prooftrees 
Deduction trees are used for investigating proofs. At the bottom is the sequent 
to be proved, and the tree is developed upwards using the inference rules given in 
Table A -1, together with structural rules which allow re- ordering or duplication 
of formulae. The rules given are those for intuitionistic logic, and are obtained 
from Gentzen's classical sequent rules by restriction to a single consequent. 
In each case, the sequent above the line is the premise and that below the line 
is the conclusion. Since these rules (with the exception of the cut rule) reduce 
the number of connectives when applied backwards, each branch of the proof will 
terminate eventually. Hence, a deduction tree is either a sequent which cannot 
be expanded further by any inference rule, or a tree grown from a sequent by the 
rules of inference to leaves which cannot be expanded further. It is a prooftree if 
all its leaves are axioms. 
An example of a prooftree is given below - it demonstrates the validity of 
P,P -*QhQ. 
axiom axiom 
g:Pl - P h:Q, g:PE-Q 
limp(f) g:P, f :P---->QHQ 
3r varies over lists of formulae. 
4See Section 10.2. 
ii 
Rule Rulename Rule Rulename 
lthin(f) rthin r , f AC PG 




land(f) FHA FHB rand f: AAB ,r1--C 11-AAB 
A,rl-C B,ri-C r FHA ror(left) f :AvB,rl-C 11-AvB 
ri-A I' ,A1--C cut rB ror(right) ri-C rl-AvB 




r(a) runi(a) f :b'x(x),r-C 
t an arbitrary term 
rf-b'x4)(x) 
a not in lower sequent 
4)(a),rf-C 
lexi(f a) , 
11-43,(t) 
rexi(t) f :]x(x),rl-c 
a not in lower sequent 
rl-3x(x) 
t an arbitrary term 
Table A -1: The Rules of Sequent Calculus in the Form Used by Seldon 
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Appendix B 
Useful Commands in Seldon /Oyster 
B.1 Start -up Commands /Commands for Travers- 
ing Tree 
oyster to start Oyster 
seldon to start Seldon 
demo to start CORE 
up go up one node in the tree 
down go down one node in the tree 
down(N) go to the Nth subgoal 
top go to the top of the prooftree 
next go to the next open subgoal 
iv 
B.2 Commands for Manipulating Proofs /Writing 
Tactics 
load_thm(referencename, savedname) to load a saved theorem 
create_thm(referencename, user) plus typing sequent after colon given to load 
a new theorem 
select(referencename) selects the particular theorem one wishes to work with 
save_thm(referencename, savedname) saves the current state of a proof 
snapshot(savedname) produces a readable version of the prooftree below the 
current node 
status(S) instantiates S to the status of the current goal: partial, complete or 
incomplete 
goal(G) instantiates G to the current goal 
hypothesis(H) instantiates H to a hypothesis: this may be used to generate 
hypotheses one by one, or to find one that matches some pattern 
hyp_list (X) instantiates X to the list of hypotheses of the current node 
v 
B.3 The Specification of Positions of Subterms 
Within a Formula 
It is necessary to tackle the problem of specification of positions of subterms within 
a formula in order to be able to store the exact subexpression to which a rewrite 
rule is to be applied. Fortunately, there is a provision for this within the CLAM 
system, namely by the use of the predicate "exp_at" . Information about the 
position of a sub -formula is included in the general proof representation, using 
this predicate. 
The latter is of the form `exp_at( +Exp, ?Pos, ?SubExp)'. The expression Exp con- 
tains a subexpression SubExp at position Pos. Positions are lists of integers repre- 
senting tree -coordinates in the syntax -tree of the expression, but in reverse order. 
Coordinate 0 represents the function symbol of an expression. One may find the 
SubExp at a given Pos, or alternatively find the Pos of a given SubExp. 
The following Prolog transcript illustrates use of the predicate. 
I ?- exp_at(f(g(2,x),3),X,Y). 
X = [] , Y = f (g(2,x) ,3) ; 
X = [2], Y = 3 ; 
X = [1] , Y = g(2,x) ; 
X = [0] , Y = f ; 
X = [2,1], Y = x ; 
X = [1,1], Y = 2 ; 
X = 
no 
[0,1], Y = g ; 
vi 
Appendix C 
Comparison of List Proofs: Summary 
This appendix summarises and compares the main alternative approaches towards 
the proof of various list examples which involve accumulators. 
C.1 b'l len(rev(l)) = len(l) 
Proof by induction: 
Requires rev(T) to be generalised to U, as shown below. The following is NQTHM's 
method: 
len(rev(H :: T)) = len(H :: T) 
len(rev(T) <> (H :: nil)) = len(H :: T) = s(len(T)) = s(len(rev(T))) by hyp 
Note that the general proof carries on from this stage, working on the structure 
of T. 
Generalise to: len(U <> (H :: nil)) = s(len(U)). 
Use induction on U. len((V :: U) <> (H :: nil)) = s(len(V :: U)) 
len(V :: (U <> (H :: nil))) = s(s(len(U))) 
s(len(U <> (H :: nil))) = s(s(len(U))) 
s(s(len(U))) = s(s(len(U))) by hyp 
(plus base cases) 
First Generalisation: 
Generalisation of this example has as far as I know not been carried out by anyone 
else's generalisation method, although the generalisation provided by J. Hesketh's 
method, as given in (Hesketh, 1991b), if obtained, would be Val len(rev(l) <> 
a) = len(a <> l), which may be proved using two inductions, plus C.1, where the 
latter is: 
(X <> Y) <> Z = X <> (Y <> Z) (C.1) 
(cf. Section 8.6 for a discussion of the relevance of the associativity of append in 
these proofs). The induction is as follows: 
Va' len(rev(V) <> a') = len(a' <> V) I- len(rev(U :: V) <> a) = len(a <> U :: V) 
ie.... I- len((rev(V) <> (U :: nil)) <> a) = len(a <> (U :: V)) 
ie.... F- len((rev(V)) <> ((U :: nil) <> a)) = len(a <> (U :: V)) by C.1 
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f- len(((U :: nil) <> a) <> V) = .. . by hyp 
I- len(U :: a <> V) = len(a <> (U :: V)) 
s(len(a <> V)) = len(a <> (U :: V)) 
Induction on a (plus base cases) gives: - 
s(len(b :: a <> V)) = len(b :: a <> (U :: V)) 
s(s(len(a <> V))) = s(len(a <> (U :: V))) = s(s(len(a <> V))) by hyp 
Second Generalisation: 
This generalisation is obtained using the `guiding method', as shown above, and 
is dal len(rev(l) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> l). It may be proved using only one 
induction, plus C.1. (Note that this the the generalisation suggested by the general 
proof). 
Va' len(rev(V) <> a') = len(rev(a') <> V) F- len(rev(U :: V) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> 
U:: V) 
ie.... f- len(rev(V) <> (U :: nil)) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> (U :: V)) 
ie.... I- len(rev(V) <> ((U :: nil) <> a)) = len(rev(a) <> (U :: V)) (by C.1) 
ie.... H len(rev((U :: nil) <> a) <> rev(V)) = ... (by HYP) 
ie.... I- len(rev((U :: a) <> V)) = len(rev(a) <> (U :: V)) 
ie.... I- len((rev(a) <> (U :: nil)) <> V) = .. . 
ie.... I- len(rev(a) <> ((U :: nil) <> V)) = len(rev(a) <> (U :: V)) (by C.1) 
ie.... I- len(rev(a) <> U :: V) = len(rev(a) <> U :: V) 
So, this is a better generalisation since it requires only one induction. 
General Proof of Original Goal: 
P(s(n)) does not reduce to P(n), but the general proof carries through. Compare 
the general proof with the (failed) proof by induction. 
P(s(n)) - len(rev(G(s(n)))) = len(G(s(n))) (part of GP) 
len(rev(xsn(o) :: G(n))) = len(xsn(o) :: G(n)) 
len((rev(r(n)) <> (xsn(o) :: nil)) = len((xsn(o) :: nil) <> G(n)) 
which is not equivalent to P(n). 
General Proof of Generalised Goal: 
Q(s(n)) - len(rev(G(s(n))) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> (G(s(n)))) 
len(rev(xsn(o) :: G(n)), .a) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) 
len((rev(G(n)) <> (xsn(o) :: nil)) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) 
len(rev(G(n)) <> ((xsn(o) :: nil) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) (by C.1) 
len(rev(G(n)) <> (xsn(o) :: a)) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn /o\ :: G(n))) 
Q(n) 
if len(rev(xsn(o) :: a) <> G(n)) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) 
ie. if len((rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: nil)) <> G(n)) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) 
ie. if len(rev(a) <> ((xsn(o) :: nil) <> G(n))) (by C.1) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn/o) 
G(n))) 
ie. if len(rev(a) <> (x sr, (o) :: G(n))) = len(rev(a) <> (xsn(o) :: G(n))) (OK) 
Q (s (n)) does reduce to Q (n) (but one must force this reduction, in the sense that 
it is necessary to match the right hand side of the equation with the desired form, 
ie. to check that rev(xsn(o) :: a) <> G(n) rev(a) <> sn(o) :: G(n)). Thus, we 
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may have a linear general proof of the form 
bb len(rev(r(n)) <> b) = len(rev(b) <> G(n)) - Q(n) 
Va len(rev(G(s(n))) <> a) = len(rev(a) <> G(s(n))) - Q(s(n)) 
In fact, b = xsn.(0) :: a. Since there is a linear form, induction will work on Q, 
which is the case. This process of linearisation may be thought of as the search 
for an inductive proof. 
Note that in this example, the proof by induction proceeds when blocked by gen- 
eralisation of rev(T) to U, and then induction on U. This sort of approach is not 
available for many examples. The general proof proceeds by breaking down the 
structure of T, by means of the representation of members of a type, which allows 
additional rewrite rules to be applied. 
C.2 bl rotate(len(l), l) = l 
Proof by induction: 
This is blocked. 
rotate(len(T),T) = T I- rotate(len(H :: T), H :: T) = H :: T 
ie. . . . I- rotate(s(len(T)), H :: T) = H :: T 
ie. . rotate(len(T),T <> (H :: nil)) = H :: T 
BLOCKED 
Note that the general proof allows continuation of this proof, by the structure of 
T being broken down. 
Generalisation: 
This is dal rotate(len(l), l <> a) = a <> 1 , which is provable using one induction, 
plus C.1. (But it is necessary to match xsn.(o) :: G(n) (xsn(o) :: nil) <> G(n) to 
suggest this generalisation from the general proof). 
Va'rotate(len(T),T <> a') = a' <> T I- rotate(len(H :: T),H :: T <> a) = a <> H 
T 
ie.... I- rotate(s(len(T)), H :: (T <> a)) = a <> H :: T 
ie.... f- rotate(len(T), (T <> a) <> (H :: nil)) = a <> (H :: T) 
ie.... I- rotate(len(T),T <> (a <> (H :: nil))) = a <> H :: T (by C.1) 
ie.... H (a <> (H :: nil)) <> T = a <> H :: T (by HYP) 
ie.... Ha<> ((H :: nil) < >T)= a< >H::T (by C.1) 
ie.... F-a< >H::T= a<>H::T 
(Plus base case). 
General Proof of Original Goal: 
P(s(n)) does not reduce to P(n). 
ix 
P(s(n)) - rotate(len(G(s(n))),G(s(n))) = G(s(n)) (ist line of GP 
rotate(sn(0),xsn(o) :: G(n)) = G(s(n)) 
rotate(len(G(n)),G(n) <> (x sr, (0) :: nil)) = xsn(o) :: G(n) 
which is not equivalent to P(n). 
General Proof of Generalised Goal: 
Q(s(n)) does reduce to Q(n), but it is necessary to match goals, and use C.1 in 
the proof. 
Q(s(n)) - rotate(len(G(s(n))),G(s(n)) <> a) = a <> G(s(n)) 
rot ate(len(G(s(n))), (x (0) :: G(n)) <> a) = a <> (x (0) :: G(n)) 
rotate(len(G(s(n))),xsn(0) :: (G(n) <> a)) = a <> (xsn /o\ :: G(n)) 
rot ate(len(r(s(n))), £(n) <> (a <> xsn(o) :: nil)) = a <> (x.sn (o) :: G(n)) 
Q(n) 
if (a <> (xsn /01 :: nil)) <> G(n) - a <> (xsn /o\ / :: r(n)) 
i f a <> ((xsn /o\ :: nil)) <> G(n)) - a <> (xsn`( o) :: r(n)) 
if a <> xsn(0) 
` 
:: (nil <> G(n)) - a <> (xsn(o) 
if a <> xsn(o) :: G(n) - a <> (x (0) :: G(n)) (OK) 
C.3 bl rev2(l, nil) = rev(l) 
Proof by induction: 
This is blocked. 
rev2(T, nil) = rev(T) I- rev2(H :: T, nil) = rev(H :: T) 
... I- rev2(T, H :: nil) = rev(T) <> (H :: nil) 
... I- ... = rev2(T, nil) <> (H :: nil) 
The general proof allows continuation, by the structure of T being broken down 
(thus allowing more rewrite rules to be applied). 
Generalisation: 
Namely dal rev2(l, a) = rev(l) <> a, which is provable using one induction, plus 
C.1 
Va' rev2(T, a') = rev(T) <> a' I- rev2(H :: T, a) = rev(H :: T) <> a 
. . . I- rev2(T, H :: a) _ (rev(T) <> (H :: nil)) <> a 
.. . I- rev(T) <> (H :: a) = rev(T) <> ((H :: nil) <> a) (by C.1) 
. . . I- rev(T) <> (H :: a) = rev(T) <> (H :: a) 
(Plus base cases). 
In each case, the generalisation proves the original theorem by setting a = nil. 
General Proof of Original Goal: 
P(s(n)) does not reduce to P(n). 
P(s(n)) = rev2(r(s(n)),nil) = rev(r(s(n)))(ist line of GP) 
rev2(xsn(o) :: G(n),nil) = rev(xsn(o) :: G(n)) 
rev2(r(n), xsn(o) :: nil) = rev(G(n)) <> (xsn(o) :: nil) 
x 
No more rewrite rules applicable, and this is not equivalent to P(n). This is in 
fact exactly the same as why the induction proof gets blocked. 
General Proof of Generalised Goal: 
Q(s(n)) does reduce to Q(n). 
Q(s(n)) - rev2(G(s(n)), a) = rev(G(s(n))) <> a 
- rev2(xsn.(o) :: L(n), a) = rev(xsn(o) :: G(n)) <> a 
- rev2(G(n), xsn(o) :: a) = (rev(G(n)) <> (xsn(o) :: nil)) <> a 
(by C.1) = rev2(G(n), xsn/o/ \ :: a) = rev(G(n)) <> ((xsn` o) :: nil) <> a) 
rev2(G(n), xsn(o) :: a) =` rev(G(n)) <> xsn(o) :: a 




The following is a transcript returned by the theorem prover NQTHM when asked 
to prove Vx x $ 0 -+ p(x) + s(s(x)) = s(x) + x. As seen below, the proof 
fails. Other methods of proof for this example are discussed in Subsections 8.1.5 
and 11.4.1. 
>(prove-lemma 13 () 
(implies (and (natp x) (not (zilchp x))) 
(equal (esplus (pred x) (suc (suc x))) 
(esplus (suc x) x) 
This formula can be simplified, using the abbreviations ZILCHP, NOT, AND, and 
IMPLIES, to: 
(IMPLIES (AND (NATP X) (NOT (EQUAL X (ZILCH)))) 
(EQUAL (ESPLUS (PRED X) (SUC (SUC X))) 
(ESPLUS (SUC X) X))), 
which simplifies, rewriting with PRED -SUC, and expanding the definitions of 
ZILCHP and ESPLUS, to: 
(IMPLIES (AND (NATP X) (NOT (EQUAL X (ZILCH)))) 
(EQUAL (ESPLUS (PRED X) (SUC (SUC X))) 
(SUC (SUC (ESPLUS (PRED X) X))))). 
Applying the lemma PRED -ELIM, replace X by (SUC Z) to eliminate (PRED X). We 
use the type restriction lemma noted when PRED was introduced to restrict the 
new variable. This produces: 
(IMPLIES (AND (NATP Z) 
(NOT (EQUAL (SUC Z) (ZILCH)))) 
(EQUAL (ESPLUS Z (SUC (SUC (SUC Z)))) 
(SUC (SUC (ESPLUS Z (SUC Z)))))), 
which further simplifies, clearly, to: 
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(IMPLIES (NATP Z) 
(EQUAL (ESPLUS Z (SUC (SUC (SUC Z)))) 
(SUC (SUC (ESPLUS Z (SUC Z)))))), 
which we would normally push and work on later by induction. But if we must 
use induction to prove the input conjecture, we prefer to induct on the 
original formulation of the problem. Thus we will disregard all that we have 
previously done, give the name *1 to the original input, and work on it. 
So now let us return to: 
(IMPLIES (AND (NATP X) (NOT (ZILCHP X))) 
(EQUAL (ESPLUS (PRED X) (SUC (SUC X))) 
(ESPLUS (SUC X) X))), 
named *1. Since there is nothing to induct upon, the proof has 
************** F A I L E D************** 
Appendix E 
The CORE System 
This appendix extends the description given in Chapter 10 of the Constructive 
Omega Rule Environment (CORE), which is a system in which w- proofs may be 
displayed and investigated. The latter consists in implementation of the system 
of arithmetic with the w -rule (cf. PAc,,), which includes generation of individual 
proofs, the formation of general proofs, demonstration of correctness of the gen- 
eral proof, and the application of rewrite rules. Thus, the implementation allows 
both the automatic or incremental construction of w- proofs, and the validations 
of descriptions of u-proofs. In addition, it encompasses implementation of the 
generalisation method proposed in Chapter 8 (ie. the provision of a cut formula 
via explanation -based generalisation methods). The implementation is carried out 
within the framework of an interactive theorem -prover with Prolog as the tactic 
language, namely Seldon, a version of the OYSTER theorem -prover in which the 
object -level logic is replaced by classical and constructive theories of arithmetic. 
Relevant code is given in (Baker, 1992). 
E.1 Description 
This appendix is a technical description of the CORE system, a proof development 
environment in which a (constructive) version of the w -rule may be used as a rule 
of inference. The w -rule infers the universal application of a proposition from an 
infinite number of individual cases of that proposition. The full description of the 
development of the system, together with discussion of general proofs and related 
theory, has already been given in the main body of the thesis. 
In general, cut elimination holds for arithmetical systems with the w -rule, but not 
for systems with ordinary induction. Hence in the latter, there is the problem 
of generalisation, since arbitrary formulae can be cut in. This makes automatic 
theorem -proving very difficult. An important technique for investigating deriv- 
ability in formal systems of arithmetic has been to embed such systems into semi- 
formal systems with the w -rule. This appendix describes the implementation of 
such a system. 
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The implementation is carried out within the framework of an interactive theorem - 
prover with Prolog as the tactic language, in which the object -level logic is replaced 
by classical and constructive theories of arithmetic. Any finitely large number of 
individual instances of proofs of a proposition may be generated automatically by 
the use of various tactics. The general representation of the proofs is provided 
by having an initial generalisation from a `starting' proof, and then by updating 
this general proof using the other individual proofs, until the general proof seems 
to have reached a stable form. This general proof is then checked to see if it 
is indeed the correct one, as described above. The whole of this stage has been 
automated. There are two options which are allowable from the Seldon proof 
(in PA or HA) with goal r I- dxP(x). One is to ask to use the constructive 
w -rule, whereby the system will check to see whether there is a correct general 
proof, and then return to the former system and close the branch, or else state 
that this rule may not be used. The user may then continue to investigate other 
positions in the prooftree. The other option is to ask for an appropriate cut to 
be carried out in PA (the cut being worked out by the system from the general 
proof), with a further option to complete the tree as far as possible (using standard 
theorem -proving techniques). The general proof may be provided automatically, 
but there is an option in each case to switch temporarily to another system which 
will allow for the description, manipulation and display of the general proof. The 
user may specify the proof incrementally, in terms of applications in positions in 
the tree, plus induction over a distinguished parameter, or all at once - and this 
is checked. The system builds up a recursive function description of the general 
proof, and is able to display individual proofs in addition to the general case. A cut 
formula is automatically suggested from general proofs using an implementation 
based on the method of explanation -based generalisation, which is a technique 
for formulating general concepts on the basis of specific training examples, first 
described in (Mitchell, 1982b). 
The following sections provide details of 
the systems allowing development of proofs within arithmetic upon which 
the implementation is based; 
representation of the w -rule and its subgoals; 
manipulation of individual proofs; 
provision of a general proof; 
correctness checking; 
generalisation; 
and finally, the interactive system, and how to use it. 
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Name Sequent Rule System-Name 
thin-L ri-G ext Gext lthin (f ) r, f :AF-G ext Gext 
thin-R 11-1 ext X rthin ri--G ext any(X 
A-L 
I',a:A,b:BI G ext Gext land ( c ) I',c:AnBf-G ext spread(c,a.)b.Gext) 
rF-A ext Aext ri-- ext Bert rand 11-AAB ext (Aext,Bext) 
V-L 
r,a:AG ext Gx t I',b:Bl-G ext GB t 
for c 
( ) r,c:AVBI-G ext decide(c,Aa.GP t,ab.GB t) 
V-R(i) 
rF-A ext G xt 
ror (left) 
I'{-AVB ext left(G) Pr,t, 
V-R(ii) 
11-Bext GB t ror(right) 
rf-AVB ext right(G) 
->-L 
r,b:Bl-G ext GB t rl-A ext Aext 
p( r, f :ABI-Geit GB t[f (Aext)/b] 
->-R 
r,a:Af-B extBext rime rF -AB ext Aa.BPrt 
basic r, b : Al- A ext b basic 
cut 
r,a:AF-B ext B x rHA ext Aext 
cut(A) 
FHB ext Bt[Aext/a] 
Table E-1: Propositional Calculus Rules 
E.2 The Seldon Proof Environment System 
The operating systems OYSTER and Seldon have already been presented in Sec- 
tion 10.2. The rules and corresponding witness terms of Seldon are given in Ta- 
ble E-1, with their reference names used in the system in the right hand column; 
note that they are merely intuitionistic sequent calculus rules with the witness 
terms added. The witness terms are terms of lambda -calculus, with some extra 
functions, namely spread, decide,' any, substitution, etc. 
This system may be extended to cover predicate logic. A universally quantified 
proposition VxP(x) can be thought of in terms of a function that takes any object 
y in the set quantified over and constructs a witness to show P(y). The witness 
term of an existentially quantified proposition 3xP(x) is a pair consisting of firstly, 
an object from the set quantified over, and secondly, a proof that this object is 
a member of the appropriate type. Compare with the rules given in Table E -2. 
One may obtain an extract term for the proof subtree below a node by using the 
extract command at that node. 
'The functions `spread' and `decide' are defined by the expressions: spread((a, b), c) _ 
c(a) (b); decide(le f t(a), b, c) = b(a); decide(right(a), b, c) = c(a). 
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Name Sequent Rule System-Name 
V-L 
I ,z:A(t)F-G ext Gext 
lupi f t r, f :bx.A(x)I-G ext Gext[.f (y)/z 
b R 
11- A(y) ext AP,.t 
runi(y) ext ax.Atx/y] 
L 
I',z:A(y)F-G ext Gext 
lexi(f,y) r, f :]x.A(x)F-G ext spread( fext,AyAzGext) 
3-R 
FI-A(t) ext A%xt 
rexi(t) FF-3x.A(x) ext (T,APTt) 
Table E -2: Predicate Calculus Rules 
A classical system is formed by introducing the law of excluded middle: the rule 
"divided" accepts any consequent of the form A V -A, and allots it the witness 
term "magic", provided the system is operating in the classical mode. 
The Seldon system may be run by loading /usr /sin /siani /current /code /seldon_ 
update on top of the OYSTER system. This system has been considerably extended 
by the author from Matthew's original version. Code for the rules of this extension 
of Seldon may be found in /usr/ sin /siani /math_reasoning /crab /rules.pl, 
which is one of the files comprising seldon_update. Rules are written in the form 
rule (rulename,conclusion, [hypotheses]). For example, 
rule(rand, ==> A # B ext (ExA & ExB), [ ==>A ext ExA, ==>B ext ExB]). 
The law of the excluded middle only works when `classical' is true, and is repre- 
sented by: 
rule(divided, _ ==> A \ ( A => void) ext magic, []) :- 
( classical 
write('you are not allowed to exclude the middle currently'), 
nl, 
fail 
The cut rule is defined as: 
rule(cut(A), 
H ==> G ext substitute(ExA,L,ExG), 




Another rule of interest is rewrite, which is a tactic which rewrites terms within 
double square brackets, in such a way that given the sequent f (k) ==> g (w) , 
then rewrite ( (f [ [x] ] __> g ([ [y] ] ) rewrites k to x and w to y in the original 
expression, thus giving f (x) ==> g (y) , but only if these rewrites are admissible. 
rule(rewrite(Exp), 
H ==> OldExp ext G, 
[==> NewExp ext G I RewriteSubgoals]) :- 
get_rewrite term(Exp, OldExp, NewExp, RewriteSubgoalsD), 
\+ RewriteSubgoalsD = [] , 
get_rewrite_subgoals(RewriteSubgoalsD,RewriteSubgoals, H). 
xvii 
The code to represent the w -rule is discussed in the next section. For further 
details about the system, including how to make definitions, save and manipulate 
lemmata, unfold terms, etc., see (Matthews, 1989). 
E.3 Representation of the w -rule and its Sub - 
goals 
In order to implement the w -rule, given a goal of the form `VxP(x)', it is necessary 
to generate the hypotheses `P(r) for uniform r', and subsequently to enable this 
subtree to be completed. It is important to determine what a proof using the 
constructive w -rule would look like; this is a difficult problem since only one proof 
at a time may be operated upon in the Seldon system, and infinitely many proofs 
cannot be dealt with. 
This section presents and explains the actual code written in order to imple- 
ment the w -rule. The idea is that, given a goal of form /\ X :: A, one may try 
the tactic find_gen_rule (R) to provide a generalisation. autogen (Rulelist) , 
where Rulelist is the general proof of A, may be used to apply a cut within 
Peano Arithmetic (by working out an appropriate cut formula from the general 
proof), and has an option to complete the tree as far as possible. Rulelist may 
be inputted manually or else provided by the tactic find_gen_rule (Rulelist) 
omega_rule (Rulelist) is a rule in Seldon which closes the prooftree if appropriate 
using the constructive w -rule (and thus in a different system to Peano Arithmetic) 
by means of the interactive system described in Section E.8. If this option is cho- 
sen, a cut may still be applied instead by typing find_cut, and then cutting in 
the appropriate formula, as shown in Section E.8. 
In summary, the rule "omega_rule" takes us into the interactive system described 
in Section E.8, in which a general proof may be recursively constructed by the 
user, whereas "autogen" (which is a tactic rather than a rule) allows the interac- 
tive stage to be omitted, thus fully automating the process. If we do not wish to 
input the general proof by hand using the interactive system, find_gen_rule will 
provide a suitable automated guess. 




autogen{List,2,10,F). % alter numbers, as appropriate 
general proof provided manually, or using 'f ind_gen_rule(R)', 
generalisation required; M and N are numbers 
autogen(List,M,N,F): - % set F to "finish" if wish to complete the tree 
goal( / \X::A), 
assert(gen( / \X::A,List)), 
pos(K), select(Z), % sets Z = name of current theorem 
make_thms2(proof(n,List),M,N), % gives input for third_stage cf 5 
third_stage( / \X::A), % checks correctness of genpf cf section 6 
find_cut(C), % finds cut by EBG method cf section 7 
xviii 
select(Z), pos(K), % returns to initial position in Seldon tree 
complete_tree(X,C,F). % applies cut rule, and option to complete tree 
find_gen_rule(R) will return (non -checked) general proof R. 
R will be of the form 
gen(P,[rulel(Posl,T1 *),...]). 
ie. it guesses the general proof, R 
find_gen_rule(R):- 
goal(/\X::A), 
generate _indiv_proofs( / \X::A,M,N), % see subsection 4.1 
seldon_to_rule(M,N), % see subsection 4.2 
generalise_proof( / \X::A,M). % see section 5 




case when general proof provided manually, or using 
'find_gen_rule(Rulelist)', closed subtree required 
definition of constructive omega rule 
closes subtree if succeeds; otherwise, will not apply 
rule(omega_rule(G), H =_> / \X::A ext ExtN, 0):- 
pos(K), select(Z), % instantiates K and Z 
new_system(X,A), !, % switches into system shown in Section 8 
clause(generalisation(G),true), % returns correct generalisation 
extract_gen(ExtN), % returns ExtN, the extract term 
select(Z), pos(K). % return to original position in Seldon 
E.4 Input or Generation of Individual Proofs 
There is a problem of how to input the individual proofs P(0), P(1), P(2), ... to 
the system, for proof environments usually only deal with one proof at a time. 
There is also a problem how to incorporate these proofs into the main proof. It 
was desirable to be able to generate these proofs, rather than inputting them, 
since they might not be available for input. 
The following represents the result of running within Clam2 code (namely 
/ home /sins ¡siani /current /code /codeC) written to demonstrate the automatic 
generation and format conversion of proofs. 
E.4.1 Generation of Individual Proofs within Seldon 
generate_indiv_ proofs( +Formula, +Number1, +Number2) creates within the Sel- 
don framework and proves using a fairly basic tactic individual proof instances of 
the given formula Formula for the range of numbers from Numberl to Number2 
inclusive; these are stored as Oproof, 1proof, 2proof etc., and are shown below as 
2See Subsection 3.2.2 for details. Clam is built on top of OYSTER, and contains many 
extra useful options. 
xix 
snapshots. The following illustrates its use within the Seldon system. 
I ?- generate_indiv_proofs(/\x:: (x+x)+x=x+(x+x),0,2). 
yes 
I ?- select('Oproof'). 
yes 
I ?- snapshot. 
Oproof: [] complete autotactic(idtac) 
= => 0 +0 +0 =0+ (0 +0) 
by rewrite([[ rewrite (0)]] +0= 0 +[[rewrite(0)]]) 
[1] complete 
= => 0 +0 =0 +0 
by rewrite ([[rewrite(0)]]= [[rewrite(0)]]) 
[1] complete 
= => 0 =0 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => 0 =0 +0 
by basic 
[3] complete 
= => 0 =0 +0 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => 0 =0 +0 
by basic 
[3] complete 
= => 0 =0 +0 
by basic 
yes 
I ?- select('lproof'). 
yes 
I ?- snapshot. 
1proof: [] complete autotactic(idtac) 
__> s(0) +s(0) +s(0) =s(0)+ (s(0) +s(0)) 
by rewrite( 
([[ rewrite( s( 0+ s( 0)))]]+ s( 0 )= s(0) +[[rewrite(s(0 +s(0)))]])) 
[1] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0)) +s(0)= s(0) +s(0 +s(0)) 
by rewrite([[ rewrite( s( 0 +s(0) +s(0)))]]= s(0) +s(0 +s(0))) 
[1] complete 
= => s(0 +s(0) +s(0))= s(0) +s(0 +s(0)) 
by rewrite( s( 0+ s( 0)+ s( 0 ))= [[rewrite(s(0 +s(0 +s(0))))]]) 
[1] complete 
= => s(0 +s(0) +s(0))= s(0 +s(0 +s(0))) 
by rewrite( 
(s([[ rewrite( s( 0))]]+ s( 0))= s(0 +s(C[rewrite(s(0))]])))) 
[1] complete 
= => s(s(0) +s(0))= s(0 +s(s(0))) 





__> s(s(s(0)))= s(0 +s(s(0))) 
by rewrite( s( s( s(0)))= s([[rewrite(s(s(0)))]])) 
[1] complete 
__> s(s(s(0)))= s(s(s(0))) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(s(0))= 0 +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => s(0)= O +s(0) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0))= s(0) +s(0) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0)= 0 +s(0) 
by basic 
[3] complete 
__> s(0)= 0 +s(0) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0 +s(0)))= s(0) +s(0 +s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0) +s(0))= s(0 +s(0)) +s(0) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0))= s(0) +s(0) 
by basic 
[3] complete 
__> s(0 +s(0))= s(0) +s(0) 
by basic 
yes 
I ?- select('2proof'). 
yes 
I ?- snapshot. 
2proof: [] complete autotactic(idtac) 
= => s (s(0)) +s(s(0)) +s(s(0))= s(s(0))+ (s(s(0)) +s(s(0))) 
by rewrite( 
(([[ rewrite (s(s(0) +s(s(0))))]] +s(s(0))) 
_ ( s( s( 0))+ [[rewrite(s(s(0) +s(s(0))))]]))) 
[1] complete 
= => s( s( 0)+ s( s( 0)))+ s(s(0))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0) +s(s(0))) 
by rewrite( 
([[ rewrite (s(s(0) +s(s(0)) +s(s(0))))]] 





(s([[ rewrite (s(0 +s(s(0))))]] +s(s(0))) 
= ( s( s( 0))+ s([[rewrite(s(o +s(s(0))))]])))) 
[1] complete 
__> s( s( 0+ s( s( 0)))+ s (s(0)))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0 +s(s(0)))) 
by rewrite( 
(s([[ rewrite (s(0 +s(s(0)) +s(s(0))))]]) 
_ (s(s(0)) +s(s(0 +s(s(0))))))) 
[1] complete 
__> s( s( O+ s( s( 0))+ s( s(0))))= s(s(0)) +s(s(O +s(s(0)))) 
by rewrite( 
(s(s(0 +s(s(0)) +8(s(0)))) 
= [[ rewrite (s(s(0) +s(s(O +s(s(o))))))]])) 
[1] complete 
__> s( s( O+ s( s( 0))+ s( s(0))))= s(s(0) +s(s(0+s(s(0))))) 
by rewrite( 
(s(s(0 +s(s(0)) +s(s(0)))) 
= s([[ rewrite (s(0 +s(s(O +s(___)))))]]))) 
[1] complete 
__> (s(s(0 +s(s(0)) +s(s(0)))) 
= s(s(0 +s(s(0 +s(s(0))))))) 
by rewrite( 
( s( s ([[rewrite(s(s(0)))]] +s(s(0)))) 






















=_> s( s( s( s( s(s(0))))))= s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => s(s(s(s(0))))= 0 +s(s(s(s(0)))) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(s(0))= O +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(s(0)))= s(0) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(s(0) +s(s(0)))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => s(s(0))= 0 +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[3] complete 
__> s(s(0))= 0 +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => s( 0+ s( s( 0+ s(s(0)))))= s(0) +s(s(0 +s(s(0)))) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
= => s( s( 0)+ s( s( 0+ s( s (0)))))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0 +s(s(0)))) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s( O+ s( s( 0) ) +s(s(0)))= s(0 +s(s(0))) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(0 +s(s(0)))= s(0) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[3] complete 
__> s(0 +s(s(0)))= s(0) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s( s( 0)+ s( s( 0))+ s (s(0)))= s(s(0) +s(s(0))) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[2] complete 
__> s(s(0) +s(s(0)))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
[3] complete 
__> s(s(0) +s(s(0)))= s(s(0)) +s(s(0)) 
by basic 
yes 
E.4.2 Conversion of Proofs from Seldon to CORE Rep- 
resentation 
Note that the `rewrite' notation above is used to represent within Seldon the 
process of rewriting using a rewrite rule; within the CORE representation, a more 
explicit notation is used denoting particular rules used, namely "apply rule R at 
subposition P, number of times k ". In the case below, rules is s(x) +y -} s(x +y), 
and rule2 is 0 + y -* y. 
The representation for each individual proof for P(J) would be of the form: 
proof (J, [Rulel j(Pos1 j, T1j), Rule2 j(Posl j, T2j), ...] ) 
This is a predicate, its first argument being the natural number J, and the other 
argument being an ordered list of predicates such that RuleKj is the Kth rule 
to be applied in the proof, and is applied TKJ times, with PosKT specifying the 
position at which it is applied. Note that we may have RuleAj = RuleBj. 
seldon_to rule ( +Numberl , +Number2) converts the proofs stored as Oproof, 1proof 
and 2proof to a rule formulation used to enable manipulation of a general proof, 
namely `proof(J,Rulelist)' for Numberl < J <Number2. The results are associated 
with an appropriate integer within the range from Numberl to Number2 inclusive, 
and asserted into the database, as shown below. 
I ?- seldon_to_rule(0,3). 
yes 
I ?- proof(X,Y). 
X = O, 
Y = [rule2([1,1],1),rule2([2,2],1),rule2([1],1),rule2([2],1)] 
X = 1, 
Y = [rulel([1,1],1),rulei([2,2],1),rulei([1],1),rulel([2],1), 
rule2([1,1,1],1),rule2([1,2,1,2],1),rulel([1,1],1),rule2([1,1,1],1), 
rule2([1,2],1)] ; 
X = 2, 
Y = [rule1([1,1],1),rule1([2,2],1),rule1([1],1),rule1([1,1,1],1), 
rulel ( [1,2, 2] ,1) ,rule1( [1,1] ,1) ,rulel ( [2] ,1) ,rule1( [1,2] ,1) , 
rule2([1,1,1,1],1),rule2([1,1,2,1,1,2],1),rulel([1,1,1],1), 
rulel([1,1,1,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,1,1],1),rule2([1,1,2],1)] ; 
X = 3, 







E.5 Provision of a General Proof 
In Section 10.3 I considered how the general proofs described in Chapter 6 might 
be represented from an implementational point of view. The algorithm presented 
in that section automatically recognises a general pattern, and hence forms the 
basis for an implementation, upon input of individual proofs for P(1), P(2), .... 
f ind_gen_rule (GENPF) returns the non -checked general proof GENPF, and follows 
this algorithm. The code is to be found in / home /sins /siani /current /code /newcode. 
This code uniformly generates individual proofs in CORE (make_thms2 /3), guesses 
an initial generalisation from an individual `starting' proof (generalise_proof /2), 
and also updates the general proof using the other individual proofs, until the gen- 
eral proof seems to have reached a stable form (inspect_rep /3). The general rep- 
resentation of the proofs is asserted into the database as `gen(Sequent,Rulelist)'. 
If the above code is run within Clam, after having loaded the Seldon system, a 
general proof may be provided as follows: 
xxiv 
EXAMPLE ONE 
17- make_thms2( proof( n,[ rulel([], n), rule2 ([2],3),rulel([1],2 *n)],2,7). 
note the general proof 
yes % we wish to produce 
I ?- proof(X,Y). 
X = 2, % cf. code A - 
Y = [rulel([],2),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],4)] ? % method of generating 
X = 3, % individual proofs 
Y = [rulel([],3),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],6)] ? 
X = 4, 
Y = [rulel([],4),rule2([2],3),rule1([1],8)] ? 
X = 5, 
Y = Crulel([],5),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],10)] ? 
X = 6, 
Y = [rulel([],6),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],12)] ? 
X = 7, 
Y = [rulel([],7),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],14)] ? 
no 
I ?- generalise(2). % produces first general 
proof (see below) 
yes % note that this general 
I ?- gen(X). % proof is not the final one 
X = [rule1([],n),rule2([2],n+1),rulel([1],2*n)] ? 
no 
I ?- inspect_rep(3,0). % recursive part 
yes 
I ?- gen(X). % final general proof 
% produced - note this is 
X = [rulel( , n),rule2([2],3),rulel([1],2 *n)] ? % the correct one 
no 
I ?- halt. 
EXAMPLE TWO 
I ?- make_thms2( proof( n,[ rulel([], 3* n), rule2 ([2],n),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1], 
n +2)]),5,10). % note the general proof given 
from which the individual proofs 
yes % will be generated 
I ?- proof(X,Y). 
X = 5, % the individual proofs generated 
Y = [rulel([],15),rule2([2],5),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],7)] ? ; 
X = 6, 
Y = [rulel( ,18),rule2([2],6),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],8)] ? 
X = 7, 
Y = [rulel([],21),rule2([2],7),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],9)] ? ; 
X = 8, 
Y = [rulel([],24),rule2([2],8),rule3([],1),rule2([l,1],10)] ? 
X = 9, 
Y = [rulel([],27),rule2([2],9),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],11)] ? ; 
X = 10, 
Y = [rulel([],30),rule2([2],10),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],12)] ? ; 
no 
I ?- generalise(5). % cf. Code B 
yes 
XXV 
I ?- gen(X). 
X = [rulel([],3*n),rule2([2],n),rule3([],n+ -4),rule2([1,1],n+2)] ? ; 
no 
I ?- inspect_rep(6,0). % cf. Code C 
yes 
I ?- gen(X). % this is the general proof 
returned - the correct one 
X = [ rulel([], 3* n), rule2([ 2], n),rule3([],1),rule2([1,1],n +2)] ? 
no 
E.6 Checking Correctness of the General Proof 
Section 10.3.1 has already considered how it could be known whether the gen- 
eral proof is the right one - in other words, how one could know that the 
next individual proof example selected would not falsify it? This involves meta - 
level reasoning as a check to ensure that the general method is the required one. 
third_stage (GOAL) checks the correctness of the general proof of GOAL, and fol- 
lows the algorithm given in Section 10.3.1. It outputs the lines of the `general 
proof' and also the guessed formulae used. 
E.6.1 Examples 
The relevant additional code for this stage is found in siani /current /code /stage3 
(which is encorporated into siani /current /code /new_system2 - see Section E.8) 
and which carries out the process described above. 
I ?- make_thms2( proof( n,[ rulel([ 1, 1], n), rulel ([2],n),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2 
([2,2,2],1),rule1([1],n)]),2,7). 
note that this is the general proof we wish to produce 
yes 
I ?- proof(X,Y). % these are the (inputted) proofs 
X = 2, 
Y = 
[rulel([1,1],2),rulel([2],2),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1) 
X = 3, 
Y = 
[rulel([1,1],3),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1) 
X = 4, 
Y = 
[rulei([1,1],4),rulel([2],4),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1) 
X = 5, 
Y = 
[rulel([1,1],5),rulel([2],5),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1) 
X = 6, 
Y = 
[rulel([1,1],6),rulel([2],6),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1) 











I ?- generalise(2). % produces first general proof - note that this 
general proof is not the final one 
yes 
I ?- gen(X). % general proof produced 
X = [rulel([1,1],n),rulel([2],n),rule2([2,2,1,1],n+ 
-1),rule2([2,2,2],n+ -1),rulel([1],n)] ? 
no 
I ?- inspect_rep(3,0). % recursive part, to produce general proof 
yes 
I ?- gen(X). X final general proof produced 
X = 
[rulel([1,1],n),rulel([2],n),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],n)] ? 
no % note this is in fact the correct one! 
I ?- third_stage( / \x:: (x +x) +x= x +(x +x)). % checking this is the correct 
Subrule used: s "(m,s "(n- m,0) +s(s "(n- 1,0))) % general proof 
New equation is, using rulel: s"( n, 0+ s( s"( n- 1, 0)))+ s- (n,0)= s "(n,0) +(s "(n,0) +s "(n,0)) 
Subrule used: s"( m, s"( n- m, 0) +(s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0)))) 
New equation is, using rulel: 
s"( n, 0+ s( s"( n- 1, 0)))+ s-( n, 0)= s"( n ,0 +(s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0)))) 
New equation is, using rule2: 
s"( n, s( s-( n- 1, 0)))+ s"( n, 0)= s"( n ,0 +(s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0)))) 
New equation is, using rule2: 
s-( n, s( s"( n- 1, 0)))+ s"( n, 0)= s "(n,s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0))) 
Subrule used: s"( m, s"( n- m,s(s "(n- 1,0))) +s(s "(n- 1,0))) 
New equation is, using rulel: 
s"( n, s( s"( n- 1, 0))+ s( s"( n- 1, 0)))= s "(n,s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0))) 
Final equation is: s"( n, s( s"( n- 1, 0))+ s( s"( n- 1, 0)))= s- (n,s(s "(n- 1,0)) +s(s "(n- 1,0))) 
Correct general proof is: 
[rulel([1,1],n), rules([ 2], n), rule2([ 2, 2, 1, 1], 1) ,rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],n)] 
yes % the general proof was shown to be a correct one 
A Further Example 
I ?- make_thms2(proof(n,[rulel([1],n),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1, 
1,1,2],1)]),2,7). 
yes 
I ?- proof(X,Y). 
X = 2, 
Y = [rulel([1],2),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
X = 3, 
Y = [rulel([1],3),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
X=4, 
Y = [rulel([1],4),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
X = 5, 
Y = [rulel([1],5),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
X = 6, 
Y = [ru1e1([1],6),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
X = 7, 





I ?- gen(X). 
X = [rulel([1],n),rulel([2],n+1),rule2([2,2,1],n+ -1),rule2([1,1,1,2],n+ -1)] ? 
xxvii 
yes 
I ?- inspect_rep(3,0). 
yes 
I ?- gen(X). 
X = [rulel([1],n),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] ? 
yes 
I ?- third_stage( / \x:: x +3 =3 +x). 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n- m,0) +s(s(s(0)))) 
New equation is, using rulel: s-( n, 0 +s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(0))) +s "(n,0) 
New equation is, using rulel applied 3 times: s-( n, 0 +s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(0 +s- (n,0)))) 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 times: s"( n ,s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(0 +s "(n,0)))) 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 times: s- (n,s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(s- (n,0)))) 
Final equation is: s- (n,s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(s- (n,0)))) 
Correct general proof is: 
[ rulel([ 1], n), rulel([ 2], 3), rule2 ([2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)] 
yes 
E.7 Generalisation 
The generalisation process comprising the suggestion of cut formulae for arith- 
metic has been implemented. This is done by explanation -based generalisation, 
as described in Chapters 7 and 8, following the stages described above, namely 
the provision of a correct general proof. The transcript in the following section 
illustrates the user interface. The code for finding the cut formula is located in 
siani /current /code /find_cut4. 
E.8 Interactive System 
The system allows interaction with the user to define the general proof recursively, 
or else to produce the general proof automatically. This involves application of 
rewrite rules, and a tree representation. Code for the interactive system is located 
in / home /sins /siani /current /code /new_system2. This system encorporates all 
the code mentioned above, and follows the flow pattern in the following subsection. 
Allowance is made for branching proofs by using a tree structure for the proof, as 
may be seen by the position information in the general proof specifying such tree 
nodes. A simple rewrite rule will be of the form P Q (for example s(x) + y 
s(x + y)). A branching rule will be of the form P Q1, ... Qn and may be 
represented internally by a tree from Seq at position [k] to subnodes Ai at tree 
positions [k, i] for 1 < i < n. In the case of the rule being applied to subgoals 
recursively f (m) times, where m is a meta -variable, this is represented internally 
by a tree from position [k] to subnodes at tree positions [k, f (m), i] for 1 < i < n. 
By these means it is possible to express any finite tree of applications of a rewrite 
rule. 
xxviii 
A general description of the interactive system has already been given in Chap- 
ter 10. The following subsections illustrate the flow of the system, and provide 
transcripts illustrating how it may be used. 
E.8.1 CORE Processes 
Type "omega- rule" 
-+ goto A 
A: Input stored rules + Prompt for meta -variable eg. n -* goto B 
B: General formula displayed (cf. s'ß(0)) + set current node to [] - goto C 
C: Prompt for full general proof to be given -* YES: goto G; NO: goto D 
G: Input full generalisation. Check general proof by working out new subgoals 
and justification. -+ correct: goto K; incorrect: goto N 
N: Output "wrong general proof" message. Goto C or halt. 
D: Ask for new current node required, pos(X). Prompt for rule application, or 
finished tree belief. -4 branching rule: goto P; constant number of applications of 
rule: goto F; rule applied function of n times: goto E; finished tree: goto M. 
P: Branching rule case. Representation is "branch(rule(Subpos of expression, No 
of times applied), List of nodes eg. [1,3] describing subterms to which to apply 
more than once (if appropriate), [[Subtree (1st node)],[Subtree (2nd node)], ... , 
[Subtree (nth node)]]) ". Subdivision according to whether the rule is applied a 
constant or a parametrised number of times, as with D. 
E: The rule must be applied a parametrised number of times. Prompt for final 
subgoal. -* Given: goto Z; not given: goto Y 
Y: work out new subgoal goto Z 
Z: return justification (by induction on n) -+ works: goto X; does not work: goto 
H 
X: display new subgoal. Assert position and information about node and subn- 
odes. Display new subgoal. Goto D. 
H: Error message plus justification. Goto D. 
F: The rule must be applied a constant number of times. Work out new subgoal. 
works: goto X; does not work: goto H 
M: Check to see if the proof is finished: equality check on all subgoals. -+ not 
equal: goto H; equal: goto K 
K: output (pretty printed) general proof (by means of asserted information) 
---> goto L 
L: Prompt for display of individual proof. -* yes: goto Q; no: goto O 
Q: Work out and display. Goto L. 
O: Return to Seldon system. Close subtree, associate general proof with the node 
and provide an appropriate extract term. 
E.8.2 Structure of CORE 
'uG ©rSa rgHW 9© :-ArJ1 CH Ï 
Automatic development of proofs in PA can or suggestion of cut formulae in PA 
( Run SELDON 
1 
Develop proof within SELDON 
until goal is of form Vx P(x). 
Induction Blocked? J 
Use omega - rule to 
automatically generate, 




USE INTERACTIVE SYSTEM 
-Input generalisation 
-Generate / manipulate 
general proof 
-Check general proof 
-Option to display 
individual proofs 
-Output general proof 
Return to SELDON system 
(General proof associated with closed branch) J 
/ 1 
Type "find -cut" to automatically suggest cut formula. 
Can apply this cut and continue with proof in PA 
E.8.3 Transcript of CORE environment, illustrating gen- 
eration of general proofs and automatic provision 
of cut formula via the explanation -based generali- 
sation method 
loading file / home /ossianl /siani /current /code /demo 
foreign file /usr/ local /src /quintus3/ generic /gplib3.1.2 /library /sun4- 4 /libpl.so loaded 
demo loaded in module user, 1.883 sec 584,040 bytes 
Quintus Prolog Release 3.1.2 (Sun -4, SunOS 4.1) 
Copyright (C) 1990, Quintus Corporation. All rights reserved. 
2100 Geng Road, Palo Alto, California U.S.A. (415) 813 -3800 
CLaM Proof Planner Version 1.5 (libraries only) (7/3/93 20:24) 
CLaM Proof Planner Version 1.5: (BETA- testing) (7/3/93 20:54) 
Example One: Vs (x + s) + x = æ + (æ -Fs) 
I ?- create_thm(s,user). 
I: [] __> /\x:: (x+x)+x=x+(x+x). 
yes 
I ?- select(s). 
yes 
I ?- inputthms. % INPUTS INDIVIDUAL PROOFS BELOW 
yes 
I ?- proof(X,Y). 
X = 2, 
Y = [rulel([1,1],2),rulel([2],2),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],2)] ; 
X = 3, 
Y = [rulel([1,1],3),rulel([2],3),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],3)] ; 
X = 4, 
Y = [rulel([1,1],4),rulel([2],4),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],4)] 
X = 5 
Y = [rulel([1,1],5),rulel([2],5),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],5)] 
X = 6 
Y = [rulel([1,1],6),rule1([2],6),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],6)] 
X = 7 
Y = [rulel([1,1],7),rulel([2],7),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],7)] 
I ?- generalise(2). % INITIAL GENERALISATION GUESSED 
yes 
I ?- gen(X,Y). 
X = /\x::x+x+x=x+ (x+x), 
Y = [rulel([1,1],n),rulel([2],n),rule2([2,2,1,1],n+ -1),rule2([2,2,2],n+ -1),rulel([1],n)] 




X = /\x::x+x+x=x+ (x+x), 
Y = [rulel([1,1],n),rulel([2],n),rule2([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1),rule1([1],n)] 
I ?- display. % NODE IN SELDON SYSTEM 
s: [] incomplete autotactic(idtac) 
==> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
by _ 
yes 
I ?- induce. % USE INDUCTION RULE 
yes 
I ?- snapshot. 
s: [] partial autotactic(idtac) 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
by induction(x) 
[1] incomplete 
__> 0 +0 +0 =0+ (0 +0) 
by 
[2] incomplete 
v0. x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
==> s(x) +s(x) +s(x) =s(x)+ (s(x) +s(x)) 
by % THIS BRANCH IS EVENTUALLY BLOCKED 
yes 
I ?- omega_rule(_). % CALLS INTERACTIVE SYSTEM 
Which meta -variable do you wish to use? 
If not known, type n. 
I: n. 
General assertion (to be proved) is s" (n,0) +s" (n,0) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,0)+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)). 
Do you wish to input a full generalisation? (yes /no) 
I: yes. % INPUTTING FULL GENERALISATION 
Input general proof in the form of a list with members: 
Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied) 
or branch (Rule,Pos,No,[[S1],...,[SK]]) 
I: inputgen. % INPUTS THE GENERALISATION PRODUCED ABOVE 
Original expression is, at position []: 
s" (n,0) +s" (n,0) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,0)+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Subrule used: s" (m,s" (n-m,0) (n,0)) 
New equation is, at position [n,1] using rulel applied n times: 
s_ (n,0 +s" (n,0)) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,0)+ (s" (n,0) (n,0)) 
Subrule used: s" (m,s" (n -m,0)+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0))) 
New equation is, at position [n,l,n,1] using rulel applied n times: 
s" (n,0 +s- (n,0)) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,0+ (n,0) +s" (n,0))) 
New equation is, at position [n,l,n,1,1] using rule2 applied 1 times: 
s" (n,s" (n,0)) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,0+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0))) 
New equation is, at position [n,i,n,1,1,1] using rule2 applied 1 times: 
s" (n,s" (n,0)) +s" (n,0) =s" (n,s" (n,0) (n,0)) 
Subrule used: s" (m,s" (n -m,s" (n,0)) +s" (n,0)) 
New equation is, at position [n,i,n,1,1,1,n,1] using rulel applied n times: 
s" (n,s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) =s" (n,s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Final equation is: s" (n,s" (n,0)+s" (n,0)) =s" (n,s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Correct general proof. 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type no to 
exit the system. 
yes. 
Input index of proof: 
I: 3. 
Individual proof rules to be applied are: 
[ rulel([ 1, 1], 3), rulel([ 2], 3), rule2([ 2, 2, 1, 1], 1) ,rule2([2,2,2],1),rulel([1],3)] 
Would you like the individual proof, if possible? 
I: yes. 
Initial sequent is, at tree -position []: 
s" (3,0) +s- (3,0) +s" (3,0) =s- (3,0)+ (s" (3,0)+s- (3,0)) 
At position [1,1,1,1] the sequent is 
s- (3,0 +s- (3,0))+s- (3,0) =s" (3,0)+ (s- (3,0) +s- (3,0)) using rulel([1,1],3) 
At position [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is 
s- (3,0 +s- (3,0)) (3,0) =s" (3,0+ (s- (3,0) (3,0))) using rulel([2],3) 
At position [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is 
s- (3,s- (3,0))+s- (3,0) =s- (3,0+ (s- (3,0) +s- (3,0))) using rule2([2,2,1,1],1) 
At position [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is 
s- (3,s- (3,0)) +s' (3,0) =s- (3,s" (3,0) +s- (3,0)) using rule2([2,2,2],1) 
At position [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is 
s" (3,s- (3,0) +s" (3,0)) =s- (3,s- (3,0) +s- (3,0)) using rulel([1],3) 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type "no" to 
exit the system. 
I. no. 
yes 
I ?- display. % BRANCH COMPLETED BY OMEGA RULE 
s: [] complete autotactic(idtac) 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
by omega_rule( 
[ rulel([ 1, 1], n), rule1([ 2], n), rule2 ([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1), 
rulel([1],n)]) 
yes 
I ?- retract. % REMOVE ASSERTED INFORMATION 
yes 
I ?- omega_rule(_). % USER WISHES TO INPUT THE GENERAL PROOF 
Which meta -variable do you wish to use? 
If not known, type n. 
I 
n. 
General assertion (to be proved) is 
s" (n,0) +s" (n,0) (n,0) =s- (n,0)+ (s' (n,0) +s- (n,0)). 
Do you wish to input a full generalisation? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([1,1],n). 
Current node is: [] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0) +s" (n,0) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s" (m,s- (n- m,0) +s" (n,0)) 
New equation is, using rulel([1,1],n): 
s- (n,O (n,0)) (n,0) =s- (n,0)+ (s- (n,0) (n,0)) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([2],n). 
Current node is: [n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0)+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: yes. 
Input subexpression: s "(n,0) +s- (n,0). 
Trying to induce: 
XXXIV 
The base case of (meta)induction is to prove 
y +s" (0,0) =y+ (0,0) (0,0)) 
Base case does not follow by basic "successor" definitions. 
The step case of (meta)induction is to prove 
y (s(n),0) =y+ (s- (s(n),0) (s(n),0)) assuming y (n,0) =y+ (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
The meta -induction does not work. 
The induction did not succeed. 
The subexpression given was not the correct one. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0)+ (s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: yes. 
Input subexpression: s -(n,0+ (s "(n,0) +s "(n,0))). 
Trying to induce: 
The base case of (meta)induction is to prove 
s" (0,0 +y) (0,0) +y 
Base clase follows by definitions of successor function. 
The step case of (meta)induction is to prove 
s- (s(n),0 +y) =s' (s(n),0) +y assuming s" (n,0 +y) =s' (n,0) +y 
Using rulel on RHS, we obtain: s- (s(n),0 +y) =s(s- (n,0) +y) 
Fertilising with the hypothesis, we obtain: 
s- (s(n),O +y) =s(s- (n,0 +y)) 
This is an equality using the "successor" definitions. 
The meta -induction worked, showing that the subexpression was 
a correct one. 
Hence the new equation is, using rulel([2],n): 
s- (n,0 +s- (n,0))+s- (n,0) =s- (n,0+ (s' (n,0) (n,0))) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or " finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1,1],1). 
Current node is: [n,1,n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): 
s" (n,s- (n,0)) +s- (n,0) =s" (n,0+ (s- (n,0) +s" (n,0))) at tree position [n,1,n,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or " branch (Rule,Pos,No,[[S1],...,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,2],1). 
Current node is: [n,l,n,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): 
s_ (n,s- (n,0)) +s" (n,0) =s' (n,s" (n,0) +s" (n,0)) at tree position [n,l,n,1,1,1] 
Input " Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule1([1],n). 
Current node is: [n,l,n,1,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s" (n,s- (n,0)) +s' (n,0) 
XXXV 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n -m,s- (n,0)) +s- (n,0)) 
New equation is, using rulel([1],n): 
s- (n,s- (n,0) +s- (n,0)) =s- (n,s- (n,0) +s- (n,0)) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or " finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: finished_tree. 
General proof: 
At position [] the sequent is s" (n,0)+s- (n,0) (n,0)= 
s- (n,0)+ (s' (n,0) +s- (n,0)) 
At position [n,1] the sequent is s- (n,0 +s- (n,0)) +s- (n,0)= 
s- (n,0)+ (s- (n,0) +s- (n,0)) using rule rulel([1,1],n) 
At position [n,1,n,1] the sequent is s- (n,0 +s- (n,0)) +s- (n,0)= 
s- (n,0+ (s- (n,0) +s- (n,0))) using rule rulel([2],n) 
At position [n,1,n,1,1] the sequent is s- (n,s- (n,0)) +s" (n,0)= 
s- (n,0+ (s- (n,0) +s- (n,0))) using rule rule2([2,2,1,1],1) 
At position [n,1,n,1,1,1] the sequent is s- (n,s- (n,0)) +s" (n,0)= 
s- (n,s- (n,0) +s- (n,0)) using rule rule2([2,2,2],1) 
At position [n,1,n,1,1,1,n,1] the sequent is s- (n,s- (n,0) +s- (n,0))= 
s- (n,s- (n,0) (n,0)) using rule rulel([1],n) 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type "no" to 
exit the system. 
I: no. 
yes 
I ?- display. % SELDON BRANCH COMPLETED USING OMEGA RULE 
s: [] complete autotactic(idtac) 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
by omega_rule( 
[ rulel([ 1, 1], n), rulel([ 2], n), rule2 ([2,2,1,1],1),rule2([2,2,2],1), 
rulel([1],n)]) 
yes 
I ?- find_cut. % AUTOMATICALLY PRODUCES CUT FORMULA 
- EBG WORKING PRINTED OUT 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
fn0(s- (n, _7223+_7217),_7272,_7273) =_7139 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
fn0(s- (n,_7223 +_7217),_7272,_7273) =s- (n,_7450+_7444) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
fn0(s- (n,_7217),_7272,_7273) =s- (n,_7450 +_7444) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
fn0(s" (n,_7217),_7272,_7273) =s- (n,_7444) 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s- (n,_7217 +_7272) =s- (n,_7444) 
The generalisation is / \x::x +v0 +v1 =x+ (v0 +v1) 
yes 
I ?- cut( / \v0:: ( / \v1:: ( / \x:: x +v0 +v1= x +(v0 +v1)))). 
THE SUGGESTED CUT MAY BE APPLIED 
yes 
I ?- d. 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
by cut( / \v0:: / \v1:: / \x::x +v0+v1 =x+ (v0 +v1)) 
incomplete = => / \vO:: / \v1:: / \x::x +v0 +v1 =x+ (v0 +v1) 
incomplete = => / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
yes 
I ?- display. 
s: 0 partial autotactic(idtac) 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
xxxvi 
by cut( / \v0:: / \v1:: / \x::x +v0 +v1 =x+ (v0 +v1)) 
[1] incomplete 
= => / \v0:: / \v1:: / \x::x +v0 +v1 =x+ (v0 +v1) 
[2] incomplete 
v0. / \v0:: / \v1:: / \x::x +v0 +v1 =x+ (v0 +v1) 
__> / \x::x +x +x =x+ (x +x) 
yes 
THIS PROOF MAY EASILY BE COMPLETED 
Example Two: Vx x + 3 = 3 + x 
I ?- create_thm(t,user). 
I: [J ==> /\x:: x+s(s(s(0)))=s(s(s(0)))+x. 
yes 
I ?- select(t). 
yes 
I ?- d. 
__> / \x::x +s(s(s(0)))= s(s(s(0))) +x 
by 
yes 
I ?- omega_rule(_). 
Which meta -variable do you wish to use? 
If not known, type n. 
I: n. 
General assertion (to be proved) is s" (n,0) +s(s(s(0)))= s(s(s(0))) +s' (n,0). 
Do you wish to input a full generalisation? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Input " Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([1],n). 
Current node is: [] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0) +s(s(s(0))) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n- m,0) +s(s(s(0)))) 
New equation is, using rule1([1],n):s- (n,O+s(s(s(0))))= s(s(s(0))) +s" (n,0) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([2],3). 
Current node is: [n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rules applied 3 time(s): s- (n,0 +s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(0 (n,0)))) at tree position [n,1,1,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "bIanch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1],1). 
Current node is: [n,1,1,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s" (n,s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(0 +s" (n,0)))) at tree position [n,1,1,1,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "bIanch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or " finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([1,1,1,2],1). 
Current node is: [n,1,1,1,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s" (n,s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(s" (n,0)))) at tree position [n,1,1,1,1,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: finished_tree. 
General proof: 
At position [] the sequent is s" (n,0) +s(s(s(0)))= 
s(s(s(0))) +s" (n,0) 
At position [n,1] the sequent is s" (n,0 +s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(0))) +s" (n,0) using rule rulel([1],n) 
At position [n,1,1,1,1] the sequent is s" (n,0 +s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(0 (n,0)))) using rule rulel([2],3) 
At position [n,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is s" (n,s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(0 +s" (n,0)))) using rule rule2([2,2,1],1) 
At position [n,1,1,1,1,1,1] the sequent is s" (n,s(s(s(0))))= 
s(s(s(s" (n,0)))) using rule rule2([1,1,1,2],1) 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type "no" to 
exit the system. 
I: no. 
yes 
I ?- d. 
__> / \x::x +s(s(s(0)))= s(s(s(0))) +x 
by 
omega_ rule([ rulel([ 1], n), rulel([ 2], 3), rule2( [2,2,1],1),rule2([1,1,1,2],1)]) 
yes 
I ?- find_cut. 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s" (n,_965 +_959) =_485 
The expression, after applying rulel 3 time(s), is: 
s" (n,_965 +_959)= s(s(s(2153 +_2147))) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s" (n,_959)= s(s(s(_2153+_2147))) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s" (n,_959)= s(s(s(_2147))) 
The generalisation is / \x::x +s(s(s(0)))= s(s(s(0))) +x % CUT FORMULA SUGGESTED 
(IE. WE CAN DO INDUCTION 
ON THIS ANYWAY!) 
yes 
Example Three: Vs x + s(x) = s(s) + x 
I ?- create_thm(l,user). 
I: [] __> /\x:: x+s(x)=s(x)+x. 
yes 
1 ?- select(1). 
yes 
I ?- d. 
= => / \x::x +s(x)= s(x) +x 
by 
yes 
I ?- omega_rule(_). 
Which meta -variable do you wish to use? 
If not known, type n. 
I: n. 
General assertion (to be proved) is s" (n,0) +s(s- (n,0)) =s(s- (n,0)) +s" (n,0). 
Do you wish to input a full generalisation? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([2],1). 
Current node is: [] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rulel applied 1 time(s): s" (n,0) +s(s- (n,0))= 
s(s- (n,0) +s" (n,0)) at tree position [1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
1: rulel([1],n). 
Current node is: [1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s" (n,0) +s(s- (n,0)) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I 
no. 
Subrule used: s" (m,s- (n- m,0) +s(s- (n,0))) 
New equation is, using rulel([1],n):s- (n,0 +s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0)+s- (n,0)) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ..,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([1,2],n). 
Current node is: [1,n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0) +s- (n,0) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n- m,0) +s- (n,0)) 
New equation is, using rulel([1,2],n):s- (n,0 +s" (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 +s- (n,0))) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1],1). 
Current node is: [1,n,i,n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s- (n,s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 +s" (n,0))) at tree position [1,n,l,n,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SR]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1,2],1). 
Current node is: [1,n,1,n,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s" (n,s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,s" (n,0))) at tree position [1,n,1,n,1,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SR]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: finished_tree. 
General proof: 
At position [] the sequent is s" (n,0) +s(s- (n,0))= 
s(s" (n,0))+s- (n,0) 
At position [1] the sequent is s- (n,0) +s(s" (n,0))= 
s(s" (n,0) (n,0)) using rule rulel([2],1) 
At position [1,n,1] the sequent is s- (n,O+s" (n+1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0) +s" (n,0)) using rule rule1([1],n) 
At position [1,n,1,n,1] the sequent is s- (n,0 (n+1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 (n,0))) using rule rule1([1,2],n) 
At position [1,n,l,n,1,1] the sequent is s- (n,s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s" (n,O+s- (n,0))) using rule rule2([2,2,1],1) 
At position [1,n,i,n,1,1,1] the sequent is s- (n,s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,s- (n,0))) using rule rule2([2,2,1,2],1) 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type "no" to 
exit the system. 
I: no. 
yes 
I ?- d. 
_ => / \x::x +s(x)= s(x) +x 
by omega_ rule([ rulel([ 2], 1), rulel([ 1], n), rulel ([1,2],n),rule2([2,2,1],1), 
rule2([2,2,1,2],1)]) 
yes 
I ?- find_cut. 
The expression, after applying rulel 1 time(s), is: 
_87= s(_546 +_544) 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s- (n,_1092 +_1086) =s(546 +_544) 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s- (n,_1092+_1086) =s(s- (n,_1638 +_644)) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s- (n,_1086) =s(s- (n,_1638 +_544)) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s- (n,_1086) =s(s- (n,_544)) 
The generalisation is / \x::x +s(v0)= s(x) +v0 % CUT FORMULA SUGGESTED 
yes 
XI 
Example Four: b'x r s(x) = s(x -F r) 
I ?- create_thm(p,user). 
I: [] ==> /\x:: x+s(x)=s(x+x). 
yes 
I ?- select(p). 
yes 
I ?- d. 
= => / \x::x +s(x)= s(x +x) 
by _ 
yes 
I ?- omega_rule(_). 
Which meta -variable do you wish to use? 
If not known, type n. 
I: n 
General assertion (to be proved) is s- (n,0) +s(s- (n,0)) =s(s- (n,0) +s- (n,0)). 
Do you wish to input a full generalisation? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or " finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([1],n). 
Current node is: [] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s" (n,0) +s(s" (n,0)) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n- m,0) +s(s- (n,0))) 
New equation is, using rule1([1],n):s- (n,0 +s- (n +1,0)) =s(s- (n,0) +s" (n,0)) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rulel([1,2],n). 
Current node is: [n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subexpression to be altered is: s- (n,0) (n,0) 
Do you wish to input subexpression after rule application? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
Subrule used: s- (m,s- (n- m,0) +s- (n,0)) 
New equation is, using rulel([1,2],n):s- (n,0 +s" (n +1,0)) =s(s- (n,0 +s- (n,0))) 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1] [SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1],1). 
Current node is: [n,l,n,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s- (n,s- (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 +s- (n,0))) at tree position [n,1,n,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or " finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: rule2([2,2,1,2],1). 
xli 
Current node is: [n,l,n,1,1] 
Do you wish to select another position? (yes /no) 
I: no. 
New equation is, using rule2 applied 1 time(s): s- (n,s" (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,s- (n,0))) at tree position [n,1,n,1,1,1] 
Input "Rule(Pos of Subexpression, No of times applied)" 
or "branch(Rule,Pos,No,[[S1], ,[SK]])" or "finished_tree" or "exit ". 
I: finished_tree. 
General proof: 
At position [] the sequent is s- (n,0) +s(s- (n,0))= 
s(s- (n,0)+s" (n,0)) 
At position [n,1] the sequent is s- (n,0 +s' (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0) +s' (n,0)) using rule rulel([1],n) 
At position [n,1,n,1] the sequent is s" (n,0 +s" (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 +s" (n,0))) using rule rule1([1,2],n) 
At position [n,l,n,1,1] the sequent is s" (n,s- (n+1,0))= 
s(s- (n,0 +s" (n,0))) using rule rule2([2,2,1],1) 
At position [n,1,n,1,1,1] the sequent is s" (n,s" (n +1,0))= 
s(s- (n,s- (n,0))) using rule rule2([2,2,1,2],l) 
Type "yes" to see an individual proof, type "no" to 




_ => / \x::x +s(x)= s(x +x) 
by omega_ rule([ rulel([ 1], n), rulel([ 1, 2], n), rule2( [2,2,1],1),rule2([2,2,1,2],1)]) 
yes 
I ?- find_cut. 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s_ (n,_560 +_554) =_88 
The expression, after applying rulel n time(s), is: 
s_ (n,_560 +_554)= fn9(s- (n,_1445 +_1439),_1809,_1810) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s_ (n,_554)= fn9(s" (n,_1445 +_1439),_1809,_1810) 
The expression, after applying rule2 1 time(s), is: 
s" (n,_554)= fn9(s- (n,_1439),_1809,_1810) 
The generalisation is / \x::x +s(v0)= s(x +v0) % CUT FORMULA SUGGESTED 
yes 
I ?- halt. 
Process prolog finished 
